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I. INTRODUCTION
The first comprehensive article about the operation and jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of Florida was written in 1993 and published the follow-
ing year in this law review.' In more than ten years since, much has changed
and a full revision of the earlier text is in order. For example, none of the
Justices who sat on the Court in 1993 are still serving.' The change in mem-
bership alone has led to a number of significant refinements in Court proto-
col and analysis of its jurisdiction. Changes also appear to have been influ-
enced by another historical fact: the ever-rising caseload of the Court. Im-
mediately following jurisdictional reforms in 1980 that further limited the
1. Gerald Kogan & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation & Jurisdiction of the Florida
Supreme Court, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1151 (1994).
2. The last, Justice Leander J. Shaw, Jr., retired in January 2003.
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Court's jurisdiction, total court filings decreased.3 Yet by 2003, filings had
risen to 2486. 4 This rise has been accompanied by actions by the Court to
increase support staff while restricting its discretionary review jurisdiction in
certain categories of cases.
Another historical shift of the last decade is of great importance: the
technological revolution of the 1990s-most particularly the advent of the
World Wide Web'-has had a profound impact both on the Court's internal
operations and on the way it interacts with the public and the media. At the
time this article first was published, the World Wide Web was in its infancy.6
The original authors7 were only dimly aware that technology staff within the
Office of the State Courts Administrator had posted a handful of pages on
this medium in 1994. This made the Florida State Courts one of the first
judicial bodies in the world-if not the first-to have a permanent presence
on the Internet. From that single innovation, much else followed.
By 1995, the Supreme Court of Florida began greatly expanding its web
presence with the addition of information dedicated solely to its own opera-
tions and procedures.8 In 1996, it posted its first press page,9 making briefs
and other Court documents available instantaneously on a world wide basis.
This use of the Web to distribute court documents and information was novel
at the time, though soon widely imitated, and is standard practice today.
This use resulted in the Court's first formal public information program,1°
3. See MANNING J. DAUER & FRED GODDARD, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS ON
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION, AND ON CHANGES IN TAX PROVISIONS INCLUDING
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION, TO BE CONSIDERED AT MARCH 11, 1980 ELECTION, CIVIC
INFORMATION SERIES, No. 62, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CLEARING SERVICE, UNIVERSITY OF
FLORIDA (1980); Arthur J. England, et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Florida: 1980 Reform, 32 Fla. L. Rev. 147 (1980) [hereinafter Constitutional Jurisdiction].
4. See, e.g. Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245-46 (Fla. 2004), for a discussion on
some aspects of the Court's increasing caseload and their effort to better conserve judicial
resources.
5. The term "World-Wide Web" came into use about the time the earlier version of this
article was published. Originally it meant a relatively new subset of the much older "inter-
net," though the two terms now are virtually synonymous and will be used as such here.
6. See Robert Craig Waters, An Internet Primer for Florida Legal Researchers, 70 FLA.
B. J., at 12, 20 (1996).
7. The original authors were Justice Gerald Kogan and Robert Craig Waters.
8. These pages have undergone several technological and stylistic renovations over the
years and currently are located at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org (last visited Feb. 5,
2005).
9. This page subsequently was renamed the Public Information page and is located at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org//pub info/index.shtml. (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
10. The first version of this article suggested that the Court had no public information
officer (PIO) or program, which was true at the time. See Kogan & Waters, supra note 1, at
1154. The first and only PIO to date, Mr. Waters, was named in 1996, and the position be-
[Vol. 29:3:431
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but also led to still other innovations that, coupled with unforeseen events,
would end the relative obscurity in which the Court largely operated in 1994.
Some innovations were of particular importance: in September 1997 the
Court began its first live, unedited television broadcasts of oral arguments,
followed in October that year by its first live webcasts on the World Wide
Web. That November the Court began its first live broadcasts via satellite
available for downlink anywhere in North America.
The presence of this new technology and the happenstance of history
later would prove potent. Perhaps the ultimate test came with the presiden-
tial election cases of 2000. For more than a month in November and De-
cember of that year, the Court's web and satellite technology gave the entire
world a transparent view of its proceedings and decisions even as the Su-
preme Court Building was locked down, surrounded by armed security offi-
cers, and besieged by hundreds of reporters1 and thousands more protesters
and onlookers. Media such as the New York Times praised the Court's open-
ness.' 2 Though these election cases may have comprised the Court's most
visible and historic appeals, they were not the first time technology played a
major role in a Court-related news event. As early as 1996, the Court found
itself in international headlines when its two-year-old website was defaced
by hackers at a time when similar attacks on federal websites had generated
enormous media interest. Some predicted this event would end judicial use
of the new technology. Even at this date, many still did not understand the
Web's irrepressibility.
But it was one year before the 2000 presidential elections that the
Court's web presence clearly revealed its unique potency as an unfiltered
information medium. In 1999, it would magnify a single Justice's dissenting
opinion into a worldwide news phenomenon that some believe altered the
history of Florida's death penalty law. 3 In its 1994 version, this article be-
gan with a brief overview of routine Court operations followed by a study of
came full-time in 1998. This reflects a growing trend among major courts in the United States
to have full-time public information officers.
11. Police estimates put the number of reporters at between 300 and 800 at any given
time during high profile proceedings and announcements. This almost certainly is an under-
statement of overall numbers because many media organizations rotated reporters in and out
of Tallahassee to relieve them from the twenty-four hour a day, seven days a week operation
and give others experience in covering an event of such historic proportions.
12. See Linda Greenhouse, Another Kind of Bitter Split, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at
Al.
13. Patrick Schmidt & Paul Martin, State Supreme Courts on the World Wide Web, 84
JUDICATURE 314, 314-15 (May/June 2001).
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a high profile case. 4 Ironically, it is appropriate that this article begin much
the same, but this time focusing on Provenzano v. Moore15 and the history-
making dissent that Justice Leander J. Shaw, Jr., attached to it challenging
the constitutionality of the continued use of the electric chair. In the eyes of
many scholars, that dissent, and its attachment of vivid photographs of the
body of an electrocuted person, were the impetus behind a chain of events
leading to the abolition of electrocution as the state's sole method of execu-
tion. 6 The events surrounding the Provenzano case are an instructive exam-
ple of courts operating in full and intense public view in the age of the new
media and technology.
II. THE ROUTINE OPERATIONS OF THE COURT
Despite extended media coverage of a handful of high-profile cases in
the last decade, the judiciary in Florida remains-as it was in 1994' 7-the
most poorly understood branch of government. A lack of general public
knowledge about the routine operation of the judiciary arises chiefly from the
nature of the institution itself. With limited exceptions, judges and their em-
ployees, unlike legislative or executive officials, are ethically restricted from
talking publicly about pending matters. Even the Court's Public Information
Officer (PIO) has severe limitations in public comment compared to PIOs in
the other branches of government or in the private sector. Official silence is
imposed by constitutional constraints and by codes of ethics requiring strict
impartiality and providing that judges receive information on a case only
through the closely regulated process of briefing, motions, and adversarial
argument.1
8
There are many factors contributing to the public's poor understanding
of the Court. For one thing, the seven Justices and their staffs perform virtu-
ally all of their work and official duties away from public view, on the se-
cured second floor of the Supreme Court Building in Tallahassee. 9 What is
14. Kogan & Waters, supra note 1, at 1156-61 (studying In re T.A.C.P, 609 So. 2d 588
(Fla. 1992)).
15. 744 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1182 (2000).
16. Id.
17. Kogan & Waters, supra note 1, at 1153.
18. See FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3B(7) (2004).
19. The current high-technology security barriers are a recent addition, dating only to the Fall of
1989. They were added as a result of violent attacks inside courtrooms that have occurred else-
where in Florida and the nation, and because of threats received by some members of the Court.
Prior to 1989, security was far more lax, and it was not unusual for persons to walk off the street
and into a justice's office.
Kogan & Waters, supra note 1, at 1154, n.2.
[Vol. 29:3:431
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publicly known of the Court consists largely of its more formal and ceremo-
nial aspects: black-robed Justices seated at the bench, listening and respond-
ing to arguments by lawyers often talking in legal jargon difficult for even
the participants to understand. In its decisions, the Court speaks only
through formal opinions and orders normally released through the Clerk's
office and Public Information Office each Thursday morning at 11 a.m. with
no advance notice to the public.
Although the internal procedures of the Court are not widely known,
they follow a fairly straightforward and well-defined code. Some rules have
been distilled into the Florida Supreme Court's Manual of Internal Operating
Procedure2" and portions of the Rules of Judicial Administration,21 though
these by no means contain all or even most of the principles and practices by
which the Court operates. Some of the flavor of day-to-day Court operations
can also be obtained from other works detailing the Court's history.22 The
purpose of this section is not to belabor material that can be obtained else-
where, but to review the more significant operations regulated by the Court's
customary, unwritten code,23 some aspects of which date to the Court's first
sessions in 1846.
Much of the mystery behind the Court's daily operations is simply be-
cause the internal machinery is not visible to public view. Unlike the legisla-
ture with its committee system or the executive branch with its cabinet meet-
ings and routine press briefings, the Court's meetings and research-apart
from oral arguments-are kept entirely confidential until the release of an
opinion or order. The most important meetings of the seven Justices occur
during conferences that are closed even to the Court's own staff. Further,
until 1996 the Court did not have a public information officer 24 and did not
use its website to distribute public documents as extensively as it does today.
This lack of daily contact with the public has been an unfortunate fea-
ture, but one largely born of necessity. The Court must retain absolute neu-
trality and impartiality until a case is decided. The constitutional require-
20. See generally SUP. CT. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE (2002), avail-
able at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub info/documents/IOPs.pdf (last visited Feb. 5,
2005) [hereinafter MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES].
21. See generally FLA. R. OF JuD. ADMIN.
22. E.g., Joseph A. Boyd, Jr. & Randall Reder, A History of the Florida Supreme Court,
35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1019 (1981).
23. Of course, it will be necessary to reiterate a few matters addressed in Florida's Su-
preme Court Manual of Internal Operating Procedures in order to lay the groundwork for a
discussion of the Court's unwritten procedures. The authors also note that there are some
aspects of Court operations that are confidential for a variety of reasons.
24. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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ment of due process 25 gives litigants an absolute right to have their cases
reviewed in an impartial forum by neutral judges. The Florida Code of Judi-
cial Conduct also requires judicial impartiality and prohibits judges and their
employees from talking about pending or impending 26 proceedings except
through established and regulated procedures including briefing, internal
discussions among Court personnel, and the adversarial process.27 As a gen-
eral rule, no such discussion outside the confidentiality of the Court's cham-
bers is permitted while a case is pending unless all parties to the case are
given a chance to participate and respond.28 There is, in sum, a strict avoid-
ance of anything that might be seen as an ex parte communication involving
the Court, the Justices, or Court personnel. Despite the important reasons for
such security in communications, it is clear that much of the public does not
generally understand the reasons for such restricted communication. For
example, Court staff received thousands of e-mails and phone calls during
the 2000 election appeals urging the Justices to rule a certain way or to ex-
plain comments made during arguments or in recently released opinions. Of
course, these communications could not ethically be considered by the Jus-
tices and were never forwarded to them.
The procedures leading up to the release of a written opinion or order
are by far the most important work of the Court. Binding precedent is often
created in this decision-making process, affecting the lives of all Floridians.
Citizens elsewhere in the United States can also be affected by this process.
Florida is a major state-the fourth most populous in the nation-and its
courts' opinions are often used for guidance in other courts throughout the
nation. 29 The 2000 election cases demonstrated that the interpretation of
Florida election laws could have a profound impact on the nation, the world,
and the subsequent election reform movement.
It appears paradoxical that a state like Florida, which is so deeply com-
mitted to government in the sunshine, is required by its constitution to con-
duct the bulk of its judicial proceedings in secret. However, there clearly is
no other way to preserve litigants' rights under the rule of due process.
Unlike legislators or governors, judges cannot be required or allowed to take
25. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
26. There is an important distinction between the terms pending and impending. A case
is pending if it has been properly filed in a court. A case is impending if Court personnel have
reason to suspect that it will eventually be filed in a court.
27. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3B(7), (9).
28. Id. at Canon 3B(7).
29. E.g., Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 431-32 (Ohio 1991) (adopting
analysis developed in Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla.
1989)).
[Vol. 29:3:431
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public stands on pending or impending matters that are yet to be resolved.3"
The purpose of this article is to dispel some of the mystery and lift some of
the misconceptions about the Court's daily operations, including the exercise
of its jurisdiction. Further, it is intended to expand and update its 1994
predecessor article, while serving the original purpose of providing informa-
tion useful both to lawyers and to laypersons interested in how the Court
operates.
On another level, this article will review the top level of a judicial sys-
tem that has come into existence in Florida because of the various constitu-
tional reforms that began with the adoption of the 1968 Florida Constitution
and continued with the jurisdictional reforms of 1980. The authors believe
that the present operations and jurisdiction of the Court are one of the suc-
cess stories of Florida's efforts to modernize its governmental structure in
recent decades. This article examines how that constitutional mandate is
translated into the Court's daily functions.
A. A Case Study: Provenzano v. Moore
In an effort to dispel some of the lack of knowledge that this mandatory
secrecy has created, this article will begin by reviewing the internal process
by which the 1999 case of Provenzano v. Moore3 was decided. Understand-
ing how this case was handled administratively may give a broader perspec-
tive on the Court's operations and exercise of its constitutional powers.
The case was chosen for several reasons. First, the decision is now final
and thus there is no ethical impediment in discussing it to a limited extent.32
Second, the issue at stake in Provenzano-the constitutionality of Florida's
use of the electric chair-now has been rendered moot by a statute changing
the principle method of execution to lethal injection. " Thus, the specific
issue is unlikely to come before the Court again. Lastly, the case received
widespread publicity and drew great public interest around the world. As a
result, Provezano is better known than most cases decided by the Court.
30. Despite this restriction, the Court's Public Information Office and Clerk's Office
routinely receive calls asking for Justices to state their positions on issues like abortion or the
death penalty when they are facing merit retention elections. Most callers are frustrated or
incredulous when told the Justices cannot answer questions like these. Some controversy over
this restriction on Justices has been raised by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
31. 744 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999).
32. The authors will not interpret the legal analysis of the case, only the process by which
it was shepherded through the Court. In addition, matters that fall within the secrecy of the
Court will not be discussed.
33. See FLA. STAT. § 922.105(l)(2004).
2005]
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On Thursday, July 8, 1999, shortly after 7 a.m., a Florida death row in-
mate named Allen Lee "Tiny" Davis was executed in the state's electric
chair at the state prison near Starke. 34 Early press accounts of the event sug-
gested that Davis bled from his chest 35 during the execution, resulting in a
plate-sized blood stain on his white shirt.36 State officials contended that the
blood was from a nosebleed exacerbated by the fact that Davis used blood-
thinning medication. 7 Nonetheless, attorneys for a man scheduled to be
executed the following day-Thomas Provenzano-immediately filed mo-
tions with the Court seeking a stay and an opportunity to raise the often liti-
gated question of the constitutionality of the use of the electric chair.
The combination of blood appearing during the execution and the pos-
sibility of a third serious constitutional challenge to the chair in a decade
caused a media sensation. Within hours, media had flooded the Court's pub-
lic information office with more public records requests than it could handle,
resulting in the creation of a special webpage to distribute those documents
38
in a portable document format.39 Until that time, most media requests for
documents related to pending executions were handled in person or by fac-
simile machine.4" This quickly became impossible in the Provenzano case as
documents with a hundred or more pages were rapidly filed and dozens of
media representatives sought copies before their deadlines. The Davis exe-
cution, in other words, had the effect of expanding the kinds of documents
placed on the public information pages of the Court's website, a trend that
has continued since.41 Ironically, this same death-warrants website--created
solely to deal with overwhelming media demand caused by the Davis execu-
34. Lesley Clark, Controversy Erupts Over Execution, MIAMI HERALD, July 9, 1999, at
A1 [hereinafter Clark I].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. That website remains a part of the Supreme Court public information collection and
is located at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/deathwarrants/index.shtml. (last
visited Feb. 5, 2005).
39. Usually called PDF, it has become a standard web format. Unlike other web formats,
PDF documents do not lose the most important qualities of their paper originals, such as exact
page breaks.
40. However, the Court began distributing briefs and opinions in cases from its website
in 1996, and a more limited system of distribution using email was in use even earlier.
41. In 2000, the Court added a separate page in its "press page collection" for documents
related to the discipline of judges for ethical breaches. Also in 2000, the Clerk's office began
placing nearly all merits briefs it receives in cases on its website. Later that same year all
orders disposing of cases, not just opinions, were posted on the website the same day the
orders were issued. In 2002, nearly all jurisdictional briefs were added to the briefs being
posted. In late 2003, the docket for all cases was placed on the website.
[Vol. 29:3:431
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tion-would itself become the focus of international media attention weeks
later.
By the time an evidentiary hearing was held in the Provenzano case, the
Florida Department of Corrections revealed that one of its employees had
taken color photographs of Mr. Davis shortly after his execution. These
were used as evidence in hearings before the trial judge, who ultimately ruled
that Florida's use of the chair did not violate constitutional guarantees.42
Media, however, did not publish copies of the photographs even though they
were public records, apparently because of their gruesome nature. 43  The
public received only written descriptions of the photographs penned by re-
porters. Mr. Provenzano appealed" to the Court, and the photographs were
part of the record. The Court expedited the case and oral argument was
heard on August 24, 1999.
4 1
42. Sydney P. Freedberg, Judge Upholds Electric Chair Use, ST. PETERSBERG. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1999, at IA.
43. Their gruesomeness was much noted in the media. E.g., Sue Anne Pressley, New
Debate About an Old Killer; Foes of Electric Chair Say Florida Engages in Cruel, Unusual
Punishment, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1999, at A03; David Cox, Bloody Execution Photos
Viewed the High Court Saw the Presentation During Arguments Over the Future of an Or-
lando Killer's Trip to the Electric Chair, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 25, 1999, at D1.
44. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1)-(6). The Florida Constitution creates a distinction
between the terms "appeal" and "review." Id. Appeals constitute those appellate cases in
which the Court must hear the case, such as cases in which the death penalty has been im-
posed. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(l)-(2). Reviews are for those appellate cases in which the
Court merely has discretionary jurisdiction. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3)-(6). The Court
traditionally has observed another standard for judicial nomenclature relevant to the distinc-
tion between appeals and reviews. For appeals, the Court either affirms or reverses the deci-
sion below; for reviews, the Court either approves or quashes the decision below. By contrast,
when the Court expressly agrees or disagrees with a decision other than the one below, the
Court "approves" or "disapproves" the decision. On occasion, there may be lapses in the use
of this nomenclature, but the convention now is well established as a matter of Court custom.
45. This case was heard outside the regular calendar cycle. By tradition, the Court usu-
ally observes its regularly scheduled oral arguments during the first full business week of each
month, with the exception of July and August when no oral argument usually occurs. How-
ever, the Chief Justice has discretion to schedule the oral argument calendar as necessary. For
example, oral argument sometimes is scheduled for weeks in which Monday or Tuesday is the
last day of the month. That occurred in August 1999 when Monday was August 30, so regular
arguments were scheduled for that week. Special oral arguments can be scheduled at other
times by the Chief Justice, a practice that especially occurs when the Court deems oral argu-
ment necessary on a pending death warrant, in some requests for advisory opinions, in cases
involving pressing constitutional questions, and in other emergency matters. The Court, like
most courts of last resort nationwide, traditionally observes a summer recess that usually
occurs from the middle of July through the middle of August, but occasionally has been ob-
served earlier or later. The suspension of a regular oral argument calendar in these two sum-
mer months is a traditional consequence of the summer recess.
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Arguments consumed about an hour in a courtroom filled with report-
ers, and video of the arguments was distributed live from an electronic distri-
bution box in the Court's press room46 via satellite 47 and over the Internet.48
Mr. Provenzano's attorney made the execution photographs a major feature
of the arguments by holding at least one of them up for display. This argu-
ment was broadcast and photographs of it were published in newspapers, but
not in any significant detail. In effect, the public still did not see the photo-
graphs. After arguments, the media held impromptu press conferences with
the attorneys outside the Court, something that often follows a high-profile
session.
In Provenzano, as with most other cases orally argued, the Court imme-
diately held a closed-door conference. Neither the public nor the Court's
own staff are allowed to attend such conferences. At conferences, the Jus-
tices tentatively voted on how the case would be decided. The official Court
file was then transmitted by the Clerk's office to the office of the Justice
assigned to write the majority opinion.49
Provenzano was decided quickly because it was an expedited case in-
volving a death warrant, a category of cases that always receives the Court's
immediate attention. The normal lapse of time between oral argument and
the release of an opinion in other categories of cases is usually a matter of
months, and the Court attempts to render decisions within six months of oral
argument or submission of the case without oral argument.5 ° Occasionally,
the duration can be longer in difficult cases.5 The opinion in Provenzano
46. The press room now is located just inside the front doors of the Florida Supreme
Court Building. Broadcast journalists can hook up their recording equipment to a "mult box"
that can distribute the live feed to multiple users simultaneously.
47. The satellite used at the time of this writing is AMC-3 (KU band) at 87 degrees west,
transponder 18, Virtual Channel 802. The downlink frequency is 12046.750 MHz. The up-
link frequency is 14348.500 MHz. The L-band frequency is 1296.750 MHz. The symbol rate
is 7.32. The FEC is 3/4. The satellite may be preempted during legislative sessions and emer-
gencies.
48. All broadcasts are managed by Florida State University's WFSU television station
under state contract. These broadcasts have been a permanent service offered to the public
since they began in 1997.
49. The process of opinion writing and voting on cases is discussed more fully. See
discussion infra Part II.B.
50. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.085(e)(2).
51. See id. In rare cases, the Court fractures so badly that no single Justice is able to
obtain the concurrence of three other Justices in a decision, which the Florida Constitution
requires for any decision to be binding. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a). Release of any opin-
ion thus may be delayed for long periods of time while members of the Court seek a compro-
mise. It is very rare, however, that the Court is completely unable to reach some decision in
which at least four Justices agree. When that happens, the Court's precedent holds that the
lower court opinion under review is automatically affirmed or approved for want of a majority
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was issued on September 24, 1999, in a split decision joined by four Justices
upholding the constitutionality of the electric chair,5 2 while three dissented,
including Justice Shaw.53
But Justice Shaw did something novel in his dissent. He attached three
photographs of the prior execution of Mr. Hill, to be released as part of the
opinion.5 4 Because opinions are posted in their entirety on the Court's web-
site, the photographs were also posted.5" They also were posted on the new
death warrants webpage because of the media demand for all documents in
the Provenzano case. Initial news reports noted that Justice Shaw had taken
this "unusual step." 6 None noted that the photographs were available on this
new page of the Court's website collection, which of course was created
solely as a vehicle for distributing court documents to the media.57 Their
placement remained unnoticed by nearly everyone until a Miami Herald re-
porter published an article on October 1, 1999, including for the first time the
address of the website where the photographs could be found.58 The story
was quickly picked up by news wire services and published by media around
the world.
The effect was immediate. So many people began accessing the death
warrants webpage that the Court's server-its connection to the Internet-
repeatedly became overtaxed and unusable. 59 Nonetheless, the public de-
mand to view the page rose. While some found this use of the Internet con-
or, if the Court's original jurisdiction is being invoked, the relief requested is deemed to be
denied. Opinions issued in the absence of a four-member majority set no precedent and do not
constitute a decision for legal purposes. See State v. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d 124, 126 n.5 (Fla.
1991) (citing Powell v. State, 102 So. 652 (Fla. 1924)); E.g.,State ex rel. Albritton v. Lee, 183
So. 782 (Fla. 1938); Honaker v. Miles, 171 So. 212 (Fla. 1936). Thus, the doctrine of stare
decisis does not apply to such cases. There is some question whether these cases remain good
law, however, in light of the present constitutional requirement that "[t]he concurrence of four
Justices shall be necessary to a decision." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a).
52. Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 416 (Fla. 1999).
53. Id. at 422-51.
54. Id. at 442-44. The version in Southern Reporter, Second series is reproduced in
black and white. Justice Shaw used color photographs.
55. The entire opinion-including the photographs-remained on the Court's website.
56. Steve Bosquet, Electric Chair Staying on the Job, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 25, 1999, at
IA.
57. E.g., Sydney P. Freedberg, Court Upholds Use of Electric Chair Series: The Electric
Chair, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 25, 1999, at IA.
58. Lesley Clark, Execution Photos, Racist Tape On-line, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 1, 1999,
at lB. The reference to a "racist tape" was for an audio file posted on the Florida Department
of Law Enforcement's website in the hope someone would recognize the voice of a man being
sought for a bombing at Florida A&M University. Id.
59. Lesley Clark, Death Photos Attract Crowds, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 6, 1999, at 1B.
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troversial,6 ° the reaction of the general public in e-mails and web chat room
discussions in the United States seemed to approve of both the death penalty
and posting the photographs on the Internet as a deterrent. 6' The discussion
among the lay public, in other words, came to regard the death warrants web-
site as a news phenomenon in itself. Many people made their own assump-
tions about why the photographs were on-line. Few seemed to grasp the true
reason why the page had been created, and few expected it to alter the legal
status of the death penalty in Florida.62 Whether it did can only be a matter
of speculation.
Nonetheless, without stating a reason, the United States Supreme Court
accepted certiorari jurisdiction in the Provenzano case on October 26, 1999.
This appeared to surprise some state lawmakers, who immediately suggested
a special legislative session.63 A session was convened in early January 2000
and legislation was passed providing that the death penalty be administered
by lethal injection unless the inmate opts for electrocution. Following this
change, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the case. Whatever ac-
tion the Court might have taken thus cannot be known.
Some have suggested that Justice Shaw's actions in the Provenzano
case created a climate that led to the reform.64 However, the only thing that
can be said with certainty is that his publication of the execution photographs
marked the point in time at which courts and court watchers vividly realized,
perhaps to their surprise, that the World-Wide Web is a powerful medium,
and the information it provides reaches people unsummarized, unfiltered, and
undelayed.
This experience contributed to the Court's subsequent approach to the
most high profile cases it has recently considered-those associated with the
2000 presidential elections a year later. Thus, the two key ingredients for
communicating to a watching world-web distribution of documents, and
broadcasts of arguments-already were in place and had been tested by real
events before the elections of 2000. Even the separate webpage created to
60. David Rovella, Electrocution's Face on Display, 22 NAT'L L.J., Nov. 8, 1999, at A4.
61. Jackie Hallifax, Bloody Execution Photos Make Florida Court's Web Site Popular
World Wide, NAPLES DAILY NEWS, Oct. 29, 1999, available at http://web.naplesnews.
corn/today/florida/d3751949.htm.
62. Steve Bousquet, Florida Faces Legal Crisis over the Chair, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28,
1999, at 1 A (noting that the later decision of the United States Supreme Court to accept certio-
rari jurisdiction in Provenzano was "unexpected.").
63. Marcia Gelbart & Jenny Staletovich, High Court Has State Asking: How Do We
Keep killing?, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 28, 1999, at 1A.
64. See Schmidt & Martin, supra note 13.
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distribute documents in those cases was modeled after the one created out of
sheer necessity in the Provenzano case.65 As commentators have noted:
Given the intense demand for immediate information on develop-
ments in the post-election legal fight, it was fortuitous that the bat-
tleground state was Florida. The Florida Supreme Court's ready ca-
pacity for distribution of parties' briefs and netcasts of oral argu-
ments provided worldwide media and interested individuals with a
relatively transparent view of the process. Although few Internet
servers in the world can support such extreme and focused demand
for bandwidth without some slowdown, Florida's experience with
the Provenzano affair made it as ready as any state high court.66
Moreover, the existing use of satellite broadcasts since 1997, fully
tested by Provenzano and other cases, created media history: the two Su-
preme Court of Florida arguments associated with what later would be called
Bush v. Gore67 became and remain the only appellate arguments broadcast
live in their entirety by all major television networks and cable news chan-
nels world-wide. Hence, the public nature of court proceedings in the United
States was transformed in a very short period of time.
B. Internal Case Assignments & Opinion Writing
As the discussion about Provenzano suggests, the Court's work in writ-
ing official opinions is not conducted by all seven Justices simultaneously.
Rather, work is randomly and proportionately delegated to individual offices.
The system by which this delegation occurs is perhaps one of the least under-
stood aspects of the Court's routine operations. As a result, parties some-
times have erroneously assumed that particular Justices have some unusual
or unfair ability to control case assignments. The reality is the opposite.
Justices, other than deciding general policy about assignments, play no role
in the assignment process.
The actual method by which cases are assigned for opinion writing in
the Supreme Court of Florida differs substantially from that used in the
United States Supreme Court, in which seniority equates to power. In the
latter Court, the assignment typically is made by the Senior Justice who is in
65. Florida Supreme Court at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pubinfo/election/
index.shtml (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
66. Schmidt & Martin, supra note 13, at 325.
67. None of the pleadings in Florida were so titled. This popular reference to the cases
became common because the case argued before the United States Supreme Court on Decem-
ber 11, 2000, received this case style.
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the majority, with the Chief Justice always considered more senior than any
other Justice. Thus, Senior Justices in the nation's highest court do, in fact,
have an unusual ability to control case assignments.
In the Supreme Court of Florida, however, cases are assigned at random
by the Office of the Clerk, and assignments typically are made as soon as
briefing is completed. There are, however, some exceptions, discussed be-
low. 68 In other words, case assignments in the Supreme Court of Florida are
generally accomplished by a system of rotation. This can lead to situations
in which the Justice assigned to write a majority opinion in a case may dis-
agree with the majority viewpoint.
Under this rotation system, the case file is sent to the office of the des-
ignated Justice, who then usually will assign one of that office's law clerks
69
to begin preparing the case for ultimate disposition. The process that follows
varies somewhat depending upon the type of case at issue. There are four
broad categories of cases in which an opinion will be written or an order
entered: 1) cases scheduled for oral argument and conferenced; 2) cases
accepted without oral argument (no request cases) and conferenced;7° 3) peti-
tions by death-row inmates (death cases); and 4) special cases, often requir-
ing expedited consideration by the Court.
1. Oral Argument Cases
In all cases scheduled for oral argument, the law clerk assigned to the
case is required to write a memorandum reflecting original research on the
law and the facts, as well as analyzing the parties' arguments and the issues
of the case. A recommendation regarding the case's disposition is in-
cluded.71 Prior to oral argument, each Justice is presumed to have read all of
the briefs and the staff memoranda as well as to have conducted any addi-
tional research into the law or the facts deemed necessary. The Justices
68. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1-4.
69. Each of the Justices has three law clerks and a judicial assistant. Law clerks' exact
titles vary according to seniority. The most junior are called staff attorneys followed by Sen-
ior Staff Attorney and then Career Staff Attorney. They are called law clerks, which is the
term that will be used in this article.
70. The term "no request" is misleading. Many, if not most, of these cases had a request
by at least one of the parties for oral argument. The term derives from the fact that the Court
itself has not requested oral argument, meaning that any such request by the parties was de-
nied.
71. This is a significant change since 1993, when law clerks only produced short summa-
ries with no recommendation.
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normally do not formally meet to discuss the cases in advance of oral argu-
ments.72
As noted earlier in the discussion of Provenzano, a closed-door confer-
ence of the seven Justices is usually held the day of oral argument, although
conference may be delayed up to a few days due to conflicts in the schedules
of the Justices. In some district courts of appeal, law clerks are permitted to
attend court conferences or are even asked to participate in the judges' dis-
cussion of cases. However, in the Supreme Court of Florida, law clerks do
not attend.73
If a law clerk needs access to a Justice during a conference, they are
permitted only a single liberty that is seldom exercised: knocking on the con-
ference room door. An old custom--one increasingly honored more in the
breach--dictates that the most junior Justice in the room answers the door.74
New technology has changed this custom in one regard. Because the confer-
ence room is now computerized and at least one Justice has a computer
working during conference, the clerk can send e-mails to the Justices if re-
quired.
The confidentiality surrounding conferences means that the Justices,
and especially the Justice assigned to write an opinion, must take notes re-
garding the positions or reasoning espoused by the other members of the
Court. The conference also is memorialized electronically. One Justice now
records, via computer, what occurred at conference in a conference action
agenda. The Clerk of Court, but no one else, can access this document while
the conference is proceeding. The Chief Justice presides over the confer-
ence. During the conference, all of the Justices-beginning with the Justice
whose office was initially assigned to work up the case-are given a chance
to indicate their initial and tentative preferences regarding a case's disposi-
tion and these tentative views are recorded for later reference. 75 After the
72. Oral argument summaries, bench memoranda, and other documents associated with
the preparation of a case are internal court documents related to the decision-making process
and thus cannot be released to the public or any person not on the court's staff. Violation of
this rule is considered an ethical breach and can be punished by contempt of court. In 1974,
for example, the Court ordered one of its law clerks to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt for releasing copies of oral argument summaries to unauthorized persons. Based
on the mitigating evidence, the Court withheld a contempt citation but publicly reprimanded
the law clerk and placed him on probation for a period of two years under close supervision.
In re Schwartz, 298 So. 2d 355, 356 (Fla. 1974).
73. With increasing frequency, the Court does require staff and others to discuss adminis-
trative matters under consideration. There is no discussion of cases during these colloquies.
74. By tradition, the Court sits by seniority in the conference room. There are two doors
to the conference room. One door is immediately adjacent to where the junior Justices sit.
75. These preferences are by no means final. Justices frequently change their minds after
giving a case more thought, after closer review of the record or the law, or after another Jus-
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assigned Justice announces her or his views, the other Justices in order of
seniority give their views, with the Chief Justice speaking last.
If the view of the assigned Justice prevails, that Justice then has the re-
sponsibility of drafting a majority opinion. If the assigned Justice is in the
minority, the Chief Justice still has the option of having that Justice draft the
majority opinion in accordance with the views of the majority, or of assign-
ing the opinion to the most senior Justice in the majority. Responsibility for
opinion drafting varies from office to office in the Court. Some Justices pre-
fer to draft their own opinions, with law clerks often being asked only to
check the finished product for accuracy and style. Other Justices may orally
outline their views to a clerk and assign the clerk the responsibility of pro-
ducing an initial draft, with the Justice then taking over until a final draft is
circulated. In still other offices, opinion drafting is a shared responsibility of
the Justice and the assigned law clerk, and in some instances, involve every
staff member in that office.
Of course, the legal analysis and reasoning of all opinions is discussed
and agreed to at conference. However, the exact way an opinion will be
written may be discussed in conference, but it usually is left to the discretion
of the assigned Justice subject to some significant exceptions. For example,
the Court has promulgated a system of legal style contained in rule 9.800 of
The Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.76 For matters not covered in the
rule itself, style is governed by the latest edition of The Bluebook: A Uni-
form System of Citation.77 If nothing in The Bluebook is on point, style is
governed by the Florida Style Manual.78 If none of these sources are on
point, the Court generally considers that style should be governed by the
closest analogous rule or example contained in the three sources listed here,
in the same order of preference. As a practical matter, most authorities not
covered by the rule and style manuals are Florida documents, and these typi-
cally are dealt with by reference to the closest analogous rule or example
from the Florida Style Manual.
tice proposes a different method of analysis or disposition. On occasion, the Court has de-
cided a case contrary to the initial conference vote, although such instances are the exception
rather than the rule.
76. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.800.
77. FLA. R. App. P. 9.800(n). The Bluebook is a compiled publication created by respec-
tive law reviews at Columbia University, Harvard University, the University of Pennsylvania,
and Yale University. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law
Review Ass'n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000).
78. FLA. R. App. P. 9.800(n) (referencing Florida Style Manual, 19 FLA. ST. L. REv. 525
(1991)); see also Florida Style Manual, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 137 (1987). The Florida Style
Manual is published by the Florida State University Law Review.
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Another significant exception deals with gender-specific language. In
the wake of a report by a court commission investigating gender bias,79 the
Court now has instructed its staff and The Florida Bar agencies charged with
developing rules of court to avoid all gender-specific language wherever
possible. The most common methods of complying with the rule are to use
plural pronouns instead of singular,8° and to rewrite sentences so that gender-
specific language is not needed.
In most instances, the parties have their greatest opportunity to influ-
ence the Court in their written briefs. While oral presentations happen only
once, lawyers have substantial time to articulate the views of their clients in
draft after draft of their briefs until they get it just right. Lawyers who fail to
take advantage of this opportunity to get it just right do a disservice to their
clients and their causes. Briefs are read, summarized, and subjected to vig-
orous critical analysis prior to oral argument. Briefs actually introduce the
Court to the case.81 Obviously, a bad brief is a bad first impression, whereas
a strong brief can strongly influence the initial views of the Justices on the
case. Some cases may be won or lost in oral argument, but these are a mi-
nority and usually involve issues that were already close and difficult to re-
solve. Oral argument primarily allows the Justices to test the strengths and
weaknesses of first impressions created by reading the briefs. In sum, attor-
neys should scrupulously prepare their briefs to the Court.
Style and content of briefs are governed by court rule. 82 Beyond that,
counsel should avoid presentations that create confusion as to the facts or
issues. One practice sometimes used by respondents or appellees, for exam-
ple, is to ignore the sequence of issues or arguments presented by the peti-
tioners or appellants. This usually creates needless confusion and should be
avoided. If the issues in the briefs do not match one another, the Court then
must perform a kind of mental "cut and paste." The better practice is to ad-
dress the issues in the same sequence, even if only to note that an issue is
redundant or irrelevant, and then to list separately and discuss any issues the
79. See Ricki Lewis Tannen, Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study
Commission, 42 FLA. L. REV. 803 (1990).
80. In the English language, plural pronouns are inherently gender-neutral.
81. In another major change since the last version of this article, many documents must
be submitted to the Court both on paper and electronically. See Fla. Admin. Order No.
AOSC04-84 (Fla. Sept. 13, 2004) (on file with Clerk, Fla. Sup. Ct.), available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/adminorders/2004/scO4-84.pdf (last visited Feb. 5,
2005). In high-profile cases, the Court now routinely orders parties to submit all documents,
including appendices, in an electronic format so they readily can be posted on the public in-
formation pages of the Court's website.
82. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210, 9.800.
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opponent may have failed to raise but that are relevant to the disposition of
the case.
Another practice to avoid is incorporating by reference an argument
from a brief in a different proceeding or court, or even in the same case, ex-
cept when the Court grants leave to do so. Often the other brief may not be
readily available, or may require needless effort, and the net result renders
the current brief unintelligible on its face. It is always better to make sure a
complete statement of the argument can be found within the four comers of
the brief.
One peculiarity of the Court's method of blind assignment of cases is
that the initially assigned Justice's vote may not always be in the majority.
However, under long-standing Court custom, this fact alone does not dis-
qualify that Justice from writing the proposed majority opinion. Most often,
the assigned Justice will agree to write an unsigned per curiam opinion 3
reflecting the views of the majority, with the Justice also writing a separate
opinion expressing any contrary views. If an assigned Justice feels unable to
develop the majority's proposed opinion or if there is an objection, the case
can be reassigned to another Justice at conference. All reassignments lie
within the discretion of the Chief Justice, though in practice the case is usu-
ally transferred to the senior Justice in the majority who first expressed the
view adopted by the majority. However, on occasions when the conference
vote is close or fails to establish a tentative majority, the assigned Justice
may circulate a proposed majority reflecting that Justice's views, with the
hope that other offices will find the analysis compelling. Less commonly, a
Justice may circulate two or more proposed majority opinions in the same
case, thereby giving the Court options from which to choose.
Once a proposed majority opinion is circulated, each Justice must vote
on the proposal. Technology has again resulted in a major change in how
voting is done. Previously, a written vote sheet was prepared and attached to
each proposed opinion. The vote sheet included a listing of each kind of vote
possible for the type of case in question.' All voting was then done manu-
ally on the vote sheets, with the Justices voting by placing their initials next
to the voting category they prefer.8 5 Now all voting on opinions is done via
computer using an application developed by the Court's technology staff,
called eVote. This application records votes electronically in a secure data-
83. Per curiam opinions as they are used by the Supreme Court of Florida are discussed
within the text. See discussion infra Part lI.D.
84. The possible votes vary according to the kind of case.
85. If a Justice is out of town and there is a pressing need for a vote on the case, the Jus-
tice by telephone or e-mail may authorize a staff member to indicate the proper vote.
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base. However, the Justices continue to indicate their votes on paper copies
as a backup, and these copies are kept by the Clerk's office.
By custom, the Justices usually cast only three types of votes that do not
require a separate opinion. These are: concur, concur in result only, and
dissent.86 Of course, each Justice can write a separate opinion. The kinds of
separate opinions are discussed more fully below.87
During the voting process, it is not unusual for the Justices to continue
to exchange views either in writing or by personal visits. Once all votes are
recorded, one of two things will occur. If the case has generated no further
debate among the Justices, it will be routed to a professional reporter of deci-
sions in the Chief Justice's office to be checked for substantive and stylistic
problems before being released to the parties and the public. However, if
some debate remains, the case will be scheduled for a second court confer-
ence. When this happens, the case is routed to a staff member in the Chief
Justice's office to be included on the next available conference agenda.8 8 At
conference, the Justices will discuss the case and decide on any further action
that may be necessary. Frequently, only minor revisions are made in opin-
ions to satisfy the concerns of particular Justices.
Occasionally it becomes apparent during a conference, or after voting,
that a majority of the Court does not agree with the proposed majority opin-
ion that was circulated, and the Chief Justice may reassign the case to be
written by a Justice in the new majority.89 Sometimes when it is apparent
86. These votes mean precisely what they say. Concur indicates a full acceptance of the
majority opinion and decision. Concur in result only indicates an acceptance only of the deci-
sion, and a refusal to join in the analysis expressed in the opinion. Dissent indicates a refusal
to join in either the decision or opinion. Members of the Court usually do not specially concur
or concur in part and dissent in part unless they also write a separate opinion, although there
are exceptions even here. E.g., Maison Grande Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Dorten, Inc., 600 So. 2d
463, 465 (Fla. 1992) (McDonald, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Moreover, in
death penalty cases, each Justice votes separately as to conviction and sentence. Therefore, a
Justice can concur as to the conviction but dissent as to the sentence without writing a separate
opinion. E.g., Maharaj v. State, 597 So. 2d 786, 792 (Fla. 1992) (McDonald, J., concurring as
to conviction, dissenting as to sentence). Though less common, Justices also may vote sepa-
rately as to punishment in cases of attorney discipline. E.g., The Florida Bar v. Morse, 587
So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1991) (McDonald, J., concurring as to guilt, dissenting as to punish-
ment).
87. See discussion infra Part II.C.
88. Conference agendas are produced by the office of the Chief Justice.
89. For example, a Justice may have written a separate dissenting opinion that clearly
reflects the views of at least four members of the Court. In such cases, the Court's majority
and the Chief Justice may agree informally among themselves that the author of the dissent
will simply recast the dissent as a majority and circulate it to the full Court without need for a
conference discussion. In that case, the now failed majority opinion may be recast as a dis-
sent.
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that the proposed majority opinion has failed to garner four votes, the Clerk
prepares a memorandum to the Chief Justice advising him of that fact. How-
ever, the original author of the failed majority opinion sometimes may be
given an opportunity to write a new per curiam opinion that conforms to the
majority's views, perhaps accompanied by a separate opinion expressing any
divergent views of the author.
Once all questions regarding a case are settled and the opinion or opin-
ions have been proofread and approved for release, the Clerk's office will set
a tentative date for the opinion to be released. However, no opinion can be
issued except upon the signature of the Chief Justice. Typically, opinions are
scheduled for release no earlier than a week in advance. 90 Copies of the final
version of the opinion or opinions are circulated by the Clerk to all Justices
and each member of their staffs, and all staff attorneys who work for the
court one week prior to the scheduled release the following Thursday. The
purpose of this exercise is to allow for continuous quality control and further
proofreading of opinions right up until the time of release. Justices, their
staffs, and the Clerk's office sometimes find errors or inconsistencies not
caught during the normal proofreading process.
When the Clerk's office determines that a case has the necessary votes
for release, the case is sent to the Reporter of Decisions for technical review.
The Reporter of Decisions then directs the Clerk in writing to file any opin-
ion to which at least four Justices have subscribed.9 Copies of opinions
ready for release to the public are delivered to each Justice no later than
Thursday at noon the week before actual release. At any time before 10 a.m.
on Thursday of the following week, any Justice may direct the Clerk not to
release an opinion. Unless otherwise directed by this day and time, the Clerk
and the Director of Public Information release the opinions at 11 a.m.
Another significant change since this article was first written in 1993 is
the way in which opinions are released at the Court. Previously, the Court
maintained a press room in which paper copies of opinions would be stacked
on a large table for release to media. Only paper copies were considered the
official release at this time. The door to the press room would remain locked
until the time for release, and the opening of the door thus marked the offi-
cial moment of release. Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, the Court
began posting its opinions on its website at the time of release. Media and
90. This is not true, however, of some emergency cases such as collateral challenges by
death-row inmates scheduled for execution. When some urgency is involved, the Chief Jus-
tice has discretion to order opinions released at any time after voting is finalized and the Jus-
tices have resolved any differences as fully as is possible.
91. A minimum of four Justices must concur at least in the result reached under the state
constitution. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a).
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the public in general became increasingly accustomed to this electronic re-
lease, though many longtime members of the Tallahassee capital press corps
continued to stand outside the door of the press room every Thursday. How-
ever, in 2001 the Clerk and the Court's Public Information Officer polled the
press corps about their willingness to replace the existing system with a
purely electronic one. With little dissent, the press corps accepted this
change. Opinions now are posted on the Court's website under the Court
Decisions & Rules link9 2 as soon as possible after 11 a.m., and media are
simultaneously notified by means of an e-mail list reserved exclusively for
media. These electronic releases now constitute the official release of opin-
ions, and paper copies are no longer produced. The press room now has
been moved into a smaller room, since its only remaining use is as a distribu-
tion point for the video and audio of court arguments to broadcast media.
93
Opinions are not considered final until any motion for rehearing or
clarification is disposed of. However, there are some cases in which the
Court notes that rehearing or clarification will not be entertained. For exam-
ple, the Court routinely notes that it will not entertain motions for rehearing
or clarification in cases requiring immediate finality, such as cases in which a
death warrant is pending, or after an opinion has been revised upon the grant-
ing or denial of a motion for rehearing or clarification.
2. "No Request" Cases
A substantial percentage of the Court's docket consists of cases in
which oral argument is not granted. These can include cases in which oral
argument was sought but denied, the majority of contested Florida Bar disci-
pline cases, and a few other categories. These cases are decided in the same
manner as oral argument cases except that no oral argument in the courtroom
is entertained.
After all briefing is complete, the "no request"94 case is randomly as-
signed to an office95 much like oral argument cases. The assigned Justice
92. See Court Decisions & Rules at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/deci-
sions/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
93. A live feed of video and audio is available at this location. A distribution device
called a mult box allows multiple users to plug into the feed simultaneously and record it.
Because the Court also broadcasts live via satellite, there has been a growing trend for broad-
casters to prefer the satellite feed over the press room feed.
94. There is no absolute right to oral argument in any case, although the Court's Manual
of Internal Operating Procedures requires that oral argument always be scheduled in every
appeal from a judgment imposing a death sentence. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING
PROCEDURES, supra note 20, at § II(B)(3).
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then directs a law clerk to prepare a summary and memorandum that is simi-
lar to the staff memorandum prepared in oral argument cases. The memo-
randum contains research on the law and facts and a recommended disposi-
tion.
The case is then scheduled for discussion at the next available court
conference. At this time, the Justices discuss their views, again with the as-
signed Justice going first, and a vote is taken. The preparation of an opinion
is done in the same way as in an oral argument case, and the proposed major-
ity opinion is circulated to the entire Court. Any differences among the Jus-
tices are resolved in the same manner as would apply in oral argument cases,
including additional conference discussions as needed. Once all the Justices
are satisfied that no further debate remains about the case, the majority opin-
ion and any separate opinions are prepared for public release.96
3. Death Penalty Cases
Appeals from judgments imposing the death penalty are treated like any
other oral argument cases, and are assigned for oral argument as soon as
briefing is completed. The Court traditionally follows a somewhat different
procedure in collateral challenges by death row inmates. Many of these
cases involve appeals of claims raised via a traditional habeas corpus petition
or through the related procedure set forth in rule 3.85097 of the Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure and its related rules 3.851, 3.852, and 3.853. Occa-
sionally, other means of collateral review are sought, including the Court's
all writs jurisdiction,98 mandamus,99 or other means. Of course, the most
pressing of these cases involve claims by inmates who have been scheduled
for execution by issuance of a death warrant by the Governor. These cases
are put on a special scheduling track because they are expedited.
Appeals of collateral challenges in death penalty cases are handled
much the same as other cases. Oral argument is almost always granted, but
can be denied-unlike in appeals from judgments imposing the death penalty
95. There are exceptions to the random assignment process, most commonly, where a
number of cases all pose the same issue. In such circumstances, all the cases may be assigned
to the same office. See discussion infra Part IV.B, regarding the discussion of cases involving
similar issues, also called "tag cases".
96. "No request" cases are prepared for release in the same manner as other cases.
97. Although habeas corpus and rule 3.850 and 3.851 have some differences, the Court
has held that they constitute a procedural vehicle for providing relief otherwise available
through habeas corpus. State v. Bolyea, 520 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 1988); see discussion infra
Part VII.D.
98. See discussion infra Part VILE.
99. See discussion infra Part VII.A.
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where oral argument is always granted.'00 In addition to the staff research on
the law and the facts, an assigned Justice's staff attorney will include details
of the entire procedural history of the case, from trial to the latest collateral
challenge, and the issues previously raised and their outcomes.10 Opinions
are usually issued for each collateral challenge filed, though the Court some-
times denies a claim in a summary order if it is determined that a claim
clearly is barred or meritless.
When a death warrant is issued, the Court usually anticipates that some
action will be taken in the trial court on behalf of the prisoner and the Court
sets a briefing schedule and oral arguments for any subsequent appeal, to
take place before the warrant period ends. The assigned Justice's staff will
prepare a chronological history of past proceedings in the case and provide
that to all the Justices. If an appeal is filed, the Court adheres to the previ-
ously issued schedule, and staff memoranda are prepared and circulated on
an expedited basis. The case is discussed and decided at a conference imme-
diately after oral argument, and the assigned Justice expedites the preparation
and circulation of an opinion. One of the factors that the Court considers in
expediting the release of an opinion is whether there will be some time, how-
ever brief, for the prisoner to seek further relief in the federal courts after the
state remedies are exhausted. Of course, depending on the circumstances of
the individual case, it may also be necessary for the Court to issue a stay of
the execution, either to permit adequate consideration of the claims, or be-
cause a particular claim may be found to have merit.
As the time for the inmate's execution approaches, the Clerk of the
Court, the assigned Justice, and assigned Justice's staff remain on call
twenty-four hours a day for any last minute petitions that may be filed. By
custom, the Chief Justice or a Justice designated by the Chief Justice will be
present in the Florida Supreme Court building at the time of execution and is
usually assisted by the Clerk of the Court, the Public Information Officer,
and sometimes also by the staff of the Justice assigned to the case. 10 2 There
also are a number of deputy clerks on standby in case an emergency order
needs to be issued. The Governor or a member of the Governor's staff opens
100. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20.
101. In order to better facilitate the decision-making process in death penalty cases, the
Clerk's office tracks all proceedings no matter what court is reviewing them, for death row
inmates. This information is kept on what the Clerk's office refers to as the death penalty
module on the Court's case management system. This allows the Court to determine the
current status on any death row inmate. Because this information is used in the Court's deci-
sion making process, it is exempt from public disclosure.
102. The law clerk's presence may be especially important if there is any concern that a
legal issue might be raised at the last minute.
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a three-way telephone communication between the Governor's Office, the
death chamber of the state prison, and the Clerk's office at the Court. The
Chief Justice, the assigned Justice, the Clerk, and the Public Information
Officer gather in the Clerk's office. All three groups remain on the phone to
consider any last-minute issues, until the execution is completed and the in-
mate is declared dead. Under the Florida Constitution, any single Justice
could order the execution stayed for good reason shown,113 but this power
has only been exercised in emergencies." Any problems associated with the
execution detected at this time are reported back to the full Court." 5
4. Other Cases
The Court sometimes receives other cases, often involving important or
emergency issues that ultimately may be resolved in a written opinion. Ex-
amples include: pressing constitutional questions between the branches of
state government, 10 6 requests for an advisory opinion by the Governor,10 7 or a
petition to invoke the Court's own emergency rule-making powers. 8 Oral
argument is often granted in cases of this type, though not always, with ar-
gument usually scheduled as soon as possible. Whether accepted for argu-
ment or not, emergency matters are normally handled like any other case,
except that the process and preparation of the opinions usually is expedited
and the case is assigned to an office by the Chief Justice. 9 The opinions
103. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(9). Of course, the full Court could probably dissolve
any stay improvidently granted. See id.
104. Because of the timing of one execution, the Chief Justice, the Clerk, the Public In-
formation Officer, and a number of the other Justices were not in the Supreme Court Building
at the time of execution. A last-minute motion was filed. The senior-most Justice in the
building at the time, the acting Chief Justice under the Court's rules, issued a temporary stay
long enough to assemble the other Justices and the Clerk. A four-way phone connection was
established.
105. For example, the problems associated with three executions in Florida's electric chair
were reported back to the full Court by the Justices assigned to be present in the Supreme
Court Building during the executions.
106. E.g., Fla. House of Representatives v. Martinez, 555 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1990); The Fla.
Senate v. Graham, 412 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1982).
107. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).
108. In re Emergency Petition to Extend Time Periods Under All Fla. Rules of Procedure,
17 Fla. L. Weekly S578 (Fla. Sept. 2, 1992) (emergency rule-making related to Hurricane
Andrew). This particular case has been codified and supplemented by changes to rule
2.030(a)(2)(B)(iv) of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration granting the Chief Justice
authority to toll time limits because of emergencies. Id.
169. Emergency cases are thus an exception to the Court's random assignment system.
The Chief Justice has broad discretion over these assignments, subject as always to the will of
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themselves may be released outside the normal Thursday cycle if necessary
to resolve the particular issue or emergency.
C. Types of Separate Opinions
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Florida follows the traditional
practice of American appellate courts in assigning a single Justice to write
the majority opinion in a case. However, Justices are not obligated to agree
with the proposed majority opinion's viewpoint or even with the unsigned
majorities they themselves have written. Any view apart from the majority's
is expressed through the vehicle of a separate opinion attached to and pub-
lished with the majority opinion.
Although most of the Court's decisions are unanimous, the public and
press have a strong tendency to focus on disagreements embodied in separate
opinions. Strongly worded dissents catch the most attention. This public
focus can create a seriously exaggerated sense of division on the Court and
may suggest that dissents carry a legal significance that they actually lack.
Dissenting views usually are the least influential in the long term, because of
the very nature of a dissent-the expression of a view contrary to that of the
majority.1 ' On the other hand, a well-reasoned concurring opinion, while
technically not establishing any precedent,11I may still be cited for persuasive
authority in future cases and occasionally may become more influential than
the majority opinion to which it was attached." 2 Of course, there are occa-
sions when future majority opinions directly reject the reasoning of earlier
concurrences. 113 Dissenting views also sometimes prevail in the long run,"'
the full Court, but often may assign the case to an office with special expertise in the field or
one that is most current in its workload. This is rarely done.
110. See Ephrem v. Phillips, 99 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1957). It is worth
noting, however, that dissents often contain statements that are dissent dicta because they
exceed the scope of what the majority is deciding. A majority opinion should not be read as
rejecting extraneous dissent dicta, but only as rejecting anything in the dissent contrary to
what the majority has actually said. There are occasions when dissent dicta may later be em-
braced by a majority without overruling any prior opinion. Some attorneys erroneously as-
sume that the majority necessarily has rejected everything stated in a dissent.
111. Greene v. Massey, 384 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1980).
112. See, e.g., In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer Truck Altered Vin
243340M, 576 So. 2d 261, 262-63 (Fla. 1990) (applying Wheeler v. Corbin, 546 So. 2d 723,
724-26 (Fla. 1989)) (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
113. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 665-66
(Fla. 2003).
114. E.g., Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659-60 (Fla. 1985), receding from
Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980). In Pullum, the Court ex-
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but this is a far rarer occurrence. To embrace a prior dissent, the Court usu-
ally must overrule its own precedent notwithstanding the doctrine of stare
decisis;" 5 while a well-reasoned concurrence can be accepted without neces-
sarily overruling anything, on grounds that it better illuminated or explained
the majority opinion it accompanied.
Concurrences and dissents, however, constitute only two of five differ-
ent kinds of separate opinions that are in customary usage by the Court, al-
though there is a sixth type so rare it has been used only once. This variety
has sometimes confused lawyers and the public alike, because the Court has
never adopted precise rules governing the use of separate opinions. Confu-
sion sometimes arises because the categories are not necessarily discrete and
often blur into one another. Much depends on precisely what the individual
author has stated in the separate opinion, although the choice of category is
often a strong indicator of the strength of the author's feelings about the ma-
jority view.
There has been some concern in recent years that these traditional cate-
gories are not sufficient. The specific concern involves situations in which a
Justice agrees with the result of an opinion and perhaps much of the analysis,
but not all of it. Justices sometimes have concurred in the result only-
something that may suggest they only agree with the outcome but disagree
with the entire analysis even if this is not the case. At other times, Justices
have concurred in part and dissented in part in the same case, which can sug-
pressly embraced Justice McDonald's dissent in Battilla. Compare Batilla, 392 So. 2d at
874-75 (McDonald, J., dissenting) with Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 659-60.
115. Many people erroneously view stare decisis as rigidly inflexible. The Court, how-
ever, has held that "stare decisis is not an ironclad and unwavering rule that the present must
bend to the voice of the past, however outmoded or meaningless that voice has become. It is a
rule that precedent must be followed except when departure is necessary to vindicate other
principles of law or to remedy continued injustice." Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 618 (Fla.
1992) (citing McGregor v. Provident Trust Co., 162 So. 323 (1935)). In a similar vein, the
Court has said that "the common law will not be altered or expanded unless demanded by
public necessity ... or where required to vindicate fundamental rights." In re T.A.C.P., 609
So. 2d 588, 594 (Fla. 1992). Although attorneys sometimes incorrectly argue that only the
legislature can change the common law, the Court in actuality has not hesitated to change the
law when proper reasons exist to do so, at least where the legislature has taken no action on
the precise subject. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957); see,
e.g., Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 1993) (abrogating common law doctrine of
interspousal immunity); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 434 (Fla. 1973) (abrogating com-
mon law doctrine of contributory negligence). Common law refers to law that has arisen from
the customary practices of the courts of Florida and their predecessors, which exists in its
most authoritative form when embodied in the written opinions of the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida. Once common law is codified within a legislative enactment, the Court is far more hesi-
tant to overrule it, because of the doctrine of separation of powers. See FLA. CONST. art. II, §
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gest that they do not agree with part of the result and it is for this reason they
cannot join. There has been some discussion of adopting a practice used as
the United States Supreme Court, where Justices sometimes write opinions
concurring in the judgment or some variation such as concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. However, the Justices have chosen not to adopt
this practice.
The following six categories of opinions utilized by the Justices are
identified and their customary usage are described. This ranking begins with
the category having the strongest sense of concurrence and ends with the
category having the strongest sense of dissent.
1. Concurring Opinions
A separate concurring opinion usually indicates that the Justice fully
agrees with the majority opinion but desires to supply additional reasons for
supporting the decision and to make additional comments or observations.
Concurring opinions often are used when a Justice wishes to explain individ-
ual reasons for concurring with the majority. As a general rule, concurring
opinions should be presumed to indicate complete agreement with the major-
ity opinion unless the concurring opinion says otherwise. Thus, a concurring
opinion can constitute the fourth vote needed to establish both a decision and
a Court opinion,1 6 subject only to any reservations expressly stated in the
concurring opinion itself.117
116. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a). There is a distinction between the terms decision and
opinion. The decision is the court's judgment, i.e., the specific result reached. Whereas, the
opinion is the written document explaining the reasons for the decision. Seaboard Air Line
R.R. Co. v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1958). Thus, so long as at least four members
of the Supreme Court of Florida agree on the decision, it is irrelevant that no similar agree-
ment was reached regarding a written opinion. Similarly, at least four Justices must concur in
an opinion for it to have any precedential value beyond the case at hand. Greene v. Massey,
384 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 1980). However, the word decision may have a different meaning in
the context of the Court's jurisdiction over particular categories of decisions. See discussion
infra Part lI.D.
117. Such reservations, depending on their strength, may give the concurrence the appear-
ance of actually being a special concurrence or a concurrence in result only. However, the
fact that the author has chosen to concur necessarily implies a greater sense of agreement with
the majority view. However, attorneys and lower courts may still legitimately take note of
any reservations expressed in a concurrence, especially where they may indicate that at least
four Justices have not agreed on a relevant point.
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2. Specially Concurring Opinions
A specially concurring opinion... indicates general agreement with both
the analysis and result of the majority opinion but implies some degree of
elaboration of or addition to the majority's rationale, unless the separate
opinion itself says otherwise. The most common use of a special concur-
rence is when the author believes the majority's analysis is essentially correct
though, perhaps, in need of elaboration or clarification. For example, a spe-
cially concurring opinion may be used to explain why, in the author's view, a
separate dissenting opinion has mischaracterized the majority's views and
why the majority is correct." 9 Hence, the author believes something addi-
tional should be said, even if for a limited purpose.
A specially concurring opinion can constitute the fourth vote needed to
create a binding decision under the state constitution"2 and can be sufficient
to establish an opinion as binding precedent. However, in this last instance,
the true nature of the precedent would not necessarily consist of the plurality
opinion, the special concurrence, or even both taken together. Rather, the
Court's opinion for purposes of precedent would consist of those principles
on which at least four members of the Court have agreed.'2 ' In other words,
it is possible for a special concurrence to be sufficiently narrow as to deprive
a plurality opinion of precedential value with respect to matters about which
the concurring Justice has expressed disagreement or reservations.
3. Opinions Concurring in Result Only
A concurring in result only opinion indicates agreement only with the
decision, that is, the official outcome and result reached, but a refusal to join
in the majority's opinion and its reasoning. 122 A separate opinion that con-
curs in result, only can constitute the fourth vote necessary to establish a
118. Members of the Court sometimes label this type of separate opinion concurring spe-
cially. This label is synonymous with specially concurring. The transposition is a matter of
each individual Justice's preference.
119. E.g., Pub. Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98-102 (Fla. 1989)
(Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially).
120. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a).
121. An example of such a case is In re T.W., in which Chief Justice Ehrlich specially
concurred but expressed reservations about certain points in the plurality's analysis. 551 So.
2d 1186, 1197-1200 (Fla. 1989).
122. Rowe v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 714 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
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decision under the Florida Constitution,'23 but the effect in such a case is that
there is no majority opinion of the Court and thus no precedent beyond the
specific facts of the controversy at hand. 24 There may be cases in which a
Justice writes a concurring in result only opinion that also appears to agree
with more than just the result. However, it seems doubtful that such an ac-
tion could constitute the fourth vote needed to give the opinion validity as
precedent.
4. Opinions Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
An opinion that concurs in part and dissents in part is commonly used to
indicate disagreement with only one or some of the results reached by the
majority opinion, but may also be used to show disagreement with part of the
analysis of the majority, depending on what the separate opinion itself actu-
ally says. Where an opinion of this type establishes part of the Court's ma-
jority, a careful reading of the different opinions may be needed to ascertain
the votes on a particular issue or particular line of reasoning and, hence, the
actual precedent of the case. 25
5. Dubitante Opinions
The rarest category of separate opinions are those issued dubitante,'26 a
notation expressing serious doubt about the case. Only one such opinion has
been issued in the Court's entire history.' 27 With this sparse usage, it still is
123. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a). For an example of a case in which the fourth vote con-
curred in result only, see Dougan v. State, 595 So. 2d 1, 6-8 (Fla. 1992). The result is that
there is a decision in Dougan-in other words, a result in which at least four Justices con-
curred-but no court opinion.
124. See Greene, 384 So. 2d at 27.
125. The Supreme Court of Florida has not consistently followed the United States Su-
preme Court's practice of dividing opinions into numbered sections, in which members sepa-
rately can indicate agreement or disagreement. There are exceptions, e.g., Traylor v. State,
596 So. 2d 957, 974-85 (Fla. 1992), but most opinions of the Supreme Court of Florida are
not divided in this manner. This means that a careful reading may be necessary to determine
the actual majority position; and in some cases, the true majority view simply may be unclear.
However, the Supreme Court of Florida's practice has the grace of avoiding the fractured
opinions sometimes found in the United States Supreme Court, in which two or more Justices
may separately write and sign parts of opinions that collectively constitute the "majority"
view.
126. The term dubitante means doubting. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (6th ed. 1990).
127. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601 So. 2d 543, 549 (Fla. 1992)
(Barkett, J., dubitante). It should be noted that other separate opinions have been written that
in effect constituted a species of dubitante opinion, but without using the designation dubi-
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not entirely clear in Florida whether a dubitante opinion should be regarded
as a type of concurrence or dissent or something else, 128 or indeed, whether a
dubitante opinion can constitute the fourth vote necessary to fulfill the con-
stitutional requirement that four Justices must concur in a decision.129 The
failure of any Justice to issue a dubitante opinion since its single use in 1992
strongly implies that it has not been accepted by the Justices for routine use,
a conclusion reinforced by the fact that dubitante does not appear as an op-
tion on the Court's computerized eVote system.
In the federal system, an opinion designated dubitante at least some-
times appears to constitute a very limited form of concurrence, 130 and some
federal judges have gone to the trouble of designating their opinions as con-
curring dubitante.13' At least one has issued a dubitante opinion that ex-
pressly concurred in part and dissented in part, although the author seemed to
indicate doubts only as to the partial concurrence. 3 2 Other states have also
used such opinions.133
tante. E.g., Johnson v. Singletary, 612 So. 2d 575, 577-81 (Fla. 1993) (Kogan, J., specially
concurring).
128. The single instance in which a dubitante opinion was issued in Florida suggests that it
indicated neither a concurrence nor dissent, but rather a statement of complete doubt as to the
disposition of the case. See In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601 So. 2d
at 549.
129. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(a).
130. See Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 403 (1967) (Douglas,
J., dubitante); Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 421-27 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., dubitante). Indeed, some federal judges have marked their separate opinions with
the heading concurring but have indicated in the text that the opinion is dubitante. New York
ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619-21 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
131. E.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 390-93 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Friendly, J., concurring dubitante).
132. United States v. Walker, 9 M.J. 892, 894-97 (A.F.C.M.R. 1980) (Mahoney, J., dis-
senting in part, concurring in part, and dubitante).
133. For example, in Georgia, the courts have sometimes issued "dubitante" dissents,
apparently meaning dissenting views in which the author has serious doubt. E.g., Kelleher v.
State, 371 S.E.2d 450, 451 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (Deen, P.J., dissenting dubitante); City of
Fairbum v. Cook, 372 S.E.2d 245, 255-56 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (Deen, P.J., dissenting dubi-
tante). Thus, a dubitante dissent would seem to constitute a species of dissenting opinion less
vigorous than a full dissent. However, there also seem to be times when an opinion marked
merely dubitante is neither a dissent nor a concurrence, but an expression of doubts so grave
that the judge or justice can neither agree nor disagree with the majority. See Constitutionality
of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601 So. 2d at 549. This probably is the best construction, for
example, in those rare cases in other jurisdictions in which a judge votes "dubitante" without
writing a separate opinion. Adams v. Williams, 838 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(Crandall, J., dubitante). In the absence of a written opinion, it is impossible to tell what the
author's views were, other than an expression of doubt.
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A statement that the Justice concurs dubitante certainly would seem
necessary where the dubitante opinion is relied upon as the fourth vote
needed to create a binding decision; but even then, it remains to be seen
whether that concurrence would give the written opinion itself the value of
precedent. Some diminished form of precedential value might be in order in
such a situation, but only where it is clear from a careful reading of the dif-
ferent opinions that at least four members of the Court, in fact, have agreed
on some rationale, not merely the result. Otherwise, there would be no opin-
ion by the Court, and the plurality's view would not create precedent beyond
the case at issue.
6. Dissents
A dissenting opinion should be presumed to indicate a complete refusal
to join with the majority's decision and opinion. A close reading of some
dissenting opinions may disclose that the author actually only disagrees with
part of the majority opinion,"' and such a dissent could be read as though it
were an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. But the fact that
the Justice has labeled the separate opinion as a full dissent almost certainly
means the opinion could not constitute the fourth vote needed to create a
binding opinion or decision by the Court.
D. Per Curiam Opinions
Per curiam is a Latin phrase meaning "by the court." 135 At one time, the
Supreme Court of Florida followed the practice, still common in the district
courts of appeal, of issuing cursory opinions designated per curiam, with the
actual identity of the author not disclosed. This was the general sense con-
veyed by the Court in 1956 when it defined the term per curiam as indicating
"the opinion of the court in which the judges are all of one mind and the
question involved is so clear that it is not considered necessary to elaborate it
by any extended discussion."'136 Historically, then, per curiam opinions came
to imply short opinions devoid of a rationale. Some attorneys and even
judges have ruefully noted the potential for abuse inherent in the power to
134. E.g., In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1204-05 (Fla. 1989) (McDonald, J., dissenting)
(dissenting opinion agreeing with part of plurality's rationale).
135. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (8th ed. 1990).
136. Newrnons v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 87 So. 2d 49, 50 (Fla. 1956).
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issue such opinions, 137 because even a "clear" rationale helps no one if left
unstated.
After the creation of the district courts of appeal and the later adoption
of jurisdictional reforms, the use of per curiam opinions in this sense has
fallen into disuse in the Court.138 The Court now seldom issues unsigned
opinions devoid of an obvious rationale. The few that might qualify under
this old definition typically involve questions of law now fully resolved in a
recently issued opinion, to which the lower courts and parties are referred.1
39
Instead, the Court's per curiam opinions have metamorphosed into majority
opinions with complete analyses whose authors simply are not identified.
40
The news media typically call such opinions unsigned.'
41
There are a variety of reasons for not identifying the true author or au-
thors.142 One is because the author of the majority opinion actually may dis-
agree with its analysis, something that can occur because of the Court's
method of assigning cases for opinions.143 Another reason may be that por-
tions of the opinion were written by more than one Justice or contain a ra-
tionale requested by a Justice as a condition of joining the majority. As a
matter of courtesy, Justices usually avoid claiming credit for material par-
tially written or suggested by another Justice. Such a per curiam opinion
might be issued, for example, when a majority of the Court has not agreed
with the full analysis of a proposed majority opinion and has decided to en-
graft onto that opinion part of a separate analysis prepared by another Justice.
The decision to make an opinion per curiam is left to the discretion of
the Justice who drafted the opinion. There also are some traditions or pat-
terns that have emerged through the years. For example, subject to some
exceptions, most Bar discipline cases and disciplinary actions against judges
137. Toby Buel, Conflict Review in the Supreme Court of a DCA 's Per Curiam Decision,
56 FLA. B.J. 849 (1982).
138. The bulk of the Court's jurisdiction now is discretionary, in which case the Court has
authority simply to deny jurisdiction. This is vastly different than the situation that existed
when the Supreme Court of Florida was the state's only appellate tribunal, with much broader
mandatory jurisdiction.
139. E.g., State v. M.S.P., 647 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1995).
140. E.g., Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215, 1217 (Fla. 2003).
141. The media also sometimes mischaracterize such cases as being written by the Chief
Justice. If the opinion is per curiam the concurring Justices names are listed at the end of the
opinion by seniority, meaning if the Chief Justice is in the majority, he or she is always listed
first. This sometimes has led the press to believe that the Chief Justice is the author.
142. Members of the Court, including the true author, still must indicate their votes regard-
ing a per curiam opinion, and those votes are recorded with the published opinion. There is no
anonymity in this sense. Moreover, only a majority opinion can be issued per curiam. The
Court has never issued, for example, per curiam dissents or concurrences.
143. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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are now issued per curiam. The same is true of most death penalty cases.
There is no way for the public to know the reasons an opinion was issued per
curiam, and it would be considered a breach of confidentiality for the Justice
or staff to publicly identify the true author. In any event, the fact that an
opinion is issued per curiam by the Supreme Court of Florida has no signifi-
cant effect other than to identify the Court itself, as an institution, and not
any particular Justices as the author. Per curiam opinions bear the same
status as any other opinion in which the Justices have voted the same way."
E. Role of the Chief Justice or Acting Chief Justice
The Chief Justice is Florida's highest ranking judicial officer, serving
both as head of the Court and chief executive officer of the entire Florida
Judicial Branch. 145 The Chief Justice presides at all official Court functions
and administers the state court system through the Office of State Courts
Administrator. One of the Chief Justice's most significant powers in a legal
sense is the ability to dispose of motions and procedural matters connected
with pending cases.'46 This is a marked change from earlier court practice,
which required a meeting of the Court to consider motions. Today, some
motions may be placed on the full Court's agenda for further guidance, par-
ticularly on controversial matters; but by far, most currently are handled by
another Justice designated by the Chief Justice. As the number of motions
and other administrative duties has increased steadily over the years, Chief
Justices have increasingly delegated authority to an Administrative Justice to
resolve most pre-merits motions. Likewise, the Clerk has limited authority
to dispose of certain categories of motions pursuant to express guidelines set
by the Court.
Whenever the Chief Justice is absent or unable to act, the role of Acting
Chief Justice automatically falls upon the next most senior Justice who is
available. Most commonly, the Dean of the Court 47 is the acting Chief Jus-
tice, but on occasion when the Chief and Dean are both absent, that duty
descends to the most senior Justice available. The Rules of Judicial Admini-
stration also specify that the Dean of the Court automatically becomes acting
Chief Justice if the sitting Chief leaves office for any reason; but in that
event, the Court is also required to promptly elect a successor to serve the
balance of the unexpired term. 1
48
144. See Newmons, 87 So. 2d at 50.
145. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(b).
146. FLA. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.030(a)(2)(B)(ii).
147. The present Dean is Justice Charles T. Wells.
148. FLA. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.030(a)(2)(A).
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Each Chief Justice's term runs for a period of two years beginning and
ending on July one of each successive even-numbered year. 49 Prior to the
end of each two-year term, the Court must elect the Chief Justice who will
serve during the next term. By a custom unbroken for three decades, the
Court has elected as Chief Justice the next most senior Justice who has not
yet held the office. 50 In the rare event that a time comes when all seven have
served, the Court presumably would begin the rotation again, starting with
the longest serving Justice.
One beneficial result of this rotation system is that it lessens the possi-
bility that any particular Justice or group of Justices could gain indefinite
control of the Court's executive functions. This is vastly different from the
United States Supreme Court, where the Chief Justice of the United States is
nominated by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, and is life ten-
ured. The Supreme Court of Florida's customary rotation system creates a
significant check and balance omitted from the constitution itself, which
specifies only that the Court must choose a Chief Justice by majority vote.'5 '
By honoring the rotation system, the Court also eliminates the discord that
seems inherent in any competitive election system and could hamper the
Court's collegiality, an essential component of any multi-member decision-
making body.
F. Role of the Other Justices
The power of the Chief Justice, however, is not limitless. Very signifi-
cant powers reside in the Court as a body, particularly through the fact that
all judicial opinions and many major administrative concerns require assent
by at least four Justices. Moreover, the Chief Justice alone cannot possibly
supervise all of the various entities under the Court's control. The effect is
that the Court in practice operates on a highly collegial basis, with all of the
Justices assigned and involved in some aspect of administration.
One aspect of shared responsibility and collegiality is expressed most
noticeably in the fact that each Justice is assigned a variety of supervisory
duties. These include: oversight of the internal committees and offices that
govern the Court; liaison responsibility with bar organizations and rules
committee; and assignment to a variety of special commissions and commit-
tees created, from time to time, to address questions of public policy involv-
149. Id.
150. The custom actually predates the 1980s but was interrupted during the 1970s when
some members of the Court were under investigation for alleged improprieties. The custom
resumed in 1984 with the election of Justice Joseph A. Boyd, Jr.
151. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(b).
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ing the courts. For example, members of the Court have chaired or super-
vised public commissions charged with reforming guardianship laws, inves-
tigating gender bias in Florida's judiciary, and examining ways to eliminate
racial and ethnic bias from the judicial system. Each of these commissions
ultimately produced extensive proposals for reform, most of which now have
been implemented by the Governor, the legislature, and the courts.'52 To this
extent, members of the Court use their offices to help effect changes in pub-
lic policy beneficial to the state and consistent with the sound administration
of justice.
G. Role of the Judicial Assistants, Law Clerks, & Interns
Because the Justices' duties are so extensive, they could not possibly
discharge their obligations without the help of staff. Each Justice accord-
ingly is permitted to hire four staff members: a secretary (more commonly
known as a judicial assistant in the state court system) and three law clerks.
The Chief Justice, with far greater responsibilities, has a larger staff. The
staff includes two additional Judicial Assistants, a Reporter of Decisions, the
Director of Public Information, and an Inspector General, all of whom re-
main attached to the office through different administrations. Also reporting
to the Chief Justice is the Director of Central Staff, who supervises a staff of
six other attorneys and an additional judicial assistant. Central staff assists
the entire Court by processing many routine kinds of cases and handling
other projects as assigned by the Chief Justice. Finally, the staffs of the Jus-
tices are usually supplemented three times a year by an internship program
that brings law students into the Court to act as research aides.
1. Judicial Assistants
In Florida's judiciary, Judicial Assistants are the persons responsible for
the general administration and the flow of work in a judge's or Justice's of-
fice. Their duties are broad and vary from office to office, but almost always
include supervising the flow of judicial activity, paperwork, keeping files,
overseeing the Justices' schedules, interacting with other offices, and dealing
with correspondence and telephone calls. Judicial Assistants also may help
in the drafting of judicial opinions, especially in the preparation and editing
of successive drafts. Members of the public who call individual Justices
almost always deal with the Judicial Assistant first. Judicial Assistants are
hired by and serve at the pleasure of their respective Justice.
152. E.g., Tannen, supra note 79.
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2. Law Clerks
As noted above, the duties of law clerks-now formally called Staff At-
torneys-also vary among the offices, but they are usually responsible for
conducting research and producing memoranda reflecting that research.
Many also have the responsibility for the initial drafts of opinions for their
Justices after receiving express instructions and guidance from the Justice.
In this situation, law clerks typically are instructed on the result and analysis
that should be used in the proposed opinion for the assigned Justice to re-
view, revise, or edit.
Opinion writing is a responsibility that can be both time-consuming and
labor-intensive.15 3 Often, the most time-consuming task is creating the first
draft, though this work is crucial in moving the opinion toward a form that
can be circulated for review by the full Court. Few Justices would be able to
manage their schedules unless at least some opinion drafting was done by
their staffs. Members of the Court often choose law clerks not merely based
on academic performance in law school but also on proven writing ability,
often demonstrated in prior professional careers, law clerk experience at an-
other court, or scholarly work completed in law school. 54 This professional
writing ability is an absolute prerequisite to a legal position that requires not
only constant and extensive research, but also the reduction of that research
into a concise yet comprehensive memorandum. Of course, the writing of
legal opinions can be very exacting, if only because impact opinions have on
the law. Law clerks responsible for opinion drafting, thus, must be able to
master a style of English that is not merely formal, but very precise as well.
Because of this heavy responsibility, it is somewhat paradoxical that the
common public image of law clerks is of young people freshly graduated
from law school, with no real experience,155 who will leave to enter private
practice after a year or two of clerking. While this may be the case in many
instances, it should be noted that the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida
153. As a result, law clerks, at a minimum, must have a law degree before the date they
begin work. The Court previously required admission to The Florida Bar soon after law
clerks began work, but this requirement was dropped as part of the job description in the mid-
1980s. Justices, however, remain free to require Bar membership if they desire, and pay
scales overwhelmingly favor those who have Bar membership. As a result, rarely are law
clerks not members of The Florida Bar.
154. For example, past law clerks have included former journalists, former law professors,
former Assistant Prosecutors, and former Appellate Public Defenders.
155. This perception is a reality for the United States Supreme Court. Most law clerks
there serve only a one-year term.
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throughout its history have often retained law clerks on a permanent basis.'56
These most often are attorneys whose skills and experience especially suit
them for the tasks assigned, and who remain on staff indefinitely, at the
pleasure of the Justice.
A number of factors have contributed to the movement to retain one or
more permanent law clerks. Perhaps the most significant is that the adminis-
trative and public responsibilities of the Justices have so greatly increased in
recent years that the need for quality legal support has increased dramati-
cally. In essence, since no additional judicial resources are available to meet
the increased responsibilities, Justices must rely on other legal professionals
to help shoulder the work. The competence and experience of those profes-
sionals are at a premium.
3. Interns
Since 1993, the Court has dramatically altered its intern program. In
2001, it created the Supreme Court of Florida Internship Program for Distin-
guished Florida Law Students. This honors program is open to qualified law
students from all accredited Florida law schools.' Previously, the Court
accepted its interns in August and January only from students selected by the
faculty of the Florida State University College of Law in Tallahassee and
these students were in turn given academic credit for their work at the Court.
Now all law schools in Florida are invited to send their best students to take
part in the internship program during the fall, spring, and summer semesters.
Usually students ranking in the top of their class are selected. Depending on
the number selected for internship each semester, two interns are assigned to
each office, the Clerk's office, and the Court's central staff of attorneys.
Internships starting in May and extending over the summer also are po-
tentially available to students from any law school and may be more or less
informal in nature.'58 These interns serve on a purely volunteer basis and are
responsible for their own expenses. Academic credit is available only if the
students make the necessary arrangements with their law schools.
156. Law clerks are not permanent in the sense of having a job with civil service-style
protections. Rather, these law clerks, at the request of their Justices, agree to stay for some
indefinite period beyond the two-year minimum commitment typically required by each Jus-
tice at the time the law clerk is hired.
157. On occasion similarly qualified students from out-of-state law schools are accepted.
158. An application is usually accomplished by the student sending in a cover letter, re-
sume, and writing sample to a Justice at the Court, in late winter or early spring, prior to the
summer in question. Standards for these internships vary from office to office, as do the
number of interns that will be accepted. Some offices take only one intern, while others take
two or three.
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Job responsibilities of interns vary among the offices, but usually in-
volve assisting the law clerks in preparing memoranda regarding the Court's
determination of jurisdiction in discretionary review cases.'59 Many offices
have a structured program in which student interns are given increasingly
more responsibility as they demonstrate aptitude. Much of an intern's work,
however, consists of more routine matters such as writing memoranda to the
Justice on petitions for jurisdiction, photocopying research material identi-
fied by law clerks, and writing memoranda to the law clerks on legal issues
that have been assigned by the supervising Justice. Interns in the Clerk's
office provide assistance to the administrative Justice and do other special
projects as directed by the clerk.
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the Court's internship program is
an insight into the Court's operation and an opportunity to work with a Jus-
tice of the state's highest tribunal. An internship coupled with a positive
evaluation by a Justice or the Justice's staff can be a strong credential.
Moreover, a very significant number of former interns have gone on to find
jobs as law clerks at the Supreme Court of Florida or in other courts. There-
fore, an internship can be an important stepping stone for a student interested
in working as a law clerk after graduation. It is also a way in which the
Court assists in educating succeeding generations of lawyers.
H. Ethical Constraints on the Justices and Their Staffs
The public, and even some members of the legal profession, do not fully
appreciate the strict ethical constraints imposed upon judges and their staffs,
including interns. The Clerk's office and the public information office fre-
quently receive letters from people asking that particular cases be decided
certain ways or that judges should correct some perceived oversight in a
case. Members of the public are sometimes offended when queries of this
type go unanswered. This occurred most notably during the 2000 presiden-
tial election appeals, in which the various staff offices throughout the build-
ing received thousands of phone calls and well over 100,000 emails and let-
ters that essentially sought to "lobby" the Court in its decision-making proc-
ess. However, the Court and its staff live under a very rigorous code of eth-
ics that forbids them to consider such outside comments or to comment on
pending matters.
159. See discussion infra Part VI.
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1. Constraints on Justices
Perhaps the most common misunderstanding, especially among the lay
public, is a widespread belief that judges or Justices can be approached about
their official duties in much the same way a governor, a legislator, or their
respective employees can. However, the United States and Florida Constitu-
tions 60 and ethics codes' absolutely require that judges be and appear to be
impartial. For that reason, judges and Justices are not permitted to publicly
discuss any aspect of pending or impending cases'62 as well as cases that
have become final'63 or are pending in other courts."6
Impartiality and neutrality are, of course, the bedrock upon which all
who come before the courts must rely. Judicial independence is predicated
upon the assurance of this evenhandedness or level playing field. Partisan-
ship is strictly prohibited. In an effort to maintain public confidence in the
judiciary's impartiality, judges and Justices are required to maintain a broad
detachment from political activity. For example, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida has determined that a judge or Justice may be reprimanded for writing
public endorsement letters of a candidate even in a nonpartisan judicial elec-
tion.'65 This conclusion was based on an ethics rule generally prohibiting a
judge or Justice from lending the prestige of the office to any political
cause. 166 As a result, judges and Justices are required to refrain from partici-
pation in most types of political activities beyond those necessary for their
own judicial elections.
Even the personal finances of judges and Justices are closely regulated.
For example, they are not permitted to be involved in any business transac-
tions that might reflect poorly on their impartiality or job performance. 67
They are required to divest themselves of investments that result in their fre-
quent recusal in cases before the Court, such as where a judge or Justice
owns stock in a corporation that is a frequent litigant. 168 Gifts, loans, and
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
161. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canons 2, 3.
162. Id. 3B(9).
163. These include, for example, the fact that matters were discussed at Court conference,
the content of unpublished draft opinions, and the Court's initial vote or changes in votes prior
to release of an opinion.
164. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3B(9).
165. See In re Glickstein, 620 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1993); see also In re Code of Judicial
Conduct (Canons 1, 2, & 7A(1)(b)), 603 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1992).
166. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 7.
167. Id. 5D.
168. Id. 5D(4).
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favors are closely regulated 169 and some restrictions even apply to the fi-
nances of a judge or Justice's family and household members.17 ° Judges and
Justices must also file disclosures of their income, assets, and business inter-
ests.17' A compendium of other ethical constraints imposed upon judges and
Justices are set out in considerable detail in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Enforcing ethical constraints on Justices of the Court poses a unique
concern because, in theory, the Court is almost always the final arbiter of
what is ethical and what is not.1 72 The Justices thus are the most highly visi-
ble examples for ethical conduct. As a result, the Florida Constitution has
created special mechanisms to deal with any alleged impropriety by a Jus-
tice.'73 First, members of the Court are subject to inquiry by the Judicial
Qualifications Commission ("JQC"), as are all Florida judges. 7 4 The JQC
recommends proposed discipline for breaches of judicial ethics, subject to
review by the Court. However, when a Justice of that court is being investi-
gated, all sitting members of the Court are automatically recused. Thereaf-
ter, the seven most senior Chief Judges of Florida's twenty judicial circuits
automatically sit as temporary Associate Justices 175 to review the case and to
impose discipline if appropriate. Discipline can include reprimand, suspen-
sion, or removal from office. 176
Justices of the Court, like all judicial officers, are also subject to im-
peachment and to removal by the legislature. Grounds for impeachment
include any misdemeanor in office as determined by a two-thirds vote of the
Florida House of Representatives. 7 7 Once impeached, a Justice is automati-
cally suspended and the Governor can appoint a temporary replacement until
completion of the trial. 78 Trial after impeachment occurs before the Florida
Senate, and the Justice being tried can be removed from office upon a two-
thirds Senate vote. The Senate can also take the additional step of disquali-
fying the Justice from holding any future Florida office, 179 though this re-
quires an affirmative act and is not an automatic consequence of removal.'80
169. Id. 5D(5).
170. Id.
171. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 6B(1).
172. The Court itself promulgates the ethics rules. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
173. See 'FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12.
174. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a).
175. The significance of the term "Associate Justice" is discussed infra Part 11.1.
176. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a)(1).
177. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(a); see also Forbes v. Earle, 298 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1974).
178. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(b).
179. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(c).
180. Smith v. Brantley, 400 So. 2d 443, 450 (Fla. 1981).
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The Florida Constitution specifies that the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Florida must preside or choose another Justice to preside over the
Senate at all trials after impeachment.'' If the Chief Justice is the one under
investigation, the Governor presides.'82
2. Constraints on Justices' Staffs
Judicial Assistants, law clerks, and court interns are subject to much the
same ethical constraints imposed on Justices, at least with respect to official
matters on which they work. 83 For their tenure on the staff, these persons
are effectively a part of the Justice's official position when dealing with the
Court's official business. As a result, they are retained subject to strict rules
of confidentiality and to the canons of judicial ethics in a derivative sense,
though the JQC obviously lacks jurisdiction over persons who are not judges.
However, it deserves emphasis that this conclusion applies only to official
matters and not to all activities of staff members outside the Court.
Prior to 1992, many persons assumed that judicial staff members were
subject to all of the constraints imposed upon the Justices, even for matters
conducted on personal time.'84 In May 1992, the Florida Committee on Stan-
dards of Conduct Governing Judges-now called the Judicial Ethics Advi-
sory Committee-reinforced this interpretation in an advisory opinion con-
cluding that judicial assistants were prohibited from engaging in partisan
political activities, just as judges and Justices are.'85 The Committee's con-
clusions obviously implied that all judicial staff members were subject to the
canons of judicial ethics as though they themselves were judges. This view,
however, was rejected by the Supreme Court of Florida in a court conference
in the fall of 1992. At that time, the Court took the unusual step of overrul-
ing ' 6 the advisory opinion and issuing its own statement on the question.
181. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(c).
182. Id.
183. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3B(2).
184. See Scott D. Makar, Judicial Staffand Ethical Conduct, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1992, at 10.
185. See Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges Op. 92-33 (1992) (concern-
ing FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 7 (B)(1)(b) Judicial Assistant's Political Activity).
186. The Court has traditionally used a somewhat unusual method of commenting on
advisory opinions of the Committee. This is something that, in any event, is rarely done. If a
member of the Court disagrees with an advisory opinion, the matter may be discussed at a
Court conference. If a majority of the Court agrees, a statement may be prepared commenting
on the advisory opinion and that statement is then placed in the official minutes of the Court.
At that time, the Clerk of the Court notifies the Committee Chair of the Court's action and
transmits a copy of the relevant portion of the minutes to The Florida Bar News for publica-
tion. The act of commenting on an advisory opinion in this manner obviously does not consti-
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This occurred after some of the judiciary's employees voiced objections to
the Committee's reasoning.
In its statement, the Court found that judicial staff members have a First
Amendment right to engage in political activities provided this is done out-
side of Court, on personal time, and without reference to the judge or the
judge's office.'8 7 In support of this conclusion, the Court said that members
of a judge's staff are analogous to the spouses of judges, who have a right to
engage in political activities using their personal time and resources.'88 This
reasoning implies that staff members may be treated the same as a judge's
spouse in other contexts involving the use of free time, though the analogy
obviously is not a perfect one'89 and could be less forceful outside the context
of exercising free-speech rights.
A special variety of ethical problems may arise with respect to law
clerks. Some law clerks decide to enter private practice after completing
their work for the Court, and some firms have voiced confusion over the
ethical standards that govern the process of hiring a law clerk. Obviously, a
problem could develop if the hiring firm has a case pending before the Court.
Thus, law clerks must disclose any possible conflict of interest to their Jus-
tices. 90 To assist in proper disclosure to the Justice, a law firm should dis-
close to the law clerk any of its cases pending for review in the Court or that
are likely to be pending, while employment negotiations are pending. 9' At
that time, the law clerk is bound to discuss the matter with the Justice and
avoid contact with the disclosed cases.'92 The law clerk may be segregated
from these cases even after negotiations end or fail if the Justice deems it
necessary. 19
3
Upon leaving the Court, former law clerks may not work on any case
which was pending at the Court while they were employed at the Court, pro-
vided they participated personally and substantially in the case. 94 This last
tute a decision of the Court and, for that reason, is not absolutely binding, although highly
persuasive.
187. Supreme Court of Florida Conference, minutes of meeting (Sept. 8, 1992) (on file
with Clerk).
188. Id.
189. It is unlikely, for example, that the financial activities of a judge or Justice's judicial
assistant would create a substantial conflict of interest. The financial activities of the judge or
Justice's spouse could.
190. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.12(b).
191. This should include any case in which the firm has an interest in its own right or as
counsel to a party.
192. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.12(b).
193. Id.
194. FLA. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.060(b).
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proviso was expressly adopted by the Court in 2003 to remove ambiguities
from the previous rules and to ensure that Florida's Supreme Court law
clerks-who often gain substantial knowledge about death penalty law in
their jobs-would not be disqualified from every death case pending during
their tenure at the Court. 195 The Court noted that it did not want to further
limit the pool of qualified capital appeals lawyers.' 96 Because some law
clerks work for the Court for many years before entering practice, they virtu-
ally would be disqualified in every single capital case if a stricter rule ap-
plied.
The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar requires that law clerks who go
on to work for law firms must be segregated from working on any case in-
volving matters in which the law clerk participated personally and substan-
tially, except upon consent by all parties after disclosure.' 97 A problem of
this type might occur, for example, where the firm, after hiring the law clerk,
acquires a client who had a case pending in the Court. Moreover, law clerks
are generally ethically restricted in discussing information learned at the
Court, including the nature of their work assignments.
Similar restrictions apply as to Judicial Assistants and interns, though
problems are less frequent in this regard. Judicial Assistants are fewer in
number and do not leave their positions with the Court as frequently as law
clerks. Interns, meanwhile, are present at the Court for a few months at most
and seldom are exposed to any but the most routine matters. However, both
Judicial Assistants and interns must adhere to the rules of ethics and confi-
dentiality applicable to law clerks.
Enforcement of ethical constraints imposed on judicial staff differs from
that used in the case of Justices and judges. Ethical violations of a less seri-
ous nature typically are handled by the Justice as a personal issue and can
include reprimand or termination of employment. Serious violations also can
result in contempt proceedings being brought, though only one such incident
has occurred in the last few decades.'98 Any staff member who is an attorney
is also subject to professional discipline by The Florida Bar, with penalties
ranging from a private reprimand to disbarment. Student interns who plan to
become licensed attorneys can be investigated for ethical breaches by The
Florida Board of Bar Examiners, possibly resulting in a denial of licensure.' 99
195. Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin. (2-Year Cycle), 851 So. 2d 698,
699-700 (Fla. 2003).
196. Id.
197. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.12(a).
198. In re Schwartz, 298 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1974).
199. The Florida Board of Bar Examiners routinely sends detailed questionnaires regard-
ing former interns to the Justices and their staffs. The questions probe such matters as the
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I. Court Protocol
In its day-to-day operations, the Supreme Court of Florida has followed
a simple protocol that borders on the informal. The unifying factor of the
protocol, and perhaps its most formal aspect, is a seniority system in which
more senior Justices outrank their colleagues for certain procedural and for-
mal purposes, with the sitting Chief Justice always deemed most senior. If
more than one Justice is appointed to the Court simultaneously, seniority is
determined by reference to the appointee's prior career using a standard
adopted in 1968.200 Virtually every other aspect of procedure in the Florida
Supreme Court building is governed by this seniority ranking.
Justices are listed according to seniority in court stationery, choose their
office suites in the same order, and appear formally in public ranked from
most senior to most junior. When the Court is in session the Justices are
seated with the Chief Justice presiding in the center, the next most senior
Justice placed to the immediate right, the next most senior Justice placed to
the immediate left, and so on until all are seated. Even the separate opinions
attached to a majority opinion are ranked by reference to seniority."z '
The seniority system also expresses itself in other ways. For example, a
listing of Justices in a publication should adhere to the system. However,
formal public introductions reverse the seniority ranking on the premise that
intern's thoroughness, promptness, work ethic, background, and personal problems. If the
answer to any question raises a concern about fitness to practice law, the bar examiners will
investigate further.
200. See The Fla. Supreme Court, minutes of meeting (Jan. 12, 1987) (on file with the
Court). On October 14, 1968, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the following resolution:
BE IT RESOLVED:
Seniority on this Court shall be determined by length of continuous service on this Court:
In the event more than one Justice assumes office on this Court at the same time, seniority of
such Justices shall be determined in the following manner:
1. Former Justices of this Court;
2. Judges or former Judges of the District Courts of Appeal. Seniority of such District Court
Judges shall be based upon the length of continuous service;
3. Judges or former Judges of the Circuit Court. Seniority of such Circuit Court Judges shall
be based upon the length of continuous service;
4. Judges or former Judges of other courts of record of this State. Seniority of such Judges
shall be based upon the length of continuous service;
5. Lawyer[s] without former judicial experience. Seniority of such lawyers shall be deter-
mined by length of time they have been admitted to The Florida Bar.
This Resolution shall become effective immediately.
Id. This policy was reaffirmed on January 12, 1987, when two Justices-Stephen Grimes and
Gerald Kogan-assumed office simultaneously. Because Justice Grimes had served on a
district court, he was accorded a higher seniority than Justice Kogan, who had served on a
circuit court.
201. As a general rule, separate opinions are divided into the six separate categories and,
within each category, are then ranked according to the author's seniority.
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the most senior Justices should be introduced last, giving them the "last
word.
,
"
202
Formal modes of addressing Justices in writing have varied over time.
However, in 1992, at the request of Allen Morris,2"3 and through Justice
Parker Lee McDonald, the Court established a few guidelines. The Court
concluded that it would be appropriate in addressing correspondence to refer
to the Chief Justice as "The Honorable (name), Chief Justice, Florida Su-
preme Court.' '204 By analogy, letters addressed to other Justices would be the
same, but with the word "chief' omitted. The most common introductory
salutation in a letter is "Dear Chief Justice (name)" or "Dear Justice (name)."
A member of the Court should not formally be called "Judge (name)."
In the Florida judiciary, the title "Justice" is given exclusively to members of
the Court2 °5 because the Florida Constitution clearly distinguishes "Justices"
from "judges" sitting on the state's lower tribunals.20 6 Contrary to the prac-
tice in the United States Supreme Court, the term "Associate Justice" is not a
proper title for any sitting member of the Supreme Court of Florida. The
term is not used in the constitution. "Associate Justice" is the customary
temporary title given to judges of a lower court assigned for temporary ser-
vice on the Court.27 Thus, the title should not be used in any context except
when a judge is temporarily assigned to the Court.
In less formal situations, or when addressing a Justice verbally, the
members of the Court usually are called simply "Justice (name)." For exam-
ple, this has become the standard method of addressing a member of the
Court during oral argument. In the late 1980s, the Court completely aban-
doned the use of the gender-specific titles "Madam Justice (name)" or "Mis-
ter Justice (name).""2 '
202. ALLEN MORRIS, PRACTICAL PROTOCOL FOR FLORIDIANS 77 (rev. 4th ed. 1988).
203. Clerk-Emeritus/Historian, Florida House of Representatives.
204. Letter from Justice Parker Lee McDonald, Supreme Court of Florida to Allen Morris,
Clerk-Emeritus/Historian, Florida House of Representatives (Nov. 2, 1992) (on file with au-
thor).
205. Id.
206. See FLA. CONST. art. V.
207. FLA. R. JuD. ADmN. 2.030(g). Temporary assignments are made, for example, when
a quorum of the Court is not available. Id. 2.030(a)(4)(A).
208. This change dates from the appointment of Rosemary Barkett, who was the first
woman Justice appointed to the Supreme Court of Florida. Shortly after her appointment in
1985, Justice Barkett indicated she would not use the title "Madam Justice Barkett" but simply
"Justice Barkett." Later, the other members of the Court dropped the "Mister" from their
titles, and this change was formalized by altering all name plates on the Justices' suites in the
Florida Supreme Court Building. The use of the unadorned title "Justice" is consistent with
the court's policy of avoiding gender-specific language wherever possible. However, some
attorneys still use these gender-specific titles without incident. See Ricki Lewis Tannen,
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Justices who have retired from the Court commonly are addressed by
the courtesy title "Justice," though this is not required and is subject to some
ethical constraints. The courtesy title should not be used during the practice
of law in which a former Justice may be engaged except for purely bio-
graphical purposes. Nor should the title be used in any other context in
which the title may create a false impression. The title "Chief Justice" can
be used only with respect to a sitting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Florida and is never used as a courtesy title.2°9
A few other matters of court protocol have been distilled into written
form by Allen Morris, including details of the investiture ceremony for new
Justices 210 and protocol for funeral ceremonies of Justices.21 By tradition,
the Court also has generally adhered to these two protocols with some excep-
tions. In the case of investitures, for example, the exact details of the pro-
gram are left to the new Justice. In the case of funeral ceremonies, the
wishes of the family will be honored even if they wish to depart from the
protocol. For example, deceased Justices by longstanding custom are per-
mitted to lie in state in the Supreme Court Building rotunda with a Florida
Highway Patrol Honor Guard assisting. In recent years, some families have
foregone the lying in state. In 2004, with the passing of retired Justice Rich-
ard W. Ervin, the Court also returned to another tradition from earlier years:
it convened a full ceremonial session in remembrance of the Justice's life
and achievements several weeks after his death. The full text of this cere-
mony was scheduled to be published in West Publishing Company's South-
ern Second series, a tradition still in use in many of the state's lower courts.
Finally, the Court also lowers its flags to half-staff upon the death of any
present or former Justice.
J. The Clerk's Office
The vast majority of the Supreme Court of Florida's contact with law-
yers and the public occurs through the Office of the Clerk of the Court. 2
Briefs are filed through the clerk, and virtually all routine communications
with lawyers are handled by this office. Yet, the clerk's staff does far more
Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA. L. REv. 803
(1990).
209. Letter from Justice Parker Lee McDonald, Supreme Court of Florida to Allen Morris,
Clerk-Emeritus/Historian, Florida House of Representatives (Nov. 2, 1992) (on file with au-
thor).
210. MoRRIs, supra note 202, at 122-24.
211. Id. at 113-14.
212. The present clerk is Thomas D. Hall, and the Chief Deputy Clerk is Debbie Caus-
seaux.
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than just deal with the public. The Clerk, who serves at the pleasure of the
Court,213 is charged with the responsibility of maintaining all papers, records,
files, and the official seal of the Court. Moreover, the Clerk's staff maintains
the Court's docket, oversees the rigorous procedural requirements imposed
on death penalty cases, arranges the exact timing of oral argument, issues
certificates of good standing for attorneys, certifies law students for practice
pursuant to chapter eleven of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar2 14 and
prepares finalized opinions for release to the public. Orchestrating routine
functions such as these requires considerable coordination among the law-
yers, the parties, and the Court. All such matters are handled by the Clerk's
office,215 and the workload is substantial and steadily increasing. In 1992,
the Clerk's office filed dispositions in 1890 cases and opened files in 1844
new cases, in addition to handling 314 motions for rehearing. In 2003, by
contrast, the Clerk's office filed dispositions in 2295 cases and opened files
in 2486 new cases, in addition to handling 245 motions for rehearing.
K. The Library of the Supreme Court of Florida
For its entire history, the Court has maintained its own law library,
which consequently is Florida's oldest state supported library in continuous
operation. An 1845 catalog in the library's possession still lists the 260 vol-
umes that comprised the Court's first collection in the year Florida was
granted statehood. By mid-2004, the library maintained around 117,908
volumes along with some 12,417 monograph titles, 1497 serial titles, and
hundreds of linear feet of archival and manuscript material.2t 6
But the library has not lost touch with its considerable history. A num-
ber of rare Florida legal books are in the Court's collection, including Span-
ish texts that were of great importance in the years after the Spanish Crown
ceded Florida to the United States.21 7 The library also still retains and uses a
large number of antique glass-front "barrister" book cases that have belonged
to the Court since they were first purchased in 1913. These Globe-Wernicke
sectional bookcases filled five railroad cars when originally delivered,
213. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(c).
214. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 11.1.4.
215. Current clerk's office staff assignments are listed at http://www.floridasupremecourt.
org/clerk/index.shtml.
216. Some of the information used here was compiled by former Supreme Court Librarian
Brian Polley.
217. The treaty ceding Florida bound both the United States and the future state govern-
ment to honor matters already finalized under Spanish law. Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v.
McRae, 98 So. 505, 524-25 (Fla. 1923). Thus, a large number of early court cases actually
rested on an interpretation of Spanish law.
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prompting a proud headline in the October 3, 1913 edition of a Tallahassee
newspaper, The Weekly True Democrat.2 8
The Office of the Court Librarian 29 has existed only since 1957, and the
occupant serves at the pleasure of the Court. The current librarian also has
been designated as the official court archivist and historian by the Chief Jus-
tice. Beginning in 1862, the Clerk also wore the hat of "head" librarian,
though from 1899 until 1957, a full-time assistant librarian was employed.
The library is open to the public, but it does not circulate books. Its hours of
operation are 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holi-
days, although the stacks are available to Court Justices and staff at any time.
L. The Office of the State Courts Administrator
The Office of the State Courts Administrator was created on July 1,
1972, when the state courts were constitutionally unified under the adminis-
trative control of the Supreme Court. It is also located in the Supreme Court
Building. Its initial purpose was to assist the Chief Justice and the Court
with technical and fiscal problems associated with preparing the operating
budget of the judicial branch, as well as compiling statistics on the need for
new judges and specialized court divisions throughout Florida. Today, the
Office of the State Courts Administrator22° serves as the overall administra-
tive office, overseeing the operations of the entire justice system, including
all of the trial and appellate courts and the state's judicial education system.
It also serves as the Court's liaison to a number of other agencies, including
the legislature, the Governor, auxiliary court agencies, and national judicial
agencies. Under the supervision of the Chief Justice, the office oversees a
variety of legal programs, information systems used by the courts, and the
judicial branch's accounting and fiscal activities.
M. The Marshal
The Court also appoints a marshal to be the custodian of the Supreme
Court building and grounds and to be the conservator of the peace in the
building or any place where the Court is sitting. The Marshal is also author-
ized to execute the process of the Court throughout Florida. To this end, the
marshal is vested with constitutional authority to deputize the sheriff or a
218. See Five Carloads of Book Cases for Tallahassee, THE WEEKLY TRUE DEMOCRAT,
Oct. 3, 1913.
219. The present librarian is Joan Cannon.
220. The present State Courts Administrator is Elisabeth Goodner, and the Deputy State
Courts Administrator is Blan Teagle.
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deputy sheriff in any Florida county.22' The Marshal also is responsible for
performing some court budgeting, purchasing and contracting, security, and
property accountability and maintenance. Traditionally, the marshal also
calls the courtroom to order whenever the Justices enter to sit at any official
session. This call to order, often called the "oyez," is: "Hear ye, hear ye,
hear ye, the Supreme Court of the great state of Florida is now in session.
All who have cause to plea, draw near, give attention, and you shall be heard.
God save these United States, the great state of Florida, and this honorable
Court." 
2 2 2
III. AN OVERVIEW OF JURISDICTION
Of course, the most important aspect of the Supreme Court of Florida's
day-to-day operations is the exercise of its jurisdiction as the state's highest
court.223 It is through the exercise of jurisdiction that the Court chooses the
cases that it will hear and the issues that will be decided. Florida's society is
shaped by these decisions because the opinions that result from the exercise
of jurisdiction become a part of Florida law and create the precedent that will
control future cases. Moreover, the bulk of the Court's jurisdiction is discre-
tionary, meaning that the Court may decline to hear cases falling into particu-
lar categories even if it has jurisdiction over them.224 Accordingly, the Court
has significant power to choose the issues it deems to be the most important.
Jurisdiction in discretionary cases, for example, usually is put to a vote by a
panel of five Justices, with four votes being necessary to grant review.225 If
the vote of the five Justices is three-to-two, the case is then sent to the re-
maining Justices.226 In all such cases a majority of Justices is necessary for
the Court's exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction.227
221. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(c).
222. E.g., Text of the Florida Supreme Court Hearing on the Presidential Election Case,
ST. PETE. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 2000, available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/120700/Election
2000/ Text of theFlorida S.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
223. The historical development of the Court's jurisdiction is amply discussed elsewhere.
E.g., Arthur J. England, Jr. & Richard C. Williams, Jr., Florida Appellate Reform One Year
Later, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 221 (1981) [hereinafter Appellate Reform]; Constitutional Juris-
diction, supra note 3.
224. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3)-(6).
225. FLA. SUP. CT. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES § 2(A)(1)(a), available
at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/documents/IOPs.pdf (last visited Mar. 20,
2005). [hereinafter MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES]. If review is granted, but
four Justices do not agree on the need for oral argument, the Chief Justice decides the issue or
places the matter on the court conference agenda for resolution. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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A. The Nature of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction always involves a deceptively simple question: does the
Court have the power to hear and to determine the case?228 In discretionary
cases, a second question must also be addressed: why should the case be
heard?229 Most of the time, the answers are obvious. But there are a signifi-
cant number of cases that fall somewhere at the limits of the Court's jurisdic-
tion. These can be exceedingly complicated, and opinions addressing them
often take on the quality of philosophical abstraction. Yet such cases may be
highly important in the law because they draw the line between what the
Court will and will not hear. Much of the discussion below involves such
cases, and for that reason, the remainder of this article will be of primary
interest to lawyers and persons who may ask the Supreme Court of Florida to
hear their cases.
To further complicate the issue, the Court's jurisdiction is not based
upon a single unified concept. Rather, jurisdiction falls into five distinct
categories, each of which involves different concerns. These categories are:
advisory opinions, mandatory appellate jurisdiction, discretionary review
jurisdiction, discretionary original jurisdiction, and exclusive jurisdiction. 3 °
Each of these categories is addressed in detail below.
The basis of the Court's jurisdiction is not entirely uniform, but rather,
can vary among the categories. The variations are too numerous to include
in anything less than a treatise. However, the most important include: 1) the
presumptions circumscribing the Court's jurisdiction; 2) the precedential
value of decisions and opinions within each category; and 3) the limits
placed on the Court's discretion.
1. Presumptions
The presumptions circumscribing jurisdiction usually depend on the
question of whether the Court's jurisdiction is limited or plenary. The Su-
preme Court of Florida is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction.213 ' This means
that the Court is forbidden to exercise any form of jurisdiction not expressly
228. See State ex rel. Campbell v. Chapman, 1 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 1941).
229. See generally Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1988) (holding that the Court
has subject matter jurisdiction over appeal of decision of intermediate appellate court ex-
pressly citing a statute).
230. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b).
231. See generally Mystan Marine, Inc. v. Harrington, 339 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1976) (holding
that the Court has limited review); Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958) (holding that the
Court cannot go beyond its limited powers).
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provided in the Florida Constitution.232 Unlike the circuit courts, the Su-
preme Court of Florida does not have a general grant of plenary jurisdic-
tion,233 a grant that would give the Court authority over any matter not ex-
pressly excluded from its jurisdiction.
This is an important distinction and one of the most misunderstood as-
pects of the operation of the Court. The public, and indeed attorneys, often
cannot understand why the state's highest court cannot correct every per-
ceived wrong that has occurred in the lower courts. It also is the reason why
virtually every well written opinion issued by the Court begins with a state-
ment referencing the basis of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Florida
cannot act without an express basis in the constitution authorizing jurisdic-
tion. On the other hand, the circuit court is presumed to have jurisdiction
unless the constitution or statutes say otherwise.3 Put another way, the ju-
risdiction of the Court, being limited, tends to be strictly construed, while the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts, being plenary, tends to be liberally con-
strued.
Thus, in close cases, the presumptions would disfavor jurisdiction in a
court of limited jurisdiction while favoring jurisdiction in a court of plenary
jurisdiction. This has an important consequence. When parties invoke the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida, they usually are fighting against
a presumption that the Court cannot hear the case, and they carry a heavy
burden to demonstrate jurisdiction.
However, these limitations are not entirely uniform. The Court's au-
thority may verge on being plenary, at least within the context of certain
types of cases. For example, the Court has mandatory exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over a final judgment imposing a sentence of death.235 As a re-
sult, once the Court finds that a case involves the death penalty, the Court, as
a practical matter, probably has a form of plenary jurisdiction in that case
and the presumption would favor taking the case, even if there is some doubt
remaining.136 This is particularly true in light of the Court's "all writs" juris-diction, discussed more fully below. 2 37
232. See Harrington, 339 So. 2d at 201.
233. Compare FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) with FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
234. See id. at § 5(b).
235. Id. at § 3(b)(1).
236. See Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991).
237. See discussion infra Part VII.E.
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2. Precedential Value
Another factor that varies among the five categories is the precedential
value of cases. Some types of opinions issued by the Court may lack the
dignity accorded to others. This is especially true of advisory opinions,
which, though they may be persuasive, do not establish controlling prece-
dent.23 Opinions issued pursuant to the Court's exclusive jurisdiction also
may lack the binding effect of precedent, but only to the extent that they deal
with the Court's administrative and rule making functions. The Supreme
Court of Florida's exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the bench and the bar is
somewhat different. Court opinions disciplining judges and lawyers for im-
proprieties may establish a kind of precedent, while in practice, such cases
may be so fact-bound that the precedent is limited.
3. Discretion
Two categories of discretionary jurisdiction, discretionary review juris-
diction and discretionary original jurisdiction, involve a separate problem:
the concept and use of "discretion"239 in deciding to hear the case. Discretion
implies broad authority to choose, but the term has a somewhat different
meaning in the present context. In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,24° the Court noted
that even when a form of discretionary jurisdiction is established, the discre-
tion of the Court to act is not always boundless. 24  Discretion itself can be
limited by the existing policy and applicable law restricting the Court's ac-
tions even though technical jurisdiction might exist.242 In other words, when
the Court's authority to act is discretionary, it can establish by its own case
law rules governing the exercise of the discretion.
Restrictions on discretion may be most obvious when the Court's dis-
cretionary original jurisdiction is invoked seeking one of the so-called "ex-
traordinary writs." The mere request for mandamus, for example, vests the
Court with jurisdiction. However, well established law severely restricts the
Court's actual exercise of discretion to issue writs of mandamus2 43 and other
extraordinary writs. Similar restrictions apply when the Court is asked to
238. E.g., Fla. League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 399 n.3 (Fla. 1992).
239. Discretion can be involved to a lesser extent in other categories of jurisdiction, but
the restriction usually is so obvious as to merit little discussion. For example, the Court has
no discretion to refuse to hear a proper appeal pursuant to its mandatory jurisdiction. See FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1)-(2).
240. 530 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1988).
241. Id. at 288.
242. Id.
243. See discussion infra Part VII.A.
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review an appellate decision that allegedly conflicts with a decision of an-
other appellate court.244
As a practical matter, a determination of a lack of jurisdiction or lack of
discretion results in the same outcome, the case is not heard by the Court.
The distinction usually does not matter. However, there is at least one im-
portant consequence that justifies the distinction. In some cases, the deadline
by which appeals must be taken to the United States Supreme Court hinges
on whether the Supreme Court actually had jurisdiction of a case in which it
has denied review. If the Court had jurisdiction but did not exercise discre-
tion, then the time to take the further appeal is judged from the date the peti-
tion was dismissed or denied by the Court.245  But, if the Supreme Court
lacks jurisdiction, then the time to seek review in the higher court is judged
from the date the lower court's opinion became final.246 This is crucial for
litigants seeking an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Thus, law-
yers and litigants who hope to preserve all avenues of appeal must be mind-
ful of the distinction between jurisdiction and discretion.
Finally, of course, even when discretion is not limited by the law, the
Court still can refuse to exercise its discretion to hear any case falling within
a discretionary category. 247 Typically, this may occur if the Court determines
that the case does not present a significant issue or the result was essentially
correct. For this reason, jurisdictional briefs in discretionary cases should
always demonstrate that the case is significant enough to be heard. It is not
enough to establish that jurisdiction exists and that discretion is unrestricted
for present purposes, except in the rare case perhaps where the importance is
obvious.
B. Invoking the Court's Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida usually must be in-
voked by an affirmative act of one of the parties to the cause. This can occur
in several ways. In the advisory opinion category, jurisdiction is invoked by
the Governor or Attorney General by the mere filing of a letter with the
244. See discussion infra Part VI.D.
245. See Fla. Star, 530 So. 2d at 289.
246. Id. This problem sometimes has been addressed by saying that a court has "jurisdic-
tion to determine jurisdiction." However, the Supreme Court of Florida has avoided this type
of analysis, which does not really solve the problem. If a court merely has jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction, then the decision not to hear a case could be construed as retroactively
depriving the court of actual jurisdiction over the controversy. This would create a "Catch-
22" for lawyers who hope to appeal their cases to the United States Supreme Court.
247. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3)-(6).
2005]
57
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LA WREVIEW
141Court, outlining the issues. In the mandatory appellate jurisdiction cate-
gory, the Court's jurisdiction is automatic in death penalty appeals. 249 The
Court's jurisdiction is invoked by notice of appeal25 and petition in the other
subcategories. Discretionary review jurisdiction is invoked by filing a notice
of appeal to invoke discretionary jurisdiction and is followed by jurisdic-
tional briefs. However, in some types of cases, briefing on jurisdiction is
skipped and the case proceeds directly to merit briefing.251 In the discretion-
ary original jurisdiction category, review is sought by petition. Finally, the
Court's exclusive original jurisdiction can be invoked by petition;2 2 and in
the case of the decennial review of legislative apportionment, the Attorney
General must file the petition. 3
By far, the largest single category of petitions for review are based on
the assertion that jurisdiction exists because the decision under review con-
flicts with an opinion of another Florida appellate court. This category is
discussed in greater detail below. 4
IV. ADVISORY OPINIONS
Any discussion of advisory opinions usually begins with the observa-
tion that they are disfavored. 255 This principle hinges on the nature of advi-
sory opinions. As a broad rule, an advisory opinion is any conclusion of law
stated by a court in the absence of an actual controversy.256 The reasons are
obvious; courts exist to resolve real disputes, not to address abstract ques-
tions. Thus, the rule prohibits parties from bringing spurious lawsuits in
order to create precedent. The rule equally forbids judges to establish law
irrelevant to the matters at hand.257
However, the rule is subject to exceptions, partly because some contro-
versies do not fall into the neat categories the rule might suggest. Reason-
248. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(10); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
249. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
250. Technically, since review is mandatory after the death sentence is imposed, no notice
is actually required. However, because filing the notice triggers various time periods under
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice is almost always filed and, if not, the Court enters
an order advising the parties what it deems to have been a notice.
251. See discussion infra Part VI.
252. The Court also may exercise its exclusive original jurisdiction over rule making and
regulation of The Florida Bar on its own motion, but this is not done often.
253. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
254. See discussion infra Part VI.D.
255. See, e.g., Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Brooks, 341 So. 2d 993, 995 (Fla. 1976);
Dep't of Admin. v. Home, 325 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1976).
256. See Interlachen Lakes Estates, 341 So. 2d at 995.
257. See id.
[Vol. 29:3:431
58
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/1
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
able people often differ over the true scope of legal controversies. Moreover,
judicial opinions must be conveyed through the inherently inexact medium
of human language, and sometimes it is useful for judges to comment on
trends in developing case law and give guidance on ambiguous or unresolved
questions of law.
There is established precedent, for example, for judges to write what of-
ten are called "scholarly" opinions creating an in-depth analytic framework
to resolve particular issues. Opinions of this type almost always go beyond
the bare analysis required to answer the specific question presented by the
case, but rest on thorough research and reasoning contained in the text. As
cases from the United States Supreme Court have demonstrated, they often
are admired, honored, and addressed a wide range of issues.258 Thus, the rule
against advisory opinions does not apply to scholarly analyses, though such
opinions sometimes are criticized for their expansiveness.
Florida appellate opinions also have a long-standing tradition of con-
taining obiter dicta, a phrase usually shortened to "dicta," which by defini-
tion are statements in a court's opinion that are extraneous or absolutely un-
necessary to the resolution of the issues.25 9 Scholarly opinions, almost by
definition, are often built on dicta. Moreover, dicta are so common in opin-
ions that a well-established body of cases govern their interpretation, and
obviously, tolerate their continued use. Thus, dicta are extraneous statements
of law that are permissible, though not always taken as seriously as the hold-
ing in a case. Here again, the rule against advisory opinions does not reach
so far as to prohibit the use of dicta where it is deemed necessary to help
support the resolution of the issue being decided.
In any event, dicta are subject to strong limitations. Courts sometimes
say that dicta binds no one, not even the ones who wrote them,2 60 though this
assertion may be unreliable in many instances. In actual practice, dicta can
have persuasive force in much the same way that a concurring opinion can,
depending on the circumstances.261 This is most apparent in scholarly opin-
ions. In other words, dicta should be considered if relevant, can be ignored if
poorly reasoned or distinguishable, and gain greater force with repetition.
Whatever border separates dicta from advisory opinions has never been
finely drawn, and there probably can be no bright line rule. Clearly, dicta
can verge into an advisory opinion and thus, may be abused. In broad terms
258. E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
259. See Therrell v. Reilly, 151 So. 305, 306 (Fla. 1932).
260. E.g., Hart v. Stribling, 6 So. 455, 456 (Fla. 1889).
261. See Milligan v. State, 177 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965). But see Cont'l
Assurance Co. v. Carroll, 485 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 1986) (stating dicta is never regarded as
"ground-breaking precedent").
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however, statements that illuminate or place in context any relevant issue
have long been considered acceptable as a useful feature of opinion writing,
especially in forecasting the law's evolution. The rule against advisory opin-
ions would be most applicable to attempts to address wholly irrelevant is-
sues.
Even then, other long standing exceptions to the rule against advisory
opinions exist. In a few instances, even moot or completely abstract ques-
tions can be answered by the Court. For example, the mootness doctrine
generally requires dismissal of a cause in which the issues have been re-
solved so fully that any decision would have no actual effect.262 There is,
however, an important exception for moot cases that present important ques-
tions capable of repetition yet likely to evade review. If the Court finds this
situation to exist, jurisdiction may be determined as though the controversy
had never become moot.2
63
Likewise, the Florida Constitution itself expressly authorizes the Court
to consider questions of law and issue advisory opinions to the Governor and
Attorney General in two narrow circumstances. 2' Like all advisory opin-
ions, these opinions may not constitute binding precedent, though they can
be persuasive.26 5 They are authorized by the constitution to deal with situa-
tions in which the Court's opinion on a legal question can advance the public
interest, discussed below.
A. Advisory Opinions Requested by the Governor
The Supreme Court of Florida may issue advisory opinions to the Gov-
ernor on any question affecting the Governor's constitutional powers and
duties.266 By tradition, the question or questions are posed in a simple letter
to the Court from the Governor. 67 Often, the letter is quite detailed and may
include an in-depth briefing on the relevant law, including reasons why the
Governor believes the questions should be answered in a particular way.
Here, jurisdiction is mandatory; the Court must hear the case and issue
an opinion. 68 Upon receipt of the Governor's request, the Clerk's office
creates a case file and the letter is immediately routed to the Chief Justice,
262. Hollywood, Inc. v. Clark, 15 So. 2d 175, 181 (Fla. 1943).
263. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 589 n.2 (Fla. 1992) (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d
217 (Fla. 1984)).
264. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1(c), 10.
265. See Fla. League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1992).
266. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c).
267. This is consistent with the applicable rule which only requires that the Governor's
request be in writing. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.500(a).
268. Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. IV, § I(c).
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who will call a court conference to determine if the question can be answered
and if oral argument is desired. 69 If the case is accepted, the Chief Justice
may keep the case or assign it to another Justice.27° Oral argument is usually
granted,27' except where at least four Justices determine that the question is
not subject to answer for reasons discussed below.272 Any person whose
substantial interest may be affected by the advisory opinion also may be
permitted to participate.273 Time limitations on briefing and scheduling of
argument lie within the Court's discretion.274
An opinion is then issued on an expedited basis, subject to one excep-
tion-the constitution provides that the opinion must be rendered "not earlier
than ten days from the filing and docketing of the request, unless in [the
Court's] judgment the delay would cause public injury. '275 The opinion is
written in the form of a letter addressed to the Governor and signed by the
concurring Justices. The letter is then published like any other court opinion.
Any concurring or dissenting views are written in separate statements to the
Governor signed by the Justices agreeing with that particular viewpoint, and
are appended to the majority's letter.
Under the constitution's requirements, in the strictest sense, the Court's
discretion to answer a request for an advisory opinion is confined solely to
questions of the Governor's constitutional powers. 76 If the questions are
determined to be beyond constitutional concern, then the Court lacks discre-
tion and must refuse to answer.277 There is precedent that an advisory opin-
ion cannot address issues of the Governor's purely statutory powers. 78
Over the years, however, the distinction between constitutional and
statutory concerns has become a subject of some debate. In some cases the
Court's majority has answered questions about statutory matters if there was
some significant and identifiable nexus with the Governor's constitutional
269. See MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20, at § II(G)(1).
270. Id. Advisory opinions almost always fall into the "special" category of case assign-
ments. See discussion supra Part II.B.4.
271. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
272. FLA. R. App. P. 9.500(b)(1).
273. FLA. R. AP. P. 9.500(b)(2); MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES supra
note 20, at § II(G)(1).
274. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.500(b)(2).
275. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c).
276. Id.
277. See, FLA. R. APP. P. 9.500(b)(1); MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES
supra note 20, at § II(a)(1).
278. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 225 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1969) [hereinafter
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, July 1969].
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powers or duties. 279 For example, the Court has held that the Governor's
constitutional powers are implicated by questions posed to the Court about
new statutory tax schemes.280 This was done on grounds that the fiscal sta-
bility of the state was at stake, which implicated the Governor's fiscal duties
under the Florida Constitution.2 81
A similar result was reached in a case involving a statute modifying
Florida's appellate districts and creating judicial vacancies. There, the
Court found discretion to act because "irreparable harm" 283 otherwise might
result, and the constitutional nexus relied upon was the Governor's duty to
fill judicial vacancies. 284 Thus, in actual practice, the Court sometimes has
found it has discretion to answer questions about statutes significantly related
to any one of the Governor's express constitutional powers or duties.
"Statutory" advisory opinions of this type, even if proper, are not with-
out problems. Advisory opinions to the Governor have important limitations
beyond the fact that they are not technically binding precedent. For example,
the Court has held that advisory opinions cannot address federal issues. 85
The Court has also held that they can address Florida constitutional issues
only for prima facie validity.286 As a result, all federal questions remain un-
resolved, as well as any challenge to the statute's constitutionality as applied
to specific individuals.287 A Justice in one of the tax cases suggested that an
advisory opinion of this type can win the Governor, at best, a fragment of an
answer.
288
Advisory opinions to the Governor, in other words, appear most useful
when they are confined to the stricter parameters suggested by the Florida
Constitution itself: the Governor's constitutional powers and duties.2 89 The
Supreme Court of Florida is the final authority on the meaning of the state
279. E.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 301 (Fla. 1987) [here-
inafter Advisory Opinion to the Governor, July 1987].
280. Id. at 301.
281. See Advisory Opinion to the Governor, July 1987, 509 So. 2d at 292 (citing In re
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243 So. 2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1971)).
282. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor Request of June 29, 1979, 374 So. 2d 959
(Fla. 1979) [hereinafter June 29, 1979 Opinion].
283. Id. at 962.
284. Id.
285. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, July 1987, 507 So. 2d at 302.
286. Id. at 301-02.
287. Id. at 301. This restriction is self-evident. Advisory opinions deal with abstract
questions of law, not the concerns of single individuals not present in the court. "As applied"
challenges, by their very nature, require a controversy raised by individuals. See id. at 302.
288. Id. at 319-20. Justice Barkett declined to answer the questions. Advisory Opinion to
the Governor, July 1987, 507 So.2d at 319-320.
289. FLA. CONST. art. IV. § l(c).
[Vol. 29:3:431
62
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/1
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
constitution, subject to the people's power of amendment.290 Advisory opin-
ions confined to a question of pure Florida constitutional law are thus far
more persuasive than ones that delve into the potential challenges to the va-
lidity of statutes or into matters regulated by federal law.
B. Advisory Opinions Requested by the Attorney General
A second type of advisory opinion authorized by the constitution is re-
quested by the Attorney General. Cases of this type are confined solely to
the question of whether a citizen's petition to amend the state constitution
complies with technical requirements of the amendment process. 291' This
type of jurisdiction is of recent vintage.2  It was added to the constitution by
the people of Florida to lessen the possibility that citizens might expend con-
siderable time and resources on a petition initiative later declared invalid on
technical grounds. Previously, there was no way for initiative proponents to
obtain an advance court ruling on the validity of their petition.
Such a ruling is important because citizen petition initiatives are subject
to two requirements imposed by state law. The proposed amendment must
contain only a single subject293 and must include a fair and accurate ballot
summary of no more than seventy-five words.294 The Supreme Court of
Florida has determined that it cannot consider any issue beyond these two,
including whether the amendment, if enacted, would violate the United
States Constitution.295 Nor can the Court rewrite an unfair or inaccurate bal-
lot summary.296 However, these are restrictions imposed not by the constitu-
tion, but by the enabling legislation, which could be amended to lift the re-
290. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d 286, 288 (Fla. 1988); see also FLA. CONST. art. XI,
§3.
291. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10; see also FLA. CONST. art V, § 3(b)(1O).
292. The relevant constitutional amendment creating this form of jurisdiction was adopted
by the voters of Florida on November 4, 1986, and enabling legislation was approved the
following year.
293. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
294. See FLA. STAT. § 101.161(1) (2004).
295. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Ltd. Political Terms in Certain
Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1991) [hereinafter Ltd. Political Terms in Certain
Elective Offices]. In early 1994, a case was pending before the Supreme Court of Florida in
which several parties argued that advisory opinions to the Attorney General may properly
address federal constitutional questions. In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-
Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994) [hereinafter Restricts
Laws Related to Discrimination]. In effect, these petitions asked the Court to recede from its
earlier decision that the constitutional issues are not justiciable. Limited Political Terms in
Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d at 227.
296. Smith v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 606 So. 2d 618, 621-22 (Fla. 1992).
2005]
63
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LA W REVIEW
strictions. A bill to accomplish just that was approved by the 1993 Florida
Legislature but vetoed by the Governor297 and never became law. However,
in 2004, the voters overwhelmingly approved an amendment to the Constitu-
tion requiring that anyone circulating an initiative petition to file the appro-
priate paperwork with the Custodian of State Records no later than February
1st of the year in which the general election is held. Further, the Supreme
Court of Florida must render its written opinion no later than April 1st of the
same year.298
An action requesting an advisory opinion of this type is commenced by
the Attorney General, who is required by law to petition the Court once cer-
tain threshold requirements are met.299 The enabling legislation provides that
proponents of the citizen petition initiative must register as a political com-
mittee; must submit the ballot title, substance, and text to the Secretary of
State; and must obtain a letter from the state Division of Elections that a cer-
tain number of verified signatures have been obtained on the petition.300 At
this juncture, the Secretary of State must submit the petition to the Attorney
General,30 ' who is required to petition the Court within thirty days.30 2
The Court has determined that advisory opinions of this type are han-
dled substantially like those requested by the Governor.30 3 By analogy to
gubernatorial advisory opinions, the Attorney General has adopted the prac-
tice of submitting the case to the Court by means of a letter addressed to the
Justices. 34 The two relevant questions must be posed and answered, because
neither the Attorney General nor the Court has any discretion to expand or to
restrict the issues.
The Attorney General is neither required to brief the issue nor to take
any particular side in the case. However, the Attorney General's letter usu-
ally includes a statement outlining the facts, issues, and relevant law in an
objective manner. While most of the letter requests do not advocate any
297. See H.R. 195, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1993); S. 1278, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla.
1993).
298. See Div. of Elections, Fla. Dep't. of State, Constitutional Amendments Proposed by
Initiative, at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/fulltext/10-60.htm (last visited Mar. 12,
2005).
299. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
300. FLA. STAT. § 15.21 (2004). The number required is determined by a formula con-
tained in this statute. Id.
301. Id.
302. § 16.061.
303. MANUAL OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20, at § II(G)(2).
304. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. English-the Official Language of Flor-
ida, 520 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1988) [hereinafter Official English Language] (noting case was
submitted by letter).
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particular result, there have been exceptions.0 5 Any interested party may file
responses in the case, which usually is scheduled for oral argument. There
have been instances where the cases are expedited.30 6
Although consideration of cases of this type is of relatively recent ori-
gin, the Court nevertheless decides these cases by drawing on precedent.
Previously, challenges to proposed constitutional amendments could be
brought by means of a mandamus action filed at any time prior to the date of
the election.30 7 The Court has concluded that its new advisory jurisdiction is
similar to cases presenting the same issues previously considered by way of
mandamus, while subject to the inherent limitations of advisory opinions.3"8
Thus, earlier mandamus actions involving initiatives are relevant in deter-
mining the applicable law.
At one time the fact that this newer form of jurisdiction was regarded as
"advisory" was assumed to mean that any opinion issued by the Court was
persuasive but technically not binding, in keeping with the traditional under-
standing of advisory opinions.30 9 Nonetheless, it is increasingly hard to
square this limited conception with the way the Court actually treats these
cases. First, the Court still can entertain a later petition for mandamus pro-
vided that it does not attempt to relitigate issues already addressed in the
advisory opinion.3"0 To this extent the advisory opinion is not, strictly speak-
ing, "advisory" at all because it does establish a kind of law of the case.
More importantly, the Court clearly looks to its prior precedents in determin-
ing how to analyze and resolve such cases. The analysis does not simply
change from case to case, and it clearly has evolved beyond the earlier deci-
sional law established by mandamus.3 '
The standard for addressing the "single-subject" requirement wavered
during the early 1980s but has recently become more stable. All that is re-
quired is that the proposed amendment have "'a logical and natural oneness
305. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen., re: Amendment to Bar Gov't from Treating
People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d 888, 892-93 (Fla. 2000) [herein-
after Race Amendment Opinion] (showing that Attorney General firmly took the position that
the proposed initiative violated ballot requirements).
306. E.g., Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen., re: Patients' Right to Know About
Adverse Med. Incidents, 880 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 2004).
307. Fla. League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. 1992).
308. See Id. at 398-99.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 399.
311. See Race Amendment Opinion, 778 So. 2d at 888.
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of purpose,' 31 12 which occurs if all parts of the amendment may be "'viewed
as having a natural relation and connection as component parts, or aspects of
a single dominant plan or scheme."'3 13 The Court also has held that it is not
necessarily relevant that the proposed amendment affects more than one pro-
vision of the Florida Constitution or more than one branch of government
provided it meets the "oneness" standard.31 4 This analysis has been criticized
for its subjectivity315 but currently remains the standard of review.316
The standard for addressing the ballot summary issue has a more stable
history. The Court has consistently held that the "summary must state 'in
clear and unambiguous language the chief purpose of the measure,' but need
not explain every detail or ramification."3 7 The chief evil addressed by this
standard of review is to prevent the voters from being misled and to allow
votes to be cast intelligently.318 For example, the Court has held ballot sum-
maries defective for suggesting that new rights were to be given to the peo-
ple, when in fact rights were being taken away.319 Moreover, the failure to
include an adequate ballot summary cannot be cured by the fact that public
information about the amendment was widely available."
The Court has not adopted the practice of answering the Attorney Gen-
eral's questions in the form of a letter signed by the concurring Justices, as
happens with gubernatorial advisory opinions. Instead, the Court has issued
its conclusions in the form of an opinion, possibly because this was done in
the earlier mandamus actions.
V. MANDATORY APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Florida is vested with mandatory appellate juris-
diction over four specific categories of cases. These are: 1) death appeals;321
312. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen.-Ltd. Political Terms in Certain Elective
Offices, 592 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1991) [hereinafter Political Terms Opinion] (quoting Fine
v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 990 (Fla. 1984).
313. Id. (citing Fine, 448 So. 2d at 990 (quoting City of Coral Gables v. Gray, 19 So. 2d
318, 320 (Fla. 1944))).
314. Id. (discussing Weber v. Smathers, 338 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1976)).
315. Id. at 231 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
316. See Race Amendment Opinion, 778 So. 2d at 892.
317. Id.
318. Id. (quoting Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 155 (Fla. 1982)).
319. Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1355 (Fla. 1984) (discussing Askew, 421 So. 2d
at 151); People Against Tax Revenue Misgmt., Inc. v. County of Leon, 583 So. 2d 1373, 1376
(Fla. 1991).
320. Wadhams v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 567 So. 2d 414, 417 (Fla. 1990).
321. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
[Vol. 29:3:431
66
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/1
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
2) appeals involving the validity of public-revenue bonds; 22 3) appeals from
the Florida Public Service Commission;323 and 4) appeals from opinions of a
district court declaring a state statute or provision of the Florida Constitution
invalid.324 Jurisdiction in the first three subcategories is exclusive, meaning
that no other state appellate court can hear the case. 325 All cases brought
under the Court's mandatory jurisdiction are called "appeals," as distin-
guished from "reviews. 326
The reasons for vesting the Court with some limited forms of manda-
tory, exclusive appellate jurisdiction, are varied. In death appeals, for exam-
ple, the Court has noted that its mandatory appellate jurisdiction rests in part
on the need to ensure uniformity of the applicable law throughout Florida.32 7
Uniformity is essential in death cases because of a variety of federal constitu-
tional restrictions. Similar, but not necessarily the same reasoning applies to
bond validations and appeals to the Public Service Commission, where the
public policy implications are apparent. Enormous amounts of public money
and great potential liability often are at stake in these cases, and a determina-
tion by the state's highest court is necessary to dispel questions as to whether
publicly issued bonds are valid and whether utility regulations and rates are
lawful. Without such finality, bonds might be considered a poor risk by in-
vestors who might suddenly be cast in doubt by lingering and unresolved
legal issues and utility services might be delayed or impeded by protracted
appellate litigation or unresolved doubts in the law. Thus, the framers of the
constitution vested the Supreme Court of Florida with mandatory appellate
jurisdiction to resolve these matters.328
A. Death Appeals
The Court's authority over death appeals is one of the most straightfor-
ward. Very simply, the Court has exclusive, mandatory, and plenary juris-
diction over any final judgment imposing a sentence of death3 29 and all other
322. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
323. Id.
324. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b).
325. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
326. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) (using terms "appeal" and "review" in contradis-
tinction). The distinction apparently has a long history in Florida, where courts sometimes
have said that the word "appeal" denotes an appellate proceeding that may be had as a matter
of right. See Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 128 So. 2d 594, 597 (Fla. 1961).
327. Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991).
328. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1), (2).
329. FLA. CONST. art. V. § 3(b)(1).
2005]
67
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LAW REVIEW
matters arising from the same trial and sentencing.330 Moreover, jurisdiction
is automatic, meaning the Court must hear the case even if the inmate sen-
tenced to death does not wish to appeal. 3 In fact, this is the only category
of jurisdiction that is automatic. In the others, failure to bring an appeal or
seek review does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.332 A murder convic-
tion resulting in any penalty less than death is appealed to the appropriate
district court.
The disputes over this form of jurisdiction often relate to the collateral
proceedings that follow the conclusion of the appeal. The Court commonly
cites its constitutional jurisdiction over death appeals as a basis for hearing
collateral challenges. 333 This suggests the plenary nature of the jurisdiction
granted once the Court finds there is a final judgment of death in the case, a
conclusion reinforced by the Court's habeas corpus 33" and "all writs" juris-
diction.335 On rare occasions the Court has agreed to review such matters by
336
way of writ of prohibition.
Interlocutory appeals in ongoing trials that might result in a death pen-
alty also have raised issues of jurisdiction. The argument against the Court
hearing these cases rests chiefly on the fact that the constitution grants juris-
diction only where there is a final judgment imposing the death penalty.337
Thus, while it is clear that the Court can hear interlocutory matters in post
conviction death cases-those in which the death sentence has been imposed
and remains intact338 the same conclusion is less clear where the death sen-
tence has been vacated or is only a future possibility. In 1979, the Court
330. See Asay v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 649 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1994). See also Savoie v.
State, 422 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1982) (stating once the Court accepts jurisdiction to resolve a legal
conflict, it has discretion to consider other issues).
331. Muehleman v. State, 503 So. 2d 310, 313 (Fla. 1987) (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4)
(1985)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 882 (1987).
332. There are limited but rare exceptions when the Court exercises its administrative
jurisdiction sua sponte to make rules and regulate The Florida Bar. Moreover, administrative
acts of the Court are not judicial acts, properly speaking.
333. E.g., Johnson v. Singletary, 612 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S.
901 (1993).
334. See discussion infra Part VII.D.
335. See discussion infra Part VII.E.
336. See, e.g., State v. Donner, 500 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1987); State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2
(Fla. 1986). The writ of prohibition is discussed infra Part VII.C.
337. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
338. Trepal v. State, 754 So. 2d 702, 705-06 (Fla. 2000). However, the standard for de-
termining whether to accept such interlocutory matters is whether the order below "does not
conform to the essential requirements of law and may cause irreparable injury for which ap-
pellate review will be inadequate." Id. at 707. There are other strict filing requirements for
these types of appeals. Id.
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stated that there is no reason interlocutory appeals in death cases should not
go to a district court of appeal when they involve matters routinely reviewed
there.339 The Court's 1979 analysis of this issue came prior to the jurisdic-
tional reforms of 1980, but the rationale remains the same.34 ° However, the
Court has established that it retains its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
collateral matters on remand if it has vacated the death sentence but not the
underlying conviction.'
In 1988, the Court appeared to hold that decisions in interlocutory ap-
peals to a district court in a capital case become "law of the case," perhaps
even when no further appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida was possible at
the time. 42 This suggestion contradicted a 1984 holding to the contrary.343
A possible result is that the Court could be deprived of its ability to consider
an interlocutory issue that affects the validity of a later death sentence; a re-
sult that appears contrary to the principle of automatic and full review in
death cases.3 " Possible solutions to this issue include the recognition of
some form of exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction in all interlocutory ap-
peals in capital cases or to hold that the law of the case doctrine does not
apply in this context. Exclusive jurisdiction could be premised on the
Court's jurisdiction over judgments of death or its all writs power.345 How-
ever, this view apparently was rejected by the Court in 2000.346
Moreover, either of these approaches strains the constitution's language
and risks burdening the Court's docket with interlocutory appeals from cases
that may or may not result in a death penalty. Limiting the law of the case
doctrine seems more consistent both with the pre-1988 case law3 47 and the
language of the constitution itself. The Supreme Court of Florida's jurisdic-
tion requires a final judgment of death, not mere speculation that such a
judgment will be entered.348 Moreover, interlocutory appeals in death cases
rarely involve matters the district courts do not routinely consider, a state-
339. State v. Preston, 376 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 1979).
340. State v. Fourth Dist. Court of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1997).
341. Id.
342. LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750, 754 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989).
But see Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939, 942 (Fla. 1984).
343. Preston, 444 So. 2d at 942.
344. See id.
345. See discussion infra Part VII.E.
346. See Trepal, 754 So. 2d at 707.
347. See discussion supra Part 11.B.
348. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
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ment that the Court itself has now specifically endorsed in the context of
death cases3 49 and that district courts have applied.35
B. Bond Validation
The second form of mandatory, exclusive appellate jurisdiction deals
with a trial court's validation or rejection of bond issues made for some pub-
lic purposes.3 51 Typically, the bonds are issued by governmental units to
build infrastructure, to finance public projects, or to otherwise advance the
public welfare. This is a type of jurisdiction authorized by the Florida Con-
stitution but requires enabling legislation352 that has been enacted.353
The jurisdictional grant is narrow. The Court has said that its sole func-
tion in such cases is to determine whether the governmental agency issuing
the bonds had the power to act as it did, and whether the agency exercised its
power in accordance with the law.354 Some procedural time limits are abbre-
viated in bond cases to allow expedited review.355 The determination of le-
gality can include questions that might impugn the bond issue, such as the
propriety of an election in which voters approved a funding source securing
the issue.356 Moreover, many types of bonds are proper only if issued for
public, municipal, or other specific purposes.357 But these restrictions are
sometimes broadly construed. "Public purpose," for instance, has been
found to include even some projects of primary benefit to relatively small
segments of the public358 or even private enterprise. 359 Perhaps the most fa-
349. Richardson v. State, 706 So. 2d 1349, 1357 (Fla. 1998) (citing State v. Pettis, 520 So.
2d 250, 253 (Fla. 1988) (involving interlocutory matters in case not involving capital punish-
ment)).
350. E.g., State v. Richards, 843 So. 2d 962, 968 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
351. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
352. See id.
353. FLA. STAT. § 75.08 (2004).
354. State v. Leon County, 400 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla. 1981).
355. FLA. R. App. P. 9.110(i), 9.330(c).
356. People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. County of Leon, 583 So. 2d
1373, 1376 (Fla. 1991).
357. E.g., State v. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d 1315, 1316-18 (Fla. 1991) (receding from
State v. City of Panama City Beach, 529 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1988)); see FLA. CONST. art. VII. §§
2, 10-17; FLA. STAT. §§ 75.01-.17 (2004).
358. N. Palm Beach County Water Control Dist. v. State, 604 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1992).
359. E.g., Linscott v. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth., 443 So. 2d 97, 101 (Fla. 1983);
State v. Osceola County Indus. Dev. Auth., 424 So. 2d 739, 742 (Fla. 1982).
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mous of these cases involved the validation of bonds for reclamation and
water control in the vicinity of Walt Disney World.
360
C. Public Service Commission Appeals
The third form of mandatory, exclusive jurisdiction governs appeals
from orders of the Florida Public Service Commission affecting rates or ser-
vices of electric, gas, or telephone utilities."' Jurisdiction requires enabling
legislation, which has been enacted.362 It deserves emphasis that the orders
under appeal must relate to rates or services.363 Other types of issues often
arise in Public Service Commission cases and, therefore, do not fall within
the Supreme Court of Florida's exclusive jurisdiction.3"
The enabling legislation adds a few insights into the Court's jurisdic-
tion. For instance, it specifies that appeal is obtained "upon petition. 365
Additionally, one statute equates the term "telephone service" with "tele-
communications company, 366 thus defining the Supreme Court of Florida's
jurisdiction to reach most forms of communication for hire within the
state.367 There appear to be no cases addressing whether this statutory defini-
tion comports with the strict language of the constitution, which only uses
the word "telephone, 368 or indeed whether the term "telephone" now must
be read more inclusively as new forms of communication emerge in an era of
technology unforeseen when this constitutional language was framed.
D. Statutory/Constitutional Invalidity
The final form of mandatory jurisdiction differs from the other three be-
cause it is not exclusive. Cases involving statutory or constitutional invalidity
are appealed from a district court decision that has stricken a provision of the
Florida Statutes or Florida Constitution. 369 The plain language of the consti-
tution requires that this decision must actually and expressly hold the statu-
360. State v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist., 216 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1968) (case arose prior
to adoption of the 1968 Constitution).
361. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
362. FLA. STAT. §§ 364.381, 366.10 (2004).
363. See§364.381.
364. E.g., State v. Lindahl, 613 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). For a discussion
of jurisdiction in other types of cases, see Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 3.
365. FLA. STAT. § 366.10 (2004).
366. FLA. STAT. § 364.381 (2004).
367. See § 364.02(7).
368. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
369. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
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tory or constitutional provision invalid.37° Apparently, it is not enough that
the opinion can merely be construed to have reached the same result tac-
itly. 371 Likewise, jurisdiction does not exist if only a single judge on a three-
judge district-court panel "held" the statute invalid, even if that judge's opin-
ion is characterized as the "opinion" of the Court. This rests on the sound
principle that the actual holding of the Court is what a majority has voted to
approve, not what the minority has opined.372
However, commentators have suggested that the Court might properly
exercise this type of jurisdiction in the rare event that a district court has
summarily affirmed a lower court's ruling expressly invalidating a statute.
373
It is not difficult to interpret this grant of mandatory jurisdiction as entirely
eliminating the concerns applicable in reviewing "per curiam affirmed" deci-
sions in other contexts,374 at least where the trial court itself clearly declared
a statute invalid. This situation would contrast with the problem contem-
plated by the inherency doctrine: How should the Court handle decisions
from the lower courts that have not clearly declared a statute invalid? Even
if this view is rejected, however, another possible basis for review could be
the Court's all writs jurisdiction, discussed below.375 It is entirely possible
that serious disruption in the state's legal process could occur if a trial court's
plain declaration of statutory invalidity remained unreviewable by the Su-
preme Court simply because it is shielded behind a district court's "per cu-
riam affirmed" decision.
370. Id. Any direct statement by a district court that a statute or constitutional provision is
invalid almost certainly would be construed as a holding and thus part of the decision, even if
unnecessary to the case. Review then could be had on that basis. However, the Supreme
Court of Florida did decline review in one case with peculiar facts. In Hanft v. Phelan, the
court dismissed jurisdiction where invalidity was only one of several alternative holdings and
the district court had remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine which of the holdings
was proper in the specific case. 488 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1986). Absent the remand for an eviden-
tiary hearing, it seems unlikely that Hanfi would have been dismissed merely because there
were alternative holdings. Id.
371. For a discussion of this "inherent invalidity" argument, see Constitutional Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 3. As this article notes, the first "inherent invalidity" case in which jurisdic-
tion was denied apparently was Southern Gold Citrus v. Dunnigan, 399 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.
1981) (unpublished table decision). For a discussion of the now-abolished inherency doctrine,
see discussion infra Parts VI.A-B.
372. Byrd v. State 880 So. 2d 616, 617 (Fla. 2004).
373. Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 169-70.
374. But cf, Grate v. State, 750 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 1999). Grate can be distinguished
on grounds it mandates denial of review of per curiam affirmed decisions when review is
sought in the Supreme Court by way of extraordinary writ. Id. Nevertheless, the broad word-
ing of Grate can be read as forbidding jurisdiction over per curiam affirmed decisions on any
basis. See id.
375. See discussion infra Part VII.E.
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There has been concern that this form of jurisdiction might only apply
when a statutory or constitutional provision is declared facially invalid and
not where invalidity is determined on an "as applied" '376 challenge. However,
the Court has not recognized this distinction. "As applied" invalidity has
been used as the basis for jurisdiction, though the Court sometimes has done
so without comment by extension from earlier case law.377 Before the 1980
reforms, "as applied" jurisdiction had proven controversial, being rejected in
1961,378 and then authorized again in 1963 by a divided court. 379 The prac-
tice was reaffirmed in 1979 shortly before the most recent jurisdictional re-
forms, again by a fragmented court,38 and has remained in use since with
little discussion.381
Earlier criticisms may still have some merit in that an "as applied" deci-
sion invalidates a statute or constitutional provision only in cases with simi-
lar and limited facts. Thus, there is a less pressing reason for mandatory
review, because the decision under appeal essentially leaves the statute or
provision in effect, subject to a fact-specific exception. However, much of
the earlier criticism focused on the fact that trial court orders declaring a
statute invalid were directly appealable to the Court.382 This direct review is
no longer available.
It is also worth noting that the apparent purpose of mandatory jurisdic-
tion in these cases is to achieve a degree of finality and uniformity of law. If
the Court were not required to hear an appeal, the district court decisions in
question might remain on the books for years without being either approved
or disapproved. As a result, statutes or constitutional provisions might be
enforced in some appellate districts but not others. Mandatory jurisdiction
greatly diminishes these possibilities.
Such concerns cannot be completely eliminated, however. For exam-
ple, any state court decision striking a provision of the Florida Constitution
could do so only on grounds that the provision violated the United States
Constitution, a federal statute, or a treaty binding upon the state through the
Supremacy Clause.383 That necessarily means that the resolution of the issue
376. See Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 170.
377. See Psychiatric Assoc. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 1992) (accepting jurisdic-
tion for "as applied" invalidity).
378. Stein v. Darby, 134 So. 2d 232, 237 (Fla. 1961).
379. Snedeker v. Vemmar, Ltd., 151 So. 2d 439, 441-42 (Fla. 1963).
380. Cross v. State, 374 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1979).
381. E.g., State v. lacovone, 660 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1995).
382. See Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 166.
383. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Of course we are not talking here about the far different
situation in which a constitutional amendment is stricken because of ballot defects, which has
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by the Supreme Court of Florida would rest entirely on federal questions that
could be decided differently by federal courts. Thus the determination of the
case by the Supreme Court of Florida would not necessarily be the final
word.
VI. DISCRETIONARY REVIEW JURISDICTION
The discretionary review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida
accounts for the largest share of the petitions that it receives.3 4 This type of
jurisdiction is discretionary because the Court, in every instance, can decline
to hear a case and in some instances will decline because its case law has
restricted discretion.385 All cases brought under this type of jurisdiction tech-
nically are called "reviews," as distinguished from "appeals," though lawyers
and justices alike sometimes use the terms interchangeably. 86 The distinc-
tion between the terms is found in the constitution itself.3 87 In a more collo-
quial sense, "reviews" in this category do, in fact, constitute a broad type of
"appellate" jurisdiction because the Court is reviewing actions taken by
lower courts.
Jurisdiction over discretionary review cases is invoked when a party
files two copies of a notice that review is being sought, which must be done
within thirty days of rendition 38 8 of the order in the case. 389 The notice must
be filed with the clerk of the district court, must be accompanied by the
proper fee, and must be in the form prescribed by rule.39° Briefing on juris-
diction is allowed in all cases except where the district court has certified a
question of great public importance, or has certified that the case is in direct
conflict with the decision of another district court.39' The Court has not re-
quired briefing on jurisdiction in these cases beyond the filing of the notice.
occurred at least once after the vote on the amendment. See Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7
(Fla. 2000).
384. For example, there were approximately ninety-three such petitions filed in 2002.
385. For a discussion of "discretion" see supra Part III.A.3.
386. For a discussion distinguishing reviews from appeals, see supra text accompanying
note 326.
387. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b).
388. Rendition occurs when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower
tribunal, subject to some exceptions. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.020(h).
389. FLA. R. App. P. 9.120(b).
390. FLA. R. App. P. 9.200(b)-(c), 9.900.
391. FLA. R. App. P. 9.120(d). "Certified question" is discussed infra Part VI.E. "Certi-
fied conflict" is discussed infra Part VI.F. The historical reason underlying the lack of juris-
dictional briefing in this category of cases now has been called into question by subsequent
refinements in the Court's jurisdictional case law. See infra notes 593-97 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 29:3:431
74
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/1
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
A. Declaration of Statutory Validity
The first type of discretionary review jurisdiction governs district court
decisions expressly declaring a state statute valid.392 For jurisdiction to exist,
the decision under review must contain some statement to the effect that a
specified statute is valid or enforceable.393 The constitution does not directly
say whether the statement must be necessary to the result reached.394 In an
analogous context, however, the Court has expressly premised its jurisdiction
on statements that were dicta.395
While this conclusion may be justifiable in the sense that dicta have
persuasive force, it does seem somewhat at odds with the constitution's re-
quirement that jurisdiction be based on a "decision. '3 96 At least in other con-
texts, it has been held that the decision is the result reached and is not gratui-
tous dicta in the opinion.397 However, in an earlier decision the Court indi-
cated that the term "decision," as used in the constitution's jurisdictional
sections, encompasses not merely the result but also the entire opinion.398 Of
course, the fact that a statute is declared valid in dicta may provide a less
compelling basis for the Court to exercise its discretion over the case.
Importantly, the 1980 constitutional jurisdictional amendments over-
ruled the much criticized "inherency doctrine ' 399 by which review might be
had if the Court believed that an opinion tacitly found a statute valid.4"' This
might occur, for example, where the opinion applied the statute as though it
were valid but did not directly discuss or make a finding of validity.
392. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
393. See Cantor v. Davis, 489 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1986).
394. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
395. See Watson Realty Corp. v. Quinn, 452 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 1984) (involving ex-
press and direct conflict of decisions).
396. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
397. The Court has recognized the importance of the distinction in analogous contexts.
See Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980) (jurisdiction based on express and
direct conflict of decisions of different courts of appeal or the supreme court).
398. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1958).
399. See Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 111 So. 2d 439
(Fla. 1959).
400. See Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 183. The situation contemplated by
the inherency doctrine, involving statutory validity, should be contrasted with the situation
where a trial court declares a statute invalid and the district court then affirms by per curiam
affirmed decision. In the latter case, the Court still might have jurisdiction based on other
provisions of Article V, section 3, of the Florida Constitution. See discussion infra Parts
VI.B-H.
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B. Construction of State or Federal Constitutions
The second form of discretionary jurisdiction arises when the decision
of the district court below expressly construes a provision of the state or fed-
eral constitutions.40 ' The operative phrase "construes a provision" was im-
ported into the 1980 jurisdictional reforms essentially unchanged from what
had existed previously, except that the word "expressly" was added.4 °2
Commentators in 1980 stated their view that the new requirement of "ex-
pressness" merely codified prior case law.403 Thus, it does seem likely that
pre-1980 case law on this type of jurisdiction remains persuasive and that the
addition of the word "expressly" may signal either an affirmation of existing
case law or a more stringent test for jurisdiction than was mandated earlier.
Prior to the 1980 reforms, the Court held that the inherency doctrine
does not apply to this type of jurisdiction °. 4' Rather, the decision under re-
view had to "explain, define or otherwise eliminate existing doubts arising
from the language or terms of the constitutional provision."" 5 The key word
was "doubts;" the opinion under review had to contain a statement recogniz-
ing or purporting to resolve some doubt about a constitutional provision. 6
Thus, jurisdiction does not exist if only a single judge on a three-judge dis-
trict court panel "construed" a statute or provision of the Constitution, even if
that judge's opinion is characterized as the "decision" of the Court 7.40  This
rests on the sound principle that the actual holding of the Court is what a
majority has voted to approve, not what the minority has opined.0 8 For
much the same reason, the statement of construction must be a "ruling" 409
that was more than a mere application of a settled constitutional principle.410
Absent the obligatory act of construction, it was not enough that a petitioner
simply alleged an unconstitutional result.41' Commentators called this the
"explain or amplify" requirement. 2
401. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
402. See Appellate Reform, supra note 223, at 184-85.
403. Id. at 184.
404. Ogle v. Pepin, 273 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. 1973).
405. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. City of Tampa, 106 So. 2d 407, 409 (Fla. 1958)).
406. Id.
407. Byrd v. State, 880 So. 2d 616, 617 (Fla. 2004).
408. Id.
409. Dykman v. State, 294 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975).
410. Rojas v. State, 288 So. 2d 234, 236 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851 (1974).
411. See Carmazi v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 104 So. 2d 727, 728-29 (Fla. 1958).
412. Appellate Reform, supra note 223, at 240.
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This analysis still would appear to be sound, especially in light of the
additional requirement that the construction be express. The Supreme Court
of Florida is the one state court that can resolve legal doubts on a statewide
basis. Resolving constitutional doubts is a highly important function because
it results in more predictable organic law. No similar purpose is served by
the Court hearing a case that has merely reiterated settled principles. The
Court's jurisdiction, for example, may be exercised to say whether an evolu-
tion in constitutional law developed by the lower appellate courts is
41314proper, or to resolve a doubt those courts have expressly noted.414 The
Court's more recent cases appear to be in accord with the pre-1980 analysis
outlined above." 5
Issues have arisen, however. For one thing, the line that separates "ex-
plain or amplify" from "mere application" has sometimes been hard to dis-
tinguish. In the 1975 case Potvin v. Keller,4" 6 for example, a district court
opinion merely mentioned the appellants' Fourteenth Amendment argument
and then affirmed the trial court's order without stating whether the Four-
teenth Amendment had any bearing on the decision. 4  The Supreme Court
of Florida's majority in Potvin buttressed its jurisdiction by noting that the
district court had "ruled" that "no constitutional infirmity" existed based on
the specific facts at hand.418 Later in the opinion's analysis, the majority
noted that the district court's opinion "may" have overstated federal case law
when talking about constitutional and statutory rights that were not further
identified. 49 Thus, the district court arguably had tried to eliminate a doubt
about the Fourteenth Amendment. A misapplication or misstatement of set-
tled law can be viewed as an evolutionary development deserving correction;
but on Potvin's peculiar facts, it appears that some straining was needed to
reach so far, especially because the lower court's result was affirmed.
The difficulty becomes especially evident when a second question is
posed: How specifically must the district court identify a constitutional pro-
vision it is construing? The district court in Potvin did not premise its actual
holding on any specific constitutional provision, though it did construe a
413. Any evolution in law by a lower court inherently creates a "doubt:" Is the new prin-
ciple or the new application correct?
414. A district court sometimes may outline its doubts about what appears to be a settled
constitutional principle it is applying. The statement of doubt creates an issue that sometimes
may deserve resolution by the Supreme Court of Florida.
415. E.g., Foster v. State, 613 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1993); City of Ocala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15
(Fla. 1992); City Nat'l Bank v. Tescher, 578 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1991).
416. 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975), aff'g 299 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
417. Id. at 704.
418. Id.at704n.l.
419. Id. at 705.
2005]
77
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LA WREVIEW
federal case dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, a reader could
not finally determine that the Fourteenth Amendment was being construed in
Potvin without considering the opinion of the federal case cited therein.420
This analysis may risk creating a kind of "incorporation-by-reference"
jurisdiction any time an opinion cites to other authorities analyzing a consti-
tutional provision. Such a possibility is especially difficult to square with the
1980 amendment's requirement that construction must be "express." In fact,
the 1980 jurisdiction amendments could be viewed as superseding Potvin by
adding the requirement that constitutional construction be "express.'1 21 Pot-
vin probably is now best understood as a case of limited precedential value in
which the Court stretched the envelope of its jurisdiction to correct a defi-
cient lower court analysis that, nevertheless, had reached a correct result.
Perhaps a better approach is the one suggested in the Court's earlier
cases. For jurisdiction to exist, the district court's opinion must explain or
amplify some identifiable constitutional provision in a way that is an evolu-
tionary development in the law or that expresses doubt about some legal
point.42 Misapplication of earlier law could rise to this level to the extent
that it can be considered an evolutionary development; but even then, the
decision must contain a discussion of a specific constitutional provision.
While it would be needlessly technical to require a specific citation, any ref-
erence sufficient to identify a particular constitutional provision may qual-
ify.4
23
It remains to be seen whether the Court will recognize dicta as a suffi-
cient basis for jurisdiction in cases of this type. The Court has expressly
used dicta to establish jurisdiction in analogous contexts,424 and thus, proba-
bly could do so here as well. Dicta establishing some new principle of con-
stitutional law would have persuasive value, though perhaps not quite
amounting to "rulings., 425 Review might be justified on that basis, especially
where the dicta could be disruptive of established law. In any event, jurisdic-
tion remains discretionary and could be declined if the dicta seem harmless.
420. See Potvin v. Keller, 299 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (citing In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
421. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
422. Ogle v. Pepin, 273 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1973); Dykman v. State, 294 So. 2d 633, 634-35
(Fla. 1973).
423. See Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So. 2d 57, 59 (Fla. 1971).
424. Watson Realty Corp. v. Quinn, 452 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 1984).
425. See Dykman, 294 So. 2d at 635; but cf Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Branham, 104 So.
2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1958) (stating term "decision" as used in the constitution's jurisdictional
provisions includes the entire written opinion).
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C. Opinions Affecting Constitutional or State Officers
The third basis of discretionary review jurisdiction exists when a deci-
sion of a district court expressly affects a class of constitutional or state offi-
cers.4 26 Again, the operative language here was imported into the 1980 revi-
sions nearly unchanged from the pre-1980 constitution, but again with the
word "expressly" added. Commentators in 1980 noted that the "express-
ness" requirement had the principle purpose of foreclosing any review of a
district court decision issued without opinion.2 7 The Court has adopted this
view.428 In that light, the pre-1980 case law was largely unaffected and
probably remains persuasive.
Consistent with the "expressness" requirement, the Court in 1974 held
that a decision does not fall within this type of jurisdiction unless it meets a
very restrictive test; it must "directly and, in some way, exclusively affect the
duties, powers, validity, formation, termination[,] or regulation of a particu-
lar class of constitutional or state officers., 429 Thus, the decision must do
more than simply modify, construe, or add to the general body of Florida
law. If other criteria are met, it is not necessarily dispositive that members of
a valid class were or were not litigants in the district court.4 °' The Court has
said that jurisdiction could exist even where no class members were parties
to the action, provided the decision affects the entire class in some way "un-
related to the specific facts of [that] case."43
In most instances, it would appear safe to assume that the parties to the
proceedings below are the only ones allowed to seek review in the Supreme
Court of Florida, even though they may not be members of the "affected
class." However, this has not always been true. One case, In re Order on
Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public De-
fender,432 was accepted even though review was sought by governmental
agencies not actually a party in the proceedings below.133 In any event, the
case had very unusual facts, and some may question whether it was errone-
ously assigned to this particular subcategory of jurisdiction.
426. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
427. See Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 187.
428. See School Bd. of Pinellas County v. Dist. Court of Appeal, 467 So. 2d 985, 986 (Fla.
1985).
429. Spradley v. State, 293 So. 2d 697, 701 (Fla. 1974).
430. Id. at 701-02.
431. Id. at 701.
432. 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990).
433. Id.
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The case arose in 1990 when a district court entered a sua sponte order
prohibiting a public defender from bringing appeals arising outside his own
circuit.434 This, of course, would require public defenders in other circuits to
handle their own appeals. Because the public defenders in other circuits
lacked adequate resources, it appeared that county governments would be
forced to pay for court-appointed private lawyers in their own circuits. As a
consequence, several county governments then filed a "motion for rehear-
ing," which was summarily denied. The county governments then sought
and obtained review in the Supreme Court of Florida, based not on their own
constitutional status, but on the basis that the district court's order affected
the duties of public defenders in other counties.435
The act of filing the "motion for rehearing" somehow made the county
governments a "party," but this is not at all clear. This situation also could
be viewed as a determination that the counties, as affected parties, were
granted the right to intervene, albeit not explicitly. The summary order of
dismissal is equally consistent with the view that the district court refused to
recognize the county governments as a party. Importantly, however, it ap-
pears that no one raised or argued any objections to jurisdiction when the
matter was brought to the Supreme Court of Florida. It thus seems highly
unlikely that the Court was creating any form of "third-party standing."
Whatever the case, In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals
may be characterized as an exercise of the Court's "all writs" jurisdiction,
which is discussed in greater detail below.436 "All writs" review previously
has been allowed to bring serious governmental crises for expedited review
where some factual or procedural quirk threatens to deprive the Court of its
"ultimate jurisdiction."'' " That situation almost certainly existed here, where
a technical lack of standing might have frustrated the Court's ultimate ability
to review an important case that could have been brought to the Court by
someone else or in some other form.43 8
Another problem in this form of jurisdiction is the definition of the
phrase "class of constitutional or state officers." The Court has held that the
word "class" means there must be more than one officer of the type in ques-
434. Id. at 1132.
435. Id. at 1131-33; see Brief on Jurisdiction of Collier County, In re Order on Prosecu-
tion of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla.
1990) (No. 74-574).
436. See discussion infra Part VILE.
437. E.g., Fla. Senate v. Graham, 412 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1982).
438. See discussion supra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of the reasons why the lack of
standing might have frustrated the Court's ultimate ability to review the case.
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tion,439 and there is no jurisdiction over a decision affecting only a single
board with multiple members where the sole powers affected are those of the
board as a single entity.44° In such a situation, the entity constitutes only one
"officer." 441 The fact that an office or board is unique, would appear to mean
that there is no jurisdiction.44 At a minimum, there must be two or more
officers or entities who separately and independently exercise identical pow-
ers of government that are peculiarly affected by the district court's deci-
sion.443 Jurisdiction would exist, for example, where a decision affects every
board of county commissioners in the state in some way peculiar to them as a
class.
The Court has rejected the view that the "class" requirement applies
only to constitutional officers, not to state officers.4" Indeed, the Court has
never clearly distinguished the two types of officers. It is clear from the lan-
guage of the cases that the Court considers a "constitutional officer" to in-
clude any office of public trust actually created by the constitution itself.445
439. State Bd. of Health v. Lewis, 149 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. 1963).
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. The opinion in State v. Bowman, 437 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1983), at first blush, seems to
reach a contrary result; the district court's opinion primarily affected the Attorney General, a
unique office. Moreover, the Attorney General brought the case to the Supreme Court of
Florida. Id. at 1095. However, Bowman involved a question of whether a particular duty fell
to the Attorney General or to the various state attorneys throughout Florida. Id. at 1096.
Thus, there was a "class" of constitutional officers whose duties were at stake. Id. Bowman
may be significant in that sense because the district court's opinion had determined that the
duty in question fell to the Attorney General, not to the State Attorneys. Id. Thus, Bowman
tacitly recognizes jurisdiction where the district court's decision holds that the "class" of
officers has no duty to act in a particular situation. Bowman, 437 So. 2d at 1096. Bowman is
also significant in that it tacitly recognizes jurisdiction even where the petition for review is
not brought by a member of the affected class-a conclusion supported by other cases. Id.;
see Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d at 1130.
443. Lewis, 149 So. 2d at 43.
444. See Larson v. Harrison, 142 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla. 1962) (Drew, J., concurring spe-
cially).
445. E.g., Skitka v. State, 579 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1991) (stating that public defenders, cre-
ated by Article V, section 18 of the Florida Constitution are constitutional officers); Ramer v.
State, 530 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1988) (stating that sheriffs, created by Article VIII, section 8(1)(d)
of the Florida Constitution are constitutional officers); Bystrom v. Whitman, 488 So. 2d 520
(Fla. 1986) (stating that property appraisers, created by the Article VIII, section l(d) of the
Florida Constitution are constitutional officers); Jenny v. State, 447 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984)
(stating that state attorneys, created by the Article V, section 17 of the Florida Constitution are
constitutional officers); Taylor v. Tampa Elec. Co., 356 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1978) (stating that
clerks of the circuit court, created by the Article VIII, section l(d) of the Florida Constitution
are constitutional officers).
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But it is apparently insufficient that the officer or entity is merely named in
the constitution in an indirect or general way." 6
The term "state officer" remains somewhat vague. It apparently does
not include purely local entities not created by the constitution itself,447 but
beyond that, the Court has said little. There has been no definitive statement
that all local officials and entities are excluded if they fail to qualify as con-
stitutional officers. A good argument can be made that a "class of state offi-
cers" should include offices of trust created by statute and authorized to in-
dependently exercise identical powers of government as part of some larger
statewide scheme." Examples might include the governing boards of Flor-
ida's water management districts." 9 However, this is an issue that remains
undecided.
Finally, dicta theoretically might constitute a basis for exercising this
type of jurisdiction. But in practice, the prerequisites for review here are so
rigorous that dicta rarely would appear to qualify. Dicta by definition is not
binding,45° and a petitioner presumably would need to show some real likeli-
hood that the dicta could be enforced against the "affected" class. A detailed
and scholarly court opinion, for example, sometimes might pose such a
threat. Otherwise, there would be no actual legal effect on a class of consti-
tutional or state officers, and thus no discretion to hear the case.
446. For example, the Florida Constitution mentions "municipal legislative bodies." FLA.
CONST. art. VIII, § (2)(b). Yet, the case law indicates that a city official is not a constitutional
or state officer. Estes v. N. Miami Beach, 227 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1969).
447. Estes, 227 So. 2d at 34; Hakam v. Miami Beach, 108 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1959) (holding
that a police officer is not a constitutional or state officer).
448. The Florida Constitution juxtaposes "constitutional officers" with "state officers." If
a constitutional office is one created by the constitution, then it is reasonable to say that a state
office is one created by statute. The "class" requirement obviously suggests that the office
must exist in more than one location throughout the state. Unique local offices would not
qualify. Finally, the rationale for exercising jurisdiction over a constitutional class of officers
applies with equal force to a statutory class of officers; a district court opinion affecting either
class could result in serious disruption of governmental services, requiring resolution by the
state's highest court. On the whole, both the language of the constitution and public policy
considerations support jurisdiction over a statutory class of officers that meet the other crite-
ria.
449. See FLA. STAT. §§ 373.069-373.073 (2004) (creating districts and governing boards).
450. See Watson Realty Corp. v. Quinn, 452 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 1984) (stating that
language in a previous case was simply obiter dicta and should not be relied upon as case
authority).
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D. Express and Direct Conflict
By far the largest and most disputatious subcategory is jurisdiction
premised on express and direct conflict, 451 usually called simple "conflict
jurisdiction., 452 Jurisdiction of this type exists where the decision of the dis-
trict court expressly and directly conflicts with a decision4 53 of another dis-
trict court of appeal or of the Supreme Court of Florida on the same question
of law. 454 This relatively straightforward statement has taken on great com-
plexity in practice. Conflict jurisdiction also is the subcategory most af-
fected by the somewhat arcane, but critical distinction between "jurisdiction"
and "discretion.
455
Historically, the 1980 jurisdictional reforms had one of the greatest ef-
fects on this type of jurisdiction. Prior to the amendments, a much broader
form of conflict jurisdiction existed in practice. It had come into existence in
1965 when a divided Supreme Court of Florida held that conflict jurisdiction
could exist over decisions affirming the trial court without opinion, in which
the entire opinion usually said nothing but "per curiam" and was affirmed.456
These opinions often are identified by the acronym "PCA." '4 57 Obviously, the
determination of "conflict" in such cases only could be made by looking at
the record, and not from a review of the opinion under review. By definition,
a PCA establishes no precedent beyond the specific case, and Supreme Court
of Florida review thus was believed by many to be of questionable utility.
Through the years, the ability to review PCAs grew increasingly onerous and
was sternly criticized, even by members of the Court.4 5' The criticisms,
along with the Court's overburdened docket, led directly to the 1980 constitu-
tional reforms and the end of review for PCAs.459
451. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
452. The term "conflict jurisdiction" is almost never used by the Court to refer to "certi-
fied conflict," which is a separate subcategory. See discussion infra Part VI.F.
453. In a case that preceded the 1980 amendments to Article V, the term "decision" was
held to include both the judgment and opinion for purposes of the Supreme Court of Florida's
jurisdiction over "decisions." Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla.
1958).
454. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
455. See discussion supra Part III.A.
456. See Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958), overruled by Foley v. Weaver Drugs,
Inc., 177 So. 2d221 (Fla. 1965).
457. PCAs should be distinguished from "per curiam" opinions issued by the Supreme
Court of Florida, which are very different in nature. See discussion supra Part II.D.
458. E.g., Fla. Greyhound Owners & Breeders Ass'n v. W. Flagler Assocs., 347 So. 2d
408, 410-12 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., concurring).
459. See Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980).
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1. The Elements of Obtaining Conflict Review
As a result of the 1980 reforms and the cases construing them, the Court
potentially has conflict jurisdiction only over a district court decision con-
taining at least a statement by a majority460 or a majority citation to author-
ity.46' Petitions seeking jurisdiction are brought to the Justices and at least
four of them, a majority of the Court, are required to accept or deny jurisdic-
tion.
The Court's determination of jurisdiction is constrained by the "four-
comers" rule: conflict must "appear within the four comers of the majority
decision" brought for review.4" There can be no examination of the record,
no second-guessing of the facts stated in the majority decision, and no use of
extrinsic materials to clarify what the majority decision means. Dissenting
or concurring opinions in the district court cannot supplement what is left
unstated in the majority opinion. Moreover, the Court has strictly applied the
four-corners rule even after a 2002 amendment to the Florida Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure463 that authorized attorneys, as part of their motions for
rehearing in the district courts, to request that the lower court withdraw a
PCA and replace it with an opinion that potentially would be reviewable by
the Supreme Court of Florida.46" The Court held that the four-corners rule
still must be applied despite the changed Florida Rules of Court.465 In the
vast majority of cases, the Court strictly honors the four-corners rule, though
there may be rare cases difficult to square with it.
Within the constraints of the four-comers rule, review will be allowed
only if the following questions are all answered in the affirmative: 1) does
jurisdiction actually exist; 2) does discretion exist; and 3) is the case signifi-
cant enough to be heard. The three elements are easy to see in some types of
cases, but are harder to see in others.
460. The court has held that discussion of the "legal principles which the court applied
supplies a sufficient basis for a petition for conflict review." Ford Motor Co. v. Kikis, 401 So.
2d 1341, 1342 (Fla. 1981). There is no requirement that the district court opinion must explic-
itly identify conflicting decisions. Id.
461. See Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981).
462. Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986). Here, the Court clearly is using the
term "decision" to encompass both the result and the entire opinion. Accord Seaboard Air
Line R.R v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1958).
463. Amendment to Fla. Rules of App. Proc., 827 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2002).
464. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Kenyon, 882 So. 2d 986, 988-89 (Fla. 2004).
465. Id.
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a. Does Jurisdiction Exist?
The most obvious effect of the 1980 reforms was to eliminate com-
pletely the Court's jurisdiction over PCAs-those decisions issued without
statement or citation. If a PCA includes no statement by a majority and no
majority citation to authority, then the Court completely lacks jurisdiction to
review the case.466 This is a fact of great importance for attorneys who wish
to seek further appellate review of PCA decisions, because it means that the
only possible appeal is to the United States Supreme Court. 67 Statements in
a separate opinion, whether dissenting or concurring, are not sufficient if
there is no majority statement or citation.468
It deserves to be stressed that the Court has held that jurisdiction is
completely absent in these cases; it is not that the Court simply will not exer-
cise discretion to hear the cause.469 As a consequence, the Clerk of the Court
has been authorized by the Court to issue a form summary denial in most
cases brought for review to the Court based on a PCA that lacks a majority
statement or citation to authority. The Justices and their staffs do not review
these petitions, thus filing them is a complete waste of time, resources, and
money, especially client money.
The case law has established only one other category of district court
opinions over which the Court may lack conflict jurisdiction as a matter of
law. 47 0  These are PCAs that contain nothing but a citation to authority
(called "citation PCAs"). In 1988, the Court distilled much of its earlier law
on this question into a single formula. In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,471 the Court
said that there is no jurisdiction over a citation PCA unless "one of the cases
cited as controlling authority is pending before this Court, or has been re-
versed on appeal or review, or receded from by this Court, or unless the cita-
tion explicitly notes a contrary holding of another district court., 472 As noted
earlier, the failure of the district court opinion to meet any of these require-
ments forecloses the possibility of jurisdiction in the Court, and attempts to
466. Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980).
467. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1988).
468. Id.
469. Id. at 288 n.3. In other words, any further appeal from a PCA issued without a major-
ity statement or citation can be had only in the United States Supreme Court, in its discretion.
Attempting to bring the case for review in the Supreme Court of Florida may have the effect
of barring an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, because the time to file the appeal
most likely will be consumed. Id.
470. Theoretically there could be another: PCAs that contain only a statement insufficient
to establish a point of law, without citation.
471. 530 So. 2d at 286.
472. Id. at 288 n.3 (citing Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981)).
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assert jurisdiction in such cases can have significant consequences when
further appeal may be sought in the United States Supreme Court.473
As is apparent from the language quoted here, the citation to authority
must be to a case 474 issued by a Florida district court of appeal or by the Su-
preme Court of Florida.475 A citation to a statute, administrative, or other
rule, federal case, or case from another jurisdiction is insufficient to establish
discretion for review. There is no jurisdiction, for example, where the al-
leged conflict is between the decision below and a Florida Rule of Court.476
On the other hand, jurisdiction exists if there is any notation in a citation
PCA (or any other type of opinion, for that matter) of contrary case law is-
sued by another district court of appeal or the Supreme Court of Florida.477
This may be as simple as a citation beginning with the signals "contra" or
"but see, '478 because they indicate contradiction. A citation beginning with
"but cf." may be insufficient4 79 because the signal indicates contradiction
only by analogy,48° which may not meet the constitutional requirement of
"direct" conflict.48
1
Further, citation to a case from the same district court of appeal can es-
tablish jurisdiction only if that case is pending for review in or has been re-
versed by the Supreme Court of Florida.482 Thus, a conflicting opinion or a
"contra" or "but see" citation to an opinion of the same district court would
not in itself establish conflict. This rests on a simple rationale. The fact that
a district court decides to expressly or silently depart from its own case law
does not establish conflict, because there is no such thing as "intradistrict
473. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
474. Fla. Star, 530 So. 2d at 288 n.3 (citing Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 420).
475. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
476. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 93 n.1 (Fla. 1995).
477. See Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1983), affg 408 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981). A district court may seem foolish recognizing contrary authority from
the Supreme Court of Florida, but this sometimes happens with good reason. In Watson Re-
alty Corp. v. Quinn, 435 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983), the First District Court of
Appeal noted that it was departing from dicta issued by the Supreme Court of Florida in Canal
Auth. v. Ocala Mfg., Ice, & Packing Co., 435 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citing
Canal Auth. v. Ocala Mfg., Ice & Packing Co., 332 So. 2d 321, 327 (Fla. 1976)). The district
court believed the dicta to be incorrect, and the Supreme Court of Florida later agreed. Wat-
son Realty Corp. v. Quinn, 452 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1984).
478. See Frederick v. State, 472 So. 2d 463, 464 (Fla. 1985), aff'g 472 So. 2d 463 (1985).
479. Such citations are rare. See, e.g., Cherry v. State, 618 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1993); Phelps v. State, 368 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). No further review
was taken in either of these cases.
480. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFoRM SYSTEM OF CITATION, R. 1.2(c), at 23 (Columbia
Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000).
481. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
482. Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981).
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conflict" as a basis for supreme court jurisdiction. The latest inconsistent
opinion is deemed to overrule the earlier.483
Often, a citation PCA may include a parenthetical statement that con-
flict exists. The statement can establish jurisdiction only if it is accurate484
and identifies a specific decision of another district court or the Supreme
Court of Florida as the basis for conflict. But when this happens, it is possi-
ble that jurisdiction may exist on a completely independent basis-the
Court's separate "certified conflict" jurisdiction, discussed below.485 The
possibility always should be considered, because "certified conflict" jurisdic-
tion may be easier to obtain, though not always.486
b. Does Discretion Exist?
Except for PCAs that fail to meet the criteria outlined above, the Su-
preme Court of Florida technically has potential jurisdiction to review all
other district court opinions. However, the Court may still lack discretion to
hear the particular case.4 87 As noted earlier, the distinction between "juris-
diction" and "discretion" is somewhat arcane and in many instances really is
relevant only in determining the time to bring appeals to the United States
Supreme Court. So, in common usage, lawyers and Justices often tend to
speak of both under the rubric "jurisdiction," although this technically is
incorrect.
Nevertheless, in 1988, the Court indicated that, apart from the special
rules governing PCAs, the problem of "conflict" involves a constitutional
limit on the Court's discretion to hear a case rather than a limit on jurisdic-
tion.488 If there is no conflict, then there is no discretion, and the petition for
review must be denied or dismissed on that basis.4 89 Thus, the existence of
conflict is an absolute prerequisite for a review.4 90 In addition, conflict can-
not be "derivative." It is insufficient that a decision cites as controlling au-
thority a completely separate decision that supposedly is in conflict with a
483. State v. Walker, 593 So. 2d 1049, 1049-50 (Fla. 1992) (citing Little v. State, 206 So.
2d 9, 10 (Fla. 1968)).
484. The accuracy requirement arises from the plain language of the constitution that there
must be express and direct conflict appearing on the face of the decision below. FLA. CONST.
art. V, § 3(b)(3). The fact that the parties assert conflict in their jurisdictional briefs will not
supply this requirement, even if both parties erroneously conclude that conflict exists.
485. See discussion infra Part VI.F.
486. See id.
487. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d 286, 288-89 (Fla. 1988).
488. Id. at 288
489. Id.
490. Id.
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third decision,49' unless some other basis for jurisdiction exists. In other
words, there is no such thing as "daisy-chain" conflict.
The jurisdiction/discretion distinction has prompted "creative" efforts to
expand conflict jurisdiction, which the Court consistently has declined. Af-
ter Florida Star established the distinction, some parties seized upon lan-
guage in that opinion to argue that conflict jurisdiction can be merely "hypo-
thetical., 492 This was a misreading of the opinion of Florida Star and a mis-
apprehension of the difference between "jurisdiction" and "discretion.""
In Florida Star, the Court said that jurisdiction exists if a district court
decision contains any statement or citation that "hypothetically could create
conflict if there were another opinion reaching a contrary result. 494 How-
ever, discretion is still limited by the conflict or "opinion reaching a contrary
result" requirement.495 In other words, a petitioner still must establish that
discretion to hear the case genuinely exists. Any petition arguing "hypo-
thetical conflict" alone without establishing actual conflict would fail to es-
tablish the Court's discretion to take the case.
In a larger sense, the overriding purpose of conflict review remains the
elimination of inconsistent views within Florida about the same question of
law.496 But this does not necessarily mean the Court can review a case only
when necessary to resolve a conflict of holdings. Many conflict cases ac-
cepted by the Court fall within this last grouping, but not all do. Part of the
reason is that a genuine "conflict" also can be manifested in more than just a
holding. The result is that several types of conflict have been recognized. In
actual practice, the Court tends to accept cases that fall into four broad and
sometimes overlapping categories: (i) "holding conflict;" (ii) "misapplica-
tion conflict;" (iii) apparent conflict; and (iv) "piggyback conflict."
(i) "Holding Conflict"
The most obvious conflict cases involve "holding conflict." The major-
ity opinion below contains a holding of law that is in irreconcilable conflict
with a holding of law in a majority opinion of another district court or of the
Supreme Court of Florida. In other words, there is an actual conflict of con-
491. Dodi Publ'g Co. v. Editorial Am., S.A., 385 So. 2d 1369, 1369 (Fla. 1980).
492. Fla. Star, 530 So. 2d at 288.
493. See id.
494. Id.
495. See id.
496. E.g., Wainwright v. Taylor, 476 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1985); see FLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 3(b)(3).
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trolling, binding precedent. Where this is true, conflict jurisdiction unques-
tionably exists.
For example, a district court in 1992 issued an opinion expressly apply-
ing the doctrine of interspousal immunity in a particular case.4 97 While re-
view was pending, the Supreme Court of Florida issued an opinion in another
case holding that the doctrine of interspousal immunity no longer existed in
Florida.498 Hence, these two opinions were in actual and irreconcilable con-
flict with one another, because the holding of one could not stand if the other
was correct.
Conflict is not always so plain as this example, however. In many in-
stances, the cases in question may be factually distinguishable to a greater or
lesser extent, and these distinctions may be critical to a conflict analysis. As
a result, the "holding conflict" category probably should not be considered
entirely discrete from other categories. "Holding conflict" sometimes may
blur into the next two kinds of conflict, which themselves are not entirely
distinct.
(ii) "Misapplication Conflict"
A separate kind of conflict occurs when the decision of the district court
misapplies controlling precedent.4 99 "Misapplication conflict" thus is not
precisely the same as "holding conflict," because the cases involved are dis-
tinguishable. The conflict arises because the district court has failed to dis-
tinguish the cases properly. In other words, no conflict would have existed
had controlling precedent been properly construed. Though sometimes con-
troversial even among members of the Court, °0 it has been used time and
again. "Misapplication conflict" usually comes in three varieties: "errone-
ous reading" of precedent, "erroneous extension" of precedent, and "errone-
ous use" of facts.
"Erroneous reading" cases are perhaps the most clearly justifiable of the
three because they involve the purely legal problem of whether the control-
ling law was properly stated. Thus, they verge on being "holding conflict"
cases. For example, in 1982, the Court confronted a case in which the dis-
trict court first had misinterpreted controlling precedent on awards of puni-
497. McAdam v. Thorn, 610 So. 2d 510, 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed by
Thorn v. McAdam, 626 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1993).
498. Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 1993).
499. E.g., Acensio v. State, 497 So. 2d 640, 641 (Fla. 1986).
500. Knowles v. State, 848 So. 2d 1055, 1059 (Fla. 2003) (Wells, J., dissenting) (express-
ing considerable doubt over whether misapplication conflict has a valid constitutional basis).
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tive damages and then had applied the misinterpretation to the case."' The
Court accepted jurisdiction expressly because of misapplication conflict.50 2
This was not precisely a "holding conflict" case, however. Two dissenting
Justices argued that the district court actually read the precedent correctly.0 3
In other words, misapplication was not necessarily clear until the Court's
majority decided the matter and construed the precedent.
"Erroneous extension" cases are those in which the district court may
correctly state a rule of law, but then proceeds to apply the rule to circum-
stances for which it was not intended. In other words, the district court
stated the law correctly and framed the facts accurately, but it should never
have linked the two. This type of conflict is easily masked as some other
type of conflict, and for that reason is seldom expressly identified in opin-
ions. The existence of the "erroneous extension" is sometimes noted in opin-
ions dissenting to a denial of jurisdiction.50 Prior to 1980, the Court ex-
pressly recognized "erroneous extension" as a valid basis of conflict jurisdic-
tion.' °
"Erroneous use" cases are those in which the district court misapplies a
rule of law based on its own misperception of the facts.5"6 This is the most
troublesome form of misapplication conflict, because it often tests the
strength of the four-comers rule. Sometimes the factual error may be evident
on the face of the opinion, but often it is not. For example, in 1985, the
Court accepted jurisdiction in a case where the district court had "over-
looked" a relevant factual finding of the trial court.0 7 Although controlling
law was stated properly, the district court's opinion improperly applied the
law because it failed to consider the overlooked finding. 8
The discretion to review such cases really may be justifiable where the
factual error is apparent within the four comers of the opinion being re-
viewed." 9 In State v. Stacey,"' for example, the district court opinion did in
501. Arab Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1040 (Fla.
1942).
502. Id.
503. Id. at 1043 (Sundberg, C.J., dissenting, joined by Adkins, J.).
504. E.g., Salser v. State, 613 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1993) (Kogan, J., dissenting).
505. Sacks v. Sacks, 267 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1972).
506. E.g., Acensio, 497 So. 2d at 641.
507. State v. Stacey, 482 So. 2d 1350, 1351 (Fla. 1985).
508. Id.
509. The court elsewhere has said that in determining conflict there can be no considera-
tion of facts outside the four comers of the opinion. E.g., Hardee v. State, 534 So. 2d 706, 708
(Fla. 1988).
510. 482 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1985).
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fact "overlook" the relevant finding. 51  However, at best, the possibility of
the error could be inferred from the district court opinion, but the facts stated
therein were not complete enough to make the error apparent. "Inferential"
factual error is a very slim reed to support a finding of express and direct
conflict,512 and the justification for review becomes questionable if the exis-
tence of the error cannot be inferred from material contained within the four
comers of the district court opinion. Thus, the Court may have overlooked
the four-corners rule in accepting jurisdiction, and the case is probably best
understood as marginal for purposes of precedent.
From the case law it appears that all instances of "misapplication con-
flict" expressly noted in the jurisdictional statement of opinions have in-
volved the misapplication of Supreme Court of Florida decisions, not those
of the district courts.513 The unanswered question is whether "misapplication
conflict" of district court decisions even exists. It may be that such cases are
simply being analyzed as something other than misapplication cases, at least
where the district court does not directly announce that it is applying the law
set forth in an opinion of a separate district court. In any event, the reasons
for pennitting "misapplication conflict" are a little different if there is an
obvious conflict caused by a misapplication of controlling law. That would
be most clear where the district court opinion being misapplied itself merely
restated law already established in Supreme Court of Florida opinions.
1 4
Where the "misapplied" district court opinion establishes a new point of
law, however, the rationale becomes strained. This is because the Florida
Supreme Court first must construe the new point of law in order to find that
it has been "misapplied," which raises the possibility that the Court's con-
struction may extend beyond what the district court intended. In other
words, a question would exist as to exactly which court has committed the
misapplication. On the whole, this argues against the Supreme Court of
Florida extending conflict jurisdiction to this narrow category of cases, espe-
cially where the decision brought for review expressly declares that it is ap-
plying a new point of law established by another district court. At least in
that instance, the two holdings are the same and uniformity is maintained. In
511. Id.at1351.
512. See Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Nat'l Adoption Counseling Serv., Inc., 498
So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1986) (holding conflict cannot be inferred or implied).
513. E.g., Knowles v. State, 848 So. 2d 1055, 1058 (Fla. 2003); Robertson v. State, 829
So. 2d 901, 904 (Fla. 2002).
514. The four-corners rule applies to the decision brought for review. There is no similar
restriction affecting the separate opinions with which it is in conflict, though attorneys would
be wise in their jurisdictional briefs to rely on conflict with Supreme Court cases when argu-
ing misapplication conflict jurisdiction.
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such an instance, it is difficult to say conflict is evident within the four cor-
ners of the opinion brought for review if that opinion says precisely the con-
trary, unless some other basis for jurisdiction exists.
Finally, a case may involve an alleged misapplication of dicta. In 1984,
the Court accepted a case based on conflict with dicta in a prior Supreme
Court of Florida opinion, although the Court overruled the dicta rather than
the district court's decision. 15 If "dicta conflict" existed in that context, it
probably also could exist as a form of misapplication conflict. "Dicta con-
flict" may be justified in light of the fact that the Court previously suggested
that its jurisdiction over "decisions" can rest on anything in a written opin-
ion, not merely a judgment or result."6 For example, a scholarly opinion
may make broad statements of law that are actually dicta, yet these state-
ments express an opinion about some legal point. Later a district court could
conceivably find the dicta persuasive but then misapply it. In such a situa-
tion, all the reasons justifying review of misapplication conflict also apply,
and review would be warranted to the extent the misapplication may create
confusion in the law or reach an incorrect or unfair result.
(iii) "Apparent Conflict"
Another category is "apparent conflict," arising when a district court
opinion only seems to be in conflict, even though there actually may be some
reasonable way to reconcile it with the case law. A cramped or overly strict
reading of the constitution might suggest that discretion should not be al-
lowed here. 57 However, such an approach would ignore a very real problem.
Until the Supreme Court of Florida harmonizes cases that seem to be in con-
flict, for all intents and purposes, there is an actual conflict.
Moreover, it would not appear to be sound policy to deprive the Court
of discretion merely because there is some way to harmonize cases without
overruling any of them. This amounts to saying that the Court, in conflict
cases, can review only if it negates, which will not always be desirable pol-
icy. The authority to review and harmonize decisions when appropriate
would appear to be a legitimate and effective means for the Court to address
the issue of uniformity of the law. The Supreme Court of Florida should not
be forced either to decline jurisdiction or overrule essentially sound deci-
sional law whose relation to other cases is simply uncertain.
515. Watson Realty Corp. v. Quinn, 435 So. 2d 950, 950 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
516. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1958).
517. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
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In any event, review of "apparent conflict" cases is now a well estab-
lished feature of the Court's jurisdiction, and it may or may not result in the
overruling of precedent from a Florida appellate court. In fact, this review
can include "receding" from the Court's own cases. 5 In 1991, for example,
the Court accepted jurisdiction to resolve an "apparent conflict" with over-
broad statements of law that it had made in one of its own opinions two years
earlier. 59 The Court ultimately receded from those statements, but without
actually reversing the result it previously had reached; and the Court ap-
proved the district court's decision, harmonizing the cases and eliminating
the apparent conflict.52°
"Apparent conflict" sometimes may arise from a prior district court
opinion simply lacking in precision. In 1988, for example, the Court ac-
cepted a case for review based on "apparent conflict" with an earlier district
court opinion that had not set out sufficient facts in order to determine
whether the ruling was correct.521 In that sense, the earlier case could be
considered overbroad, but was not necessarily so, depending on the facts.
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved the "apparent conflict" by disapprov-
ing the earlier case "only to the extent that it may be inconsistent with [a
correct and complete statement of the relevant law]. 522 In a similar case, the
Court said that conflict may exist if a rule of law is stated so vaguely or im-
precisely as to create a "fair implication" of conflict.1
23
(iv) "Piggyback Conflict"
The final category of conflict is "piggyback conflict." Discretion over
these cases arises because they cite as controlling precedent a decision of a
district court that is pending for review in, or has been subsequently over-
ruled by, the Florida Supreme Court; or they cite as controlling precedent a
decision of the Florida Supreme Court from which the Court has subse-
518. "Recede" is the term of art used when the Court overrules its own decisions in whole
or in part.
519. Pub. Health Trust of Dade County v. Menendez, 584 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 1991).
520. Id. at 569-70.
521. D'Oleo-Valdez v. State, 531 So. 2d 1347, 1348 (Fla. 1988).
522. Id.
523. Hardee v. State, 534 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla. 1988). These examples also demonstrate
applications of the four-comers rule: the Court should confine its determination to the four
comers of the conflicting district court opinions, making no attempt to review the record in the
earlier district court. The decision whether discretion exists must be made based on the facts
as stated in the four comers of the "conflicting" opinions, though these may be numerous. Id.
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quently receded.5 24 A considerable number of cases falling within this cate-
gory, but not all, are citation PCAs. The district courts sometimes issue
lengthy opinions resting on precedent that is currently pending review in the
Florida Supreme Court or precedent that is later overruled.
There are good reasons for allowing this type of discretion. For exam-
ple, the lower appellate courts often have a large number of cases before
them dealing with the same legal issue. To save both time and resources,
one case may be selected as the "lead case" to be decided with a full opinion,
while the others are resolved in short opinions that often do little more than
cite to the decision in the lead case. Logic and fairness would dictate that the
Court has discretion to review the lead case along with its "companion"
cases. For this reason, the Court accepts the bulk of "piggyback" cases for
review, though these may be handled as no request cases or disposed of by
order.525
It is worth noting, however, that "piggyback conflict" by definition
would not exist for the "lead" case in this example. "Piggyback conflict"
exists only if a decision cited as controlling precedent already has gotten
inside the courthouse door on some other jurisdictional basis, or the decision
has been disapproved or receded from.
There may be another problem: "piggyback conflict" sometimes may
be only an inchoate, unrealized possibility at the time when review must be
sought. For example, the Florida Supreme Court may be uncertain for a time
whether it will accept a lead case for review. Perhaps the Justices are uncer-
tain as to whether they have discretion to hear it. During the interim, juris-
diction remains inchoate and only a possibility.
In such instances, the Court typically follows a practice of postponing
its decision on jurisdiction while sometimes permitting parties to brief the
substantive issues in the interim. 2 6 However, once the lead case is accepted
for review, the companion cases may be accepted, except on some occasions
when "piggyback" cases actually reached the correct result. Of course, a
denial of jurisdiction in the lead case may eliminate the possibility of "pig-
gyback" jurisdiction, meaning that review will be declined in the companion
cases unless some other basis for jurisdiction exists.
524. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d 286, 288 n.3 (Fla. 1988) (citing Jollie v. State, 405 So.
2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981)).
525. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
526. FLA. R. App. P. 9.120(e)-(f).
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c. Is the Case Significant Enough?
The final element in obtaining review of a conflict case is a showing
that the issues are significant enough for the Court to exercise its discretion.
Often the importance or lack of significance of the decision is obvious to
everyone. At other times, a decision may seem trivial at first blush, yet in
fact involve a potential for serious disruption. For that reason, persons trying
to invoke the Court's conflict jurisdiction are well advised to also explain
why the case is important enough to be heard. It is always important to real-
ize that conflict jurisdiction is discretionary. Even if discretion exists, the
Court is free to deny the petition if the issues seem unimportant or the result
is essentially fair or correct,2 7 among other reasons.
It is worth noting that the act of accepting review based on conflict
vests the Court with power to hear every issue in the case, not merely the
conflict issues.5 28  As a result, these "nonconflict" issues sometimes may
weigh with the Court in deciding whether to accept review. However, the
fact that these issues may seem important will not cure a lack of conflict or
act as a substitute for it. Finally, the Court has absolute discretion not to
address nonconflict issues.529  By doing so, the Court does not establish
precedent regarding these issues.
2. Briefing on Conflict Jurisdiction
For parties to invoke the Court's conflict jurisdiction, they must file ju-
risdictional briefs with the Court. The Rules of Court limit these briefs to ten
pages.5 30 The most persuasive briefs on conflict jurisdiction are short and
make their points with direct, plain language. If conflict truly exists, all the
brief need do, in most instances, is quote the law from the district court opin-
ion and the law from the allegedly conflicting opinion, and then explain the
importance of the case. For "piggyback" jurisdiction, it is sufficient and
imperative to expressly note the fact that a case cited in the district court
opinion is pending review or has been disapproved or receded from.
527. See Wainwright v. Taylor, 476 So. 2d 669, 670-71 (Fla. 1985) (petition dismissed in
the interests of judicial economy where outcome would not be different and where erroneous
statement of law had been corrected by other means).
528. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 1985); Savoie v.
State, 422 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1982).
529. See, e.g., Thom v. McAdam, 626 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1993).
530. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(a)(5). This rule is strictly enforced, and the Court currently
grants no request for an extension of the page limit.
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In many cases, the actual point of the jurisdictional brief usually can be
established in far less than the ten pages allotted. 3' Of course, where the
existence of conflict is not as clear, a brief must engage in a lengthier and
more complex analysis to demonstrate the conflict. Nowhere is brevity and
precision more valued than in a jurisdictional brief.
Appendices may consist only of a copy of the decision below and a
copy of the alleged conflict cases. Anything else is irrelevant and will be
stricken by the clerk's office. Under the four-corners rule, the record cannot
be used to establish conflict, and attorneys who ignore this fact do them-
selves and their clients a disservice. The Court sometimes receives volumi-
nous appendices that obviously required much work and expense to compile,
reproduce, and bind. However, such material has no purpose other than add-
ing to the Court's drive to collect recyclable paper.532
Except for PCAs in which jurisdiction is clearly lacking, nearly all ju-
risdictional briefs are handled and decided by the Justices. Justices have
their staffs prepare brief memoranda summarizing relevant facts and hold-
ings and analyzing the jurisdictional issues. New law clerks and interns fre-
quently are assigned to work on jurisdictional memoranda as their first learn-
ing experience at the Court, on the theory that jurisdiction is the first thing a
new law clerk or intern must learn.
When the Justices' staffs prepare memoranda on DOJs, these necessar-
ily must focus on the three questions relevant to conflict cases: 1) does ju-
risdiction exist; 2) does the Court have discretion to hear the case; and 3)
why should the discretion be exercised. As noted earlier, a case can be ac-
cepted for review only upon the affirmative vote of at least four Justices,
though the decision whether to grant oral argument sometimes can be deter-
mined by fewer votes, or by the Chief Justice.
3. Opinion -Writing in Conflict Cases
Conflict cases are randomly assigned and treated the same as other
cases for purposes of opinion writing. There is an important point, however,
that must be consistently addressed in any opinion in conflict cases. A con-
flict opinion should do one of three things before it concludes: disapprove a
district court decision in whole or in part, recede from a Florida Supreme
Court decision in whole or in part, or harmonize cases. This practice arises
from the very nature of conflict jurisdiction, which exists only when two or
more relevant cases are directly or apparently irreconcilable. Thus, for juris-
531. Sometimes multiple conflicts exist.
532. The Court has instituted a very successful paper recycling program in recent years.
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diction to exist, something must be wrong that the Court determines needs
"fixing." Fixing always requires that at least one previous statement of law
be overruled or harmonized.
E. Certified Questions of Great Public Importance
The next subcategory of discretionary review jurisdiction exists when a
decision of a district court passes upon a question certified by it to be of great
public importance.533 Commentators have noted that the operative language
essentially was unchanged by the 1980 reforms, although the pre-1980 con-
stitution specified that the question be one of great public "interest." '534 This
last change, however, may only have been semantic when the case law under
the earlier scheme is examined. Even prior to 1980, certified questions rou-
tinely involved important issues in which the general public may actually
have had little "interest," generally speaking.535 So, the requirement of "im-
portance" appears to have existed even before 1980.
At one time, the Justices routinely accepted cases in this category, a his-
torical fact reflected in the rule still in force dispensing with jurisdictional
briefs.536 That fact has now changed, though there were hints for many years
that this might happen. Some time ago, a Justice argued that certified ques-
tions should not be reviewed unless the case involved some minimum level
of immediacy. 537 That particular view was silently rejected when first made
after the 1980 reforms,538 but the general concern underlying it never fully
vanished and finally came to full flower in the late 1990s. Even before this
change began, the Court had suggested that it would not use its discretion
boundlessly. A number of earlier certified questions were treated summa-
rily,539 and the Court showed no unwillingness to characterize a certified
question as "irrelevant. '5 40 Moreover, the Court has firmly established that it
will not review a certified question that the district court actually failed to
pass upon 541 or that was based upon speculative facts.54  The rationale for
533. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
534. See Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 191-92.
535. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030 (1980 amendment committee notes).
536. FLA. R. App. P. 9.120(d).
537. Dep't of Ins. v. Teachers Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 735, 736-39 (Fla. 1981) (England, J.,
dissenting as to jurisdiction).
538. See id. at 735.
539. E.g., Varney v. State, 659 So. 2d 234, 234 (Fla. 1995).
540. Fawcett v. State, 615 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1993).
541. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. v. Jensen, 777 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla. 2001); Gee v.
Seidman & Seidman, 653 So. 2d 384, 384-85 (Fla. 1995).
542. State v. Schebel, 723 So. 2d 830, 830 (Fla. 1999).
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these last restrictions ultimately is rooted in the sound principle that courts,
with limited exceptions, do not give advisory opinions. 43
One of the first outright dismissals of a previously accepted certified
question of great public importance appeared in 1998, though in a summary
form that called little attention to the potentially significant policy shift it
represented.5" By the following year, the Court was directly expressing mis-
givings in some certified questions. In one case accepted for review, the
Court noted that the certified question "appears to be more of a request for
our approval of the conclusion reached by the court below," something the
Court expressly discouraged.5 45 In State v. Sowel146 and Dade County Prop-
erty Appraiser v. Lisboa,547 the Court finally dismissed certified questions in
unvarnished terms. 548 The Court in Sowell found that the question presented
affected "an extremely narrow principle of law, and, as phrased, [did] not
present an issue of 'great public importance.' 549 The vote to dismiss juris-
diction as improvidently granted was unanimous, with all Justices participat-
ing. 550 Likewise, in Lisboa, the Court dismissed a certified question involv-
ing what it described as "a narrow issue with very unique facts. 55'
While in the past the Court would routinely accept jurisdiction even if it
552followed with a summary disposition, it now had established a principle
obvious in the constitutional grant of jurisdiction: it could decline to review
such cases, in its discretion, if they do not meet some minimum threshold.
This shift came apace with other opinions restricting review in some cases in
which a district court certified conflict with another state appellate case553
and in cases involving "pass-through" jurisdiction.554 All appeared to be
based on the same policy concerns and occurred during the same time in
which both the Court's caseload and the complexity of its cases were in-
creasing.555 These circumstances, combined with the obvious reluctance of
543. Id.; see discussion supra Part IV.
544. State v. Thompson, 721 So. 2d 287, 287 (Fla. 1998).
545. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483, 485 n.3 (Fla. 1999).
546. 734 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1999).
547. 737 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1999).
548. Sowell, 734 So. 2d at 422; Lisboa, 737 So. 2d at 1078.
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Lisboa, 737 So. 2d at 1078. The vote in Lisboa was five to one. Id.
552. E.g., Fawcett v. State, 615 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1993).
553. See discussion infra Part VI.F.
554. See discussion infra Part VI.G.
555. See THE OFFICE OF THE STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF FLORIDA 54 (2000), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub info/workload/work-
loadcomplete.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2005) [hereinafter WORKLOAD].
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the Court to use resources on relatively minor legal issues,556 have combined
to produce a new threshold for review.
The exact nature of this threshold will continue to be fleshed out in fu-
ture cases. At present, however, the discernible rule is that the Court will not
necessarily review questions certified to be of great public importance if they
involve narrow issues or unique facts, or both, thus supporting a conclusion
that the certified question is not actually of great public importance.557 Al-
though much of the case law after 1999 contains no discussion of why the
certified question is being dismissed,558 other cases focus on the existence of
narrow issues and unique facts.559 In that regard, the exact phrasing of the
question by the district court may be of crucial importance, a conclusion sug-
gested by the language of Sowell.560 The Court indicated years earlier, for
example, that jurisdiction is "particularly applicable" to cases of first impres-
sion,56' perhaps implying a greater presumption that review should be
granted.
Other points deserve mention. The decision to certify falls within the
"absolute discretion" of the district court,562 and thus cannot be required or
undone by the Supreme Court of Florida. It is not sufficient, of course, for a
party to assert great public importance where the district court itself has not
done SO.5 6 3 Jurisdiction over cases in this subcategory is absolutely depend-
ent on the act of certification by a district court, which operates as a condi-
tion precedent.56 Once the case is certified, the condition precedent has been
fully met, and no review or redetermination of the point is necessary or
proper,565 other than the Court's decision whether to exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction.
As a corollary, the failure to certify a question eliminates this potential
basis for the Supreme Court of Florida's jurisdiction. 66 Thus, once a district
556. This reluctance is reflected in other contemporaneous jurisdictional refinements. In
Harvard v. Singletary, the Court announced it would cease considering routine petitions for
writs if they could instead be transferred to a lower court with concurrent jurisdiction over the
matter. 733 So. 2d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 1999).
557. This is not to say that the cases dismissed are not important, merely that they do not
rise to the level of great public importance.
558. E.g., Murphy v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 769 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000).
559. E.g., State v. Brooks, 788 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 2001).
560. Sowell noted that the question "as phrased" did not meet the standard. State v.
Sowell, 734 So. 2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1999).
561. Duggan v. Tomlinson, 174 So. 2d 393, 393 (Fla. 1965).
562. Rupp v. Jackson, 238 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1970).
563. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 93 n.1 (Fla. 1995).
564. Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 834 (Fla. 1959).
565. Id. at 834-35.
566. FLA. CONST. art V, § 3(b)(4).
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court opinion becomes final and is not subject to rehearing or to clarification,
the time has passed for a question to be certified.567 However, the Court has
indicated that "any interested person" can ask for a certification by the dis-
trict court at any time before the opinion becomes final. 68
Under the pre-1980 constitution, a common practice for many years was
for the district courts simply to certify the case without actually framing a
question. Later, the Supreme Court of Florida urged the district courts to
explicitly state the question being posed,569 and finally, in 1995, the Court
virtually required a framed question.57 As a rationale, the Court noted that
the failure to frame the question makes review more difficult, though techni-
cally not extinguishing the possibility of jurisdiction.5 7' Framing the ques-
tion is important and clearly the prevailing practice.7 Interestingly, when
questions actually are framed, the Court sometimes rephrases them in a man-
ner that it believes better suits the purposes of review. 73 This implies no
disrespect to the court below, but merely reflects the Court's belief that re-
framing sometimes is necessary for a proper resolution of the case.
In the past, when the question was left unframed, the Court also some-
times proceeded to discuss the issue without actually framing it.574 At other
times, the Court framed the question at the start of an opinion, though occa-
sionally it was not entirely clear what the question was.575 One case was
accepted for review even though the district court had issued its opinion as a
summary PCA and then certified the "question. ' 576 This prompted a dissent
from one Justice who argued that the Court should decline to review PCAs,
even if certified, because the unstated "question" simply was not clear. 77
The approach reflected in these earlier cases clearly is disfavored today. 78
Sometimes a special problem arises in cases involving certified ques-
tions; the losing party fails to seek review of the Supreme Court of Florida.79
The Court has held that the party who prevailed on the issue embodied in a
567. Whitaker v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 131 So. 2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1961).
568. Id.
569. Duggan, 174 So. 2d at 394.
570. Finkelstein v. Dep't of Transp., 656 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla. 1995).
571. Id.
572. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 470 So. 2d 1382, 1383 (Fla. 1985) (quoting question as
framed); Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1984) (quoting question as framed).
573. E.g., Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360, 1360 (Fla. 1993).
574. See Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1982).
575. See, e.g., Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983).
576. Id.
577. Id. at 332 (Alderman, C.J., dissenting).
578. See Finkelstein, 656 So. 2d at 922.
579. See Taggart Corp. v. Benzing, 434 So. 2d 964, 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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certified question cannot seek review solely on that basis."' In other words,
the Court will not review the case if the losing party on the certified question
does not petition for review, unless some other basis of jurisdiction exists. 58 '
When a certified question is properly brought by the parties, they some-
times ask the Supreme Court of Florida to relinquish jurisdiction to the dis-
trict court for some reason.582 In one such case, upon relinquishment, the
district court granted rehearing and issued a new opinion that failed to in-
clude a certified question. 3 The Court dismissed the case when it came
back for review, apparently for want of jurisdiction. 4 Similarly, the Court
does not have jurisdiction if the en banc panel of the district court divided
equally on the issue facing review, effectively meaning it reached no "deci-
sion" apart from certifying a question.
585
F. Certified Conflict
Discretionary review jurisdiction also exists when the district court cer-
tifies that its decision is in direct conflict with a decision of another district
court of appeal.586 This form of jurisdiction was created by the 1980 consti-
tutional reforms and had no earlier analogue. 87 Case law on certified con-
flict has done little to illuminate its scope, though-with some early excep-
tions-the district court opinions accepted in this way almost uniformly meet
two requirements: they use the word "certify" or some variation of the root
word "certif.-' '588 in connection with the word "conflict;" and, they indicate a
decision from another district court upon which the conflict is based. The
Court sometimes has accepted jurisdiction even if some study of the district
court opinion is needed to find the exact conflict case.589
580. Id.
581. See Petrik v. N.H. Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d 8, 9-10 (Fla. 1981); Taggart Corp., 434 So.
2d at 966.
582. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.110, 9.600.
583. State v. Smulowitz, 486 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 1986).
584. Id.
585. Boler v. State, 678 So. 2d 319, 320 n.2 (Fla. 1996).
586. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
587. See Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 193.
588. One district court used the words "certificate of direct conflict." State v. Dodd, 396
So. 2d 1205, 1208 n.7 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), approved by 419 So. 2d 333, 336 (Fla.
1982). In one case, the Court accepted "certified conflict" solely because a citation PCA
contained a "contra" cite. See Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 1981), rev'g 386
So. 2d 1297, 1298 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
589. E.g., Hannewacker v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 402 So. 2d 1294, 1296 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1981), approved as modified, 419 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. 1982).
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On the other hand, all of the cases-with few exceptions59 0 -in which
the district court has merely "acknowledged" conflict are treated as petitions
for "express and direct" conflict, and some are accepted for review on that
basis. The distinction between "acknowledged conflict" and "express and
direct conflict" can have an important consequence, however, because ex-
press and direct conflict historically has been subject to more rigorous re-
quirements. This history, however, has seen some significant changes in
recent years.59'
Certified conflict cases differ in two important ways from the "express
and direct" conflict subcategory, discussed above. 92 First, no briefing on
jurisdiction is permitted. 93 Historically the prohibition against jurisdiction
briefs was based on the fact that certified conflict cases were accepted rou-
tinely. That has now changed. With no discussion, the Court in 1996 appar-
ently dismissed its first certified conflict case on grounds that jurisdiction
was granted improvidently. 4 This has been followed with a handful of
similar summary dismissals. 95 Because this change in custom occurred si-
multaneously with a similar shift in the analysis of certified questions of
great public importance,596 the Court may be motivated by a similar rationale.
That is, it may be rejecting certified conflict cases because they involve nar-
row issues, unique facts, or both. However, the number of cases actually
rejected in this manner appears to be small.597
Second, the Court has found discretion to hear certified conflict cases
even if it ultimately finds no conflict, something that cannot be done for ex-
press and direct conflict.598 The policy for accepting such cases, of course, is
that the very act of certifying conflict creates confusion or uncertainty in the
law that should be resolved by the Court, a view the Court has approved.5 99
In one 1993 case, for example, the Court reviewed a certified conflict but
then harmonized the cases.6 °0 In sum, review may be easier to obtain for
590. Some cases may slip through the initial review process.
591. See discussion infra Part VI.F.
592. See discussion infra Part VI.D.
593. FLA. R. APp. P. 9.120(d).
594. See Vega v. Indep. Fire Ins. Co., 666 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1996).
595. E.g., Famiglietti v. State, 838 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 2003); Blevins v. State, 829 So.
2d 872 (Fla. 2002).
596. See discussion supra Part VI.E.
597. If the number grows larger, the Court may need to revisit its rule that jurisdictional
briefing is not permitted in cases of certified conflict. FLA. R. App. P. 9.120(d).
598. Actual conflict must exist in "express and direct" cases for the Court to have discre-
tion to hear the case. See discussion infra Part VI.D.1.
599. Clark v. State, 783 So. 2d 967, 969 (Fla. 2001).
600. See Harmon v. Williams, 615 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1993).
[Vol. 29:3:431
102
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/1
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
certified conflict than for "express and direct" conflict-apart from the hand-
ful of cases where the Court finds that jurisdiction was granted improvi-
dently.
Finally, there is one important procedural fact that may deprive the Su-
preme Court of Florida's jurisdiction even where conflict is properly certi-
fied. As with certified questions, the Court has held that the party who pre-
vailed on the "certified conflict" issue cannot seek review based on this form
ofjurisdiction. In other words, the Court will decline to accept jurisdiction if
the losing party does not petition for review, except where some independent
basis for jurisdiction exists.6 ' This situation may arise when the party who
prevailed on the conflict issue disagrees with some other aspect of the district
court opinion.
G. "Pass-Through" Jurisdiction
The next subcategory of discretionary review jurisdiction commonly
has been called "pass-through" jurisdiction.6 2 It essentially is a variation of
a certified question for very important and pressing appeals.6"3 It must be
stressed, however, that the matter certified by the district court must be an
appeal, not some other category of case such as petitions for common law
certiorari.6" Cases over which the district court has original jurisdiction thus
cannot be certified.60 5 After certification, the principle feature is that the case
"passes through" the district court without being heard and is sent directly to
the Supreme Court of Florida for immediate resolution. This substantially
speeds the appellate process. 6°6 Its classic use was shown during the 2000
presidential election cases, in which district courts routinely certified the
cases directly to the United States Supreme Court.607
The Supreme Court of Florida can hear such cases only if: 1) an appeal
is pending in the district court brought from a trial court's order or judgment;
2) the district court certifies that the case is "of great public importance" or
may "have a great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout
the state;" and 3) the district court certifies that immediate resolution by the
601. See Davis v. Mandau, 410 So. 2d 915, 915 (Fla. 1981).
602. For an opinion using the informal name, see Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472
So. 2d 1145, 1146 (Fla. 1985).
603. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5).
604. State v. Matute-Chirinos, 713 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 1998).
605. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5).
606. For a considerable history underlying the development of this form of jurisdiction,
see Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 193-96.
607. E.g., Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
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Supreme Court of Florida is required." 8 Certification can occur on the dis-
trict court's own motion, or at the suggestion of a party if done within ten
days of appealing to the district court.6 °9 As noted above, it is crucial that the
matter pending in the district court be an appeal. Under the constitutional
language, there is no jurisdiction if the pending matter is something else,
such as a petition for common law certiorari.610
While the three elements above appear mandatory from the constitu-
tional language, the Supreme Court of Florida has been lenient in accepting
district court certifications fairly susceptible of meeting the requirements.
The root word "certif.-" probably should be used by the district court, but it
is doubtful that a case of obvious importance would be refused for failure to
do so. The policy reasons for requiring a term of art in certified conflict
cases do not exist here.6 1' Typically, the district courts scrupulously meet the
certification requirement.6 12
The Supreme Court of Florida's jurisdiction over pass-through cases at-
taches immediately on rendition 613 of the district court order certifying the
case.614  Thus, the district court loses jurisdiction at that point unless the
Court relinquishes its jurisdiction.6t 5 In theory, a defective certification
would not actually divest the district court of jurisdiction nor vest the Court
with jurisdiction. For that reason, it is important that all concerned be certain
that certification is done properly.
608. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5).
609. FLA. R. App. P. 9.125(a), (c). The method of making and filing a "suggestion" is
heavily regulated by rule. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.125(c)-(f).
610. Matute-Chirinos, 713 So. 2d at 1007.
611. See discussion supra Part VI.F. for policy reasons which require a term of art in
certified conflict cases. "Acknowledged" conflict cases can be "mopped up" by the "express
and direct" category. There is no other category to "mop up" pass-through cases in which the
district court failed to use the root word "certif-."
612. In re Pearson, No. 92-0942 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1992) (unpublished
order). In the "Baby Theresa" case, for example, the Fourth District Court of Appeal issued
the following certificate:
We hereby certify to the Florida Supreme Court that the order of the trial court of March 27,
1992 requires immediate resolution by the Supreme Court, because it rules on an issue of great
public importance and because the relief sought in the trial court may be mooted by the natural
death of the infant child of appellants.
Id.
613. Rendition occurs when a "signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower
tribunal," subject to a few exceptions usually not applicable in these cases. FLA. R. APP. P.
9.020(h).
614. FLA. R. App. P. 9.125(g).
615. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110, 9.600.
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There is no requirement that the district court frame a question, al-
though most district court panels do so. 1 6 Framing a question may be useful,
but these cases almost always involve questions that are apparent to every-
one. Where a question is framed, the Supreme Court of Florida usually
quotes it."' If no question is framed, the Court sometimes states the issue to
be reviewed618 and sometimes does not.619 In any event, the presence or ab-
sence of a framed question may make no difference in the Court's jurisdic-
tion, but it can serve a useful purpose when the parties disagree on the exact
nature of the question being decided.620
The jurisdictional history of pass-through cases has evolved over the
years in much the same way as with certified questions of great public im-
portance and certified conflict cases. Pass-through cases clearly fall within
the Court's discretionary jurisdiction and can be refused, though the Court
seldom has done so until more recently. In 1987, the Court first hinted at this
by admonishing the district courts not to use pass-through jurisdiction "as a
device for avoiding difficult issues by passing them through to this Court. 62'
In 2002, the Court directly rejected jurisdiction of a pass-through case.622 A
concurring Justice suggested that the matter certified was not ripe for review
because it involved an interlocutory question.613 This prompted an opinion
from one district court in which it went to some pains to suggest why its cer-
tification was pressing enough, and why the facts at hand were ripe enough,
to be heard.624
Usually, the cases certified in this manner truly have been pressing.
These cases most commonly involve urgent questions of governmental au-
616. See, e.g., Dep't of Corr. v. Fla. Nurses Ass'n, 508 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1987); Div. of
Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Fla. Horse Council, Inc., 464 So. 2d 128, 129 (Fla. 1985).
617. See, e.g., Fla. Nurses Ass 'n, 508 So. 2d at 317.
618. E.g., In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. 1992).
619. E.g., Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1993).
620. For example, T.A.C.P. presented a situation in which some parties and amici curiae
not only disagreed about the nature of a relevant medical syndrome (anencephaly), but also
framed the issues in widely differing ways. 609 So. 2d at 589. Some saw the issue as whether
organs could be "harvested" from a living child, while others saw the issue as whether there
was a right of privacy in deciding what would happen to the body of a child who was, for all
intents and purposes, dead. Id. When the court framed the issue at the start of the opinion, it
signaled the true scope of what was being decided. Id.
621. Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 162 n.1 (Fla. 1987).
622. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Haire, 824 So. 2d 167, 167 (Fla. 2002).
623. Id. at 168 (Pariente, J., concurring).
624. See Harris v. Coalition to Reduce Class Size, 824 So. 2d 245, 248 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).
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thority,625 constitutional rights that could be undermined if the case is not
expedited,626 or personal liberties that could be jeopardized by a lengthy ap-
peal. 627 With rare exceptions, 621 all these cases have involved a significant
level of both immediacy and finality of fact finding. As a result, almost all
such cases are handled on an expedited basis by the Court. Attorneys han-
dling such cases thus must be prepared to respond immediately to the Court's
orders and concerns.
H. Questions Certified by Federal Appellate Courts
The final subcategory of discretionary review jurisdiction concerns
cases involving a question of law certified by the federal appellate courts.
Jurisdiction is allowed here only if: 1) the United States Supreme Court or a
federal court of appeals certifies a question; 2) the question is determinative
of "the cause;" and 3) "there is no controlling precedent" of the Florida Su-
preme Court.629 By rule, the federal court is required to issue a "certificate"
containing "the style of the case, a statement of the facts showing the nature
of the cause and the circumstances out of which the questions of law arise,
and the questions of law to be answered., 630 The certificate must be sent to
the Florida Supreme Court by the federal court clerk.63' The jurisdiction
granted here was not a part of the pre-1980 constitution. However, much of
the same process had arisen earlier by court rule and from decisional law.632
Thus, the 1980 reforms largely codified these procedures within the constitu-
633tion.
Perhaps the most significant requirement, other than the detailed formal
certificate,634 is that there must be a "cause" from which the certified ques-
tions arise. 635  This means that the Florida Supreme Court cannot accept
questions in the abstract, but only if they are "determinative" of a particular
625. E.g., Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 672 (concerning the constitutionality of legislature abro-
gating state employees' collective bargaining agreement).
626. See State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 263 (Fla. 1990) (concerning the constitutionality
of statute restricting political contributions when election was nearing).
627. See T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 593 n.9 (regarding the right to donate organs of child
soon to die where death would make organs unable to be donated).
628. See, e.g., Carawan, 515 So. 2d at 162 n.l.
629. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6).
630. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150(b).
631. Id.
632. E.g., Gaston v. Pittman, 224 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1969).
633. See Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 196.
634. See Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 249 (1963).
635. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 741 (Fla. 1961).
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case. In practice, this means that there must be an actual suit pending review
in the federal appellate courts. Thus, certified questions do not ask the Flor-
ida Supreme Court to issue a purely advisory opinion. The federal courts are
bound to honor and to apply the response given by the Florida Supreme
Court to the actual controversy before them. Thus, all such cases involve an
actual application of Florida law, often in cases premised on federal diversity
jurisdiction.636
Certified questions accepted from federal courts are answered by way of
a formal opinion, a requirement that stems in part from state statute.637 The
holdings of that opinion can become precedent for future cases, on the theory
that the Florida Supreme Court's opinion actually resolves controlling legal
questions. In answering the questions, however, the Court does not "re-
mand' 638 the cause to a federal court as it would to an inferior court. Some
Florida Supreme Court opinions misuse the word "remand" in this way, but
the better practice is for the Court to "transmit" or "return" the cause to the
federal court for further proceedings.639
The Court has obvious discretion to decline to answer a federal certified
question. However, in practice, the federal appellate courts have been con-
scientious in confining certification to cases that genuinely meet the rather
strict constitutional requirements. Review might be declined, for example,
where a federal appellate court overlooked controlling precedent previously
issued by the Florida Supreme Court.64 In that situation, the most construc-
tive response would be for the Court to cite the controlling precedent in the
order declining review. 4
636. See, e.g., Allen v. Estate of Carman, 486 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1973).
637. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (2004). There is no requirement to accept the case, only to issue
an opinion once the case is accepted. Id.
638. The term "remand" implies mandate and therefore suggests a direction to an inferior
court. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (8th ed. 1990). The federal appellate courts are
not inferior to the Supreme Court of Florida.
639. E.g., Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 513 So. 2d 1265, 1270 (Fla. 1987);
Bates v. Cook, Inc., 509 So. 2d 1112, 1115 (Fla. 1987).
640. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6).
641. See id. The Court probably would lack jurisdiction, not merely discretion, in this
situation. The constitution's strict language suggests that it is not enough for the federal ap-
pellate court to certify the case; there also must be an actual lack of controlling precedent of
the Florida Supreme Court. Id. In any event, whether the case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction or lack of discretion would make no difference here.
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VII. DISCRETIONARY ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Florida's discretionary original jurisdiction in-
volves a class of legal "writs" that, with some exceptions, originated centu-
ries ago in the English common law. Most Floridians know little about these
writs, with the possible exception of habeas corpus, and even some lawyers
tend to lose sight of the creative ways the writs can be used. In some cir-
cumstances, one of these so-called "extraordinary writs" may provide juris-
diction when nothing else can.
Because most of the writs are of ancient origin, there is a highly detailed
body of case law governing their use. The constitution itself does little more
than identify the writs and assign the Court jurisdiction over them,642 so the
Court almost always gauges these cases based on long-standing judicial
precedent. As a result, these cases tend to be analyzed under a kind of
"common law" approach, although, strictly speaking, the jurisdiction arises
from the constitution itself. There are some limitations imposed by the con-
stitution that did not arise from the common law, but these usually involve
the specific class of persons to whom a writ may be issued by the Court. 3
Technically speaking, the Supreme Court of Florida has jurisdiction
over any petition that merely requests some form of relief available under
this category. The Court's discretion, however, is limited by the body of
case law and common law principles defining the scope of permissible judi-
cial action. If the Court lacks discretion to issue a writ, it cannot grant relief
as surely as if it lacked jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, there are aspects of the controlling case law that can be
explained only by the distinction between jurisdiction and discretion. For
example, the Court's discretion to issue any of the extraordinary writs is de-
fined by the applicable standard of review, which differs with each writ. It is
common, though not precise, to use the word "jurisdiction" in its loose sense
to include limitations on discretion, in which case the Court's "jurisdiction"
over the extraordinary writs also would be determined by the standard of
review. However, there are cases where the Court expressly accepts jurisdic-
tion, hears the case, and issues a full opinion determining that the standard of
review has not been met and a writ cannot be issued.' If the Court deter-
642. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7)-(9). In most instances, however, jurisdiction is not
exclusive. The lower courts would also have jurisdiction to consider issuing one of the writs,
except that petitioners usually are forbidden to seek the same remedy from another court sim-
ply because they did not like the last court's decision.
643. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8).
644. See, e.g., Fla. League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 398, 400-01 (Fla. 1992).
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mined that it lacked jurisdiction of such cases, then arguably it could not
even hear them, much less accept jurisdiction and issue a full opinion.
There is another aspect of "discretion" that deserves some mention.
The fact that the Court's discretion to issue the writs is limited by judicially
created case law leaves open the possibility of the Florida Supreme Court
refining or modifying the standards of review. Such modifications are un-
usual, but they do happen."45 It would be hard to say in these cases that the
Court somehow has modified its own "jurisdiction," because this would im-
ply some inherent power to depart from the constitution. These infrequent
modifications made to standards of review are best understood as changes in
discretion, not changes in jurisdiction."
There have been four highly significant changes in the way the Court
exercises its discretion over writs in the last decade. First, the Court in Har-
vard v. Singletary,647 announced in 1999 that it would pursue a policy of ad-
ministratively transferring writs cases to lower courts with concurrent juris-
diction absent a pressing need, especially where there are facts in dispute."48
The number of such cases had increased significantly over the prior decade,
straining the Court's docket. Moreover, the Court concluded that ordinarily
trial courts are in a better position to conduct fact finding in such cases, so
they are the obvious bodies to resolve factual disputes raised by writs.64 9 To
enforce the Harvard rule, the Court developed an informal screening system
to decide which cases should be transferred. The Court in Harvard stressed,
however, that this did not constitute a change in jurisdiction. Indeed, the
decision is readily explained as establishing a new rule for exercising the
Court's discretion, similar to the evolutionary refinements over the Court's
discretion to review certified questions of great public importance. 651' The
Court's current application of Harvard means very few, if any, such writs are
actually considered on the merits by the Court.
Second, starting in the late 1990s and continuing through the present,
the Court established that the rules otherwise applicable to express and direct
645. E.g., Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) (modifying writ of error coram
nobis); Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1989) (modifying writ of error coram
nobis).
646. In theory, modifications to "discretion" could be so drastic as to essentially constitute
a change in jurisdiction. In practice, it is unlikely the Court would take any such drastic step,
which probably would invite efforts to curb the Court's actions by way of statute or constitu-
tional amendment.
647. 733 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1999).
648. Id. at 1023.
649. Id. at 1024.
650. Id.
651. See discussion supra Part VI.E.
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conflict cases will apply to reviews sought by extraordinary writ. That is, the
Court will not exercise its writs jurisdiction to review either a PCA652 or a
PCA issued with a citation653 unless it meets the rule of law explained in
Florida Star v. B.J.F.6 5 4 This was a result obviously implied by earlier case
law holding that at least one of the extraordinary writs could not be used as a
device for circumventing the limitations upon the Court's ability to review
PCAs.655 With this determination, the Court now has established that its dis-
cretion to review PCAs and citation PCAs is very limited indeed, no matter
what basis for jurisdiction is asserted.656 This is an obvious reflection of
steps being taken to address an increasingly burdensome caseload that now is
well documented.657
Third, the Court has determined that persons are prohibited from filing
pro se petitions for extraordinary writs raising issues related to a pending
case for which they already have counsel.658 The Court based this ruling on
the premise that there is no constitutional right to be simultaneously repre-
sented by counsel and act pro se.659 Rather, the person who otherwise wishes
to file the pro se petition must either discharge counsel and affirmatively
choose self-representation or must work through counsel.66 ° In reaching this
decision, the Court went to some lengths to stress that this rule will apply to
all future cases of a similar nature unless the petitioners clearly state their
desire to discharge counsel.66' Otherwise the pro se petitions will be dis-
missed as unauthorized.662
Fourth, the Court has now established a bright-line rule governing all
orders that dismiss extraordinary writ petitions summarily, without elabora-
tion. This settled a troubling problem. Summary dismissals of this type
could have been based on the merits of the case or could have been a simple
refusal to exercise discretionary jurisdiction. If the former, then the dis-
missal would have been with prejudice; if the latter, then it would have been
652. Grate v. State, 750 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 1999) (citing Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d
1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980)).
653. Persaud v. State, 838 So. 2d 529, 533 (Fla. 2003).
654. 530 So. 2d 286, 288 (Fla. 1988).
655. St. Paul Title Ins. Corp. v. Davis, 392 So. 2d 1304, 1304-05 (Fla. 1980) (seeking
review under the "all writs necessary" clause of article V, section 3(b)(7) of the Florida Con-
stitution). This rule was reiterated in Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974, 978 (Fla. 2002).
656. The possible exception remains a PCA leaving intact a lower court order striking a
state statute as unconstitutional. See discussion supra note 477 and accompanying text.
657. See WORKLOAD, supra note 555, at 21-35.
658. Logan v. State, 846 So. 2d 472, 475-76 (Fla. 2003).
659. Id. at 474 (citing State v. Tait, 387 So. 2d 338, 339-40 (Fla. 1980)).
660. Id. at 474-76.
661. Id. at 479.
662. Id.
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without prejudice. There was no way of knowing from the face of the order
itself. To address this problem, the Court held that all unelaborated orders
dismissing extraordinary writs petitions will be deemed not to be decisions
on the merits "unless there is a citation to authority or other statement that
clearly shows that the issue was considered by the court on the merits and
relief was denied.
663
A. Mandamus
The first extraordinary writ is "mandamus," which in Latin means "we
command. ' '664 As the name suggests, mandamus is a writ of commandment,
a fact underscored by its history. In ancient times, the writ issued as a com-
mand from the sovereigns of England when they sat personally as judges;
but, it later came to be a prerogative of judges of the Court of King's
Bench.665 Because of the writ's coercive nature, its use is subject to severe
restrictions developed in Florida and earlier English case law. In broad
terms, the Florida Supreme Court today may issue mandamus only to compel
state officers and state agencies to perform a purely ministerial action where
the petitioner otherwise would suffer an injury and has a clear and certain
right to have the action done.
In the Florida Supreme Court, unlike other state courts, mandamus may
issue only to state officers and state agencies. 666 This limitation arises from
the constitution itself and is the only restriction on mandamus expressly im-
posed there.667 The Court has never fully defined what the terms "state offi-
cers" and "state agencies" mean. The cases appear to assume that these
terms include agencies and public office holders within the three branches of
state government, but nothing establishes this with any finality. Arguably,
state officers could include persons holding an office created by the Florida
Constitution, 668 but the Court has never clearly said so. Moreover, the consti-
tution itself seems to contrast "state officers" with "constitutional officers"
elsewhere, implying they are not the same thing.669 It thus is possible that the
663. Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1258 (Fla. 2004).
664. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 980 (8th ed. 2004).
665. See State ex rel. State Live Stock Sanitary Bd. v. Graddick, 89 So. 361, 362 (Fla.
1921).
666. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court presently cannot issue a writ of mandamus to pri-
vate individuals or businesses, as it sometimes could in the past. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ranger
Realty Co. v. Lummus, 149 So. 650 (Fla. 1933).
667. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8).
668. Examples include sheriffs, clerks of the circuit court, and property appraisers. FLA.
CONST. art. VIII, § l(d).
669. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
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term "state officers" is more inclusive than the term "constitutional officers."
Thus, this question remains an open one.
Someone seeking mandamus also must establish that the action being
sought is "ministerial." "An action is ministerial only to the extent that the
respondent has no discretion over the matter."67 There are self-evident rea-
sons for this requirement. No court can compel that lawful discretion be
exercised to achieve a particular result, however fair it may seem to do so. 6 7 '
The existence of discretion takes an action out of the ministerial realm. Any
other rule would permit judges to exercise powers not vested in them through
the simple expedient of mandamus. Thus, a respondent's lack of discretion
is an absolute prerequisite to mandamus.
However, the lack of discretion can be partial because it is possible for
an action to be partly ministerial and partly discretionary. This most com-
monly arises where the law grants discretion to take some action but speci-
fies a particular kind of review process and factors that must be considered
when and if discretion is exercised. Sometimes a respondent may depart
from the required process. When so, mandamus can issue only to require the
proper process, not to mandate that any particular discretionary outcome
must be reached at the end of the process. However, mandamus may be used
to compel official action that falls within an established legally permissible
range if that official fails to act within the range and is required by the law to
do so. The fact that a court may need to interpret a statute to discern the
permissible range does not make the legal right any less clear.672
Thus, the Court has held that mandamus cannot compel the discretion-
ary act of granting parole to an inmate; yet mandamus potentially could be
used to compel the Florida Parole and Probation Commission to conform its
parole review process to the clear requirements of the constitution.6 73 Like-
wise, mandamus cannot be used to compel the Florida Department of Cor-
rections to perform the discretionary act of awarding "early release" credits
to inmates; yet mandamus can be used to require the Department to employ a
constitutionally required process in review of such cases.674
However, mandamus cannot be used to compel an act that is purely dis-
cretionary-that is, where the official has the authority either to do or not to
do it. Thus, mandamus cannot be used to compel The Florida Bar to com-
mence disciplinary proceedings against an attorney where it has found no
670. Kogan & Waters, supra note 1, at 1250; see, e.g., Kobayashi v. Kobayashi, 777 So.
2d 951, 952 (Fla. 2000) (Shaw, J., dissenting).
671. E.g., Moore v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 289 So. 2d 719, 720 (Fla. 1974).
672. Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 2003).
673. Moore, 289 So. 2d at 720.
674. Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla. 1990).
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reason to do so, just as it cannot be used to compel a prosecutor to com-
mence criminal proceedings."'
The person seeking mandamus also must show the likelihood that some
injury will actually occur if the writ is not issued.676 If there is no possibility
of injury, then mandamus is an inappropriate remedy.677 Thus, mandamus
will not be issued if doing so would constitute a useless act678 or would result
in no remedial good.67 9 This situation might exist, for example, where the
action that would be compelled already has been done.680 For example, the
Court has found the writ inappropriate where a license was taken away im-
properly but had been obtained in the first instance through fraud or deceit.68'
In other words, a valid reason existed to revoke the license and it would be a
useless act to issue mandamus merely because an improper reason had been
given for revocation. Moreover, injury does not exist if petitioners are able
to perform the ministerial acts in question for themselves.
682
However, injury can include some generalized harm, such as a disrup-
tion of governmental functions683 or the holding of an illegal election.684
Mandamus in particular is the appropriate vehicle for testing the constitu-
tionality of new statutes "where the functions of government would be ad-
versely affected without an immediate determination., 68' This conclusion is
reinforced if the statute in question implicates a matter over which the Court
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction or exclusive original jurisdiction.686
Petitioners seeking mandamus also must establish that they have a
"clear and certain" right imposing a corresponding duty on the respondents
to take the actions sought. 687 A right is clear and certain only if it is already
plainly established in preexisting law or precedent.68 Thus, the opinion in
which mandamus will be issued cannot be used as the vehicle for creating a
675. Tyson v. The Fla. Bar, 826 So. 2d 265, 267-68 (Fla. 2002) (citing State v. Cotton,
769 So. 2d 345, 350 (Fla. 2000)).
676. See Fla. League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 401 (Fla. 1992).
677. Id.
678. E.g., Bishoffv. State ex rel. Tampa Waterworks Co., 30 So. 808, 812 (Fla. 1901).
679. E.g., McAlpin v. State ex rel. Avriett, 19 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 1944).
680. E.g., Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Magwood, 149 So. 29, 30 (Fla. 1933).
681. State ex rel. Bergin v. Dunne, 71 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1954).
682. E.g., Gallie v. Wainwright, 362 So. 2d 936, 939 (Fla. 1978).
683. E.g., Dickinson v. Stone, 251 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1971).
684. See Fla. League of Cities, 607 So. 2d at 398.
685. Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 55 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Div. of Bond Fin. v.
Smathers, 337 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. 1976)).
686. See id. at 54 (identifying exclusive appellate jurisdiction over death penalty and ex-
clusive original jurisdiction over practice of law).
687. State ex rel. Eichenbaum v. Cochran, 114 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 1959).
688. See Fla. League of Cities, 607 So. 2d at 401.
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right previously uncertain or not yet extended to the situation at hand. The
right already must have come into existence through some other legal author-
ity.
689
However, the fact that some judicial interpretation of existing law may
be required does not make the right it establishes any less certain.69 ° More-
over, the right must be "complete" and unconditional at the time the petition
is brought.69' The existence of any unfulfilled condition precedent renders
mandamus improper.692 Likewise, mandamus cannot be used to achieve an
illegal or otherwise improper purpose693 because there is no right to break the
law or violate public policy.
Florida courts also have frequently imposed a requirement that there be
no other adequate remedy. 694 This requirement was imposed on the grounds
that mandamus exists to correct defects in justice, not to supersede other
adequate legal remedies. The extraordinary nature of the writ supports this
rationale. In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court suggested that the "no ade-
quate remedy" requirement no longer was essential, at least in cases involv-
ing "strictly legal constitutional questions., 695 The opinion appeared to have
misread the precedent on which it relied 696 and was largely ignored by later
case law.6 97 The "no adequate remedy" serves a useful purpose in that it re-
quires petitioners to exhaust other sufficient means before burdening the
Court's docket.
689. Id.
690. Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 2003).
691. Bergin, 71 So. 2d at 749.
692. Id.
693. See, e.g., State ex rel. Edwards v. County Comm'rs of Sumter County, 22 Fla. 1, 7
(1886).
694. E.g., Shevin ex rel. State v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla. 1976); State
ex rel. Long v. Carey, 164 So. 199, 205 (Fla. 1935).
695. Hess v. Metro. Dade County, 467 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 1985). Contra Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Hartsfield, 399 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
696. The Hess court cited Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984), which involved
an alleged defect in a constitutional amendment that would be put to voters. The Court in
Fine did not mention the "no adequate remedy" requirement. Id. However, it was clear that
no other adequate remedy existed there; the right to a fair election was at stake, and a fair
election would not be possible if a defective constitutional amendment was allowed to remain
on the ballot. Id. at 985. The Court has extended this reasoning to legislatively proposed
amendments challenged before an election, though the decision finding the ballot language
defective occurred after the election. Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 22 (Fla. 2000).
Justice Harding's concurring opinion expressly discusses the lack of an adequate remedy in
that situation. Id. at 24 (Harding, J., concurring).
697. E.g., Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000) (holding that no adequate rem-
edy is a requirement of mandamus).
[Vol. 29:3:431
114
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/1
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
The terms "state officers and state agencies" as used in the constitution
include judges and courts.698 In these cases, one specialized use of the writ is
to require the respondent-judges to exercise jurisdiction that has been
wrongly denied in the lower court. At earlier common law, this device was
known as the writ of procedendo,699 though today the same concept has been
subsumed under mandamus.7"0 However, mandamus would be inappropriate
unless the law clearly required the lower court to exercise its jurisdiction and
it failed to do so. 01
Finally, the Supreme Court of Florida has a long-standing custom-but
one not uniformly followed-regarding the actual issuance of mandamus.
As a matter of courtesy, the Court usually withholds issuing the writ because
the Justices are confident a respondent will conform to the majority opin-
ion.702 In any event, if a respondent later refused to conform, the Court could
still issue a previously "withheld" writ on a proper motion to enforce the
Court's earlier decision.
B. Quo Warranto
Another extraordinary writ is quo warranto, which means "by what au-
thority.""7 3 As the name suggests, quo warranto is a writ of inquiry.7" His-
torically, the English crown developed the writ as a means of calling upon
subjects to explain some alleged abuse of the power of an office, franchise,
or liberty within the Crown's purview.7 5 Today, quo warranto continues in
Florida as the means by which an interested party can test whether any indi-
vidual improperly claims or has usurped some power or right derived from
the State of Florida.7 6
Standing to seek quo warranto has been held to be broad and inclusive.
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that any citizen may bring suit for
quo warranto if the case involves "enforcement of a public right. ' 707 In prac-
tice, quo warranto proceedings almost always involve a public right because
698. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
699. See Linning v. Duncan, 169 So. 2d 862, 866 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (citing
Newport v. Culbreath, 162 So. 340, 342 (Fla. 1935)).
700. E.g., Pino v. Dist. Court of Appeal, Third Dist., 604 So. 2d 1232, 1233 (Fla. 1992).
701. Id.
702. E.g., Caldwell v. Estate of McDowell, 507 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 1987).
703. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1256 (8th ed. 1990).
704. Fouts v. Bolay, 795 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
705. State ex rel. Watkins v. Fernandez, 143 So. 638, 639 (Fla. 1932).
706. Id. at 640; Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 1989).
707. Martinez, 545 So. 2d at 1339 (citing State ex rel. Pooser v. Wester, 170 So. 736, 737
(Fla. 1936)).
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the Florida Supreme Court can issue the writ only to "state officers and state
agencies,"7 8 a term that apparently includes legislators and certain legislative
officials.7 °9 This limitation is the only express restriction contained in the
constitution, all others being derived from case law. Thus, the cases taken to
the Court usually are limited to those involving some allegedly improper use
of state powers or violation of rights by these officers or agencies.
One use of quo warranto is to test the outcome of a disputed election,
such as where one person has claimed the powers of the elective office but
another contends this was unlawful.710 Actions of this variety are governed
in part by the Florida Statutes specifying that the petition be brought by the
Attorney General or, if the latter refuses, by the person claiming title to the
office.711 If the Court grants the petition, it can issue a judgment of ouster,7' 2
which has the effect of vesting the claimant with title to the office. However,
if the Attorney General did not consent to the suit, the judgment remains
subject to challenge by the state.7t 3
There are other uses of quo warranto. For example, quo warranto has
been used by a legislator who argued that the Governor exceeded his consti-
tutional authority in calling a special session of the legislature.1 In that
instance, the petition for quo warranto was filed by the legislator as an origi-
nal proceeding in the Court.7'5 The writ has also been used to decide whether
a state public defender's office exceeded its statutory authority by represent-
ing indigent clients in federal court proceedings716 and, similarly, whether the
Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel exceeded its authority by
filing claims in federal court.717 It has been used to test the validity of the
legislative override of gubernatorial vetoes718 and the authority of the Gover-
708. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8). For a discussion of this limitation and its likely mean-
ing, see discussion supra Part VII.A. Under earlier law, quo warranto sometimes could be
used to test the validity of actions done pursuant to a franchise granted by the state, including
the right to incorporate. Thus, the writ sometimes could issue against a private concern. E.g.,
Davidson v. State ex rel. Banks, 20 Fla. 784, 790 (1884). The Florida Supreme Court no
longer has such authority. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8).
709. Chiles v. Phelps, 714 So. 2d 453, 456-57 (Fla. 1998).
710. State ex rel. Gibbs v. Bloodworth, 184 So. 1, 2 (Fla. 1938).
711. FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (2004).
712. § 80.032.
713. § 80.04.
714. Martinez, 545 So. 2d at 1338.
715. Id.
716. State ex rel. Smith v. Jorandby, 498 So. 2d 948, 949 (Fla. 1986).
717. State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1998).
718. Phelps, 714 So. 2d at 455.
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nor to name certain persons to the Public Service Commission Nominating
Council.719
As in mandamus, the Supreme Court of Florida usually withholds issu-
ance of a writ of quo warranto as a matter of courtesy where it appears the
Court's decision will be honored.72° This custom has not been followed uni-
formly, however, and the failure to withhold issuance has no real signifi-
cance.
C. Writs of Prohibition
The third extraordinary writ is that of prohibition. Like the two writs
discussed above, the writ of prohibition has an ancient origin in English
law.72 It arose out of the early struggle between the royal courts controlled
by the crown and the ecclesiastical courts controlled by the church. 722 Its
primary purpose was to prevent an ecclesiastical court from encroaching
upon the prerogatives of the sovereign. Thus, the writ of prohibition came
into being as a preventive writ and retains that quality to this day.
In Florida, prohibition is now the process by which a higher court pre-
vents an inferior tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction.723 The writ may be
obtained only by a petitioner who can demonstrate that a lower court is with-
out jurisdiction or is attempting to act in excess of jurisdiction regarding a
future matter, and the petitioner has no other adequate legal remedy to pre-
vent an injury that is likely to result.2
The writ may only be directed by the Florida Supreme Court to a lower
court and not to state agencies, state officers, or state commissions. 725 This
restriction is imposed by the constitution as a result of the 1980 jurisdictional
reforms that omitted the Florida Supreme Court's specific grant of authority
to issue writs of prohibition to some quasi-judicial commissions.7 26 In effect,
this ended the Court's earlier practice of exercising jurisdiction over state
administrative agencies when they acted in their quasi-judicial capacities.7 27
719. State ex rel. Bruce v. Kiesling, 632 So. 2d 601, 602 (Fla. 1994).
720. Greenbaum v. Firestone, 455 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1984).
721. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1977).
722. Id.
723. Id.
724. Id. at 296-97; accord Sparkman v. McClure, 498 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1986).
725. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7).
726. Moffitt v. Willis, 459 So. 2d 1018, 1020 (Fla. 1984).
727. For an example of this superseded form ofjurisdiction, see State ex rel. Vining v. Fla.
Real Estate Comm'n, 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973), where the Court issued a writ against quasi-
judicial proceedings of the Florida Real Estate Commission. Id. at 492.
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Of course, under long-standing precedent, writs of prohibition clearly cannot
reach an action that is purely legislative or executive in nature.728
Due to the 1980 amendments, the Florida Supreme Court's power to is-
sue writs of prohibition to courts is now the same for both the district
courts 72 and the circuit courts.73° Prior to the 1980 reforms, the authority
over trial courts had been limited to "causes within the jurisdiction of the
supreme court to review." '731 The restriction was deleted in 1980, effectively
vesting the Supreme Court of Florida with potential prohibition jurisdiction
over any cause arising in a trial court.732
Petitioners must also show that the lower court is without jurisdiction or
is attempting to act in excess of jurisdiction. For example, prohibition is
proper to restrain a lower court that clearly lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter.733 The Court often has contrasted "lack of jurisdiction" with those
situations in which a court merely exercises jurisdiction erroneously. In the-
ory, perhaps a writ of prohibition is not proper for the latter.3 In practice,
however, there is no realistic way to draw a clear distinction between the
lack of jurisdiction and the erroneous exercise of jurisdiction as the two often
blur together. The case law often reaches results that seem hard to reconcile
with a strict "lack of jurisdiction" element. In several cases, for example, the
Supreme Court of Florida has used prohibition to prevent a lower court from
imposing restraints on a prosecutor's discretion to seek the death penalty in a
criminal trial. This has occurred even though the lower court plainly had
jurisdiction over the issues but had merely engaged in conduct usually char-
acterized as a clear error.735
728. State ex rel. Swearingen v. R.R. Comm'rs of Fla., 84 So. 444,445 (1920).
729. See, e.g., Peltz v. District Court of Appeal, Third District, 605 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1992).
730. See, e.g., Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Bonanno, 568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990).
731. ARTHUR J. ENGLAND, JR. & TOBIAS SIMoN, FLORIDA APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL §
2.23(a) (1997).
732. Id.
733. Crill v. State Rd. Dep't, 117 So. 795, 797 (Fla. 1928).
734. English, 348 So. 2d at 297.
735. E.g., State v. Donner, 500 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1987); State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2 (Fla.
1986). But see Peacock v. Miller, 166 So. 212 (Fla. 1936) (holding prohibition not proper
where inferior court has jurisdiction but commits error). The use of prohibition in the prose-
cutorial discretion cases following the 1980 jurisdiction reforms apparently began with Bloom,
which cited as authority Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653, 653-54 (Fla. 1982). However,
this is an obvious overextension of Cleveland, which was a case that "expressly and directly
conflicts" and the Court held only that a court could not interfere with a prosecutor's discre-
tion to refuse to allow a defendant to be placed in a pretrial intervention program. Id. Cleve-
land had nothing to do with prohibition. Nevertheless, the "abuse of discretion" cases do gain
some support by analogy to the well established precedent that prohibition sometimes may be
used as a means of disqualifying biased judges even though they clearly have jurisdiction.
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On policy grounds, such a use of prohibition may be justified because it
could promote judicial economy by allowing the Florida Supreme Court to
prevent a clear error from infecting the entire proceeding. This would fore-
stall the likelihood of a useless trial that must inevitably be reversed on ap-
peal. Nevertheless, such a rule comes close to vesting the Court with a kind
of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, which could become onerous if not
used with restraint. As a practical matter, however, it seems unlikely the
Court will extend this use of prohibition beyond the unusual factual patterns
presented in such cases.
The next element a petitioner must show in order to obtain a prohibition
writ is that the alleged improper actions of the lower court will occur in the
future.736 The Florida Supreme Court often has noted that prohibition is a
preventive writ, not a "corrective" one.737 Thus, prohibition can be directed
only to future acts, not past ones. The cases suggest that the future act must
to some degree be "impending." '738 "Past acts" can include an order already
entered or proceedings already completed.739 Additionally, prohibition has
been allowed for orders previously entered if the primary effect is on a pro-
ceeding that has not yet occurred.74 This use is justifiable in that such orders
are directed to the future, but the result is a blurring of the distinction. The
best interpretation probably is that a "past act" is one involving a significant
degree of finality, whereas a "future act" does not.
To obtain prohibition, a petitioner must also show that no other ade-
quate remedy exists.4 The key word is "adequate." '742 Other remedies may
exist that are inadequate, incomplete, or unavailable to the petitioner; if so,
then prohibition is not foreclosed.743 As a general rule, the fact that an appeal
will give the petitioner an adequate and complete remedy renders the ex-
traordinary writ of prohibition unavailable.7" If another extraordinary writ
provides an adequate and complete remedy, then prohibition also should be
E.g., Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1978); State ex rel. Bank of Am. v. Rowe, 118
So. 5 (Fla. 1928). Judicial disqualification comes much closer to being a question of abuse of
discretion than abuse ofjurisdiction.
736. English, 348 So. 2d at 296-97.
737. E.g., Sparkman v. McClure, 498 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1986).
738. E.g., Joughin v. Parks, 143 So. 145, 145 (Fla. 1932).
739. English, 348 So. 2d at 297.
740. E.g., Donner, 500 So. 2d at 532-33; Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 2-3.
741. English, 348 So. 2d at 297.
742. Id.
743. See, e.g., Sparkman, 498 So. 2d at 895; Curtis v. Albritton, 132 So. 677, 680 (Fla.
1931).
744. Sparkman, 498 So. 2d at 895.
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denied.745 However, the Court still might review the case by treating the
petition as though it had requested the proper alternative remedy.746
The final requirement is that prohibition can be issued only to prevent
some likely and impending injury.74 7 Prohibition is not available if the issues
have become moot by the passage of time,"' nor can it be used to issue a
purely advisory opinion establishing principles for future cases.749 Opinions
discussing the writ also often describe it as being appropriate only in "emer-
gencies, ' '750 implying that the likelihood of some injury must be real and im-
mediate. As with many of the other extraordinary writs, the Court often
withholds formal issuance even when prohibition is granted.5
D. Habeas Corpus
Probably the best known of the extraordinary writs is habeas corpus,
whose name in Latin means "that you have the body. 752 The name arises
from the fact that the writ always began with these words, which were di-
rected to someone who was detaining another person. The writ typically
required the respondent to bring the body of the detained person into court so
that the legal validity of the detention might be examined. 753 Habeas corpus
thus arose as a writ of inquiry used to determine whether the detention is
proper5 or, put more accurately, whether the restraint on liberty is lawful.755
Potentially, any deprivation of personal liberty can be tested by habeas cor-
pus, and for that reason it is often called the "great writ.,
756
745. E.g., State ex rel. Placeres v. Parks, 163 So. 89, 91 (Fla. 1935) (holding that if man-
damus is available, prohibition should be denied); State ex rel. Booth v. Byington, 168 So. 2d
164, 175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that if quo warranto is available, prohibition
should be denied).
746. Cf, Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla. 1990) (treating petition writ of
habeas corpus as petition for writ of mandamus).
747. English, 348 So. 2d at 297.
748. Wetherell v. Thursby, 129 So. 345, 345-46 (Fla. 1930).
749. English, 348 So. 2d at 297.
750. Id. at 296.
751. E.g., State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986).
752. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).
753. There no longer is any absolute requirement that the detained person be brought to
court, and this earlier practice rarely occurs in the Supreme Court of Florida today.
754. Allison v. Baker, 11 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. 1943).
755. Sylvester v. Tindall, 18 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 1944).
756. See State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski, 152 So. 207, 209 (Fla. 1933). In ancient times,
the writ of habeas corpus was divided into many subcategories, most of which now are irrele-
vant or have been superseded by other devices such as the capias or bench warrant. Id. at 210.
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The obvious relationship to the fundamental constitutional right of lib-
erty757 explains why habeas corpus is the only writ specifically guaranteed by
the Florida Constitution's Declaration of Rights, which forbids suspension of
habeas corpus except in cases of rebellion or invasion.75 Habeas corpus is
also the most frequently used and most generously available of the extraordi-
nary writs. For that reason, the case law is exceedingly large and complex.
Entire treatises have been written addressing the writ's many nuances. A full
discussion of habeas corpus thus is not possible within the limited space of
this article. Moreover, in the last decade significant changes have been made
to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure associated with habeas corpus,759
discussed briefly below.
The standard used in considering habeas corpus claims can also be com-
plex. In very broad and general terms, the Court has said that habeas cannot
be issued except where the petitioner shows reasonable grounds to believe
that a present, actual, and involuntary restraint on liberty is being imposed
without authority of law and that no other remedy exists. Habeas is not ap-
propriate if the restraint has ended,76° if there is no actual restriction on lib-
erty, 6 or if restrictions on liberty are mere future possibilities,762 or have not
been coercively imposed.763 However, even limited restraints on liberty can
be sufficiently coercive to justify habeas relief, including an unlawfully im-
posed parole. 6
Habeas is proper only if the restraint is without legal justification 765 and
no other remedy exists to correct the problem.766 It is often said that habeas
cannot substitute for remedies available by appeal, by motion to dismiss, or
by proper use of procedural devices that were available prior to the time the
restraints on liberty were imposed.7 67 Likewise, habeas is not appropriate to
the extent that the restraint on liberty itself is not the true issue. This often
757. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
758. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 13. However, habeas corpus to some extent is regulated by
statute. See FLA. STAT. §§ 79.01-79.12 (2004).
759. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850, 3.851, 3.852, 3.853. The latter two were not adopted until
after the previous version of this article was written, and the former two have been the subject
of repeated amendments, litigation, and legislative action.
760. See Rice v. Wainwright, 154 So. 2d 693, 694 (Fla. 1963).
761. See Moon v. Smith, 189 So. 835, 837-38 (Fla. 1939); but see Sellers v. Bridges, 15
So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 1943).
762. Thompson v. Wainwright, 328 So. 2d 487, 488 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
763. See Sullivan v. State, 49 So. 2d 794, 796 (Fla. 1951).
764. Carnley v. Cochran, 123 So. 2d 249, 250-51 (Fla. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 369
U.S. 506 (1962); Sellers, 15 So. 2d at 295.
765. See State ex rel. Davis v. Hardie, 146 So. 97, 97 (Fla. 1933).
766. See Brown v. Watson, 156 So. 327, 331 (Fla. 1934).
767. See Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665, 668 (Fla. 1959).
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hinges on fine distinctions. For example, inmates alleging that "early re-
lease" credits were computed in an unconstitutional manner would not be
entitled to habeas. In that instance, the Court determined that the real issue
was not the self-evident restraint on liberty, but the improper performance of
a ministerial act-computing "early release" credits-that may or may not
reflect on the lawfulness of the detention, meaning that habeas was not the
proper remedy.768
Under this analysis, habeas is not a proper remedy if some unfulfilled
condition precedent still must occur to render any further restraint on liberty
unlawful even if the writ were issued. But habeas would be one possible
remedy at a later date if "early release" credits were properly computed, the
inmate clearly was entitled to release, and prison officials failed to honor the
law. It is worth noting, however, that an allegedly invalid death penalty it-
self constitutes a restraint on liberty even where there is no question that the
defendant will remain in prison even if the penalty is vacated. 769 But the
habeas petitioner's claim must genuinely be directed at the validity of the
penalty itself, not at some other matter.770
There are three additional aspects of habeas corpus that deserve further
mention. The most common and obvious use of habeas corpus is by inmates
who wish to challenge the lawfulness of their present imprisonment. Dozens
of petitions to this effect come to the Court every week,77' almost all of
which now are subject to the administrative transfer rule of Harvard.77 2
However, habeas corpus is not strictly confined to a penal or even a criminal-
law setting. "Civil detention" of a person can potentially be tested by the
writ of habeas corpus, including matters beyond the obvious example of in-
voluntary commitments for psychiatric treatment. 773 Even detention imposed
on someone by a private individual potentially can be tested by habeas cor-
768. Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla. 1990).
769. Compare Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 1986) (holding the
death penalty vacated on habeas petition, and case remanded for new proceedings), with Fitz-
patrick v. State, 527 So. 2d 809, 812 (Fla. 1988) (reducing death penalty ultimately to life
imprisonment for same defendant).
770. The Court itself sometimes overlooks the fine distinctions that can be involved in
determining whether a petition genuinely is challenging a restraint on liberty, not some other
matter.
771. These petitions often are in the form of handwritten notes that do not meet the
Court's usual filing requirements. However, the court accepts such "pro se" petitions if they
fairly appear to be seeking some form of relief, sometimes even assigning volunteer counsel to
assist in exceptional cases. The Court has held that even informal communications can be
sufficient to petition for habeas corpus. Crane v. Hayes, 253 So. 2d 435, 442 (Fla. 1971).
772. See Harvard v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 1020, 1024 (Fla. 1999).
773. E.g., Exparte Hansen, 162 So. 715, 717 (Fla. 1935).
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pus. For example, the writ has been used where one parent alleges that the
other parent has wrongfully taken custody of a child."'
The second point deserving mention is that the remedy available by ha-
beas corpus has been supplemented and modified since the 1960s by innova-
tions in the Florida Rules of Court. Most post-conviction claims previously
raised by inmates through habeas now must be brought under rule 3.850 of
the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure775 and other associated rules776 in
the trial court where the matter in question originated. Rule 3.850 was origi-
nally created by the Florida Supreme Court as an emergency means of deal-
ing with the turmoil created by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Gideon v. Wainwright.777 At the time, the rule's immediate purpose
was to prevent the Florida Supreme Court and courts where state prisons
were concentrated from being overwhelmed by habeas petitions prompted by
Gideon's holding that Florida had violated the rights of hundreds of indigent
felony offenders convicted without benefit of counsel.78 Rule 3.850 redi-
rected these claims to the trial courts from which the cases originated.
Over the years, rule 3.850 and its associated rules have retained the
original purpose of creating a procedural "channel" through which a large
class of habeas claims must flow. Of major importance, this includes dead-
lines for filing certain types of claims. In 2004, the Court emphasized the
important purpose of these deadlines and made explicit what had been im-
plicit in its rulings since the aftermath of Gideon-that in non-capital
cases, 779 petitioners cannot expand the time limitations imposed by rule 3.850
nor resurrect any other claim procedurally barred by the rule merely by char-
acterizing their claims as habeas corpus. Habeas petitions of this type are not
merely denied by the Court; they now are dismissed as unauthorized.7 °
Beyond this, there is already a detailed body of case law interpreting
these rules, so large that an adequate outline cannot be given in an article of
774. E.g., Crane, 253 So. 2d at 440; Porter v. Porter, 53 So. 546, 547 (Fla. 1910).
775. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850.
776. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.800, 3.851, 3.852, 3.853. See also FLA. R. App. P. 9.141(c), which
is now the procedural substitute to raise claims for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,
which were previously raised via a habeas petition. Rule 9.141 does not apply to death pen-
alty cases. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.14 1(a).
777. 372 U.S. 335 (1962). The problems Gideon caused, as well as the Florida Supreme
Court's response, are recounted in Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1963).
778. Roy, 151 So. 2d at 827.
779. Starting in 2001, post-conviction cases in capital claims have been governed exclu-
sively by rule 3.851, which includes its own time limitations. See FLA. R. ClaM. P. 3.851.
Public records claims made by inmates under a death sentence are governed by rule 3.852.
See FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.852.
780. Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245-46 (Fla. 2004).
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this kind. However, the Court has not lost sight of the origin of the rules as a
refinement of habeas corpus"' and has expressly noted that it "will continue
to be vigilant to ensure that no fundamental injustices occur. 782 These re-
finements show how even the use of extraordinary writs can evolve over
time. Obviously, further evolution will occur in years ahead as new prob-
lems arise that are unanticipated in the thousand years of Anglo-American
precedent upon which Florida's legal system draws. The upheaval caused by
Gideon, for example, was met and overcome through the Court's rule-
making powers, described more fully below.783 The Court "channelized"
habeas corpus into an orderly procedural process that not only was consistent
with the constitution but helped ensure that fundamental rights would be
honored without delay.
E. "All Writs"
The state constitution grants the Supreme Court of Florida authority to
issue "all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction., 784 The
operative constitutional language has remained essentially unchanged for
many decades now,7 85 although the construction placed on that language has
fluctuated at times. As a result, the Court's "all writs" authority remains one
of the most unsettled areas of jurisdiction, a problem worsened by the infre-
quency of all writs filings. The all writs clause cannot be understood apart
from its history.
Prior to 1968, the cases dealing with the all writs clause plainly stood
for two things. First, the all writs power could not be invoked unless a cause
was already pending before the Court on some separate and independent
basis of jurisdiction. Second, the Court's authority in this regard could only
781. In a 1988 case, for example, the Court described rule 3.850 as "a procedural vehicle
for the collateral remedy otherwise available by writ of habeas corpus," one that creates a fact-
finding function in the trial courts and a uniform method of appellate review. State v. Bolyea,
520 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 1988) (citing State v. Wooden, 246 So. 2d 755, 756 (Fla. 1971)). In
1992, the Court further suggested that rule 3.850 must be construed in a manner consistent
with the Florida Constitution's stricture that habeas corpus shall be "grantable of right, freely
and without cost." Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1992) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 13).
782. Harvard v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 1020, 1024 (Fla. 1999).
783. See discussion infra Part VIII.C.
784. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7). For a discussion of the history underlying this provi-
sion and the case law, see Robert T. Mann, The Scope of the All Writs Power, 10 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 197 (1982).
785. Compare FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7) with Couse v. Canal Auth., 209 So. 2d 865,
867 (Fla. 1968) (quoting FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. V (1957)).
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be directed at purely ancillary matters. In sum, "all writs" meant ancillary
writs in pending proceedings.786
Then, in the 1968 case of Couse v. Canal Authority,787 the Court over-
ruled its earlier standard of review.788 Under Couse, the "all writs" authority
would now exist over any matter falling within the Court's "ultimate power
of review" even if no case on the matter was pending in the Florida Supreme
Court at the time.789 The Court sua sponte amended the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure to set forth its new standard: all writs jurisdiction exists
"only when it is made clearly to appear that the writ is in fact necessary in
aid of an ultimate power of review."'7 90 In sum, the standard of review was
broadened from "ancillary writs" to "aiding ultimate jurisdiction, 791 though
it was not altogether clear in Couse what this change would mean.
Two years later, the Court mentioned its all writs powers in a way that
apparently expanded them even further. In a case involving a dispute be-
tween the Governor and the Legislature, the Court seemed to suggest that it
was exercising some form of original all writs jurisdiction because the case
"vitally affect[ed] the public interest of the State., 792 However, the reasoning
of the case is not entirely clear and actually may have focused on the use of a
writ of prohibition, with the Court imprecisely referring to "the all writ sec-
tion" as the basis for jurisdiction,793 a questionable reference that has hap-
pened before. 9
Later cases have read this same language expansively. In 1974, the
Court confronted a case involving the all writs authority of the district courts
of appeal. In deciding the case, the Court reiterated the 1968 standard of
review and added to it-the Florida Supreme Court's original all writs juris-
diction now would extend to "certain cases [that] present extraordinary cir-
786. E.g., State ex rel. Watson v. Lee, 8 So. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. 1942).
787. 209 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1968).
788. Id. at 867.
789. Id.
790. Id. (quoting FLA. R. APp. P. 4.5(g)(1) (as amended)). Apparently, the new standard
merely expanded jurisdiction. The Court still continued to issue ancillary writs in pending
proceedings under its all writs power. See, e.g., Booth v. Wainwright, 300 So. 2d 257, 258
(Fla. 1974).
791. Couse, 209 So. 2d at 867.
792. State ex rel. Pettigrew v. Kirk, 243 So. 2d 147, 149 (Fla. 1970).
793. Id. The headnote says that prohibition was issued, though the text of the opinion is
vague on this point. Id. at 148-49.
794. E.g., City of Tallahassee v. Mann, 411 So. 2d 162, 163 (Fla. 1981) (citing all writs
clause as basis of jurisdiction in granting prohibition). The misreference also was tempted by
another fact-both prohibition and "all writs" are authorized by the same sentence in the
constitution, though the two actually are distinct and subject to radically different standards of
review. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7).
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cumstances involving great public interest where emergencies and season-
able considerations are involved that require expedition., 795 It was unclear
whether this statement was a revision of the Couse standard or added an ad-
ditional requirement that must be met before all writs jurisdiction could be
invoked.
For the next two years, the Court did little to explain how its all writs
power would operate. 796 Another dramatic reversal occurred in 1976-the
Court appeared to have embraced its pre-1968 standard of review.797 No
explanation was given,798 and the Court did not discuss or overrule the other
cases it had issued since the late 1960s. Nor did the Court note that the rele-
vant Rules of Appellate Procedure still contained the language added sua
sponte to enforce Couse.799 The Court's decision was subsequently criticized
by one commentator as being "rightly decided but wrongly explained., 800
The older ancillary writs standard does seem dated in light of modem
procedural innovations. "Common-law 'ancillary writs' such as audita
querela have vanished from the law, replaced by procedural rules no longer
even identified by the somewhat quaint term 'writ."''" In the Florida Su-
preme Court, modem-day descendants of the old ancillary writs are some-
times still seen, such as the writ of injunction and the related concept of a
judicial "stay. °80 2 "However, the Court in recent years has never attempted
to use the all writs clause as the basis of jurisdiction over such matters. '0 3
Rather, the Court routinely finds some other basis of jurisdiction.8 , In this
795. Monroe Educ. Ass'n v. Clerk, Dist. Ct. of App., Third Dist., 299 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla.
1974).
796. McCain v. Select Comm. on Impeachment, 313 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1975). The McCain
case involved an effort by a sitting Justice of the Florida Supreme Court to stop impeachment
proceedings against him. See id. When he sought relief under the all writs clause, the Court
rejected it on the grounds that it failed to set forth "a claim within the jurisdiction and respon-
sibility of the court." Id. This statement, while vague, seemed much more limited than the
sweeping statements the court had made only one year earlier in 1974.
797. Shevin ex rel. State v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla. 1976).
798. Id. The Court cited only one case that had nothing to do with the all writs clause and
a 1942 case that clearly had been overruled in 1968. Id. (citing Wilson v. Sandstrom, 317 So.
2d 732 (Fla. 1975); State ex. rel. Watson v. Lee, 8 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1942)).
799. FLA. R. APP. P. 4.5(g)(1) (1962). The rule's language was even quoted two years
later in an opinion apparently applying the pre-1968 standard of review. Besoner v. Crawford,
357 So. 2d 414, 415 (Fla. 1978).
800. Mann, supra note 784, at 212.
801. Kogan & Waters, supra note 1, at 1264.
802. Id.
803. Id.
804. Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 912, 916 (Fla. 1991) (granting stay of pending execu-
tion based on Court's jurisdiction over judgments imposing sentence of death); The Fla. Bar v.
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light, an ancillary writs standard risks converting "all writs" into something
essentially meaningless, contrary to the settled rule that all constitutional
language should be construed to have an effect."0 5
Nevertheless, by the late 1970s, the Court seemed to be applying the re-
strictive ancillary writs standard, though it typically did so with a minimum
of explanation.0 6 Then, in 1982, another dispute between the Legislature
and the Governor came to the Court that was hard to pigeonhole into any
particular basis of jurisdiction. To hear the case, the Court abruptly returned
to the less restrictive Couse standard it had adopted in 1968.807 Significantly,
the 1982 Court made no mention of its earlier statements suggesting that all-
writs jurisdiction would exist if the case was simply important enough.8 8
Rather, the Court applied the earlier "aid[ing] of the ultimate jurisdiction"
standard that had been developed in 1968 by Couse.8 9 The Court found that
it had all writs jurisdiction in this particular case because the Governor had
taken actions that might restrict the Legislature's ability to reapportion the
state's legislative and congressional districts.10 Florida's Constitution re-
quires the Court to review all apportionment plans for constitutionality,81' so
the Governor's actions could have limited the Court's ultimate exercise of
that jurisdiction.
Little has happened in recent years to illuminate the all writs power. In
1984, the Court cited the all writs clause as the basis for hearing a death-row
inmate's request for a judicial order requiring a competency hearing, though
no relief was granted." 2 Exercising jurisdiction in this manner appeared to
be consistent with the "aiding ultimate jurisdiction" standard since the state
constitution assigns the Florida Supreme Court exclusive and mandatory
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving death sentences.1 3 Thus, the
Court has the ultimate jurisdiction to ensure that executions are conducted
lawfully.8 "4 Under this theory, the all writs clause could be invoked to re-
Dobbs, 508 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla. 1987) (granting writ of injunction against unlicensed prac-
tice of law).
805. Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 290 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1974).
806. St. Paul Title Ins. Corp. v. Davis, 392 So. 2d 1304, 1304-05 (Fla. 1980) (determining
that all writs clause cannot confer jurisdiction over district court PCA); see Burnsed, 290 So.
2dat 16.
807. Fla. Senate v. Graham, 412 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1982).
808. See id.
809. Id.
810. Id.
811. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c).
812. Alvord v. State, 459 So. 2d 316, 317-18 (Fla. 1984).
813. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
814. See id.
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view any matter or to issue any order necessary to ensure the propriety of a
death sentence.
Moreover, the Court now has established that its all writs authority can-
not be used in itself to establish jurisdiction over an otherwise unreviewable
district court ruling in which the entire opinion consisted of the words "PER
CURIAM. Affirmed."8"5  This holding was a strong reaffirmation of the
four-comers rule discussed above.816 It came after a 2002 amendment to the
Rules of Appellate Procedure8"7 authorized attorneys, as part of their motions
for rehearing in the district courts, to request that the lower court replace its
PCA opinion with one that potentially would be reviewable by the Supreme
Court of Florida.818 The Court held, as it has done elsewhere,1 9 that an ex-
traordinary writ cannot be used to circumvent other limitations placed on its
jurisdiction, 2° such as the four-comers rule. 21
The Couse standard is probably best seen as very limited and cases
qualifying under it would be rare. The policy of "aiding ultimate jurisdic-
tion" makes most sense when confined to a class of cases over which the
Court normally would have some form of original or appellate jurisdiction,
but where the full and complete exercise of that jurisdiction seems likely to
be curtailed or defeated before the Court could otherwise hear the case. That
would mean there are two elements: the existence of "ultimate jurisdiction"
found in the text of the constitution, and some unusual and impending factor
likely to limit or frustrate the complete exercise of that jurisdiction. 2 This is
consistent with the constitution, which itself says that the purpose of "all
writs" is to allow a "complete exercise" of jurisdiction.823
The "ultimate jurisdiction" requirement would also mean that petitions
to invoke this jurisdiction should identify at least two constitutional provi-
sions establishing jurisdiction. One would be the provision creating the ul-
timate basis of jurisdiction, and the other would be the all writs clause. In
815. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Kenyon, 882 So. 2d 986, 988 (Fla. 2004).
816. See Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1986).
817. Amendments to Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 827 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2002).
818. Kenyon, 882 So. 2d at 988.
819. E.g., Persaud v. State, 838 So. 2d 529, 532-33 (Fla. 2003).
820. Persaud, 838 So. 2d at 532-33.
821. Kenyon, 882 So. 2d at 990; accord St. Paul Title Ins. Corp. v. Davis, 392 So. 2d
1304, 1304-05 (Fla. 1980).
822. Obviously, this could include such traditional ancillary concerns as issuance of a
temporary injunction or the stay of lower court proceedings. See City of Tallahassee v. Mann,
411 So. 2d 162, 163-64 (Fla. 1981).
823. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7).
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other words, "all writs" as conceived in Couse appears to have a "dual juris-
diction" requirement."s 4
Some cases already decided in this subcategory suggest another conclu-
sion: the Court's all writs power is on its firmest footing in death cases, es-
pecially those involving pending executions,8 25 and in pressing governmental
crises. 26 In that vein, it is worth noting that the case In re Order on Prosecu-
tion of Criminal Appeals17 is probably best understood as an all writs case.
The case obviously involved a pressing governmental crisis, as the Court
expressly noted. 28 A strong argument existed that the county governments
affected by the district court's sua sponte order should have been joined as
parties below under the rule of due process. Moreover, the Court had "ulti-
mate jurisdiction" over the kind of case involved,829 and the district court's
failure to join the counties threatened to deprive the Florida Supreme Court
of the full exercise of its ultimate jurisdiction because of a technical lack of
standing. This would justify "all writs" review under the Couse standard.
A few other aspects of all writs jurisdiction deserve comment. As noted
above, the Court occasionally has cited the all writs clause as a basis for ju-
risdiction over writs such as prohibition, which are actually authorized by
separate clauses or provisions of the constitution.8 30 This is a practice that
promotes confusion and should be avoided. The Court's all writs authority
now has evolved into a distinct concept, so it muddies the waters to use the
phrase "all writs" as a generalized reference to any or all of the extraordinary
writs.
In this vein, it should be noted that there is at least one extraordinary
writ-the writ of error coram nobis-for which the Court has tended to cite
the all writs clause as a basis for jurisdiction. 3' However, that is an unusual
case and in any event, error coram nobis now has been completely subsumed
824. See Couse v. Canal Auth., 209 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. 1968); accord Fla. Senate v.
Graham, 412 So. 2d 360, 361 (citing both all writs clause and ultimate basis of jurisdiction).
825. E.g., Alvord v. State, 459 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1984).
826. E.g., Graham, 412 So. 2d at 360; accord Mize v. County of Seminole, 229 So. 2d
841, 842 (Fla. 1969).
827. 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990).
828. Id. at 1131-32.
829. "Ultimate jurisdiction" potentially existed here on a number of bases, including the
Florida Supreme Court authority to review cases affecting a class of state or constitutional
officers, the basis actually cited for jurisdiction in the case. Id. at 1132; see FLA. CONST. art.
V, § 3(b)(3).
830. See discussion supra Part VII.E.
831. E.g., Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037, 1037 (Fla. 1989). Coram nobis is not
mentioned in the state constitution's grant of jurisdiction. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b).
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under existing rules of criminal procedure. The writ of error coram nobis8 32
was the previous method by which a prior conviction could be challenged on
the basis of newly discovered evidence. 33 In 1989, the Supreme Court of
Florida essentially abolished the writ as it applied to persons still in cus-
tody,83 4 though the term "error coram nobis" still tended to be used to iden-
tify at least some of these cases. Challenges by such persons now must be
presented to the trial court pursuant to rule 3.850 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.835
Initially, there were doubts whether the two-year time limitation for fil-
ing a rule 3.850 case would apply to proceedings in the nature of error coram
nobis. These were dispelled in 1999 when the Court held that the time limi-
tation did indeed apply, but it gave all potential claimants two years from the
date of this decision before actions would begin to be barred.836 The Court
also addressed the problem caused by rule 3.850's "in custody" requirement
in the same opinion.837 This restriction was hard to justify, since it left open
the possibility that persons already released from custody would have access
to a traditional form of error coram nobis to correct a judgment, while those
still in custody would not. To eliminate this problem, the Court in 1999
amended the rule to remove the "in custody" requirement. 838 Error coram
nobis cases for persons not in custody frequently arise in the context of im-
migration proceedings.839 In this specific context, the Court has held that the
two-year limitation applies from the date they discover they may be de-
ported.84°
Attempts have sometimes been made to use the all writs clause as a
means of resurrecting a variety of writs that existed in earlier common law. 1
An example is the common-law writ of certiorari. This is an extraordinary
"writ of review" that should be distinguished from the separate "appellate
certiorari' '842 jurisdiction previously granted to the Court by provisions of the
832. The name is a peculiar blending of English and Latin. "Coram nobis" means "before
us." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 362 (8th ed. 2004). The writ exists to bring an error "before
us" for review, i.e. before the court. Id.
833. Richardson, 546 So. 2d at 1037.
834. See discussion infra Part VILE.
835. Id. For a discussion of rule 3.850, see discussion supra Part VI.D.
836. Wood v. State, 750 So. 2d 592, 595 (Fla. 1999).
837. Id.
838. Id.
839. E.g., State v. Kalici, 767 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2000); Somintac v. State, 767 So. 2d 1171
(Fla. 2000).
840. Peart v. State, 756 So. 2d 42, 46 (Fla. 2000).
841. See, e.g., Kilgore v. Bird, 6 So. 2d 541, 544-45 (Fla. 1942).
842. Id. at 544.
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Florida Constitution deleted in 1980. Common-law certiorari exists to re-
view and correct actions by a lower tribunal that violates the essential re-
quirements of the law where no other adequate remedy exists. 843 However, it
is now clear that the Florida Supreme Court cannot issue the writ or review a
writ "transferred" from a lower court.844 The Court's authority in this regard
was abolished in the 1957 jurisdictional reforms that created the district
courts of appeal845 and was not revived by the 1980 reforms.846
English common law at one time had developed many other legal de-
vices labeled "writs. 847 In theory, any of these could be revived by inter-
preting the Florida Constitution's all writs clause as a generalized reference.
In practice, however, such a thing is unlikely. Most of the common-law
writs dealt with problems fully covered by a variety of modem legal prac-
tices and procedures, most of which are no longer even considered to be
"4 848 thwrits. On the whole, it appears likely that the Florida Constitution's
reference to "all writs" should be understood as creating a single highly spe-
cialized writ available in the extraordinary circumstances contemplated by
Couse.849
VIII. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
The Florida Constitution assigns the Supreme Court of Florida exclu-
sive original jurisdiction in six categories, most of which deal with regulation
of Florida's Bench and Bar.850 Jurisdiction is both exclusive and original
because most of the topics embraced within this category involve the Court's
administrative powers over the state's judiciary and lawyers. The two excep-
tions of the six are in the case of legislative apportionment and determining
incapacity of the Governor, which are unique concerns. In the case of ap-
portionment, jurisdiction is premised on the necessity of a final and swift
legal determination that Florida's electoral districts are constitutionally valid
each time they are altered. As for gubernatorial incapacity, jurisdiction im-
843. Id. at 541.
844. 1-888-Traffic Schls. v. Chief Circuit Judge, Fourth Judicial Circuit, 734 So. 2d 413,
417 (Fla. 1999).
845. Robinson v. State, 132 So. 2d 3, 5 (Fla. 1961).
846. See Allen v. McClamma, 500 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 1987).
847. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1608 (8th ed. 1990).
848. For example, the writ of audita querela now has been supplanted by the motion for
relief from judgment authorized in the Rules of Civil Procedure. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 131 (8th ed. 1990).
849. Couse v. Canal Auth., 209 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1965).
850. See discussion infra Part VIII.A-F.
851. See discussion infra Part VIII.E.
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plicitly rests on the very dramatic constitutional crisis that would occur if
there is a dispute over a governor's ability to fulfill the duties of office.
A. Regulation of The Florida Bar
The state constitution assigns the Supreme Court of Florida exclusive
jurisdiction over the discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 52 As a
result, attorneys constitute the only profession not subject to regulation
through agencies created by the legislature. They fall within the exclusive
purview of the Court. Moreover, on June 7, 1949, the Florida Supreme
Court "integrated" The Florida Bar;.53 that is, it designated it as an arm of the
Court for purposes of regulating the practice of law. The Florida Bar main-
tains that function to this day. 54 Integration also means that no one can prac-
tice law in Florida without first becoming a member of The Florida Bar.s55
Regulation of attorneys operates on a number of levels. For one thing,
the Court controls admissions to the Bar and promulgates rules that regulate
the profession's governance and the procedures used in court.85 6 The Court's
most significant power is its ability to discipline lawyers for improprieties
based on a detailed set of ethical rules governing attorney conduct,85 7 with
The Florida Bar serving as primary enforcer.58 In this context, the Court has
said that The Florida Bar's discretion to pursue disciplinary action against an
attorney is analogous to that of a prosecutor in determining whether to bring
a case. 59 Specifically, the decision whether to do so cannot be compelled by
mandamus.860
Allegations of unethical conduct are investigated and, if meritorious,
may be reviewed by Bar counsel or Bar grievance committees.86' The matter
then may be examined by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar.862
Subject to the control of the Board of Governors, Bar counsel then may file a
complaint with the Florida Supreme Court, which initiates formal charges
852. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
853. In re Fla. State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902, 909 (Fla. 1949).
854. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 3-3.1 (2005).
855. See Fla. State Bar Ass"n, 40 So. 2d at 904.
856. See discussion infra Part VIII.C.
857. See generally RULEs REGULATING FLA. BAR.
858. Id.
859. See Tyson v. The Fla. Bar, 826 So. 2d 265, 267-68 (Fla. 2002) (citing State v. Cot-
ton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)).
860. Id. at 268.
861. See RULES REGULATING FLA. BARR. 3-3.1 (2005).
862. Id.
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against the lawyer in question."' At this point, the Chief Justice usually di-
rects the Chief Judge of the appropriate court to appoint a "referee" to re-
solve factual issues and make recommendations regarding discipline'
64
Referees ordinarily are sitting county or circuit judges; however, retired
judges also can be appointed. 65
Procedures before the referee are highly regulated by court rules and are
conducted as adversarial proceedings, like a trial.866 After hearing the evi-
dence, the referee will issue a report setting down factual findings and rec-
ommended discipline, if any.867 The report is then forwarded to the Court.
68
At this point, many attorneys decline to challenge the referee's findings and
recommendations, which the Court then summarily affirms. These are called
undisputed Bar cases. If attorneys dispute the reports, their cases usually are
accepted for review as a "no request" without oral argument, although in rare
cases oral argument is granted. The Bar also can challenge a referee's report.
Factual findings contained in the referee's report are presumptively cor-
rect and are accepted as true by the Court unless such findings lack support
in the evidence, 869-- or stated another way-unless clearly erroneous.87 Pro-
ceedings before the Supreme Court of Florida are not trials de novo in which
all matters might be revisited.87" ' However, the referee's purely legal conclu-
sions-including disciplinary recommendations-are subject to broader re-
view,7 ' though they come to the Court with a presumption of correctness.873
In practice, the Court will depart from recommended discipline deemed too
harsh or too lenient. However, the Court almost never exceeds the discipline
actually requested by Bar counsel.
Discipline can range from a reprimand to disbarment.8 74  Nearly all
forms of discipline result in a public record of the attorney's misconduct.
Disbarred attorneys typically cannot be readmitted to practice law unless at
least five years have passed and they prove they have been rehabilitated 87 5-
863. See RULEs REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 3-3.2 (2005).
864. RuLEs REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 3-7.6(a) (2005).
865. Id.
866. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 3-7.6(b) (2005).
867. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 3-7.6(m)(1)(A), (C) (2005).
868. RULEs REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 3-7.6(m)(2) (2005).
869. The Fla. Barv. Bajoczky, 558 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 1990).
870. The Fla. Barv. McKenzie, 442 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1983).
871. See The Fla. Bar v. Hooper, 507 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 1987).
872. See The Fla. Bar v. Langston, 540 So. 2d 118, 120-21 (Fla. 1989) (citing The Fla.
Bar in re Inglis, 471 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1985)).
873. The Fla. Bar v. Poplack, 599 So. 2d 116, 118 (Fla. 1992) (citing The Fla. Bar v. Lip-
man, 497 So. 2d 1165, 1168 (Fla. 1986)).
874. RULES REGULATING FLA. BARR. 3-5.1(a)-(f) (2005).
875. The Fla. Bar re Hipsh, 586 So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 1991).
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a difficult thing to do in many cases. Occasionally, the Court disbars without
leave to reapply, in which case readmission is possible only by petitioning
the Court for permission." 6
B. Admission to The Florida Bar
The Florida Constitution also grants the Florida Supreme Court exclu-
sive jurisdiction over admitting persons to practice law.877 The Court has
created the Florida Board of Bar Examiners to oversee Bar admissions. This
agency reviews all applications for admission using detailed standards in-
cluded in the Rules of Court.87 Every applicant to the Florida Bar must un-
dergo a rigorous background investigation conducted by the Bar Examiners,
must successfully complete a two-day examination on legal knowledge, and
must pass a separate examination on legal ethics, which now can be taken
while the student is still in law school.879
If the background investigation reveals anything reflecting poorly on an
applicant's character or fitness, the Bar Examiners are also authorized to
conduct a series of hearings to resolve the matter. Any decision coming out
of this process can be taken to the Court by petition for further review. The
Court can then accept, reject, or modify the recommendations of the Bar
Examiners. Bar admission cases are usually confidential, though a few are
occasionally made public and published in Southern Second, often with the
applicant identified only by initials.88°
C. Rules of Court
The development and issuance of all rules governing practice and pro-
cedure before Florida courts lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court.88' The Court has developed a very public and thorough
process for rule making. Development of rules has been delegated to various
committees of The Florida Bar, except local rules, which are developed by
the state's lower courts, reviewed by the Local Rules Committee, and sub-
mitted to the Supreme Court of Florida for approval.
In 1993, these committees submitted proposals for revisions every four
years. This quadrennial revision process now has been replaced with a stag-
876. Id.
877. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
878. See RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR R. 1-14, 1-16 (2003).
879. Id.
880. E.g., Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, re: S.M.D., 619 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1993).
881. Haven Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1991).
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gered two-year cycle that started in 2002. Proposed amendments to roughly
half the rules are made in every even-numbered year, with the remaining half
made in every odd-numbered year.8 2 The Court then accepts, rejects, or
modifies the amendments. This process is sometimes supplemented with
special proposals by the committees, petitions for revisions filed by Bar
members, and the much rarer sua sponte revisions issued by the Court "if an
emergency exists that does not permit reference to the appropriate committee
of The Florida Bar for recommendations., 883 Out-of-calendar rules revisions
sometimes are necessary to address changes in statutory law. Though it sel-
dom happens, court rules can be repealed by a two-thirds vote in each house
of the Legislature.88 The lower courts cannot ignore or amend controlling
rules. 8
5
The Court's rule-making authority extends only to procedural law, not
substantive law. Though the boundary separating the two is not entirely pre-
cise, the Court has said that "procedural" law deals with the "course, form,
manner, means, method, mode, order, process or steps" by which substantive
rights are enforced.886 "Substantive" law "creates, defines, and regulates
rights. 887  In other words, "procedure" is the "machinery of the judicial
process" while "substance" is the product reached.888
These distinctions are important because they separate the rulc -making
authority of the Court from the lawmaking authority of the Legislature.
Thus, it is possible for the Legislature to enact a "procedural" statute that can
be superseded by court rule8 89 just as it is possible for the Court to enact a
rule so substantive in nature that it violates the legislature's prerogative.89°
Disagreements between the two branches of government have occurred, most
noticeably in the development of the Florida Evidence Code.89' For the most
part, however, the Court has enacted rules consistent with legislative
amendments to the Evidence Code, sometimes even when The Florida Bar
882. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.130(c)(1).
883. FLA. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.130(a).
884. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a). This occurred in early 2000 during passage of a package
of death-penalty statutes subsequently found unconstitutional by the Court. See Allen v. But-
terworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 64 (Fla. 2000).
885. State v. McCall, 301 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1974).
886. Kirian, 579 So. 2d at 732 (citing In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d
65, 66 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J., concurring)).
887. Id. (citing State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1969)).
888. Id. (citing Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d at 66 (Adkins, J. concur-
ring)).
889. Id.
890. E.g., State v. Furen, 118 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1960).
891. E.g., In re Amendments to the Fla. Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339, 342 (Fla. 2000)
[hereinafter Evidence Amendments 1].
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recommended against doing SO. 8 92 On occasion, the Court has even called
for a "cooperative" effort with the legislature to eliminate problems between
conflicting statutes and rules 93 and occasionally has deferred adopting a leg-
islative change to the Florida Evidence Code until the legislative committee
could provide additional information requested by the Justices. 94 However,
the Court lacks any authority to issue rules governing state administrative
proceedings, which fall within the legislature's authority. 95 This includes
executive branch agencies that are quasi-judicial in nature, such as the courts
of compensation claims. 96
It is worth noting that by promulgating a rule, the Court does not vouch
for its constitutionality. 97 A court rule could thus be challenged in a future
proceeding on any valid constitutional ground. This is because rules are is-
sued as an administrative function of the Court, not as an adjudicatory func-
tion. There are no parties arguing an actual dispute, the nature of which may
be unforeseen at the time the rule is adopted.8 9 In sum, there is no case or
controversy to resolve in a rule-making case.899 For much of the same rea-
son, the act of promulgating a rule does not foreclose challenges that it con-
tains substantive aspects that are invalid. Questions such as these can only
be decided when affected parties bring an actual controversy for resolution.
Thus, ruling on the constitutional aspects of a newly adopted rule risks giv-
ing an advisory opinion.9"
892. In re Amendments to the Fla. Evidence Code, 825 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 2002) [here-
inafter Evidence Amendments I].
893. Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1992).
894. Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Workers' Comp. Procedure, 29 Fla. L. Weekly
S787 (Fla. 2004).
895. Gator Freightways, Inc. v. Mayo, 328 So. 2d 444, 446 (Fla. 1976); Bluesten v. Fla.
Real Estate Comm'n, 125 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 1960).
896. Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Workers' Comp. Procedure, 29 Fla. L. Weekly
S738, S739 (Fla. 2004).
897. Report of the Supreme Court Workgroup on Pub. Records, 825 So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla.
2002).
898. See, e.g., Evidence Amendments 1, 782 So. 2d at 341. This opinion declined "to ad-
dress the substantive/procedural issues until such time as the issue comes before the Court in a
true 'case or controversy."' Id. It should be emphasized, however, that this comment was
made in the context of refusing to adopt a purported statutory change to the hearsay rule. Id.
at 340-41.
899. Evidence Amendments II, 825 So. 2d at 341.
900. See discussion supra Part IV for discussion of the policy against giving advisory
opinions.
[Vol. 29:3:431
136
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/1
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
D. Judicial Qualifications
The next form of exclusive jurisdiction governs "judicial qualifica-
tions," which exist solely for the purpose of disciplining the state's judges
and justices for ethical improprieties. It is analogous to Bar discipline,
though accomplished through a different agency. Jurisdiction here rests on a
constitutional provision that specifies in considerable detail how such cases
are reviewed.9 °1 As noted earlier, cases of this type are commenced at the
instance of the Judicial Qualifications Commission ("JQC"), which is author-
ized to investigate alleged impropriety by any judge or justice.9"2 Upon rec-
ommendation of the JQC, the Supreme Court of Florida is then vested with
jurisdiction to consider the case.
Jurisdiction here is exclusive because the discipline proposed by the
JQC is considered to be only a recommendation.90 3 The JQC is a separate
body with its own rule-making authority.9° The JQC's factual findings are
given a presumption of correctness on review while its recommendations are
persuasive but not conclusive,95 and the Florida Supreme Court has some-
times departed from recommended discipline."0 6 Indeed, the Supreme Court
"may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations" brought before it.907 Moreover, the JQC does not
constitute a "court" in itself and is not subject to the writ of prohibition. 98
Discipline recommended by the JQC will be imposed only when supported
by clear and convincing proof of the impropriety in question.909
The Court has held that judicial qualification proceedings are not in the
nature of a criminal prosecution and are not subject to the constitutional re-
straints peculiar to criminal law.910 The doctrines of res judicata and double
jeopardy do not apply 9 ' and the JQC can, therefore, inquire into matters pre-
viously investigated in other contexts. As noted earlier, the Florida Constitu-
tion automatically disqualifies the sitting Justices of the Florida Supreme
Court to hear a proceeding brought against one of their own number. In-
stead, a panel of specially appointed "Associate Justices" will hear the case.
901. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12.
902. See supra Part II.H. 1.
903. State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609, 610-11 (Fla. 1974).
904. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a)(4).
905. Turner, 295 So. 2d at 610-11 (Fla. 1974).
906. In re Norris, 581 So. 2d 578, 579-80 (Fla. 1991).
907. FLA. CONST. art V, § 12(c)(1).
908. Turner, 295 So. 2d at 611.
909. In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1977).
910. In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 569 (Fla. 1970).
911. Id. at 570.
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E. Review of Legislative Apportionment
In every year ending in the numeral two, the Florida Legislature is re-
quired to reapportion the state's legislative and congressional districts to re-
flect the latest United States Census.912 Reapportionment must be finalized
before the fall's elections that same year, which might not be possible if law-
suits on the question began in some lower court and wended through the ap-
pellate system. Accordingly, the state constitution has given the Court ex-
clusive, original, and mandatory jurisdiction to review each decennial reap-
portionment plan approved by the legislature.9"3
The Court's authority in this regard is extraordinary and limited.914 All
questions regarding validity of the reapportionment plan can be litigated to
finality in a single forum, for both trial and appellate purposes.9 15 Moreover,
if the legislature is unable to reapportion within certain time constraints, the
Court itself has authority to impose a reapportionment plan by order.916 Judi-
cial apportionment, for example, was necessary in 1992 with respect to some
of the state's districts. 917 In that instance, the Court was swayed by argu-
ments of the United States Justice Department regarding the federal Voting
Rights Act. 918 Thus, federal issues are an important concern here. It should
be noted, however, that the Supreme Court of Florida's determination of va-
lidity does not necessarily bind the federal courts or the Justice Depart-
ment.
919
F. Gubernatorial Incapacity
The last form of exclusive jurisdiction vests the Florida Supreme Court
with authority to decide if the governor cannot fulfill the duties of office due
to incapacity. Any inquiry into this form of jurisdiction must begin with a
brief explanation of laws governing succession in other contexts. It is clear,
for example, that the Lieutenant Governor succeeds to the office of Governor
immediately upon the occurrence of a vacancy, whether by death, by resigna-
912. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(a).
913. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c).
914. See In re Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 1987, 817 So. 2d 819 (Fla.
2002).
915. See id.
916. See id.
917. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla.
1992).
918. Id. at 544-45.
919. Id. at 545.
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tion, or by removal following impeachment.920  The Lieutenant Governor
likewise becomes acting Governor automatically once the Governor is im-
peached and until acquittal by the Senate.92' Moreover, if the Lieutenant
Governor cannot succeed to the office in any situation, the succession is es-
tablished by state law.922
The constitutional language is not as clear in describing what happens if
a Governor is allegedly unable to perform the duties of office due to incapac-
ity. The relevant language states that the Lieutenant Governor will become
acting Governor during the period of incapacity. 923 However, the constitu-
tional provision then falls into ambiguity by not stating exactly how incapac-
ity will be determined. There are two separate methods of officially estab-
lishing incapacity. 924 The first is that the Florida Supreme Court "may" de-
termine the issue upon due notice after the filing of a written suggestion of
incapacity by the full cabinet92-the Attorney General, the Chief Financial
Officer, and the Commissioner of Agriculture. 926 The second is that the Gov-
ernor "may" establish the fact by filing a certificate of incapacity with the
custodian of state records.927
The obvious ambiguity rests on this question: Does the word "may" in
these two provisions mean that one or the other method must be used, or
does it mean that neither is absolutely necessary? In other words, could the
Lieutenant Governor simply assume the role of acting Governor without
either of these two processes occurring? Common sense dictates that there
must be some formal process for determining incapacity, if only to establish
that the person acting as Governor has lawfully assumed the executive pow-
ers. If these powers were not lawfully vested, every action by the Lieutenant
Governor would be subject to legal challenge. This in turn suggests that the
two methods of certifying gubernatorial incapacity are alternatives, at least
one of which must occur.
Moreover, this same conclusion is reinforced by the fact that a Lieuten-
ant Governor assuming the role of acting Governor without any such certifi-
cation would be subject to a petition for writ of quo warranto, which under
920. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a).
921. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b).
922. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 14.055, .056 (2002).
923. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b).
924. Id.
925. Id.
926. Compare id. with FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(a).
927. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b). The Governor might file such a certificate, for example,
before undergoing serious surgery. This would permit the Lieutenant Governor to serve as
acting Governor until such time as the Governor files another certificate indicating that the
incapacity no longer exists. Id.
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established case law could be filed by any state citizen.928 By this means the
issue could be brought before the Court if neither of the two requirements
were met. Quo warranto-perhaps in connection with the Court's all-writs
authority929-thus also would exist as a potential means of addressing the
legal issues that would arise if a governor was unable to declare incapacity
and one or more members of the cabinet refused to join in the suggestion of
incapacity filed with the Court.930 All-writs jurisdiction might properly exist
if the refusal of the parties in question would frustrate the Court's jurisdiction
to determine incapacity of the Governor, even if the Court ultimately found
the allegations unfounded. 931 This would be so because the constitutional
language leaves open the possibility that a Governor could be truly incapaci-
tated and the Lieutenant Governor could be unable to act as Governor if the
cabinet was unable to agree on the issue. In that unlikely situation, the state
could be left without an acting executive.
Once the suggestion is filed by the cabinet, the Court resolves the issue
as both fact-finder and final adjudicator of the question. The constitution is
silent as to what standard must be used, and the Court has never had an occa-
sion to interpret this provision of the constitution since it was added in 1968.
However, there is at least one actual case from another state. In 2003, the
Governor of Indiana suffered a stroke that rendered him unconscious for a
period of time before he died.932 The analogous provision of the Indiana
Constitution required that a petition be filed with the Indiana Supreme Court
by the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate.933 A few days later
these two officers filed their petition, but included with it a statement by the
attending physician verifying the Governor's incapacity and a letter from the
Governor's general counsel stating that the Governor's family approved of
the transfer of power.934 The Indiana Supreme Court approved the request
928. State ex rel. Watkins v. Fernandez, 143 So. 638, 640 (Fla. 1932); Martinez v. Marti-
nez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 1989) (citing State ex rel. Pooser v. Wester, 170 So. 736, 737
(Fla. 1936)).
929. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7).
930. There is an enhanced possibility in Florida that political motivations could come into
play in some future dispute over alleged incapacity because the three cabinet members are
elected independently of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§
1,4.
931. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7).
932. Mary Beth Schneider, O'Bannon Dies, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 14, 2003, at Al
[hereinafter O 'Bannon Dies].
933. Mary Beth Schneider et al., Power Transferred to Kernan, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept.
11, 2003, at Al.
934. Id; O'Bannon Dies, supra note 932.
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and expressly ratified all actions of the acting Governor from the time the
Governor became incapacitated.935
The Indiana example shows an obvious attempt to establish complete
certainty about the Governor's condition and the transfer of authority. In its
order, the Indiana court expressly found that there was "no basis for doubt or
dispute" about the Governor's incapacity. The situation obviously would be
different if a doubt or dispute did exist, especially if the dispute was raised
by the Governor in question. While not offering much guidance on this latter
hypothetical issue, the actual events in Indiana suggest a central point-a
great unwillingness on the part of all concerned, including the Indiana court,
to seek and certify incapacity if it was in any sense a political act. "Doubt or
dispute" thus could be seen as the line dividing obvious cases of incapacity
from those requiring a far more stringent standard of review.
Under Florida's constitutional scheme, a similar procedure appears to
be contemplated. The Florida Constitution expressly provides for impeach-
ment in the House followed by trial in the Senate of any Governor "for mis-
demeanor in office." '936 While one case suggests that this phrase must be
defined by the legislature itself,937 another says that the term is broader than
the criminal concept of "misdemeanor" and includes any "willful malfea-
sance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office." '938 Further, the term may not
even require actual corruption or criminal intent.93 9 The very fact that this
impeachment process exists-and is exclusively placed in the hands of the
inherently political legislative branch of government-means it would be
illogical to seek a certification of incapacity in the Supreme Court of Florida
for any situation that merely involves impeachable activity.
The impeachment process likewise requires supermajorities in both
houses and other extraordinary safeguards that do not exist in certifying in-
capacity. 940 A fair conclusion, supported by the Indiana example, is that cer-
tification of incapacity exists only to address a truly catastrophic failure in
the Governor's physical or mental health, whether short or long-lived. It
does not exist to serve as a faster means of impeachment, nor is it a proper
remedy where the motivations are political. In sum, where there is "doubt or
dispute" about incapacity, the Court would show great reluctance to certify
935. In re Temp. Inability of Governor Frank L. O'Bannon to Discharge the Duties of
Office, 798 N.E.2d 838, 838-39 (Ind. 2003).
936. FLA. CONST., art. III, § 17(a), (c).
937. Forbes v. Earle, 298 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1974).
938. In re Investigation of a Cir. Judge of the Eleventh Jud. Cir. of Fla., 93 So. 2d 601,
605-06 (Fla. 1957).
939. Id. at 606.
940. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(a), (c).
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incapacity. If the allegations fairly constitute impeachable activities, inca-
pacity would not be warranted and the matter would be left to the legislature
to resolve.
After the Florida Supreme Court certifies the incapacity of a Governor,
it also has exclusive jurisdiction to determine that the incapacity no longer
exists, thereby transferring the executive powers back to the Governor.
941
This jurisdiction is invoked in the same way described above-by the filing
of a written suggestion with the Court. However, the suggestion in this in-
stance can be filed by the unanimous cabinet, by the Governor individually,
or by "the legislature. 942 While it might be cumbersome for the legislature
to convene and vote on the issue, it appears unlikely that the need would
arise except in some extraordinary situation. The most likely person to file
the suggestion is the Governor seeking restoration of the executive powers.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida was created in 1845 and held its first ses-
sions the following year. Since that time, a considerable body of custom and
precedent has come into existence regarding the Court's operation and juris-
diction. This body is not widely known outside the Court, nor has there been
much previous effort to compile information about routine operations in a
comprehensive collection. The present article is an effort to fill this gap, to
update the previous 1993 article because of major changes that have occurred
in the intervening years, and to provide information to lawyers and layper-
sons about their state's highest court.
941. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b).
942. Id.
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SECTION I: CO-AUTHORS' INTRODUCTION
The following article is a tripartite effort by Mitchell Berger and Grace
E. Robson, members of the Florida Bar; John B. Anderson, a member of the
Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad Law Center faculty; and a
team of two of the students at that law school, Jason Blank and Tom Brogan,
to examine the subject of ballot access for non-major party candidates in
presidential elections in the wake of the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Florida in Reform Party of Florida v. Black.' Mr. Berger has fur-
nished a critical analysis of that decision. Our team of students has cata-
logued the ballot access laws of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
John B. Anderson has reviewed United States Supreme Court decisions on
the subject of ballot access specifically, and then also more generally on the
way in which they reflect on the electoral process; a process which for a cen-
tury and a half has been dominated by our two major parties. His criticism
of the resulting duopoly of political power and control should be attributed to
him alone and not to the other members of this collaborative effort. How-
ever, both Mr. Berger and Mr. Anderson support the idea of a constitutional
amendment putting forth an affirmative right to vote as both necessary and
desirable as a predicate for any effort to achieve a more uniform approach to
ballot access in future presidential contests. We also join in our appreciation
for the research assistance of Messrs. Blank and Brogan and their contribu-
tion to our joint effort.
1. 885 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2004).
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SECTION II: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN
ELECTION 2000 LIVE ON: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE, REFORM PARTY OF
FLORIDA v. BLACK
MITCHELL W. BERGER
GRACE E. ROBSON
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent elections have raised questions and concerns regarding a per-
son's ability to "get on the ballot." Should there be restrictions? Are the
restrictions in place sufficient?
Currently, each state has laws governing the requirements for an indi-
vidual to get on the general election ballot as a candidate for President of the
United States.2 This article critically analyzes the recent Supreme Court of
Florida case pertaining to ballot access for minor party candidates, Reform
Party of Florida v. Black.3 More specifically, this article discusses the appli-
cable Florida law and the shortcomings of the majority's decision in interpre-
tation thereof. In addition, this article discusses how to prevent the courts
from being confronted with making decisions that fail to apply the law. This
solution proposes an amendment to the United States Constitution that would
mandate: any eligible registered voter in the United States and the District of
Columbia would have the right to vote for an elector in his or her respective
place of residence (or directly for the President if the electoral college were
abolished); that equal machinery be used to count the votes; and that uniform
standards be provided for ballot access with respect to candidates seeking
election to the office of President of the United States.
The judiciary's role is to interpret laws.4 In fulfilling this task, courts
routinely use canons of construction to construe statutes, whether they are
state, federal, or otherwise. However, on September 17, 2004, when the Su-
preme Court of Florida decided the case Reform Party of Florida, the major-
ity failed to apply basic rules of statutory construction and ignored uncontro-
verted evidence in ruling that Ralph Nader and Peter Camejo should be listed
as presidential and vice-presidential candidates on Florida's general election
2. See infra APPENDIX.
3. See generally Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 303-21.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616-17 n.7 (1999).
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ballot. 5 Regardless of party affiliation, a review of this case shows that the
majority failed to do its job, which in this case, was interpreting a Florida
statute.6
A. Florida Legislature Modified Ballot Access Law
In 1999, the Florida Legislature uncoupled the requirement of gathering
signatures and affiliating with a national party.7 The current form of the stat-
5. See Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 304.
6. See id. at 312.
7. See FLA. STAT. § 103.021(3) (2004). This section provides:
Candidates for President and Vice President with no party affiliation may have their names
printed on the general election ballots if a petition is signed by 1 percent of the registered elec-
tors of this state, as shown by the compilation by the Department of State for the last preceding
general election. A separate petition from each county for which signatures are solicited shall
be submitted to the supervisor of elections of the respective county no later than July 15 of
each presidential election year. The supervisor shall check the names and, on or before the
date of the first primary, shall certify the number shown as registered electors of the county.
The supervisor shall be paid by the person requesting the certification the cost of checking the
petitions as prescribed in s. 99.097. The supervisor shall then forward the certificate to the
Department of State which shall determine whether or not the percentage factor required in this
section has been met. When the percentage factor required in this section has been met, the
Department of State shall order the names of the candidates for whom the petition was circu-
lated to be included on the ballot and shall permit the required number of persons to be certi-
fied as electors in the same manner as party candidates.
Id. See also section 103.021(4), Florida Statutes, which provides:
(a) A minor party that is affiliated with a national party holding a national convention to nomi-
nate candidates for President and Vice President of the United States may have the names of its
candidates for President and Vice President of the United States printed on the general election
ballot by filing with the Department of State a certificate naming the candidates for President
and Vice President and listing the required number of persons to serve as electors. Notification
to the Department of State under this subsection shall be made by September 1 of the year in
which the election is held. When the Department of State has been so notified, it shall order
the names of the candidates nominated by the minor party to be included on the ballot and
shall permit the required number of persons to be certified as electors in the same manner as
other party candidates.
(b) A minor party that is not affiliated with a national party holding a national convention to
nominate candidates for President and Vice President of the United States may have the names
of its candidates for President and Vice President printed on the general election ballot if a pe-
tition is signed by 1 percent of the registered electors of this state, as shown by the compilation
by the Department of State for the preceding general election. A separate petition from each
county for which signatures are solicited shall be submitted to the supervisors of elections of
the respective county no later than July 15 of each presidential election year. The supervisor
shall check the names and, on or before the date of the first primary, shall certify the number
shown as registered electors of the county. The supervisor shall be paid by the person request-
ing the certification the cost of checking the petitions as prescribed in s. 99.097. The supervi-
sor shall then forward the certificate to the Department of State, which shall determine whether
or not the percentage factor required in this section has been met. When the percentage factor
required in this section has been met, the Department of State shall order the names of the can-
didates for whom the petition was circulated to be included on the ballot and shall permit the
required number of persons to be certified as electors in the same manner as other party candi-
dates.
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ute provides that a minor party candidate can get on the general election bal-
lot as a presidential candidate if the candidate either obtains a petition signed
by one percent of the Florida registered voters or if the minor party is affili-
ated with a national party holding a national convention to nominate candi-
dates for President and Vice President of the United States.8
B. Procedural History
On August 31, 2004, Ralph Nader and Peter Camejo submitted papers
to the Secretary of State of Florida pursuant to section 103.021(4)(a) of the
Florida Statutes in order to be placed as Reform Party candidates for Presi-
dent and Vice-President on the ballot for the general election scheduled for
November 2, 2004.' Governor Bush certified the Reform Party slate to the
Florida Secretary of State who certified "Nader and Camejo be placed on the
2004 Florida presidential ballot."1° Complaints were filed against the Secre-
tary of State, Nader, and Camejo alleging that Nader and Camejo were not
"'minor party' candidates affiliated with a national party" as required by
section 103.021(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes, but were "independent candi-
dates who use[d] the name 'Reform Party of Florida' to claim affiliation with
the national Reform Party where no affiliation actually exist[ed].", The
Circuit Court for the Second Judicial District, in and for Leon County, issued
a preliminary injunction enjoining the Secretary of State of Florida from cer-
tifying Nader and Camejo as candidates for the Florida 2004 presidential
ballot, finding that: 1) "the Reform Party USA is not a 'national party[;]"' 2)
"Nader and Camejo were not nominated in a 'national convention"' because
they "were endorsed by the party via a conference telephone call," which
"did not follow the Reform Party USA's own definition of a 'national con-
vention"' and further, "an April 2002 letter from the Chairman of the Reform
Party of Florida shows that the Florida sector [has] disaffiliated from the
national party[;]" 3) "the Reform Party of Florida is not affiliated with the
Reform Party USA[;]" and 4) "Florida has important interests in enforcing its
election laws, ensuring that only qualified candidates appear on its ballot,
protecting the integrity of the ballot and election process, and preventing
voter confusion during the election.' 2 The preliminary injunction issued by
the circuit court was appealed by Nader and Camejo to the First District
§ 103.021(4).
8. See FLA. STAT. § 103.021(3)-(4) (2004).
9. See Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 304.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 304-05.
12. Id. at 305-06.
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Court of Appeal, and a stay of the injunction, pending review, was also
sought. 3 In addition, the Secretary of State of Florida filed a notice of ap-
peal invoking an automatic stay of the injunction pursuant to rule 9.31 O(b)(2)
of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and accordingly directed the
supervisors of elections to include Nader and Camejo on the ballot. 4 The
First District Court of Appeal certified the appeal of the order to the Supreme
Court of Florida as requiring the immediate resolution pursuant to rule 9.125
of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.5 The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida agreed to accept jurisdiction while permitting the litigation to continue in
circuit court, in order to bring the case to judgment and to determine any
motions relating to the automatic stay of the judgment the Secretary of State
of Florida was attempting to invoke. 6 While the circuit court was consider-
ing motions to vacate the automatic stay, Nader, Camejo, and the Reform
Party of Florida filed a petition in the United States District Court to remove
the case to federal court, which was met with an emergency motion to re-
mand the matter back to state court.' 7 The district court remanded the matter
to state court, finding:
all of the counts raised in [Nader and Camejo's] complaint are
grounded solidly in state law and thus do not raise a valid federal
question sufficient to invoke the district court's jurisdiction; the
defendants ha[ve] not met the unanimity requirement as [the Sec-
retary of State of Florida] ha[s] not consented to the removal and
she is a necessary and indispensable party to the case; and [Nader,
Camejo and the Reform Party of Florida] waived their rights to
remove the cause to federal court by invoking the jurisdiction of
the Florida appellate courts and by participating in evidentiary
hearings on the merits of the case.
18
The circuit court concluded its final evidentiary hearing and issued a
declaratory judgment finding that Nader and Camejo were not qualified un-
der Florida law to appear on the ballot.'9 "The court also permanently en-
joined the Secretary of State from certifying Nader and Camejo on Florida's
ballots, from instructing the county supervisors of elections to include their
13. Id. at 306.
14. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 306.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 306-07.
17. Id. at 307.
18. Id.
19. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 307-08.
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names on the ballot, and from mailing any ballots pending further order of'
the Supreme Court of Florida. 0
C. Right to Regulate Elections by State
The majority and concurring opinion recognized that "'[a]s a practical
matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair
and honest."' 2 ' The majority also recognized that the United States Supreme
Court has:
upheld generally applicable and even-handed restrictions that pro-
tect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself. The
State has the undoubted right to require candidates to make a pre-
liminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a
place on the ballot, because it is both wasteful and confusing to
encumber the ballot with the names of frivolous candidates.22
However, as further detailed herein, the majority's decision concludes
that the state regulation of election law requires the abdication of the inter-
pretation of these state statutes by the courts when a presidential election is
involved.23
II. THE MAJORITY'S DECISION IS OVERSHADOWED BY THE 2000 ELEC-
TION
The issue before the Supreme Court of Florida was whether the Reform
Party of Florida and its purported nominees, Nader and Camejo, qualified to
be placed on the general election ballot pursuant to section 103.021 (4)(a) of
the Florida Statutes."4 Although the majority recognized that there was no
question that Florida could "impose 'some burden' upon the access to the
20. Id. at 308.
21. Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)); id. at 314 (quoting Burdick
v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (citation omitted)).
22. Id. at 308 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). The butter-
fly ballots used in Palm Beach County during the 2000 presidential election caused much
voter confusion. See, e.g., Rick Weiss, Canadian Study Calls Butterfly Ballot 'Confusing,'
WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2000, at A22; Gary Kane, But More Marked Ballots for Gore, PALM
BEACH POST, Nov. 12, 2001, at 1AA.
23. See Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 308, 314.
24. Id. at 311.
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ballot,"25 it found that such burden had to be viewed in light of the United
States Constitution.26
The majority of the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the declaratory
judgment and vacated the injunction.2 1 In doing so, it recognized: (i) indi-
viduals have a constitutional right to associate and advance political beliefs;
(ii) qualified voters have a constitutional right to cast votes effectively; (iii)
states have an interest in encouraging compromise and political stability; and
(iv) election regulation is required if they are to be fair, honest, and condu-
cive to the maintenance of order.28
The most disturbing aspect of the majority's decision is its intellectual
retreat from exercising traditional statutory analysis with respect to section
103.021(4)(a), justifying this retreat by relying on Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board.29 In Bush v. Gore,3 ° the United States Supreme
Court reminded the litigants that "[t]he individual citizen has no federal con-
stitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States
unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the
means to implement its power to appoint members of the electoral college.'
The Court then unanimously vacated the Supreme Court of Florida's deci-
sion which had required the Secretary of State of Florida to allow votes cast
in the counties of Volusia, Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, and Broward, to be
included in the certified tabulated 2000 election totals.32
The Supreme Court of Florida's decision was based upon Article I, Sec-
tion 1 of the Florida Constitution,33 which expressly states in relevant part
"all political power is inherent in the people., 34 The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida reasoned that any election law or action by an election official could not
impose any "'unreasonable or unnecessary' restraints on the right of suf-
frage. 35 In vacating the decision, the United States Supreme Court relied
upon Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution 36 as the
25. Id. at 310 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433).
26. Id. at 310-11 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1968)).
27. Id. at314.
28. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 308 (citations omitted).
29. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) [hereinafter Bush 1]; Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 308-09.
30. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) [hereinafter Bush Il.
31. Id. at 104 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1).
32. Id. at 101,111.
33. Article I, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution provides: "All political power is in-
herent in the people. The enunciation herein of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or
impair others retained by the people." FLA. CO NST. art. 1, § 1.
34. Id.
35. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1236 (2000).
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
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authority to support its holding that the Supreme Court of Florida could not
construe any Florida Statute in connection with a presidential election which
would infringe upon the authority granted to state legislatures to choose the
manner of selecting that state's presidential electors.37 The Supreme Court
of Florida refused to undertake traditional statutory analysis for section
103.021(4)(a) because in doing so the majority feared it "could run afoul of
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution."3 As the
majority reasoned, "although the judiciary has the power and authority to
construe statutes, it cannot construe statutes in a manner that would infringe
on the direct grant of authority to the Legislature through the United States
Constitution.,
39
The majority per curiam decision in Bush II made it unequivocally clear
that the case was not to be cited as precedent.40 Unfortunately, the same lan-
guage of limitation was not included in Bush IL4' The same political crucible
of the nation's closest presidential election which led to the outcome deter-
minative reasoning of Bush II also drove the decision in Bush 1.42 The case
of Reform Party of Florida was not the first time the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida confronted Article II,43 since November of 2000. It also confronted that
Article in its remand decision from Bush IL 44 In that decision, the court
noted that "[t]he 'intent of the voter' standard adopted by the Legislature was
the standard in place as of November 7, 2000,1 5 and the court would not
concede on remand from Bush II that to establish standards for the determi-
nation of a legal vote in accordance with the then-existing legislation would
37. See Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 76 (holding that a legislature may take action to disenfran-
chise a voter or group of voters in the Presidential election which, while unconstitutional
under the Florida Constitution, would be constitutional under the Federal Constitution.).
38. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 313.
39. Id at 312; cf Fla. Democratic Party v. Hood, 884 So. 2d 1148, 1149-51 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (considering whether or not Florida's executive branch violated section
120.54(4) of the Florida Statutes and Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Con-
stitution by issuing an emergency rule restricting recounts of electronic voting machines one
business hour prior to the commencement of early voting in the general election); Petitioner's
Brief on the Merits at 7, Fla. Democratic Party v. Hood, 888 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 2004) (No.
SC04-2072). However, the Supreme Court of Florida refused to address this question by
declining to consider the petition for review of the emergency rule after "having determined
that it should decline to exercise jurisdiction." Fla. Democratic Party v. Hood, No. SC04-
2072, 2004 Fla. LEXIS 2043, at *1 (Fla. Nov.10, 2004).
40. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 109. "Our consideration is limited to the present circum-
stances .... Id.
41. SeeBush I, 531 U.S. at 70.
42. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
44. See Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000).
45. Id. at 526.
2005]
151
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LA W REVIEW
have violated Article II of the Federal Constitution. 46 So, why did the Su-
preme Court of Florida refuse to establish standards for ballot access in the
Reform Party of Florida case when it had previously expressly reserved its
right to interpret state statutes consistent with its responsibility as a court and
Article 1I?
4
Certainly any review of the history and meaning of Article II prior to
Bush I would have comforted the Supreme Court of Florida in performing its
traditional role as a court in interpreting section 103.021 (4)(a) of the Florida
Statutes.4' As previously stated in an article co-authored by one of these
authors:
The United States Supreme Court's "direct grant of authority"
view contemplates that the states relinquished the power to select
presidential electors to the federal government at the Constitu-
tional Convention and then, in an act of charitable benevolence,
the federal government donated that power to the states. Under
such logic, the federal government can "direct[ly] grant" the au-
thority to select electors to a specific entity of the several states,
namely the legislature. However, Article II, Section 1, Clause 2,
rather than being a "direct grant" of authority, is a reservation of
power by the states. The text of the clause itself supports this
proposition. The Constitution establishes that "[e]ach State shall
appoint" presidential electors, textually recognizing that the
power to select presidential electors lies in the several states.
The text of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code sup-
ports this view. Apparently, when creating section 5, Congress
believed that the federal constitution contemplates a state legisla-
ture delegating issues of enforcement and interpretation to a co-
ordinate branch of government.
[U]nlike the federal government, the several states are in-
dependent sovereigns with all the inherent powers of common
46. Id. at 526. "[T]he per curiam decision in Bush v. Gore acknowledged that the Su-
preme Court of Florida had the 'power to assure uniformity."' Mitchell W. Berger & Candice
D. Tobin, Election 2000: The Law of Tied Presidential Elections, 26 NOVA. L. REv. 647, 846
(2002) (citing Bush II, 531 U.S. at 109); see also Gore, 773 So. 2d at 526.
47. See Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 313 (Fla. 2004).
48. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a) (2004).
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law sovereignty, absent those relinquished to the federal gov-
ernment. State constitutions are limitations on the inherent sov-
ereign power of states created by the people of that state.
... Those limitations operate when the Florida Legislature se-
lects the manner to appoint electors. Therefore, if a law of the
Florida Legislature operates in a manner that violates one of the
paramount rights of the people of the State of Florida, then the
legislature is subverting the sovereign limitations set forth by the
people of Florida....
Essentially, the federal constitution "takes state legislative bodies
as it finds them-subject to pre-existing control by the people of
each state, the ultimate masters of the state legislatures-and the
state constitutional limits that those people create. As a result,
the United States Supreme Court's expression that the Florida
Constitution may have "'circumscribe[d] the legislative power"'
provided by Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 rests on the faulty
premise that this clause gives the Florida Legislature power that
the people of Florida had not granted it.
49
Instead of performing a traditional statutory analysis and reviewing the
record in the Reform Party of Florida case, the majority reasoned that "the
determination of whether [a] candidate qualifies under section 103.021 (4)(a)
by claiming to be a 'minor political party that is affiliated with a national
party holding a national convention to nominate candidates for President and
Vice President' involves a legal determination., 50 This reasoning is unsup-
ported by citation, but appears to stem from the court's Article II concerns.5
Against this backdrop, the majority concluded that "we have been unable to
ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statutory terms to have a
strict or broad meaning. In the absence of more specific statutory criteria or
49. Berger & Tobin, supra note 46, at 689-92 (citations omitted). Title 3, section 5 of
the United States Code further provides:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the ap-
pointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest con-
cerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other
methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been ... made at least six
days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern
in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter
regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such a State is con-
cerned.
Id. at 690 (quoting 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000)) (emphasis added).
50. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 311.
51. See id. at 312.
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guidance from the Legislature we are unable to conclude that a statutory vio-
lation occurred.,
52
A. The Concurrence of Justice Lewis
While Justice Lewis concurs in the result, he undertakes a traditional
statutory analysis performed by appellate courts on appeal. 3 Expressly dis-
agreeing with the majority's analysis, Justice Lewis held:
I cannot at all agree with the analysis and reasoning of the major-
ity. The right to vote is a fundamental and essential part of our
constitutional democracy and is subject to reasonable regulation.
The United States Supreme Court made this apparent in Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 ... (1992), when it stated:
It is beyond cavil that voting is of the most fundamental sig-
nificance under our constitutional structure. It does not follow,
however, that the right to vote in any manner and the right to as-
sociate for political purposes through the ballot are absolute.
The Constitution provides that States may prescribe "[t]he
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, " Art, L § 4, cl. 1, and the Court therefore
has recognized that States retain the power to regulate their
own elections. Common sense, as well as constitutional law,
compels the conclusion that government must play an active
role in structuring elections; as a practical matter, there must be
a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accom-
pany the democratic processes.
5 4
Justice Lewis rejected Article II as being a limitation on the state retain-
ing the power, including through its judicial branch "to regulate their own
elections., 55 As Justice Lewis stated:
Although minor political parties most certainly do have a right to
be on the ballot, courts have consistently held that this right is not
absolute and without restrictions .... Our system is legislatively
designed so that minor parties affiliated with a national party hold-
ing a national convention, see § 103.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003),
52. Id. at 314.
53. See id.
54. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted in original).
55. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 314 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
433 (1992)).
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are treated differently than minor parties that are not affiliated with
a national party holding a national convention, see §
103.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003). To construe subsection (4)(a) as
the majority does today is nothing less than this Court basically
rewriting the statute and using a judicial eraser to strip section
(4)(a) of the same dignity this Court has afforded the petition re-
quirement in subsection (4)(b) .... [Justice Lewis then declares
that] [t]here is no administrative remedy afforded under these cir-
cumstances and, therefore, it necessarily falls on the shoulders of
the judiciary to determine the rights of the parties in this dispute by
interpreting and applying the statute.56
Justice Lewis proceeded to analyze the language in the statute through
traditional means and concluded that under a traditional statutory analysis
employed by courts and reviewing courts, "[i]n my view, the determinations
made by the trial court are eminently correct based on the evidence and ar-
guments presented.,
57
B. Supreme Court of Florida Fails to Construe the Florida Statute58
After considering the evidence presented, the trial court found that
Nader and Camejo as candidates of the Reform Party of Florida, were not
56. Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 317. In concluding that the trial court was correct in finding that the Reform
Party was not a national party and that it did not hold a national convention, Justice Lewis
refers to the dictionary as required by prior precedent and says: "A simplistic approach by
reference to textual material demonstrates that Black's Law Dictionary defines 'national' as
'[o]f or relating to a nation' and 'nationwide in scope."' Id. at 318. The majority dismisses
definitions set forth in various dictionaries as providing little guidance. Id. at 312.
58. Interestingly, the Florida Secretary of State's position was that her fumction was
"purely ministerial" and therefore she had "no basis to look behind the certificate [submitted
by Nader and Camejo] to determine [whether] the party meets the statutory criteria." Reform
Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 311. However, if the Secretary's function is purely ministerial,
then how does the Secretary determine whether a petition was signed by one percent of the
registered voters of Florida under section 103.021(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes? The Secre-
tary's position would effectively eliminate the need for section 103.021 (4)(b), Florida Stat-
utes, because all potential presidential candidates would only need to submit a certificate
under section 103.021 (4)(a). See the dissenting opinion of Justice Anstead approving the trial
court's reasoning that:
in enacting section 103.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes, the Legislature surely did not intend the
standards for national party, minor party, and national nominating convention to be meaning-
less. As the trial court noted, "it doesn't seem ... to make any sense that the Legislature
would have a provision in the law that says you can get on the ballot as a minor party by get-
ting a ... great number of signatures, and then have another way that's basically no require-
ments."
Id. at 321 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
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legally qualified pursuant to section 103.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes, to ap-
pear on the ballot because: 1) Reform Party USA was not a "national party;"
and 2) Nader and Camejo were not nominated in a "national convention., 59
The Supreme Court of Florida summarized its position indicating that
section 103.021(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes did not define the terms "na-
tional party" or "national convention," concluding therefore that "the Reform
Party of Florida was not on notice that these terms were to be interpreted in
accordance with any specific criteria and certainly not the criteria utilized by
the trial court., 60 Further, "[i]n the absence of more specific statutory criteria
or guidance from the Legislature [they were] unable to conclude that a statu-
tory violation occurred.",6' The majority then stated that it "urge[s] the Leg-
islature to revisit this important issue at its earliest opportunity.
62
In making its decision, the majority indicated that it was being mindful
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution providing indi-
viduals the right to associate for the advancement of political beliefs as well
as the state legislature's exclusive power to determine how the electors of
Florida are chosen, citing to Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United
States Constitution.63 The majority indicated that "although the judiciary has
the power and authority to construe statutes, it cannot construe statutes in a
manner that would infringe on the direct grant of authority to the Legislature
through the United States Constitution. '64 However, as previously noted,
this is impossible since the federal government, which was not yet formed in
1789, could not give a direct grant of authority to state legislatures.65 In
1789, it was the state legislatures at the Constitutional Convention, who re-
served the power to appoint state electors.66 This is critical because if states
59. Id. at 305.
60. Id. at 314.
61. Id.
62. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 314.
63. Id. at 311-12. Article II provides, "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 2.
64. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 312 (emphasis added).
65. See supra Part II.
66. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961) (stating "the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty
which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United
States") (emphasis added); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 285 (James Madison) (Benja-
min Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) ("[T]he proposed government cannot be deemed a national
one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several
States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects"); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 40, at 290 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) ("[T]he
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reserved this power, they also generally reserved for the state's statutes to be
interpreted in normal course by its courts.
The majority focused on the term "national party" and essentially disre-
garded the other statutory requirement for the candidates to have been nomi-
nated by a national party "holding a national convention."67 More specifi-
cally, the majority indicated that section 103.021(4)(a) of the Florida Stat-
utes does not define "national party. 68 It reviewed the dictionary, noting the
term was not defined therein,69 then went on to analyze the term "national
party" by comparing the definitions in other states' statutes, concluding that
"there is no consensus on what constitutes a national party., 70 The majority
went on to discuss an advisory opinion issued by the Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC) which discussed criteria it used in determining whether a po-
litical party has "demonstrated sufficient activity on a national level to attain
national committee status.",71 Such criteria included: "(1) the party's nomi-
nation of candidates for various Federal offices in numerous states; (2) the
party's engagement in certain activities on an ongoing basis[;]" and "(3) the
party's publicization of issues of importance to the party and its adherents
throughout the nation. 7 2 However, despite evidence that the Reform Party
USA "lost its status as a national party because it no longer" had support,
"almost eliminated fundraising," and only had candidates for federal office
(other than President) in two other states, the court indicated that it could not
conclude that the Florida Legislature intended to incorporate the FEC's stan-
dards in connection with the term "national party" included in the Florida
Statute, because the "FEC's interest relates to the integrity of campaign fund-
raising access, whereas the state's interest lies in protecting the integrity of
the ballot."73
The court barely mentioned the dispute as to whether Nader and
Camejo were nominated in a "national convention" by their purported na-
States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent
jurisdiction").
67. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 310.
68. Id. at 312.
69. Id. However, the term "party" has been defined as "a group of persons with common
political opinions and purposes organized for gaining political influence and governmental
control and for directing government policy." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
1416 (2d ed. 1993). The adjective "national" has been defined as "of, pertaining to, or main-
tained by a nation as an organized whole or independent political unit." Id. at 1279. Although
each word is defined separately, the majority did not expend much effort to interpret the
words using a common sense approach.
70. Reform Party ofFla., 885 So. 2d at 312-13.
71. Id. at 313.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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tional party and noted that "some type of meeting occurred., 74 As clearly
indicated in section 103.021(4) of the Florida Statutes, unless a Presidential
or Vice-Presidential candidate is part of a minor party affiliated with a na-
tional party holding a national convention, such candidate must obtain a peti-
tion containing the signatures of one percent of Florida's registered voters in
order to appear on the general election ballot.75 The majority held that gath-
ering signatures involved a pure question of objectively verifiable fact, yet
indicated that the determination of whether a candidate qualifies under sec-
tion 103.021 (4)(a) of the Florida Statutes involved a legal determination.76
However, it is apparent that party affiliation and whether a "national
convention" was held are factual determinations,7 which is precisely why
the trial court considered evidence in making its finding that Nader and
Camejo did not qualify under Florida law to appear on the general election
ballot.78 Even if the term "national party" were ambiguous, as aptly stated by
Justice Lewis in his concurring opinion, "[t]he Judiciary must ... give life to
the legislative words.,
79
Our system is legislatively designed so that minor parties affiliated
with a national party holding a national convention, see §
103.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003), are treated differently than minor
parties that are not affiliated with a national party holding a na-
tional convention, see § 103.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003). To con-
strue subsection (4)(a) as the majority does today is nothing less
than this Court basically rewriting the statute and using a judicial
74. Id. at 314. The "national convention" was an endorsement of Nader and Camejo via
a telephone conference call which did not follow the Reform Party's own definition of "na-
tional convention." Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 305. According to Black's Law Dic-
tionary, "convention" is defined as "[a]n assembly or meeting of members belonging to an
organization or having a common objective," the term "national" as "[o]f or relating to a na-
tion" or "nationwide in scope" and the term "assembly" as "[a] group of persons organized
and united for some common purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 124, 355 1050 (8th ed.
2004). It is hard to conclude a plain reading of the words "national convention" would be
interpreted to include a conference call, let alone a call of the type which the record indicates
occurred in this case. Reform Party of Florida, 885 So. 2d at 305.
75. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4) (2004).
76. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 311; see also FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a).
77. See id. at 319 (Lewis, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Lewis noted that
"[n]o matter what definition one may establish as to 'national' under this statute, there would
be a factual question regarding whether the entity or group satisfies that definition, which the
majority summarily rejects." Id. (Lewis, J., concurring).
78. See id. at 305.
79. Id. at 317-18 (Lewis, J., concurring).
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eraser to strip section (4)(a) of the same dignity as this Court has
afforded the petition requirement in subsection (4)(b). s°
In sum, despite the fact that the majority acknowledged that there was a
"lengthy evidentiary hearing, that included receipt of documentary evidence
and arguments from the parties,"8' the majority decision failed to give defer-
ence to the findings of fact made by the trial court. Justice Lewis, in his
concurrence, noted that "[t]he majority, in my view, fails to even consider
that there is a factual component as to whether one satisfies the legal criteria
of a statute. 83
C. Other Concerns - Is the Florida Statute Void for Vagueness?
If the majority of the Supreme Court of Florida and the Secretary of
State are correct that the Reform Party of Florida was not on notice of the
interpretation of the terms "national party" and "national convention," is the
statute void for vagueness?
The United States Supreme Court has held that with respect to whether
a statute is void for vagueness,
generally .. .decisions of the court upholding statutes as suffi-
ciently certain, rested upon the conclusion that they employed
words or phrases having a technical or other special meaning, well
enough known to enable those within their reach to correctly apply
them ... or a well-settled common law meaning, notwithstanding
an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might
differ . . . or, as broadly stated by Mr. Chief Justice White ...
"that, for reasons found to result either from the text of the statutes
involved or the subjects with which they dealt, a standard of some
sort was afforded.,
84
Similarly, under Florida law, a statute "will not be declared vague
unless the statute fails to give persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what constitutes the forbidden conduct and which, because of imprecision,
may invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement., 85  In analyzing
80. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 315 (Lewis, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 310.
82. Id. at 317 (Lewis, J., concurring).
83. Id. (Lewis, J., concurring).
84. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1926) (citations omitted).
85. State v. Delgrasso, 653 So. 2d 459, 462 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); see also Glu-
hareff v. State, 888 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statute was "sufficiently
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whether a statute is void for vagueness courts first determine whether the
statute fairly gives notice to those it seeks to bind of its strictures.86 Second,
courts determine whether the statute is precise enough as to not invite the
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement thereof.87 If the statute provides
both fair notice and is sufficiently precise, it will be upheld.88 However, if
either determination is negative, the statute will be found void for vague-
ness.
89
The majority concluded "we are left with a statute that does not have its
critical terms defined or standards set for ascertaining compliance with the
statute. We thus urge the Legislature to revisit this important issue at its ear-
liest opportunity." 90 However, Justice Lewis' concurrence indicates that the
statute was capable of interpretation, noting:
[t]he trial court, without the benefit of a specific definition of
"national," probed the parameters of what a "national party" hold-
ing a "national convention" really was intended to and actually en-
compassed.
... [T]he trial judge had not only competent and substantial evi-
dence to support his findings but also the only evidence presented
supported the conclusion that this is not a "national party" within
the purview of the controverted statute. 91
Justice Lewis further noted:
[n]otwithstanding that there may be various inflections of what a
word may mean, an overly technical approach would result in no
word ever having an acceptable or legally sufficient definite mean-
specific to give notice and adequate warning to persons of common intelligence of the conduct
that is proscribed" despite the statute's failure to define the term "under the influence").
86. See Delgrasso, 653 So. 2d at 462-63.
87. See id. at 462.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1975) (upholding a statute
prohibiting the mailing of concealable firearms because it established a "reasonably ascertain-
able standard of conduct" and because it provided notice to the citizens as to what actions are
proscribed by the statute).
89. See id.
90. Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 314 (Fla. 2004).
91. Id. at 317 (Lewis, J., concurring).
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ing or understanding. A word does not necessarily need to be de-
fined by precise elements to have a common understanding.92
Yet Justice Lewis concurred in the result finding that "it may be properly
advanced that the appellants were not afforded adequate notice as to what
constituted a 'national party"' under the statute, thereby implicating Nader
and Camejo's due process rights.93
If the majority and Justice Lewis found that the Florida Statute was not
sufficiently clear to put Nader and Camejo on notice with respect to whether
they could qualify to be placed on the ballot, under the standards established
by the United States Supreme Court, the statute should have been deemed
void under the void for vagueness doctrine as being violative of Nader and
Camejo's due process rights.94 Such a finding would have produced a simi-
lar result-Nader and Camejo would have been placed on the ballot.95 How-
ever, both the majority and the concurrence failed to recognize the statute as
void based upon the rationale that the term "national party" was not defined
in the statute and therefore did not provide notice to Nader and Camejo on
how such term would be interpreted and applied to them.9 6 This logic is
clearly flawed as the trial court made specific findings on the issue based
upon the evidence presented, which the majority failed to recognize and
which Justice Lewis inexplicably found to be correct, yet concurred in the
result reached by the majority.97
III. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the Court failed to adjudicate the rights of the parties
through interpretation and application of the appropriate statute. Justice An-
stead, in his dissent, echoes Justice Lewis stating:
[a]s the trial court noted, "it doesn't seem ... to make any sense
that the Legislature would have a provision in the law that says
you can get on the ballot as a minor party by getting a ... great
92. Id. at 319 (Lewis, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. See Powell, 423 U.S. at 92.
95. See id.
96. See Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 314-19 (Fla. 2004) (Lewis, J.,
concurring).
97. See id.
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number of signatures, and then have another way that's basically
no requirements."
98
This is precisely the result that the Supreme Court of Florida has created by
avoiding its responsibility to act as an appellate court. However, the co-
authors of this Section of this article submit that the constitutional amend-
ment proposed by Mr. Anderson in Section III of this article, would prevent
the courts from being confronted with making decisions that fail to apply the
law.
98. Id. at 321 (Anstead, C.J., dissenting).
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SECTION III: A REVIEW OF FLORIDA'S BALLOT ACCESS
LAW IN LIGHT OF REFORM PARTY OF FLORIDA v. BLACK
JOHN ANDERSON
In Reform Party of Florida v. Black, the Supreme Court of Florida up-
held the decision of the Secretary of State, Glenda Hood, to place the names
of Ralph Nader and Peter Camejo on the 2004 Florida presidential ballot as
candidates of the Reform Party of the United States of America.99 This ac-
tion reversed the decision of the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial Circuit
of Florida, which had ordered the removal of their names from the ballot."'°
The circuit court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, who argued that Nader and
Camejo were spurious candidates of a "minor party" who were not actually
affiliated with a national party."°1 National affiliation of candidates on Flor-
ida ballots is required by section 103.021(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes. °2
The gravamen of the complaint, which numbered registered Democrats and
Republicans, as well as Florida residents, was that the above-cited section of
the Florida Statutes was inapplicable because the Reform Party of Florida
had no actual affiliation with the national party.
°3
In its ruling, the lower court further found that despite its name, the Re-
form Party USA was not a "national party," and therefore the Reform Party
of Florida could not be affiliated with a non-existent entity. °4 Among its
other findings was one in which the circuit court concluded that Nader and
Camejo were not nominees of a "national convention" because they were
nominated via a conference call which violated the Reform Party USA's own
prescribed procedures.'05
In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida also cited three United
States Supreme Court decisions involving ballot access, one of which, Storer
v. Brown,"6 refers to "the substantial state interest in encouraging compro-
mise and political stability, in attempting to ensure that the election winner
99. 885 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 2004).
100. Id. at 304-05.
101. Id. at 305; see generally FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a) (2004).
102. § 103.021(4)(a).
103. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 305. One of the Florida residents was registered
as Independent and one was a registered member of the Reform Party of Florida. Id. at 304.
104. See id. at 305.
105. Id. It should be of more than passing interest that the defendants in this litigation
sought to remove the case to federal court because a federal question was involved but were
rebuffed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida on the grounds
that all of the counts in the plaintiffs' complaint were firmly anchored in state law. Id. at 307.
106. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
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will represent a majority of the community and in providing the electorate
with an understandable ballot.' 0
7
In its per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida further cites
Storer v. Brown as holding: "'[A]s a practical matter, there must be a sub-
stantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic proc-
esses."
' 108
The Supreme Court of Florida then stated:
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has "upheld generally ap-
plicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and
reliability of the electoral process itself. The State has the un-
doubted right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing
of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot,
because it is both wasteful and confusing to encumber the ballot
with the names of frivolous candidates."' 0 9
The principal point to be made here, in analyzing the proper role for the
judicial branch of state government in deciding questions involving presiden-
tial ballot access, is that a unique national interest is involved. After all, the
presidential office is completely unlike the thousands of elected state and
federal offices that are involved in the electoral process. It is therefore the
singular nature of those offices-the President and the Vice-President-that
overshadows any effort at the state level to design the ballot and to establish
fixed rules that focus on efforts by individuals to gain access to the ballots
that are prepared quadrennially to give the American voter the right to
choose their top two national leaders.
107. Id. at 729 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)); Reform Party of Fla.,
885 So. 2d at 308.
108. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 308 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 730).
109. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 n.9 (1983) (citations
omitted) [hereinafter Anderson I1]). It should be noted at this point that Anderson H was also
cited in another per curiam opinion, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). This was unquestionably the most bitterly contentious opinion dealing with the
electoral process in the entire history of the United States Supreme Court. See generally Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined in concurring, stated in that case:
Likewise, in Anderson v. Celebrezze, we said: "[I]n the context of a Presidential
election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest.
For the President and the Vice President of the United States are the only elected
officials who represent all the voters in the Nation."
Id at 112 (citation omitted).
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I. INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The co-author of this article writes from the perspective of one who for-
mally abandoned our venerable two-party system a quarter of a century ago.
I did so by declaring myself an Independent candidate for our nation's high-
est office. I was immediately confronted with the multiple problems of bal-
lot access, and this resulted in multiple lawsuits in federal and state courts
with one, the eponymous Anderson v. Celebrezze," ° reaching the United
States Supreme Court.' In 1980, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio ruled correctly in allowing me to gain access to the
Ohio ballot, and validating my claim that I truly was a national candidate
having achieved ballot access in all states." l2 For those interested in a de-
tailed account of my entire adventure I refer you to Jumping Through 51
Hoops: John Anderson's Struggle for Ballot Access and Its Effect on the
Rights of Independent and Third Party Candidates."3
My contribution to this article is not, as should become apparent to the
reader, a reprise of that effort. Nevertheless, a quarter of a century after that
experience, my deeply held feeling is that despite a plethora of changes in
the laws relating to the electoral process, insufficient progress has been
made. Progress is essential to right the wrongs of a system so firmly held
within the implacable grasp of a two-party duopoly, that it causes independ-
ents and minor parties to become victims of a "partisan lockup" (to use the
phrase of two prominent critics of many features of our current electoral
structure)." 4
At the very outset of my contribution to this commentary on Florida's
ballot access law, as it was construed in the case of Reform Party of Florida
v. Black, I wish to associate myself strongly with the views of the distin-
guished political scientist, Morris P. Fiorina, in his celebrated article, The
Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics."5 In the article,
Fiorina pays respect to the Framers, who emphasized in the structured ar-
110. 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Anderson 1].
111. Anderson 11, 460 U.S. at 780.
112. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121 (D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 554 (6th
Cir. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
113. See Rebbecca Landis, Jumping Through 51 Hoops: John Anderson's Struggle for
Ballot Access and Its Effect on the Rights of Independent and Third Party Candidates (1985)
(unpublished thesis, University of Texas) (on file with author).
114. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643 (1998); see generally Reform Party of Fla. v.
Black, 885 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2004).
115. Morris P. Fiorina, The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics, 109
DAEDALUS 25 (1980).
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rangements they conceived and embodied in our Constitution, that govern-
ment should be workable but not all powerful. 16 This resulted in a federal
system that is deeply concerned about the government's power, hemmed in
by checks and balances, all based on the Framer's prior experiences.' 17 Be-
cause of this concern, they were predisposed to a system that would maintain
a status quo. 1 8 But writing almost 200 years later, in 1980, Fiorina felt that
it now behooves us to "worry about our ability to make government workfor
us. The problem is that we are gradually losing that ability, and a principal
reason for this loss is the steady erosion of responsibility in American poli-
tics. '
II. THE Two PARTY SYSTEM'S EFFECT ON THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
The subsequent repudiation by the United States Supreme Court of the
Supreme Court of Florida's assertion of the plenary nature of the right of the
individual voter to vote for President and Vice-President of the United States
occurred in its per curiam opinion in Bush i.'20 The Court vacated the Su-
preme Court of Florida's order, relying heavily on McPherson v. Blacker.12 1
In McPherson, the Court, more than a.century before, stated:
[Art. 1I, § 1, cl. 2] does not read that the people or the citizens shall
appoint, but that "each State shall"; and if the words "in such man-
ner as the legislature thereof may direct," had been omitted, it
would seem that the legislative power of appointment could not
have been successfully questioned in the absence of any provision
in the state constitution in that regard. Hence the insertion of those
words, while operating as a limitation upon the State in respect of
any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power, cannot be held
to operate as a limitation on that power itself.122
Thus, the United States Supreme Court, at least as it is presently com-
posed, is firmly in lockstep with a body of precedent dating back more than a
century which holds that the state legislature retains the power to determine
the election to the Presidency of the United States, not the people. 23 Indeed,
116. Id. at25.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) [hereinafter Bush 1].
121. Id. at 76, 78 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)).
122. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25.
123. See Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 76-78.
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the Court in Bush I made it abundantly clear that a principal reason for the
remand was its dubiety regarding the portion of the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida's opinion that stated: "[b]ecause the right to vote is the pre-eminent right
in the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution" it should circum-
scribe any laws governing the electoral process.1"' The Supreme Court of
Florida further stated that "election laws are intended to facilitate the right of
suffrage"'25 and therefore, laws that regulate the electoral process "are valid
only if they impose no 'unreasonable or unnecessary' restraints on the right
of suffrage." '126 The Supreme Court of Florida then cited Treiman v. Malm-
quist 127 which stated:
the declaration of rights expressly states that "all political power
is inherent in the people." The right of the people to select their
own officers is their sovereign right, and the rule is against impos-
ing unnecessary and unreasonable disqualifications to run.... Un-
reasonable or unnecessary restraints on the elective process are
prohibited.1
28
The Supreme Court of Florida then stated:
[b]ecause election laws are intended to facilitate the right of suf-
frage, such laws must be liberally construed in favor of the citi-
zens' right to vote:
Generally, the courts, in construing statutes relating to elections,
hold that the same should receive a liberal construction in favor
of the citizen whose right to vote they tend to restrict and in so
doing to prevent disfranchisement of legal voters and the inten-
tion of the voters should prevail when counting ballots.... It is
the intention of the law to obtain an honest expression of the
will or desire of the voter. 
129
Courts must not lose sight of the fundamental purpose of election
laws: [t]he laws are intended to facilitate and safeguard the right of
each voter to express his or her will in the context of our represen-
124. See id. at 75-78; Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220,
1239 (Fla. 2000).
125. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1237.
126. Id. at 1236.
127. 342 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1977).
128. Id. at 975 (citations omitted).
129. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1237 (quoting State ex. rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49
(Fla. 1940)).
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tative democracy. Technical statutory requirements must not be
exalted over the substance of this right.'
30
The Court's opinion in Bush J13 asserting the potential federal interest,
laid the foundation for Bush JJ,132 which decided the election of 2000.133 This
was only accomplished by overriding the textual commitment of the Florida
State Constitution, which gives primacy to the wish and intent of the individ-
ual voter in deciding any presidential election contest. 134 The Court accom-
plished this by an invocation of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United
States Constitution, as well as a failure to comply with title 3, section 5 of the
United States Code.135 A further ground, of course, was the Court's reliance
on the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 136
Bush H is perhaps best remembered for its sweeping assertion that
"[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors
for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature
chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint
members of the electoral college,"'137 citing then to the United States Consti-
tution, Article II, Section 1.138 The Court continued, citing McPherson v.
Blacker,139 as its authority for the additional conclusion that "the state legis-
lature's power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary; it may,
if it so chooses, select the electors itself."'4 ° Although the Court acknowl-
edged that current practice has seen citizens rather than, as was the practice
for many years, state legislatures voting for electors, it is not the constitu-
tional right of voters to do so, and the primacy of the state legislatures'
power could be asserted at any time and in any presidential election.'
41
We turn now to the relevance of these judicial precedents arising out of
the 2000 presidential election, to the controversy which arose in the 2004
election over ballot access for a candidate for the presidency, Ralph Nader,
which led to the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Reform Party of
130. Id. (footnotes omitted).
131. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
132. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Bush I, 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
133. The Presidential Election Is Finally Done, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at C 15, 2000
WL 29921494.
134. See FLA. CONST. art VI, § 1.
135. U.S. CONST. art I1, § 1, cl. 2; 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104,
110(2000).
136. U.S. CoNsT. art XIV, § 1; Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
137. Bush If, 531 U.S. at 104.
138. Id.; U.S. CONST. art 1I, § 1, cl. 3.
139. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
140. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 104 (citing McPherson, 146 U.S. at 33).
141. Id. (citing McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35).
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Florida v. Black, on September 17, 2004.142 The court had to interpret a stat-
ute allowing a non-major party candidate to gain ballot access by becoming
the candidate of a minor party, affiliated with a national party, holding a na-
tional convention to nominate candidates for President and Vice President. 43
Some of the 1999 revisions to the Florida ballot access law provided for fil-
ing a list of the required number of persons to serve as electors. 44
The ensuing litigation over the Nader candidacy and its choice of this
route to ballot access, rather than use of a petitioning process, yielded a deci-
sion in Nader's favor. a14  However, Justice Lewis, concurring in the result
only, disagreed sharply with both the "analysis and reasoning of the major-
ity.' '146 He specifically lamented at great length the statute's failure to define
what constitutes a "national party."'4 7 And although he does not dwell upon
what can legitimately constitute a national nominating convention,1 48 espe-
cially in the age of the internet, where so much of business and commerce is
electronically conducted, it would perhaps be a daunting task to determine
whether or not an appropriate definition of a political convention would even
be achievable. I mention this because the plaintiffs in the Reform Party of
Florida made much of the nomination being the product of a telephone
call. 149
Perhaps, as Justice Lewis correctly observed in his concurrence, the
question of what constitutes a party was itself difficult enough. 5 ° However,
it is the anterior question, namely, the difficulties that surround the efforts of
parties (other than the two major parties) constituting a duopoly of power to
gain entrance to the political marketplace, which is the precise task that will
be undertaken and explored in this portion of the commentary on the Su-
preme Court of Florida's decision. This necessarily involves a discussion of
the political rights of independent and third party members who would seek
to challenge the present hierarchy of the two party system. This requires at
least a brief recitation of prior history and how this duopoly has flourished
under the United States Constitution over more than the last century and a
half.
142. 885 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2004).
143. Id. at 305.
144. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a) (1999).
145. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 314. The petitioning process is allowable under
Florida law. Id. at 320 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(b) (2004).
146. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 314 (Lewis, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 316 (Lewis, J., concurring); see also FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a) (2004).
148. See Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 319.
149. Id. at 305.
150. See id. at 316 (Lewis, J., concurring).
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I firmly believe that a multi-party system would be beneficial to the
health of our democracy in general. Some of the reasons why the health of
our democracy can be questioned appeared in an article by Robert A. Pastor
who cited the following facts:
Registration and Identification of Voters. The United States
registers about 55 percent of its eligible voters, as compared with
more than 95 percent in Canada and Mexico. To ensure the accu-
racy of its list, Mexico conducted 36 audits between 1994 and
2000. In contrast, the United States has thousands of separate lists,
many of which are wildly inaccurate. Provisional ballots were
needed only because the lists are so bad. Under HAVA, all states
by 2006 must create computer-based, interactive statewide lists-a
major step forward that will work only if everyone agrees not to
move out of state. That is why most democracies, including most
of Europe, have nationwide lists and ask voters to identify them-
selves. Oddly, few U.S. states require proof of citizenship-which
is, after all, what the election is supposed to be about. If ID cards
threaten democracy, why does almost every democracy except us
require them, and why are their elections conducted better than
ours?151
Curtis Gans of the Center for the Study of the American Electorate has faith-
filly followed the rise and fall of participation by the American electorate in
presidential years over several decades.5 2 Other writers on the subject, like
Alexander Keyssar in The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democ-
racy in the United States, amply document the fact that despite the 15th,
19th, 23rd, 24th, and 26th Amendments to the United States Constitution, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 1982 amendments thereto, the National
Voter Registration Act of 1993 (often referred to as the "motor voter" law),
and last but far from least, in terms of its implications for electronic voting,
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) 53 have not improved voter
participation. 5 4 HAVA is the last major federal legislation to deal with the
electoral process and was a response to some, but certainly not all, of the
151. Robert A. Pastor, America Observed Why Foreign Election Observers Would Rate
the United States Near the Bottom, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 2005, at A2.
152. COUNCIL FOR EXCELLENCE IN GOVERNMENT, A MATTER OF TRUST: AMERICANS AND
THEIR GOVERNMENT: 1958-2004 47 (2004), at http://www.excelgov.org/usermedia/images/
uploads/PDFs/AMOT.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005) [hereinafter A MATTER OF TRUST].
153. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15301).
154. See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).
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difficulties that arose in the bitter contest over the results of the 2000 elec-
tion. It should be noted at this point that Piven and Cloward link a decline in
voter participation to one of the several so-called realigning elections in our
history. 55 In this case, it was the election of McKinley in 1896 which saw
not only the defeat of his Democratic opponent, Williams Jennings Bryan,
but the emergence of the structured two-party system that has dominated our
presidential elections ever since.
15 6
The difficulty confronting the Supreme Court of Florida in Reform
Party of Florida was definitional. 5 7 What did the Florida Legislature mean
by such phrases as "national party" and "national convention?"'' 58 Justice
Lewis, quite properly, did not want to rely on the Federal Election Commis-
sion (FEC) (the regulatory body for campaign finance laws affecting presi-
dential campaigns) as the ultimate arbiter of when a party is qualified to put
its candidate before the voters.'59 This difficulty was highlighted by Justice
Lewis's comparison of the states of Hawaii and Iowa. 16  In the former, an
existing party in one other state entitled a minor party to ballot access in
presidential contests.' 6' However, in Iowa, the party must be recognized as
such "in at least twenty-five other states."'6 2 Despite Mr. Nader's success in
winning a place on the Florida ballot in 2004, the concurring opinion warned
that the imprecise language of the statute should constitute a clear warning to
future candidates that they are in danger of being denied the right to make
their case to the voters in a run for the presidency. 63
Florida's perceived dilemma about candidates wishing to run outside
the two-party system is a national problem, not just a state or local problem.
Since at least Anderson v. Celebrezze, 64 the Court has made it perfectly clear
that presidential elections involve a contest for the one office among thou-
sands of elected offices in our democracy, that involve every American
voter. 65 The national implications of that simple, yet profound, fact clearly
155. FRANCES Fox PIvEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS STILL DON'T VOTE:
AND WHY POLITICIANS WANT IT THAT WAY 65 (2000).
156. Id. at 73.
157. See generally Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2004).
158. Id. at 312.
159. Id. at 318 (Lewis, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 316 (Lewis, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 313.
162. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 313 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.102(16)
(2003)).
163. Id. at 319.
164. 460 U.S. 780 (1983) [hereinafter Anderson I]; see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
165. Anderson I1, 460 U.S. at 795.
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call for a federal statute applicable in all fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia. The present state of our federal election law should not stop at as-
suring the right of individual voters to cast a vote for president only when the
candidate is the nominee of one of the major parties.
Efforts to deal with this problem by enacting a federal statute capable of
overriding existing state laws, on the subject of ballot access for non-major
party candidates, would not suffice. Conceivably, there could be an effort
made under HAVA to condition federal grants for improved state electoral
systems on the state's adoption of laws that would specifically grant ballot
access to non-major party candidates in a non-discriminatory manner. How-
ever, that hit or miss strategy is questionable because it does not really con-
front the problem. The mythology of this extra-constitutional political sys-
tem must be pierced, not by bribing states to allow a challenger from outside
that system, but by permitting truly unbiased freedom and equality in the
electoral arena.
Professor Jamin B. Raskin, in Overruling Democracy: The Supreme
Court vs. The American People, offers this trenchant observation:
the "two-party system" is neither a historical trend nor a constitu-
tionally driven public institution but a kind of vast political anti-
trust conspiracy.
... [I]t has successfully reshaped the essential features of our elec-
toral institutions, from ballot-access laws to ... debate-access laws
to presidential campaign public financing laws. This "two-party
system" exists indeed, and with a vengeance. 66
Surely it is difficult to imagine that when the Framers were arguing in the
debates that took place during the period of ratification for the creation of a
new democratic republic, they believed it would be based on a framework of
a two-party system; or, that it would operate to the exclusion of the possibil-
ity that a multiparty system could emerge. It certainly was not consciously
barred and excluded from future consideration. 167 It is true that Madison in
his Federalist No. 10 inveighed against factions and the peril they could pose
for a nascent Republic. 168 It is also well established that the term faction, as
used in that context, could be equated with a political party. 169 However,
there is scant evidence that Madison took a binary approach, which excluded
166. JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 98 (2003).
167. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
168. See id.
169. See id.
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the possibility that no more than two views could be refined to solve future
problems that might beset the new democracy with its republican approach to
governance. 
170
Morris P. Fiorina was cited in this article as deploring the decline of
"collective responsibility" in solving our problems as a nation.71 ' Fiorina
alleged that a generation has passed since "parties have provided an 'ade-
quate' degree of collective responsibility."'' 72 This in turn, he believed, had
produced "deleterious consequences.' 73 He also offered the conclusion that
"[s]ince 1965 the parties have done little or nothing to earn the loyalties of
modem Americans."', 74 This trenchant observation, I believe, cannot be dis-
missed a quarter of a century later as a remark out of time and out of place.
75
Two of the consequences of political decline resulting from the deficit in the
collective responsibility of our existing duopoly are: "the growing impor-
tance of single-issue politics and the growing alienation of the American
citizenry."'7 6 Another profound result of our bipolar domestic politics is
what Fiorina describes as immobilism, which specifically refers to critical
problems regarding energy, public debt, and the attendant higher costs they
will invoke in the future. 77 How prophetic indeed is his observation long
ago that:
political inability to take actions that entail short-run costs ordinar-
ily will result in much higher costs in the long-run [for the Ameri-
can people who] ... will not have an opportunity to choose be-
tween two or more such long-term plans. Although both parties
promise tough, equitable policies, in the present state of our poli-
tics, neither can deliver.'
78
These statements may seem morose or Cassandra-like pronouncements
from the Academy. However, an array of different sources, including both
political scientists and law school academics across America, are writing on
170. See id.
171. Fiorina, supra note 115, at 26.
172. Id. at 27.
173. Id. at 28.
174. Id. at 33.
175. Seeid. at 26.
176. Fiorina, supra note 115, at 39.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 40.
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this subject and asking whether the most recent decade's elections validate
Fiorina's need for greater accountability.179
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE UNITED STATES' BI-PARTISAN ORIENTED
BALLOT ACCESS LAWS
In Williams v. Rhodes, the United States Supreme Court decided an issue
regarding ballot access in an election involving the contest for presidency. 80
Williams not only involved the issue of an individual candidate, namely
George Wallace, the controversial former Governor of Alabama, but also
involved Wallace's newly-formed American Independent Party.18' Although
Wallace's petition to secure a place on the Ohio ballot garnered over 450,000
signatures in six months, far more than Ohio required for a new party, he was
not given a place on the ballot because he missed the deadline under Ohio
law.' The parties who received ten percent of the vote cast for the previous
gubernatorial election were automatically granted ballot access. 183 However,
the nominees of these parties were not chosen until later at the national gen-
eral election. 84 Wallace won this lawsuit on the grounds that the Ohio ballot
access law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution by giving
preferential treatment to the two major parties: Republican and Democ-
ratic. 18 Further, the Court held the associational rights of voters who wished
to vote for an Independent candidate were violated under the First Amend-
ment. 86 The Court applied strict scrutiny, which requires the state to show a
compelling interest to warrant interference with an individual's right to asso-
ciate. 18 Ohio had argued that its law should be sustained to further the com-
promise and stability that inheres in the two-party system.18
In reply to that argument, the Court reasoned that the Ohio law did not,
as applied, simply support a concept or a construct of a two-party system.
89
179. See generally DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2004).
180. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
181. Id. at 26.
182. Id. at 26-27. The number of signatures actually exceeded fifteen percent of the bal-
lots cast in the last election for governor, which was required by Ohio law. Id. at 27. Three
years later, the Court upheld a Georgia statute requiring five percent for independent candi-
dates. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
183. Williams, 393 U.S. at 26.
184. See id. at 33.
185. Id. at 34.
186. See id. at 32.
187. Id. at 31.
188. Williams, 393 U.S. at 32.
189. Id.
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It was clearly drawn to advantage the political chances of two specific, iden-
tifiable parties: Republican and Democratic. 90 The Court went on to chal-
lenge Ohio's right, in essence, to create a permanent political monopoly.'
Secondly, the Court reasoned that competitive politics is important because it
produces new ideas and different programmatic approaches that all require
First Amendment protection.1 92 Therefore, it is also important to permit
freedom of association to advance those new and different approaches.
193
Furthermore, if all new parties are destined to be stillborn because they are
not granted time to lay a foundation on which to grow through active partici-
pation in the electoral process, they would be robbed of the advantages that
both existing major parties enjoy.194
Pausing at this point to reflect on the Florida ballot access statute in-
volved in Reform Party of Florida, I question both the practicality and con-
stitutionality of the statutory language. 95 The statute grants ballot access
only to the nominee of a "national party" which holds a "national conven-
tion. '196 Determining what constitutes a national party should not be a judi-
cial function, even with courts having the benefit of expert testimony from
political consultants, political scientists, media consultants, or a wide variety
of other talents associated with the giant conglomerates that now make up
the national party campaigns for the American presidency.
On the other hand, section 103.021 (4)(b) of the Florida Statutes clearly
involves in-state petitioning by a new party candidate for President of the
United States as a qualifying procedure for ballot access.1 97 It is foreseeable
that this legislation will pass constitutional muster under current precedents,
going back to Williams, and more specifically, Jenness v. Fortson.98 How-
ever, other efforts by state legislatures to regulate political party conventions
and standing of putative candidates for the presidency should be regarded as
highly suspect. Conventions of the established major parties are not deci-
sion-making bodies. They are simply showcases where a party merchandises
its wares or, at the very least, attempts to do so.
190. See id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas added "Ohio... has effectively
foreclosed its presidential ballot to all but Republicans and Democrats." Id. at 35 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
191. Id. at 32.
192. Williams, 393 U.S. at 32.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 33.
195. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a)-(b) (2004).
196. § 103.021(4)(a).
197. § 103.021(4)(b).
198. 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (holding that a state's nominating petition requirement did not
violate the First Amendment).
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Aside from the officiousness and the emptiness in any meaningful sense
of a national convention as a vital cog in the machinery of our democracy,
United States Supreme Court cases like Eu v. San Francisco County Democ-
ratic Central Committee'99 have led me to wonder how hospitable the judi-
cial climate will be to statutorily link the role of national conventions of even
major parties directly to the electoral process. Admittedly, Eu struck down
severe state regulation of party committees' endorsement of political candi-
dates as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.20 0 Nonetheless, the
argument that the overarching right of the American people to choose the
President should be conditioned on a party convention nomination is simply
indefensible. In Eu, California argued that strict scrutiny was not required of
the statutory regulation, but Justice Marshall rejected that argument.20'
I next approach the problem raised by the Florida Ballot Access Law
from the broader perspective of the states' laws both generally in this article
and in more detail in the appendix explaining the ballot laws in all fifty
states. 21 2 Richard Winger, founder and long-time editor of Ballot Access
News in San Francisco, provides an excellent and highly critical historical
review of ballot access laws for all fifty states through 2002.203 Winger
points out that it was only in the late 1930s that what he labels "massive peti-
tion requirements" began.2°4 Then abruptly in 1971 with the Court's decision
in Jenness v. Fortson, which was only three years after the Williams decision
discussed above, the Court virtually called a halt to efforts by Independents
and minor or third parties to protest the raising of the petition barrier to
heights that have made the present duopoly invincible.2 5
An earlier warning, no less alarming in tone, was published in a lengthy
article by Bradley A. Smith, entitled Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access
Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply. 216 Smith developed a theme similar to
Mr. Winger. 207  Together these articles represent a body of opinion with
which I wish to publicly associate myself. They are germane to the analysis
and discussion of the Supreme Court of Florida's decision on the electoral
199. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
200. Id. at 233.
201. Id. at 222. But see Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political
Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1741 (1993).
202. See infra Appendix.
203. Richard Winger, The Supreme Court and the Burial of Ballot Access: A Critical
Review of Jenness v. Fortson, 1 ELECTION L.J. 235 (2002) [hereinafter Winger I].
204. Id. at 236.
205. Id. at 235.
206. Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties Need
Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167 (1991).
207. See id.; Winger I, supra note 203.
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process. Also, the two articles cited above furnish an opportunity to go be-
yond analysis of the decisions themselves and to offer some thoughts on pos-
sible guidelines on what the future of ballot access laws should be and to
venture some additional thoughts on a uniform, truly national approach to
how we elect our President in the twenty-first century.20 8 At the same time
we fully recognize that ours is a federal system where states both historically
and constitutionally have certain responsibilities about how our elections are
conducted.
We must necessarily begin with the recognition of the overwhelming
power of the two major parties-the past and present duopoly that has al-
ready been referred to. I shall leave much of the history of that development
to others. However, I must be forgiven if I note that it is not merely a per-
sonal predilection, but well documented by these historians that it is third
parties as far back as the early nineteenth century that produced both ideas
and action on a variety of fronts-from women's rights, to child labor, to
progressive electoral reforms designed to enlarge the role of individual vot-
ers and battle against bossism and corruption in the ranks of both capital and
labor.2 °9
James B. Weaver received eight percent of the popular vote in 1892 as
the candidate of the Populist Party. Many of the reforms contained in his
platform were taken over by the Democratic Party;2 '" some by Theodore
Roosevelt in his third party run in 1912 as nominee of the Progressive Party,
when he garnered twenty-seven percent of the popular vote.212 Such devel-
opments led to Richard Hofstadters' famous remark in 1912 that third parties
"sting like a bee and then die. 213
It has been pointed out that it was the spectacular third party run of the
Bull Moose candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, which sparked the passage of
new or revised ballot access laws precisely designed to block gains by Inde-
pendent and third party candidates. 1 4
As the state laws across the land are examined, it will be noted that
many states are not satisfied to impose the barrier to ballot access in terms of
208. Winger I, supra note 203.
209. See V.0. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, & PREssuRE GROups 257-58 (5th ed. 1964);
STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA 8 (2d ed. 1984); Smith, supra note
206, at 169.
210. KEY, supra note 209, at 257; Smith, supra note 206, at 170.
211. KEY, supra note 209, at 257-58.
212. Id. at 263; see also ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 209, at 86.
213. Stephen E. Ambrose & Richard D. Lamm, Why America Needs a New Political
Party, at http://www.americanreform.org/Lamm/new_political_party.html (last visited Mar.
30, 2005).
214. See Smith, supra note 206, at 170.
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a fixed percentage of the registered voters or the votes cast for governor or
state official in a particular prior state election." 5 They include a wide vari-
ety of procedural restrictions on who may circulate petitions and may require
certain arcane information from the signer, such as a voter affidavit num-
ber.2 1
6
While all the above is going on, it should be reiterated that major party
candidates, however, are totally exempt no matter how obscure their identi-
ties may have been in their past life.217 If they are clothed in the major party
banner they need not spend their time petitioning to be assured that their
names have been placed on the ballot.218 It is their shield against the de-
mands of time, money, and expenditure of effort to legitimate their place-
ment and right to compete in the public arena of an electoral campaign for
public office.219
What then are, and should be, the justifications for the tendency of state
ballot access laws to be exclusionary and thereby lend official state sanction
to the duopoly of political power complained of by Smith, Winger, and the
co-author of this article? The most common reasons stated are that this du-
opolistic system has given us compromise and political stability. 20 Ancillary
reasons are that these restrictive laws prevent ballot confusion and assure the
orderly administration of the electoral proceed that is necessary if citizens are
to be allowed to cast an effective vote.22 1
In Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,222 the United States Supreme
Court considered a ballot access requirement, in a so-called blanket primary
for a United States Senate seat, to determine whether a candidate should re-
ceive placement on the general election ballot if they do not receive at least
one percent of the votes cast for that office in the primary. 223 Dean Peoples,
a candidate of the Socialist Workers Party, was on the primary ballot with
thirty-two other candidates from other parties.224 However, out of 681,690
votes cast, he received only 596 or .00009 percent of total votes. 225 He was
denied placement on the ballot.226 In the suit that followed, the federal court
215. See id. at 176-77.
216. Id. at 176.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Smith, supra note 206, at 176-77.
220. See id. at 179.
221. See id. at 180.
222. 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
223. ld. at 190-91.
224. Id. at 192.
225. Id. at 192 n.9.
226. Id. at 192.
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of appeals ruled in his favor, and in answer to the State of Washington's
proffered defense that Mr. People's low vote total showed insufficient com-
munity support to suffer his candidacy through a general election, it said:
"'Washington's political history evidences no voter confusion from ballot
overcrowding." ,
227
In overruling the court of appeals and approving People's exclusion
from the ballot, Justice White accepted the truth of that historical fact but
nevertheless went on to say: "We have never required a State to make a par-
ticularized showing of the existence of voter confusion, ballot overcrowding,
or the presence of frivolous candidacies prior to the imposition of reasonable
restrictions on ballot access., 22' He went on to state (astonishingly so, in this
writer's opinion) that: "[i]n Jenness v. Fortson, [for example] we conducted
no inquiry into the sufficiency and quantum of the data supporting the rea-
sons for Georgia's 5% petition-signature requirement., 229  In the Munro
opinion, the Court referred to its previous decision in Storer in which a can-
didate had been barred from a place on the California ballot by a party disaf-
filiation provision in the state's electoral code, to renounce the idea that em-
pirical evidence was required in cases challenging a state's ballot access
laws.230 Testing the law's constitutionality does not require proof of a com-
pelling state interest. 231 It was enough for the state to allege that it was seek-
ing to protect the voters, and it was not necessary to justify the means em-
ployed or make any effort beyond the assertion itself that the voters were
better off with a more limited choice of candidates.232 It is noteworthy that
Justice Marshall, in a dissent, made this telling rejoinder:
The necessity for [a higher standard of review] becomes evident
when we consider that major parties, which by definition are ordi-
narily in control of legislative institutions, may seek to perpetuate
themselves at the expense of developing minor parties. The appli-
cation of strict scrutiny to ballot access restrictions ensures that
measures taken to further a State's interest in keeping frivolous
candidates off the ballot do not incidentally impose an impermissi-
ble bar to minor-party access.233
227. Munro, 479 U.S. at 194 (quoting Socialist Workers Party v. Munro, 765 F.2d 1417,
1420 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 479 U.S. 189 (1986)).
228. Id. at 194-95.
229. Id. at 195.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 200-01.
232. Munro, 479 U.S. at 194-95.
233. Id. at 201 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In another commentary, Professor Michael J. Klarman points out the
other problem with the Court's decision in Munro as it relates to ballot ac-
cess requirements affecting the formation of, and admission to, our political
system of independent or minor party candidates.234 In Munro, which in-
volved the exclusion of a minor-party candidate, Justice White dismissively
observed that "[i]t can hardly be said that Washington's voters are denied
freedom of association because they must channel their expressive activity
into a campaign at the primary as opposed to the general election.' '235 What
Justice White was saying is that for a minor-party candidate, one bite out of
the apple should be quite enough to satisfy that party's desire for its voice to
be heard.236 Justice White is implying that regardless of how widely diver-
gent the minor party's message might be, it need not be heard in the general
election campaign by the far wider audience of voters who tune in and par-
ticipate in the decisive contest.237 This obviously contributes to the en-
trenchment problem. In other words, one election in the primary phase of
our electoral process for minor parties is quite enough.
Another United States Supreme Court case that clearly indicates the
trend of the Court's thinking in the area of ballot access is the recent case of
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.238 Today many states ban multi-
party or cross-filing for a political office; i.e., they forbid fusion where more
than one political party seeks to nominate a candidate for the same office. 239
For example, a Minnesota law banned fusion in 1991.240 In upholding that
law, the Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, relied on the argument that:
"[s]tates certainly have an interest in protecting the integrity, fairness, and
efficiency of their ballots and election processes as means for electing public
officials., 24' The majority's opinion expressed extreme concern regarding
fusion destroying the unity of political parties, while promoting factionalism
within the parties and making the ballot "a billboard for political advertising"
instead of achieving what should be its only purpose-to choose candi-
dates.242
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter, dissented and
stated the majority was wrong in its "conclusion that the ballot serves no
234. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 522 (1997).
235. Munro, 479 U.S. at 199.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
239. Id. at 355.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 364.
242. Id. at 365.
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expressive purpose for the parties who place candidates on the ballot., 243
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg made an additional important point that "most
States have enacted election laws that impose burdens on the development
and growth of third parties. ' ,2' They went on to add "[t]he fact that the law
was both intended to disadvantage minor parties and has had that effect is a
matter that should weigh against, rather than in favor of, its constitutional-
ity.245
It is almost uniformly accepted by political scientists that the two-party
system is already aided immeasurably by our single-member system of both
congressional and state legislative districting in maintaining its dominant role
in our political system, and has for well over a century and a half.246 It is
further aided by our system of electing plurality winners in single member
districts; i.e., our "first past-the-post" system that has come to be known as
Duverger's law, and so inexorable is the resulting two-party system.247
Therefore, the misbegotten judicial concern for the protection of a two-party
system is unwarranted.
Liberalizing access to the ballot for both Independents and third parties
for legislative offices still leaves them the enormous difficulties of surmount-
ing that hurdle. For unitary offices such as the President of the United
States, or at the state level, that of governor and other state constitutional
officers, the first-past-the-post system would have quickly eliminated popu-
lar past presidential candidates such as President Theodore Roosevelt in his
1912 third-party new-party bid. 48 The major parties are not an endangered
species needing government, or for the purposes of the argument being made
here, or judicial protection, or the legislative hurdles posed by ballot access
laws conjured up in state legislature either by state legislators seeking their
own entrenchment or at the behest of party officials.
Richard Pildes, in his article Democracy and Disorder,249 has effectively
summarized and suggested an answer to the questions posed here, which I
believe are incorrect assumptions of the courts in general. 25° His assertions
are prompted by state legislation targeting the necessity of narrowly limiting
243. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 373.
244. Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
245. Id.
246. See Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 114, at 675 n.121.
247. Id. at 675 & n. 121 (citations omitted).
248. See Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: Constitu-
tional Interstices and the Twenty-SecondAmendment, 83 MINN. L. REv. 565, 583 (1999).
249. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695 (2001).
250. See generally id.
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ballot access, as well as the United States Supreme Court's misapplication of
concerns linking the maintenance of stability and order in our democracy.25'
Some would argue that American politics today suffers from a bi-polar
disorder because there is polarity manifested by a bi-partisan axis. The de-
gree to which ballot access laws have played some role in maintaining this
duopoly is open to debate and discussion. However, I believe this issue can-
not be dismissed as insignificant.
Bradley Smith, in a historical view of this question, pointed out that
ballot access laws did not really draw attention and undergo extensive revi-
sion until Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive Party out-polled his Republican
opponent, the incumbent President William Howard Taft, in the 1912 elec-
tion. 2 Although Roosevelt lost the election to Wilson, fourteen Progressive
Party members were elected to Congress under his banner.253 The Australian
secret ballot had not begun general adoption in this country until 1888.254
Until then, ballot access was not really a problem because parties prepared
their own ballots.255 However, the Socialist Party received its largest per-
centage, with six percent in the 1912 presidential election.256 As Smith fur-
ther recounts, the state legislatures then swung into action when Senator
Robert LaFollete, "trying to launch a new Progressive Party, faced ballot-
access laws that were 'an almost insuperable obstacle to the new party.' 257
Smith reached the conclusion that "[n]evertheless, strict ballot-access restric-
tions have helped the two major parties to achieve a vise-grip on American
politics never before attainable. 2 8 The parties' evolution to the present day
has been a long story in and of itself.25 9 Smith's second chapter began with
addressing Williams v. Rhodes, which was discussed earlier in this article.26°
Since this article has provided a summary of that evolution, we turn to the
issue regarding the proper state-level response to the problem confronting the
Supreme Court of Florida in Reform Party of Florida.
The difficulties facing the Supreme Court of Florida in interpreting the
state's ballot access statute for presidential candidates, along with this arti-
cle's material regarding the different approaches to ballot access in other
jurisdictions, might suggest that statutory reform would be prominent in any
251. Seeid. at 714-18.
252. Smith, supra note 206, at 170.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 172.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 170.
257. Smith, supra note 206, at 171.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See discussion supra Part III; 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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list of changes to the electoral process concerning the presidential election.26 '
Following the 2000 presidential election, former Presidents Gerald Rudolph
Ford and James Earl Carter, along with many other notables, became the
appointed co-chairs of the National Commission on Federal Election Re-
form, and in due course, the Commission produced an impressive 356-page
report, which was reassuringly entitled To Assure Pride and Confidence in
the Electoral Process.62 Sadly, the report does not discuss how to reform
the states' ballot-access laws.263 In enacting the Help America Vote Act,
Congress also chose not to broach the subject.26 This article is not intended
as a criticism of either the Commission or Congress.
Florida has received the accolade of being listed as one of the "[1]eading
major reform states" by Daniel J. Palazzolo and James Ceaser in their re-
cently published book on electoral process reform.2 65 In that volume, Susan
A. MacManus has headed her contribution on Florida as "Nonstop Reform
Since Election 2000. ' '266 The most extensive reforms were in the first session
of the Florida legislature following the election of 2000, which made Florida
the eye of the storm that enveloped the nation in the thirty-five day wait for a
final judgment of who had won the presidential election. 267 That enormously
controversial and still debated discussion has produced a flood of commen-
tary in both books and articles, but it is not the subject of further discussion
here save for mentioning its important role in generating enormous attention
to the need for electoral reform both at the national and state level.268 In
Congress, the controversy produced the HAVA, and in Florida legislation
was introduced, and has been acted upon in every ensuing session of the state
261. See also Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 312-14 (Fla. 2004).
262. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, To AssuRE PRIDE AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 87 (2001), http://www.reformelections.
org/data/reports/99_fullreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
263. See generally id.
264. See Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15301).
265. ELECTION REFORM: POLITICS AND POLICY 35 (Daniel J. Palazzolo & James W. Ceaser
eds., 2005).
266. Susan A. MacManus, Goodbye Chads, Butterfly Ballots, Overvotes, and Recount
Ruckuses! Election Reform in Florida, 2000 to 2003, in ELECTION REFORM, supra note 265, at
37.
267. Id. at 38. The President was only elected by a United States Supreme Court decision.
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101-03 (2000); The Presidential Election is Finally Done,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at C15, 2000 WL 29921494.
268. See ELECTION REFORM: POLITICS AND POLICY, supra note 265, at 35.
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269legislature, dealing with changes and reforms in the electoral process.
However, for the purposes of this article, it should be emphasized that none
of the legislation touches on ballot access by independents or third parties. 7°
Perhaps this is because the 1999 changes in the law on that subject were so
recent that it seemed unnecessary. However, more likely it was true that at
both the national and state levels, in the rush to reform, the subject of ballot
access was simply not on anyone's radar screen as a critical issue. This
seems a strange anomaly because it is almost universally accepted that had
Ralph Nader, a third party-then the Green Party candidate-not been on the
ballot in Florida, Vice President Gore would have received that state's
twenty-five electoral votes and won the presidency.27' However, across the
nation, most states that moved on election reform ignored the subject of bal-
lot access.272
I believe that against this background of indifference and inaction, the
likelihood of action at the state level-although in this article I confine my
attention to Florida, because of its principal focus on the aforementioned
decision of Reform Party of Florida v. Black and the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida's interpretation of minor-party ballot access-is only minimal, if not in-
deed highly unlikely. This is true despite Justice Lewis' concurring opinion
in which he almost plaintively decries the deficiencies of section 103.021 of
the Florida Statutes for failing to define adequately the terms "national
party" and "national convention" in order to provide needed judicial guide-
posts.
2 73
It is equally unrealistic, in my judgment, to think that Congress would
provide a remedy. For as the Court famously declared in its per curiam opin-
ion in Bush II, there is no affirmative right of the individual citizen to vote
for electors of the President in Florida or any other state. 274 That right is the
prerogative of state legislatures under Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the
269. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 15301); see also Katherine Harris, The Facts on Florida; Elections Systems
Ready for November, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 2004, at A19, 2004 WL 64166414.
270. See Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L.
REv. 195, 241-42 (2004); Roberta A. Yard, Comment, American Democracy and Minority
Rule: How the United States Can Reform Its Electoral Process to Ensure "One Person, One
Vote," 42 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 185, 197-98 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A
Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 Sup.
CT. REv. 1, 58 (2001).
271. Boudreaux, supra note 270, at 241-42; Yard, supra note 270, at 197-98.
272. See Richard Winger, Ballot Access News (Feb. 1, 2001), at http://www.ballot-
access.org/2001/0201.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
273. Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 316 (Fla. 2004) (Lewis, J., concur-
ring).
274. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
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United States Constitution275 Moreover, the Court made it clear more than a
century ago in McPherson v. Blacker that the right of individuals to choose
the electors is a plenary power.276 Therefore, even though a state's constitu-
tion has granted the franchise to the people, "[t]he State, of course, after
granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the
power to appoint electors., 27 7 "[T]here is no doubt of the right of the legisla-
ture to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor
abdicated. 2
71
In Bush 11, the Court hearkened back to its decision more than two dec-
ades earlier where, in a 5-4 decision on the ballet access law for independent
and minor parties of Ohio, they said: "[i]n the context of a Presidential elec-
tion, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national inter-
est. For the President and the Vice President of the United States are the
only officials who represent all the voters in the Nation.
2 79
I believe that a constitutional amendment expunging the language of
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, effectively abolishing the Electoral College, is
not the best path to reform the United States Constitution. Nor should state
court judges have to grapple with questions of how to define the meaning of
a "national party" or a "national convention," when such terms are linked to
a statutory scheme for ballot access for a presidential candidate. I empathize
with the frustration of the concurring justice in Reform Party of Florida .210 1
believe such language should be deleted from the statute. Far more impor-
tantly though, the energy for reform should be focused on amending the
United States Constitution to declare that it is the right of every voter to cast
a vote for President of the United States.
There is an overriding foundational principle that supports our democ-
racy. It was enunciated in one of the most famous cases in our constitutional
history, McCulloch v. Maryland,2  in which Chief Justice Marshall stated:
"[t]he government of the Union ... is, emphatically, and truly, a government
of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers
are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their
benefit., 28
2
275. Id.
276. 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
277. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104.
278. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35 (quoting S. REP. No. 395 (1874)).
279. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Anderson v. Cele-
brezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-95 (1983)).
280. See Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 315-16 (Lewis, J., concurring).
281. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
282. Id. at 404-05.
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To preserve the important principle in the words just quoted, I believe
we should now-in view of past judicial precedents that have diminished the
peoples' right to choose unfettered by an entrenched party system-reassert
that right in the United States Constitution with a "Right to Vote" amend-
ment. It would do away with more than three decades of minor parties being
kept off of state ballots283 by what one writer calls "America's Signature
Exclusion. 284 The leading expert on ballot access in the United States and
editor for many years of The Ballot Access News, a monthly publication,
entitled a recent article devoted to the subject: The Supreme Court and the
Burial of Ballot Access: A Critical Review of Jenness v. Fortson. 285 The arti-
cle points out that in the last three decades the Supreme Court has cited Jen-
ness approvingly in nine opinions.286 Even more dramatic is that, in lower
courts, independent and minor parties have lost on constitutional grounds in
126 cases.287 Almost half of the state legislatures have followed suit by en-
acting stricter ballot access laws.288 The article lays all of this at the door of
Jenness and suggests the decision has made the states confident that they can
successfully bar minority parties and independent candidates. 89 Ralph
Nader was on forty-three state ballots in 2000.290 In the last presidential
election, he succeed in gaining ballot access in only thirty-four states.291 In
eighteen states, it was the Democratic Party that undertook legal action to
keep him off the ballot.292
The people cannot, in the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, demon-
strate that "[t]he government of the Union... is, emphatically, and truly a
government of the people, 293 because they are restricted by state legislatures
which are, in turn, sustained by the judicial branch. 294 The Constitution itself
283. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
284. RASKrN, supra note 166, at 91.
285. Winger I, supra note 203, at 235.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 249-52.
288. See id. at 246-49.
289. Id. at 248.
290. See Presidential Vote, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS, Jan. 1, 2001, at http://web.archive.org/
web/20020203231432/http://www.ballot-access.org/2001/0101.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2005).
291. Richard Winger, Did the Democrats Err on Nader?, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS, Jan. 1,
2005, at http://www.ballot-access.org/2005/0101.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2005) [hereinafter
Winger II].
292. Id.
293. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,404-05 (1819).
294. See generally Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2004) (Lewis, J.,
concurring).
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must spell out that great truth in the unmistakable language of the proposed
"Right to Vote" amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
A vehicle does exist for the enactment of the proposed amendment in
House of Representatives Joint Resolution 28, which was introduced in the
108th Congress on March 4, 2003 by Congressman Jesse L. Jackson, Jr. of
Illinois. 295 In addition, in order to prevent courts from making decisions like
Reform Party of Florida, a proposed constitutional amendment should also
include provisions that: (i) guarantee every citizen the right to vote for Presi-
dent (or presidential elector to the extent the electoral college continues to
exist); (ii) limit the ability of states and the District of Columbia in regulating
presidential elections to issues surrounding placement of the ballot and de-
sign of the ballot; (iii) provide for equal technology to be used by the states
and the District of Columbia in connection with the casting and counting of
votes in presidential elections; and (iv) provide for uniform standards with
respect to ballot access for the office of the presidency. In his floor speech,
Jackson began with the following statement from Bush II: "[t]he individual
citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President
of the United States. ' 96 Jackson also referenced Alexander Keyssar's mag-
isterial work, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the
United States.297 Jackson's floor statement bore the title, "Our Voting Sys-
tem Needs a New Constitutional Foundation", and section 1 of his proposed
amendment simply stated:
All citizens of the United States who are eighteen years of age or
older shall have the right to vote in any public election held in the
jurisdiction in which the citizen resides. The right to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States, any State, or any other
public or private person or entity, except that the United States or
any State may establish regulations narrowly tailored to produce
efficient and honest elections.298
Other significant provisions deal with the power of Congress to estab-
lish "election performance standards at least once every four years," for ex-
ample, by mandating periodic review on a quadrennial basis. 299 Further, sec-
295. H.R.J. Res. 28, 108th Cong. (2003).
296. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
297. KEYSSAR, supra note 154.
298. H.R.J. Res. 28.
299. Id.
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tion 4 provides for mandatory same day voter registration, and a provision
that state rules for appointing electors for President and Vice President shall
ensure that each Elector votes for the candidates chosen by a majority of the
voters.3°
The language quoted above makes it clear that strict scrutiny should be
applied in ballot access cases and not produce what Professor Lawrence
Tribe described in the treatise American Constitutional Law: "Jenness, in
contrast [to Williams v. Rhodes], shunned discussion of the standard of re-
view, contented itself with emphasizing that the laws being reviewed were
less suffocating than those in Williams, and found the state interests quite
sufficient to satisfy whatever standard it did apply." 30 1
Hopefully, what Professor Jamin Raskin has referred to as "America's
Signature Exclusion: How Democracy Is Made Safe for the Two-Party Sys-
tem"3°2 can be halted, as the United States Supreme Court would not con-
tinue to judge state laws on petitioning for ballot access by its current nebu-
lous standard. Additionally, another critic of the trend of United States Su-
preme Court decisions in this area of the law, access to the ballot, is Profes-
sor Richard L. Hasen of Loyola School of Law. 3 3 He has addressed what he
labels as "Protecting the Core of Political Equality" 3" in his book entitled
The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr
to Bush v. Gore. 305 He sums up his chapter on the subject named above in
these carefully chosen words:
In sum, cases such as Jenness, Munro, and Timmons, may have
been wrongly decided. I say "may have been" rather than "were"
because we do not have enough evidence of (1) whether the inter-
ests put forward in the case to trump the equality right are ade-
quately supported by the evidence; and (2) if so, how the Court
should have engaged in the careful balancing of the rights. With-
out a doubt, there is good cause for concern that these cases were
wrongly decided and have had negative effects on the political
equality rights of third parties and independent candidates.
306
300. Id.
301. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1106 (2d ed. 1988).
302. See RASKIN, supra note 166, at 91-116.
303. See RICHARD L. HAsEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR To BUSH V. GoRE (2003).
304. Id. at 73.
305. Id. at 73-100.
306. Id. at 99 (footnote omitted).
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Here, the author cites to Richard Winger's seminal article, The Supreme
Court and The Burial of Ballot Access: A Critical Review of Jenness v. Fort-
son.3"7 It is clear to me that the aforementioned line of authority would im-
peril any effort by Congress to enact a national freedom of access to the bal-
lot law. This conclusion is reached based upon the strictures against interfer-
ing with state legislatures and circumscribing their power in appointing elec-
tors.3 °8 Additionally, the doctrine interposed to limit congressional authority
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment also plays an integral part.30 9
In City ofBoerne v. Flores,1 ° the Court threw down the gauntlet to Congress
with respect to what would be regarded as "appropriate legislation," by al-
lowing Congress to enforce the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 ' In deciding that case, the Court first relied on its own previ-
ous interpretations of First Amendment rights and struck down a congres-
sional enactment that would have gone beyond the Court's previous interpre-
tation of those rights.312 The Court ruled that Congress could not enlarge its
powers under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitu-
tion under the guise of implementing the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.31 3 It would not only exceed Congress's authority, but it would
also infringe upon the prerogatives of the states.314
Clearly, the road that any constitutional amendment must travel is both
rocky and steep. However, as was suggested in the work by Alexander
Keyssar, previously cited, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of De-
mocracy in the United States, so eloquently stated:
[t]he history of the right to vote is a record of the slow and fitful
progress of the project, progress that was hard won and often sub-
ject to reverses. The gains so far reached need to be protected,
while the vision of a more democratic society can continue to in-
spire our hopes and our actions. 315
It is only too clear, I believe, that a congressional statute seeking to es-
tablish federal standards for the conduct of elections and the affirmative right
307. Winger I, supra note 203.
308. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. This section was interpreted to mean plenary in nature.
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
309. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
310. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
311. Id. at519,536.
312. Id. at 518-27.
313. Id. at 534.
314. Id.
315. KEYssAR, supra note 154, at 324.
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to vote would be challenged under the doctrine of City ofBoerne v. Flores as
exceeding the authority of Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 6 Indeed the present Court, with its dedication to the principles
laid down in McPherson and heavy reliance on the per curiam opinion in
Bush 11, would undoubtedly resort to a "one-two punch" if an effort was
made to proceed by statute, instead of a constitutional amendment.1 7
316. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
317. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35; Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100 (2000).
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APPENDIX: BALLOT ACCESS LAW OF THE FIFTY STATES
AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Alabama: Candidates may obtain access to the general election ballot for
the offices of President or Vice President of the United States through either
political party nomination or petition.38 Political parties that receive 20% of
the vote at the last general election qualify to have statewide ballot access.319
Nomination by petition requires signatures equal or exceeding 3% of electors
who cast ballots for the office of Governor in the last general election.
3 20
Alaska: To have a candidate's name on the general election ballot, the na-
tional committees of political parties which are recognized political parties in
Alaska select their Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in a manner
prescribed by their party bylaws. 32 1 Any candidate not associated with one
of the aforementioned parties shall be established as a limited political party
and must gather signatures in the amount of at least 1% of the number of
voters who cast ballots for the office of President in the preceding presiden-
tial election.322
Arizona: Candidates from recognized political parties within Arizona may
place their candidates on the primary election ballot.32 3 However, any quali-
fied elector who is not a registered member of a recognized political party
324may be nominated through the means of a nomination petition. A new
political party that wishes to be recognized on the primary and general elec-
tion ballots must submit a petition with the number of signatures of qualified
electors totaling no less than 1 1/3 % of the total votes cast for governor or
presidential electors at the last preceding general election. 3
25
Arkansas: In order to have a political party's Presidential and Vice Presi-
dential candidates printed on the ballot, the party must nominate the candi-
dates via the primary election. 6 New political parties are able to nominate
by convention if the presidential election is the first general election after
318. ALA. CODE § 17-19-2(a) (1995).
319. ALA. CODE § 17-16-2 (1995).
320. ALA. CODE § 17-8-2.1(a)(1) (Supp. 2004).
321. ALASKA STAT. § 15.30.020 (Michie 2004).
322. ALASKA STAT. § 15.30.025(a) (Michie 2004).
323. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 16-301 (1996).
324. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 16-341(A) (2004).
325. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 16-801 (2004).
326. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(5)(A) (Michie Supp. 2003).
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certification as a party by the Secretary of State.327 Political groups who
have failed to obtain 3% of the total votes cast at an election for the office of
Governor or nominees for presidential elector wishing to have their nominee
placed on the general election ballot may file a petition with the Secretary of
State containing a minimum of 1000 signatures of qualified electors of the
state.328
California: If a minor political party wishes to become "qualified," thereby
giving them access to the primary ballot, they are required to gather signa-
tures equaling at least 1% of the entire vote of the state at the last preceding
gubernatorial election. 329 A party may also become qualified if the party
gathers a number of signatures on a nomination petition equal to or greater
than 10% of the entire vote of the state at the last preceding gubernatorial
election.33 °
Colorado: Any political party may nominate presidential electors by con-
vention. 331 Any candidate not wishing to affiliate with one of the major po-
litical parties may gain access to the general election ballot, other than by
primary or convention, by either paying a filing fee of $500 or by filing a
nominating petition with at least 5000 signatures of eligible electors.332
Connecticut: Nominations by minor parties may be made in accordance
with the party rules.333 A party wishing to nominate by petition must have
the petition signed by a number of qualified electors in the state equal to the
lesser of 1% of the votes cast in the preceding general election or 7500.
3 34
Delaware: A political party may be listed on the general election ballot only
when, twenty one days prior to the date of the primary election, the party has
registered a number of voters equal to at least 5/100 of 1% of the total num-
ber of voters registered in Delaware as of December 31 of the immediately
preceding year.335 A primary election shall be held for all political parties
unless they opt to nominate their candidates otherwise.336 The nominations
327. Id.
328. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-7-205, 7-8-302(5)(B) (Michie Supp. 2003).
329. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 5 100(b) (West Supp. 2005).
330. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 5 100(c) (West 2003).
331. COLO. REv. STAT. § 1-4-302(1) (2004).
332. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-4-303(1), 1-4-802(l)(c)(I) (2004).
333. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-451 (West 2002).
334. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-453(d)(1)-(2) (West 2002).
335. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3001 (1999).
336. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3181 (1999).
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of the candidates for electors of President and Vice President are to be certi-
fied to the State Election Commissioner by the presiding officer and secre-
tary of the state convention or committee of each political party eligible to
place candidates on the ballot.337 No candidate may appear on Delaware's
general election ballot as an unaffiliated candidate unless they have not been
affiliated with any political party for at least three months prior to the filing
of a sworn declaration stating such with the State Election Commissioner.338
Unaffiliated candidates must also have filed a nominating petition signed by
at least 1% of the total number of registered voters in the state.339
Florida: A minor political party that is affiliated with a national political
party holding a national convention to nominate candidates for President and
Vice President can have the names of its candidates for President and Vice
President printed on the general election ballot by filing a certificate with the
Department of State that names the candidates and lists the required number
of persons to serve as electors. 340 A minor political party that is not affiliated
with a national party holding a national convention to nominate candidates
for President and Vice President can have the names of its candidates for
President and Vice President printed on the general election ballot if a peti-
tion is signed by 1% of the registered electors of Florida.3 4'
Georgia: The two ways in which candidates may qualify for an election are
through a nomination in a primary conducted by a political party or by filing
a nomination petition as an independent candidate or as a nominee of a po-
litical body.342 Nominations of candidates for public office, other than local
office, can be made by nomination petitions signed by electors.343 A nomi-
nation petition for a candidate seeking office must be signed by those regis-
tered and eligible to vote in the election in which the candidate is seeking to
be elected, and those signing must total at least 1% of the total number of
registered voters eligible to vote in the last election for the office in which
344the candidate is running.
337. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3301(a) (1999).
338. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3002 (1999).
339. Id.
340. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a) (2004).
341. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(b) (2004).
342. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-130 (2003).
343. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-170(a) (2003).
344. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-170(b) (2003).
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Hawaii: Candidates of political parties which have been qualified to place
candidates on the primary and general election ballots must have the appro-
priate official from their party file a sworn application with the chief election
officer which states, among other things, that the candidates are the duly
chosen candidates of both the state and national party. 345 For candidates of
non-qualified parties or groups, a petition must be filed with the chief elec-
tion officer that contains the signatures of currently registered voters equal-
ing at least 1% of the votes cast in Hawaii during the last presidential elec-
tion.346
Idaho: A political party nominee for President can be printed on Idaho bal-
lots only if the Secretary of State, in his or her sole discretion, determined
that the nominee's candidacy is generally advocated or recognized in na-
tional news media throughout the United States, or if a petition for nomina-
tion is filed with the Secretary of State by members of a political party to
which the candidate belongs. 347 The petition must contain an amount of sig-
natures from qualified electors which equals at least 1% of the number of
votes cast in the state for presidential electors at the previous general election
in which a President of the United States was elected.348
Illinois: A presidential candidate may have their name printed on the pri-
mary ballot of their political party by filing a petition in the State's Board of
Elections office which is signed by not less than 3000 or more than 5000
primary electors who are members of the candidate's political party.34 9
Nomination of independent candidates and candidates of newly formed po-
litical parties for offices filled by voters of the state may be made by nomina-
tion papers signed by 1% of the number of voters who voted in the immedi-
ately preceding statewide general election, or 25,000 qualified voters of the
state, whichever is less. 35
0
Indiana: A candidate not wishing to affiliate with a major political party
and who wishes to become a candidate of a minor party not qualified to
nominate candidates in a primary election or by political party convention,
and who wishes to be a candidate for the office of President or Vice Presi-
dent at the general election, must file a written consent to become a candi-
345. HAw. REv. STAT. § 11-1 13(c)(1)(C) (1993).
346. HAw. REv. STAT. § 11-1 13(c)(2)(B) (1993).
347. IDAHO CODE § 34-732(1)-(2) (Michie 2001).
348. IDAHO CODE § 34-732(3)(a) (Michie 2001).
349. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-11 (2003).
350. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-2, 10-3 (2003).
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date and a petition of nomination with the Election Division.35' In order to
be placed on the general election ballot, a minor party candidate must obtain
signatures of voters equal to 2% of the total votes cast for Secretary of State
in the election district the candidate seeks to represent.352
Iowa: Nominations for candidates for President and Vice President may be
made by nomination petitions signed by at least 1500 eligible electors living
in at least ten counties in the state.353 Any convention or caucus of eligible
electors representing a political organization which is not a political party
may nominate one candidate for each office being voted on during the gen-
eral election.354 However, in order for a political organization to have a valid
nomination for a state-wide elective office, there must be at least 250 eligible
electors and at least one eligible elector from each of the twenty five counties
in attendance at the convention or caucus where the nomination is made.355
Kansas: In order for a political party to become recognized, the party shall
file a petition with the signatures of at least 2% of the total vote cast for all
candidates for the office of Governor in the last preceding general election.356
Party nominations for public office candidates can be made only by a dele-
gate, mass convention, primary election, or caucus of qualified voters be-
longing to one political party with a national or state organization. 357 Party
nominations for presidential electors can be made only by a delegate, mass
convention, or caucus of qualified electors belonging to a political party with
a national or state organization.358 Nominations other than party nominations
must all be independent nominations. 359 Independent nominations for each
candidate for any office elected by voters from the entire state can be made
by nomination petitions signed by at least 5000 qualified voters.36 °
Kentucky: Any political organization not constituting a political party
whose candidate received 2% of the vote of the state at the last preceding
election for presidential electors may nominate, by a convention or primary
election corresponding to the party's constitution and bylaws, candidates for
351. IND. CODE §§ 3-8-6-12, 3-8-6-14 (2002).
352. IND. CODE § 3-8-6-3 (2002).
353. IOWACODE § 45.1(1) (1999).
354. IOWA CODE § 44.1 (1999).
355. Id.
356. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-302a (Supp. 2003).
357. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-301 (2000).
358. Id.
359. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-303(b) (Supp. 2003).
360. Id.
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offices to be voted for during any regular election.361 A candidate may be
nominated by a petition of electors qualified to vote for the candidate for any
office to be voted for during a regular election.362 "A petition of nomination
for a state officer, or any officer for whom all the electors of the state are
entitled to vote," must contain the names of at least 5000 petitioners.363
Louisiana: Candidates for presidential nominee must qualify in accordance
with the procedures established by their political party.36 Before qualifying
as a candidate of a political party for presidential nominee, a person must pay
a qualifying fee of $750 and additional fees imposed by state central commit-
tees or obtain a nominating petition with handwritten signatures of at least
1000 registered voters affiliated with the political party from each of the
state's congressional districts.365
Maine: A political party qualifies to participate in a primary election if the
party was listed on the ballot of either of the two preceding general elections
and if: 1) the party held municipal caucuses in at least one municipality in
each county during the election year in which the designation was listed on
the ballot, an interim election year, and the year of the primary election; 2)
the political party held a state convention during the election year in which
the designation was listed on the ballot and any interim election year; and 3)
the party's candidate for Governor or President received at least 5% of the
total vote cast in the state for Governor or President in either of the two pre-
ceding general elections.366 A party which qualifies to participate in a pri-
mary election must hold a state convention in the same election year in order
to have its candidates' party name printed on the general election ballot of
that year.367 A party must submit nomination petitions for a slate of candi-
dates for the office of presidential elector that are signed by at least 4000 and
no more than 6000 voters.368
361. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.325(1) (Michie 2004); see also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
118.015 (defining "political party").
362. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.315(1) (Michie 2004).
363. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.315(2) (Michie 2004).
364. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1280.22 (West Supp. 2005).
365. Id.; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:464(c) (West Supp. 2005) (imposing addi-
tional fees by state central committees).
366. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 301(1) (West Supp. 2004); see also ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21-A, § 311 (West 1993 & Supp. 2004) (prescribing roles for municipal caucuses).
367. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 301(2) (West 1993); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 2 1-A, § 321 (West 1993) (prescribing rules for state conventions).
368. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(5) (West 1993).
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Maryland: Nominations for public offices that are filled by elections gov-
erned by Maryland's election laws must be made by party primary for candi-
dates of major political parties, or by petition for candidates of political par-
ties that do not conduct nominations by primary, and candidates not affiliated
with any political party.369 A candidate seeking nomination by petition may
not have their name placed on the general election ballot unless they file ap-
propriate board petitions signed by at least 1% of the total number of regis-
tered voters who are eligible to vote for the office for which the nomination
by petition is sought, and at least 250 registered voters who are eligible to
vote for the office.37°
Massachusetts: A political party may have its candidates appear on the
primary election ballot by: 1) filing nomination papers signed by at least
2500 voters; 2) the state secretary placing candidates on the ballot who have
been generally advocated or recognized in the national news media; and 3)
the chairperson of each party's state committee designating on written lists
the names of its candidates. 371 Nominations of candidates to the general elec-
tion ballot for presidential electors may be made by nomination papers with
372
no less than 10,000 voters' signatures.
Michigan: A political party must make nominations by means of caucuses
or conventions if the party's principal candidate "received less than 5% of
the total vote cast for all candidates for the office of [S]ecretary of [S]tate in
the last preceding state election, either in the state or in any political subdivi-
sion affected. 3 73 Therefore, the party is not allowed to make its nominations
using the direct primary method.374 Political parties may use a qualifying
petition to nominate candidates for statewide elective offices as long as the
petition is signed by a number of qualified and registered electors equal to at
least 1% of the total number of votes cast for all candidates for Governor at
the last election in which a Governor was elected.375 A qualifying petition
for the office of President must be signed by at least 100 registered electors
376in each of at least one half of the congressional districts of the state.
369. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 5-701 (2003).
370. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 5-703(e)(1) (2003).
371. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 70E (1991).
372. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 6 (2004).
373. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 168.532 (1989).
374. Id.
375. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 168.590b(2) (2004).
376. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 168.590b(4) (2004).
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Minnesota: Candidates for any partisan office who do not seek the nomina-
tion of a major political party must be nominated by means of a nominating
petition.377 The number of signatures required on a nominating petition must
equal 1% of the total number of individuals voting in Minnesota at the last
preceding state general election or 2000 signatures, whichever is less.378
Mississippi: A petition requesting that a candidate for an independent or
special election be placed on the ballot for an office elected by the state at
large must be signed by at least 1000 qualified electors.379 When a political
party nominates by national convention, the Secretary of State must certify to
the circuit clerks of the several counties the names of all the candidates for
President and Vice President of the United States.38°
Missouri: Unless otherwise provided for, all candidates for elective office
must be nominated at a primary election in accordance with Missouri's elec-
tion laws.381 A group creating a new political party throughout the state must
file a petition with the Secretary of State, which contains the signatures of at
least 10,000 registered voters of the state. 382
Montana: An individual who wishes to run for President or Vice President
as an independent or minor party candidate must file a petition for nomina-
tion with the signatures of 5000 electors or signatures of electors equaling
5% or more of the total votes cast for the successful candidate for governor
at the last general election, whichever is less.
383
Nebraska: Partisan candidates running for President and Vice President of
the United States must be certified by the national nominating convention in
order to be listed on the general election ballot.384 Nonpartisan candidates or
candidates from newly established political parties running for President and
Vice President may obtain a position on the general election ballot by filing a
petition signed by at least 2500 registered voters.385
377. MiNN. STAT. § 204B.03 (1992).
378. MINN. STAT. § 204B.08 (2005).
379. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-359(1)(a) (1972 & Supp. 2001).
380. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-785(1) (1972 & Supp. 2001).
381. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.339 (2003).
382. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 115.315(2), (5) (2003).
383. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-504 (2003).
384. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-620 (1998).
385. Id.
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Nevada: Candidates of a minor political party running for a partisan office
must not appear on the ballot for a primary election.386 Instead, those candi-
dates' names will be placed on the general election ballot if: 1) at the last
preceding general election, the minor party received for any of its candidates
for partisan office at least 1% of the total number of votes cast for the offices
of Representative in Congress; 2) on January 1 preceding a primary election,
the minor party has been designated as the political party on the voters' reg-
istration applications of at least 1% of the total number of registered voters in
Nevada; or 3) no later than the second Friday in August preceding the gen-
eral election, the minor party files a petition with the Secretary of State
which is signed by registered voters equaling at least 1% of the total number
of votes cast at the last preceding general election for the offices of Repre-
sentative in Congress.387
New Hampshire: A candidate may have their name placed on the ballot for
the state general election by submitting the requisite number of nomination
papers instead of obtaining a nomination through party primary. 388 The
nomination papers must have the names of 3000 registered voters, 1500 of
which must be from each United States congressional district in the state, in
order to nominate a candidate for President or Vice President of the United
States. 389 Each candidate for President who seeks nomination by nomination
papers must pay to the Secretary of State a single fee of $250 for both the
presidential and vice-presidential candidates at the time of filing declarations
of intent.3
90
New Jersey: Candidates, except electors of President and Vice President of
the United States nominated by political parties at state conventions, must be
nominated directly by petition or at the primary for the general election.3 9 1 A
party may nominate by petition its candidate for President and Vice President
by filing a petition with at least 800 voters' signatures in the aggregate for
each candidate nominated.392
New Mexico: If the rules of a minor political party require nomination by
political convention or by a method other than a political convention, the
386. NEV. REV. STAT. 293.1715(1) (2003).
387. NEV. REV. STAT. 293.1715(2) (2003).
388. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:40-b (1996 & Supp. 2003).
389. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:42(l) (1996 & Supp. 2003).
390. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:19-a (1996).
391. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-1 (West 1999).
392. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-5 (West 1999).
2005]
199
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LAW REVIEW
names certified to the Secretary of State must be filed and accompanied by a
petition containing a list of signatures and addresses of voters totaling at least
1% of the total number of votes cast at the last preceding general election for
the President of the United states.393
New York: Petitions for any office to be filled by the voters of the entire
State of New York must be signed by at least 15,000 or 5%, whichever is
less, of the then active enrolled voters of the party in the state.394 Not less
than 100 or 5%, whichever is less, of those enrolled voters must reside in
each of one half of the congressional districts of the state.395 If there are
more candidates designated for nomination by a party for an office to be
filled by the voters of the entire state than there are vacancies, the nomina-
tion(s) of the party must be made at the primary election at which other can-
didates for public office are nominated and the candidate(s) receiving the
most votes will become the nominees of the party.
396
North Carolina: Any person seeking endorsement by the national political
party for the office of President can file petitions with the State Board of
Elections that are signed by 10,000 persons who are registered and qualified
voters in North Carolina and are affiliated with the same political party as the
candidate for whom the petitions are filed.397
North Dakota: The names of all candidates of each political party or prin-
ciple or no-party designation, who are shown to have been nominated for the
several offices in accordance with the certificates of nomination filed in the
Secretary of State's office, must be placed by the secretary of state on the
official ballot to be voted for at the next general election.398 Candidates can
be nominated by petition; however, each certificate of nomination by petition
must meet the specifications set forth in section 16.1-1 1-16. 399 If the nomi-
nation is for the office of President of the United States, there must be at
least 4000 signatures on the petition.4 °°
393. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-8-2(A)-(B), 1-8-3(C) (Michie 1978 & Supp. 2001).
394. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-136(1) (McKinney 1998).
395. Id.
396. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 6-160(1) (McKinney 1998).
397. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-213.5 (2003).
398. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-13-04 (2004).
399. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16.1-11-16, 16.1-12-02 (2004).
400. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-12-02 (2004).
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Ohio: One way in which candidates for the offices of President and Vice
President may have their names printed on the presidential ballot is by hav-
ing certified to the Secretary of State for placement on the presidential ballot
by authorized officials of an intermediate or minor political party that has
held a state or national convention for the purpose of choosing those candi-
dates or simply certified those candidates in accordance with the procedures
authorized by its party rules.4 °1 If the candidacy is to be voted on by electors
throughout the entire state, the nominating petition must be signed by no less
than 5000 qualified electors, yet contain no more than 15,000 signatures.40 2
Oklahoma: The names of candidates for the office of Presidential Elector
pledged to the nominee of a political party not recognized under the laws of
Oklahoma for President of the United States can only be printed on the ballot
by submitting petitions signed by a number of registered voters supporting
the candidacy of the nominee equal to at least 3% of the total votes cast in
the last general election for President and by filing those petitions with the
Secretary of the State Election Board.40 3
Oregon: A minor political party can nominate candidates for public office
only if it follows procedures set forth in its organizational documents. 4  A
nomination certificate made by individual electors must contain signatures of
electors in the electoral district equal to at least 1% of the total votes cast in
the electoral district for which the nomination is intended to be made, for all
candidates for presidential electors at the last general election.40 5
Pennsylvania: Where the nomination is for any office to be filled by the
electors of the state at large, the number of qualified electors signing the
nomination papers must be at least equal to 2% of the largest entire vote cast
for any elected candidate in the state at large at the last preceding election for
which state-wide candidates were voted.406
Rhode Island: Every even year, a state convention for each political party
must be held no later than October 14 of that year.407 In presidential election
years, these conventions must select the party nominees for presidential elec-
401. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3505.10(B)(3) (Anderson Supp. 2003).
402. Olo REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.257(A) (Anderson Supp. 2003).
403. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 10-101.2 (1997).
404. OR. REV. STAT. § 248.009(1) (2003).
405. OR. REV. STAT. § 249.740(1) (2003).
406. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2911 (b) (West 1994).
407. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-12-13 (2003).
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tors and their names will be placed on the ballot for the upcoming election.4 °8
At the state convention, parties are to adopt a platform and handle any other
business that may properly come before the convention.40 9 The nomination
papers of a candidate for the party nomination or an independent candidate
for presidential elector must be signed, in the aggregate, by no less than 1000
voters.41°
South Carolina: Nominations for candidates for the offices to be voted on
in a general or special election may be conducted by political party primary,
political party convention, or petition.411 A candidate's nominating petition
must contain the signatures of at least 5% of the qualified registered electors
of the geographical area of the office for which the candidate runs, as long as
no petition candidate is required to furnish the signatures of more than
10,000 qualified registered electors for any office.412
South Dakota: Any candidate for President or Vice President who is not
nominated by a primary election may be nominated by filing a certificate of
nomination with the Secretary of State.413 The number of signatures required
must equal to at least 1% of the total combined vote cast for Governor at the
last certified gubernatorial election.41 4
Tennessee: Political parties may nominate their candidates for any office,
other than the offices of Governor, United States Senator, members of the
United States House of Representatives, and members of the Tennessee Gen-
eral Assembly, by primary election or any method authorized under the rules
of the party.415 Persons nominated other than by the primary election method
for offices filled by voters of more than one county or for statewide offices
must be immediately certified to the coordinator of elections by the chair of
the nominating body.41 6 The coordinator of elections must then certify those
nominees to the county election commissions in each county in which the
nominees are candidates by the qualifying deadlines.417 Nominating peti-
tions must be signed by the candidate and twenty-five or more registered
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-14-7 (2003).
411. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2004).
412. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2004).
413. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-7-7 (Michie 2004).
414. Id.
415. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-13-203(a) (2003).
416. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-13-203(c) (2003).
417. Id.
[Vol. 29:3:571
202
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/1
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
voters who are eligible to vote for the office for which the candidate is run-
418
ning. Nominating petitions for independent presidential candidates must
be signed by the candidate and twenty-five or more registered voters for each
elector.419 Each independent candidate must note the full number of electors
allocated to the state.420
Texas: In order to have the names of it nominees placed on the general elec-
tion ballot, a political party required to make nominations by convention
must file with the Secretary of State lists of precinct convention participants
which must equal at least 1% of the total number of votes received by all
candidates for governor in the most recent general election.421 To be entitled
to have its nominees for President and Vice President placed on the general
election ballot, a political party must hold a presidential primary election in
Texas if: 1) in the presidential election year, the party is required by Texas
law to nominate its candidates for state and county offices by primary elec-
tion; 2) a presidential primary election is authorized under the national party
rules; and 3) before January 1 of the presidential election year, the national
party has deemed that it will hold a national presidential nominating conven-
tion during the presidential election year.422 To qualify for a position on the
general election ballot, an independent candidate running for President must
apply for a position on the ballot and submit a petition with signatures equal-
ing at least 1% of the total vote received in the state by all candidates for
President in the most recent presidential general election.423
Utah: Registered political parties and candidates for President who are af-
filiated with a registered political party are able to participate in the Western
States Presidential Primary.424 When the nomination is for an office to be
filled by the voters of the entire state, the candidate must submit the nomina-
tion petition to the county clerk for certification when the petition has been
completed by at least 1000 registered voters living in the state.425
Vermont: A minor political party may have its candidate's name printed on
the general election ballot for any office for which major political parties
418. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-101(4)(b)(1) (2003 & Supp. 2004).
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 181.005(a) (Vernon 2003).
422. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 191.001 (Vernon 2003).
423. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 192.032(a), (d) (Vernon 2003).
424. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-802(2) (1953 & Supp. 2003).
425. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-502(2)(a)(i) (1953 & Supp. 2003).
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nominate candidates by primary or for the offices of President and Vice
President of the United States.426 To constitute a valid nomination for Presi-
dential and Vice Presidential offices, a statement of nomination must contain
the signatures of at least 1000 voters qualified to vote in an election.427
Virginia: A group of qualified voters, not constituting a political party un-
der Virginia election law, may have the names of electors selected by the
group printed on the official ballot for the election of electors for President
and Vice President by filing a petition with the State Board that is signed by
at least 10,000 qualified voters and at least 400 qualified voters from each
congressional district.42 8
Washington: A minor political party may hold more than one convention
but may not nominate more than one candidate for any one partisan public
office or position.429 For the purpose of nominating candidates for the of-
fices of President and Vice President, a minor political party or independent
candidate holding multiple conventions may add together the number of sig-
natures supporting the candidate from each convention in order to obtain the
number required by section 29A.20.141.430 In order to nominate candidates
for the offices of President and Vice President, a nominating convention
must obtain and submit to the filing officer the signatures of at least 1000
registered voters from the state.431
West Virginia: Any political party which polled less than 10% of the total
vote cast only for Governor at the immediately preceding general election
may nominate candidates by party conventions, as long as the nominations
are made and the certificates filed within the time and manner proscribed by
section 3-5-23 or section 3-5-24.432 Groups of citizens not nominating by
primary or convention may nominate by petition, and the number of signa-
tures must equal at least 2% of the entire vote cast at the last preceding gen-
eral election for any statewide, congressional, or presidential candidate, but
in no event may the number be less than twenty-five.433
426. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2381(a)(2) (2002).
427. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2402(b)(1) (2002).
428. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-543 (Michie 1950 & Supp. 2003); see also VA. CODE ANN. §
24.2-101 (Michie 1950 & Supp. 2003) (defining "political party").
429. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.20.121(4) (Supp. 2005).
430. Id.
431. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29A.20.141(2) (Supp. 2005).
432. W. VA. CODE § 3-5-22 (2002); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-5-23, 24 (2002).
433. W. VA. CODE § 3-5-23(c) (2002).
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Wisconsin: In the case of candidates for the offices of President and Vice
President, the nomination papers must contain both candidates' names, the
office for which each candidate is nominated, each candidate's residence and
post-office address, and the party or principles they represent in five words
or less.434 The number of required signatures on nomination papers for inde-
pendent candidates running for statewide offices must equal at least 2000 but
no more than 4000 electors' signatures.435 For independent presidential elec-
tors intending to vote for the same candidates for President and Vice Presi-
dent, the number of required signatures must equal at least 2000 but no more
than 4000 electors' signatures.436
Wyoming: The only method in which minor political parties may nominate
candidates to be placed on the general election ballot is by party conven-
tion.437 A minor political party may never nominate by the primary election
process.438 A petition must be signed by those registered electors in the leg-
islative district or other political subdivision in which the petitioner will be a
candidate who are able to vote for the candidate.439 The petition must in-
clude signatures equaling at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for
representative in Congress in the last general election for the political subdi-
vision or legislative district for which the petition is filed.440
District of Columbia: A political party which does not qualify under sub-
section (d) of this section, 1-1001.08, may have its candidates for President
and Vice President printed on the general election ballot, so long as a petition
nominating the candidates for presidential electors is signed by at least 1% of
registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia as of July 1 of the
year in which the election is to be and is presented to the Board on or before
the third Tuesday in August preceding the day of the presidential election.44'
434. WIs. STAT. § 8.20(2)(c) (2004).
435. WIS. STAT. §§ 8.15(6), 8.20(4) (2004).
436. WIS. STAT. § 8.20(4) (2004).
437. W'YO. STAT. ANN. § 22-4-303 (Michie 2003).
438. Id.
439. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-304 (Michie 2003).
440. Id.
441. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1001.08(f) (2001); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1001.08(d)
(2001).
2005]
205
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS: A
RETURN TO "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL?"
DAVID J. D'AGATA*
I. IN TRODUCTION .............................................................................. 635
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS.. 636
A . External Forces .......................................................................... 636
B . Internal F orces ........................................................................... 639
C. The Debate: Proponents and Opponents .................................. 640
III. THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF THE TYPICAL ALTERNATIVE
EDUCATION PROGRAM ................................................................... 643
IV. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE ................................................................ 645
A. Rights to an Education Under the Federal Constitution ............ 645
B. Student Rights to an Education Under Various State
C onstitutions .............................................................................. 653
C. The Particularized Rights of Exceptional Students Under
F ederal Law ............................................................................... 655
V. REDUCING LEGAL EXPOSURE AND ADHERING TO THE
BRO WN M ORAL IMPERATIVE .......................................................... 659
I. INTRODUCTION
In Brown v. Board of Education,' the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place."2 While some perceive alternative education programs
("AEPs") as the last hope for "at risk" students, others contend that such
programs merely function as "dumping grounds" reserved for disruptive,
underprivileged, minority students. Reflecting on the Brown decision,
school officials should not only recognize the legal exposure arising from
poorly-administered exclusionary programs that have the effect of creating
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Gary R. Jones, United States District Court, Middle
District of Florida; Adjunct Professor of Education Law, Barry University; J.D., 2003, Uni-
versity of Miami School of Law; Ph.D., 2002, Barry University; M.S. Edu., 1997, Barry Uni-
versity; B.A., 1995, Barry University. I dedicate this article to Amy D. Ronner, Professor of
Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, who has helped me and countless others form,
reach, and exceed their goals in scholarship and professional practice. I am also grateful to
my wife, Sherri D'Agata, who, as always, is my source of inspiration.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 495.
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an underclass, but such officials should also evaluate their compliance with
the moral imperative that the Brown Court articulated some fifty years ago.
Part II of this article examines the various forces driving the develop-
ment and implementation of AEPs in our public school districts. Part III
then describes the form and function of the typical AEP. This part discusses
common transfer schemes and also provides a snapshot of AEP student en-
rollment around the nation. Part IV considers various legal issues arising
from the implementation of AEPs in our school districts. This part offers the
reader an array of case law dealing with one's rights to an education, and
also outlines prospective legal challenges that may emerge with the growth
of AEPs. Finally, Part V examines the overall justification of AEPs against
the backdrop of the Brown decision. This section identifies components that
comprise an educational program that is both legally and educationally le-
gitimate under Brown, and also considers alternatives to AEPs that might
more closely approximate the vision of the Brown Court.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS
The creation and development of AEPs across the country can be attrib-
uted to a number of external and internal motivating forces. Outside our
school systems, the media has aided the development of AEPs by depicting
our public schools as madhouses of chaos and violence. Political external
forces have also contributed to the development of AEPs by the advancement
of legislation and funding schemes which require schools to take stem disci-
plinary measures against students who are characterized as violent and dis-
ruptive. Inside our school systems, administrators, teachers, and parents
have also encouraged the development of AEPs. Although their motivations
may be as numerous as they are diverse, these groups purport that AEPs not
only better serve the needs of disruptive students, but they also advance the
interests of traditional school teachers who want to teach, and traditional
school children who want to learn.
A. External Forces
Scholars have long recognized that fear of school violence has played a
prominent role in the proliferation of AEPs across the country.3 It is gener-
3. See Jonathan Wren, "Alternative Schools for Disruptive Youths"--A Cure for What
Ails School Districts Plagued by Violence?, 2 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 307, 309-10 (1995);
Augustina H. Reyes, Alternative Education: The Criminalization of Student Behavior, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 539, 543 (2001); Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an
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ally accepted that public schools are no longer considered places of safety
and stability.4 Doubtlessly, this bleak outlook has been shaped by the me-
dia's fixation on the apparently omnipresent specter of violence and chaos in
our schools.
The media portrays public school classrooms as noisy and chaotic
places in which students and teachers are subject to a culture of intense fear
and intimidation.5 According to some journalists, teachers are not even re-
motely interested in the welfare of their students, and chaos reigns supreme
in their classrooms. 6 The New York Times recently reported that Mayor Mi-
chael Bloomberg planned to dispatch a task force of 150 police officers to 12
of New York City's most violent high schools and middle schools to curb
violence.7 Joining suit, the Boston Herald also recently informed its readers
that the number of students implicated in school weapons or assault crimes
has soared exponentially in Massachusetts from 2000 through 2003.8 Be-
yond its exposure of the egregious levels of violence present in school halls
across America, the media has also suggested that school authorities rou-
tinely underreport violent incidents that occur on school grounds.9
Statistical findings lend support to the media's depiction of pervasive
violence in our schools. In recent years, the United States Department of
Justice reported that an estimated nine percent of students have experienced
one or more violent crimes while attending school.'0 More chillingly, the
National Education Association recently found that 100,000 students across
the country bring guns to school every day and another 2000 students are
attacked each hour of the school day."'
The general public has heard the media's repeated messages of school
violence loud and clear-and that message has also reached the ears of the
Underclass, or How the War on Drugs Became a War on Education, 6 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 61 (2002).
4. Wren, supra note 3, at 309-10.
5. Bob Herbert, Failing Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2003, at A23, 2003 WLNR
5654908.
6. See id.
7. Elissa Gootman, Police to Guard 12 City Schools Cited as Violent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
6, 2004, at A1, 2004 WLNR 5598486.
8. Kevin Rothstein, Ed Records: School Weapons, Assault Crimes On the Rise, BOSTON
HERALD, Aug. 9, 2003, at 10, 2003 WLNR 647920.
9. Sam Dillon, School Violence Data Under a Cloud in Houston, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2003, at Al, 2003 WLNR 5683140. The New York Times recently reported that the Houston
Independent School District reported 761 assaults in its annual disciplinary summaries sent to
Austin whereas its own police, who patrol the schools, reported 3,091 assaults during the same
time period. Id.
10. Wren, supra note 3, at 310.
11. Id.
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country's judiciary. Indeed, courts have explicitly acknowledged the depic-
tion of chaos in our schools. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
noted, "[t]oday it is generally recognized that students are being deprived of
their education by lack of discipline in the schools. Not only does disorder
interfere with learning school studies, it also defeats the charge to 'inculcate
the habits and manners of civility.""'
Political and economic forces have also aided the proliferation of AEPs
across the country. To combat school violence, politicians who have adopted
a "tough on crime" political posture have sought to bar violent students from
schools altogether." Perhaps the most well known legislation resulting from
that camp's activist position is the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994.14 Under
the Act, the United States Department of Education may cease funding to
states that do not adopt a policy requiring one-year expulsions of students
caught with guns at schools. 5
Such politicians have found great appeal in AEPs, and for good reason.
"Tough on crime" political figures that wish to avoid attacks from critics of
zero tolerance exclusionary measures have found a comfortable middle
ground in supporting the advancement of AEPs. 6 Lending their support to
AEPs, these figures are seen as responding to those constituencies who are
calling for an end to school chaos while avoiding critics' claims that tradi-
tional exclusionary tactics are short-sighted and irresponsible. 7
There are also economic factors that compel the development of AEPs.
As explained more thoroughly below, most AEPs serve students who are
considered "at risk" of dropping out of school. Roughly one million students
drop out of school each year.'8 "Dropping out of high school . . . is associ-
ated with a greater need for such expensive social services as public assis-
tance and unemployment assistance."' 9 These societal costs grow exponen-
12. Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26-27 (5th Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted).
13. Wren, supra note 3, at 312-13.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (1994) (repealed 2002, current version at 20 U.S.C.A § 7151 (West
Supp. 2003)); Wren, supra note 3, at 313.
15. Roni R. Reed, Education and the State Constitutions: Alternatives for Suspended
and Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 582, 604-05 (1996); Rene Sanchez, Expulsions
Becoming Popular Weapon in U.S. Schools, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1995, at Al, 1995 WL
2074258; Kenneth J. Cooper, President Directs Schools to Bar Students with Guns; Law
Threatens Elimination of Federal Funds, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1994, at A8, 1994 WL
2447095.
16. Wren, supra note 3, at 347-48.
17. Id.
18. Reed, supra note 15, at 605.
19. id. at 606.
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tially when taking into consideration the foregone income of dropouts. 2° One
study estimated that "the foregone income of dropouts from the class of 1981
amounted to $228 billion and that the foregone government revenues totalled
[sic] $68 billion.' Indeed, it has been estimated that "for every dollar spent
on 'early intervention and prevention ... $4.74 [can be saved] in costs of
remedial education, welfare, and crime."' 22
B. Internal Forces
AEPs have also been promoted by groups of teachers and school-site
administrators. Teachers have protested that they spend the majority of their
time on small groups of students who are "conduct-disordered. 23  Such
teachers apparently maintain that excluding disruptive students from the tra-
ditional classroom will allow them to adequately teach the remainder of stu-
dents in their classrooms who are willing to learn and cooperate.24 It has also
been reported that teachers who are outright "unable to deal with disruptive
students" have also encouraged the development of AEPs, because the pro-
grams themselves allow those teachers to avoid behaviorally troubled stu-
dents altogether.25
School administrators also find AEPs appealing, if not solely for rea-
sons related to school finance.26 Depending on the time of year that a student
is expelled, a school may sacrifice the financing that such a student would
generate if the school could report the student as enrolled. 7 If the school
district offered an AEP, the amount of funding an excluded student generated
at the transferor school may still be available to that school even after the
student is transferred to the AEP.28 Further, removing potentially low-
performing students from campus presents an opportunity for administrators
to boost their school's performance ratings, which, in turn, could lead to cash
rewards for administrators in certain school systems.2
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Wren, supra note 3, at 346.
24. See id. at 346-47.
25. Id. at 346.
26. See id.
27. See Dillon, supra note 9.
28. See Reyes, supra note 3, at 548.
29. Id. at 546.
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C. The Debate.: Proponents and Opponents
Proponents of AEPs point to several additional reasons to advance such
programs. First, they maintain that AEPs increase a student's belief in his or
her academic ability while decreasing their disruptive behavior.30 Such ad-
vocates suggest that unruly students will perform better in alternative schools
because they offer individualized curricula and because the students are
given the opportunity to be among similarly-situated youth, encouraging
them "to reflect upon their lives and consider their actions, resulting in
heightened self-esteem and eventually better performance."'"
Some supporters suggest that AEPs present a "less harmful way" of re-
ducing the tension between the state's interest in maintaining discipline and
the student's interest in receiving an adequate public education.32 Further-
more, AEPs are seen as the most reasonable solution to disruptive behavior
because they "save" disruptive minority students from being condemned to a
life without education by total exclusion.33 These advocates tout alternative
education as a form of education intervention that "would break the cycle of
violence that drives these youth, before they commit criminal acts. 34 More-
over, this camp maintains that failing to offer such programs actually con-
tributes to problems of drug abuse, crime, and increased utilization of public
assistance.35
Critics view AEPs as "dumping grounds" reserved for problematic and
mostly minority students. 36 Many contend that "alternative schools are noth-
ing more than a convenient place to warehouse students the conventional
system is unprepared to handle."37 Instead of helping these troubled stu-
dents, the traditional schools simply abandon them by placing these students
in exclusionary programs that offer virtually no academic content.38
Opponents making such charges point to programs like those adminis-
tered under Texas law, where "disciplinary" AEPs are administered by
county juvenile board officials who lack the instructional expertise to run a
successful academic program.39 The critics' fears are well taken, considering
30. Reed, supra note 15, at 587.
31. Wren, supra note 3, at 347.
32. Id. at 341.
33. Reed, supra note 15, at 609.
34. Wren, supra note 3, at 347.
35. See Reed, supra note 15, at 609.
36. Wren, supra note 3, at 349.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Steve Bickerstaff et al., Preserving the Opportunity for Education: Texas' Alter-
native Education Programs for Disruptive Youth, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 18-19 (1997).
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that under Texas law, although the academic mission of "Juvenile Justice
Alternative Education Programs" is to enable students to perform at grade
level, the programs are not required to provide courses necessary to fulfill a
student's high school graduation requirements.4"
Beyond the central criticism that AEPs offer virtually no academic con-
tent, the programs have been attacked for their punitive methodologies. Ex-
perts in the field of alternative education have stated that alternative schools
"are like soft jails, and that is not the most productive way to deal with hu-
man beings. It's a way of draining off the problem from the system rather
than changing the ... system."" That camp contends that although AEPs
may have been originally created to meet the needs of students that were not
being met by traditional schools, the programs "have started to look less like
educational alternatives for students and more like discipline alternatives for
schools. A student now attends an alternative school because she is 'bad,'
not because the new school will provide her with an educational alterna-
tive. ' 2 Such schools tend to "look less like schools and more like juvenile
detention centers., 43 Opponents argue that prison-like schools "blur the line
between education and punishment for students"' to the extent that some
accuse our traditional schools of the "criminalization" of low student
achievement.45
Even worse, school officials have been accused of using the threat of
AEP placement to coerce students who perform inadequately or who engage
in inappropriate behavior to "straighten up."' 46 That threat can be particularly
ominous, considering the fact that students in some alternative schools are
subject to levels of violence which are dramatically higher than those found
in traditional schools. 47 For example, alternative schools in one of Florida's
largest school districts routinely report "ten times more violent offenses-
including assault, battery, robbery, and weapons possession-per person than
do their conventional counterparts.
48
Finally, critics of AEPs find that they present a new form of segrega-
tion, generally separating Latinos and African Americans from the rest of the
40. Id. at 18 & n.92.
41. Wren, supra note 3, at 349-50 (quoting Jessica Portner, A New Breed of School for
Troubled Youths, 13 EDUC. WEEK, June 8, 1994, at 30).
42. Jessica Falk, Overcoming a Lawyer's Dogma: Examining Due Process for the "Dis-
ruptive Student," 36 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 457, 469 (2003).
43. Id. at 470.
44. Id.
45. See Reyes, supra note 3, at 540, 555-56.
46. Falk, supra note 42, at 469-70.
47. Wren, supra note 3, at 351.
48. Id.
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student population.49 Indeed, some opponents maintain that alternative
schools are paramount to segregated schools.5" Disparate enrollment trends
among poor and minority groups in exclusionary programs throughout the
country help to substantiate these claims.51
While Blacks comprise 21.4% of the students enrolled in public schools
across America, they comprise 38% of those suspended on an annual basis.52
"Black high school students are suspended from school at a rate of three
times that of white students., 53 Courts that have observed this disparity have
called it a form of "institutional racism.,
54
Research on student discipline demonstrates that minority students re-
ceive a disproportionate measure of discipline for their misbehavior in
schools.5 "When minority and non-minority students engage in an identical
discipline infraction, minority students receive harsher punishments by
school officials [than do their white counterparts]."56 This might explain
why underprivileged black students are disproportionately represented in
AEPs across the country. In Texas, for example, data for one school district
recently revealed that while 28% of its student enrollment was black, 43% of
those diverted into AEPs were black.
57
Some studies suggest that the racially disparate enrollment trends can be
attributed to a lack of classroom management skills among inexperienced
teachers.58 For example, an analysis of case study data covering elementary
school disciplinary referrals in Texas revealed that over 80% of the referrals
came from inexperienced teachers who lacked the skills necessary to manage
diverse student bodies.59 One school in the case study showed that "75% of
the discipline referrals were for African American males on a campus with a
less than 20% African American male student population."6
There is some criticism that making AEPs available actually exacer-
bates the problems related to school violence and mismanaged classrooms.
Some suggest that exclusionary tactics present "band aid" solutions that fail
to treat the underlying problems that cause students to act out in the first
49. Reyes, supra note 3, at 539.
50. See Wren, supra note 3, at 353.
51. See Reyes, supra note 3, at 548.
52. Reed, supra note 15, at 608.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 608-09.
55. Reyes, supra note 3, at 548.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 549.
58. Id. at 547.
59. Id.
60. Reyes, supra note 3, at 547.
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place.6 Moreover, the National School Boards Association found that ex-
clusionary practices, in general, actually reward teachers for avoiding class-
room responsibilities. 62 Further, the Association warned "removing trouble-
makers ... often harden[s] delinquent behavior patterns, alienate[s] troubled
youths from the schools, and foster[s] distrust.
'63
III. THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF THE TYPICAL ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION
PROGRAM
AEPs typically combine a personalized curriculum and smaller class
size with the stringent restrictions and social controls found in correctional
institutions. Many have no grades and no homework requirements.6' They
may offer attendance incentives and self-paced schedules.65 In addition,
AEPs frequently focus on conflict resolution and behavior modification
courses, and often offer outreach services for students' families.66 In most
school systems, the overt goal is to return the student to the traditional school
setting after being placed temporarily in an AEP.67
School district policies governing student placement in an AEP vary.
Some school districts will place a student in a disciplinary AEP for horse-
play, copying another student's work, inappropriate displays of affection, or
loitering in unauthorized areas.68 Others, however, resort to AEP placement
for students who commit more serious legal and school policy violations.
Although there is some variation across school districts with regard to
placement procedures, the policies and procedures adopted by public schools
throughout North Carolina are relatively common. The State's POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES FOR ALTERNATIVE LEARNING PROGRAMS AND SCHOOLS
manual 69 provides a comprehensive set of procedures used to place a student
in an AEP.
The first step in the process is labeling a student "at risk." Exactly what
the term means in its technical sense may vary from one school system to the
61. See Falk, supra note 42, at 469; Wren, supra note 3, at 349.
62. Wren, supra note 3, at 332.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 344.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 345.
67. Wren, supra note 3, at 344.
68. Reyes, supra note 3, at 543-44.
69. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
FOR ALTERNATIVE LEARNING PROGRAMS AND SCHOOLS GRADES K-12 (2003), http://www.
ncpublicschools.org/docs/schoolimprovement/altemative/learning/alpmanual.pdf [hereinafter
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES].
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next. North Carolina Public Schools describe an "at risk" student as "a
young person who, because of a wide range of individual, personal, financial,
familial, social, behavior or academic circumstances, may experience school
failure or other unwanted outcomes unless intervention occurs to reduce the
risk factors."7
Under North Carolina's transfer scheme, circumstances which place
students at risk include:
a. not meeting state/local/proficiency standards,
b. grade retention,
c. unidentified or inadequately addressed learning needs,
d. alienation from school,
e. unchallenging curricula and/or instruction,
f. tardiness and/or poor school attendance,
g. negative peer influence,
h. unmanageable behavior,
i. substance abuse and other health risk behaviors,
j. abuse and neglect,
k. inadequate parental, family, community and/or school support,
1. limited English proficiency or
m. other risk factors.7 1
According to the Policies and Procedures manual, a student transferred
as a result of poor academic performance and/or disruptive conduct is gener-
ally referred by parent, teacher, and/or school administrator to a student as-
sistance team or child study team.7 ' This team is comprised of at least one
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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school or "area" administrator, curriculum specialist, teacher, school psy-
chologist, and hopefully, the parents.73
The student assistance team reviews evidentiary information supporting
transfer, documents the individuals involved in the decision, documents pa-
rental participation, or lack thereof, develops an action plan, reviews pro-
gress, and recommends whether or not to transfer a student.74 If a student is
transferred, this body is also typically responsible for facilitating successful
transition into and, hopefully, out of the alternative school."
North Carolina also requires the student assistance team to submit a re-
port to a "multi-disciplinary team," which makes a final placement deci-
sion. 76 The multi-disciplinary team is considered to be "necessary to keep
the decision-making process open, and it increases objectivity [and] fair-
ness."
77
When a student subject to transfer is also disabled (and therefore has an
individual education plan ["IEP"]), there are further procedures. Such pro-
cedures center on the continuity and execution of the IEP from one school to
the next, and remain focused on determining whether the transferee alterna-
tive school provides the same educational services for the student.78
IV. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
School administrators and attorneys should beware the many legal pit-
falls associated with the decision to transfer a student into an AEP. This part
views the legal landscape of AEP administration through the lenses of fed-
eral and state law in order to expose those pitfalls. In light of relevant case
law, the first section of this part considers the impact of an AEP transfer on
the rights of the traditional K-12 student under federal law and under state
law. The second section then turns to the impact of an AEP transfer on the
more particularized rights of the exceptional K- 12 student.
A. Rights to an Education Under the Federal Constitution
Federal courts have generally found that a student does not have a con-
stitutional right to particular incidents of education such as participation in
73. Id.
74. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 69, at 10-11.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 12.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 13.
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interscholastic activities, 79 enrollment in advanced placement classes,80 or
attending the school of their choice.8 ' However, as discussed in more detail
below, there may be legal claims cognizable under federal law that can arise
from one's placement into an AEP.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,82 the United
States Supreme Court held that there is no fundamental right to an education
under the United States Constitution.8 3 The Rodriguez holding was reaf-
firmed, although somewhat qualified, by Plyler v. Doe, 4 where the Court
again stated that education is not a fundamental right-but there could be no
rational basis for the complete denial of education unless that deprivation
"furthers some substantial goal of the State."8 5 Despite its refusal to treat
education as a fundamental right, in Goss v. Lopez,86 the United States Su-
preme Court determined that states are constrained to recognize a student's
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest that is pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.87 It also held
that students have a reputation liberty interest in not being excluded from
school for good cause.8 In light of these constitutional constraints, the Court
determined that a suspension of ten days or less only requires notice, an ex-
planation of the evidence against the student, and an opportunity for him to
be heard. 9
Of course, in its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the
Supreme Court also held that where a state chooses to provide its citizens
with a public education, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that such education be provided equally to all citizens,
and that segregation on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection
Clause.9°
In several of the cases reviewed below, the respective plaintiffs have
challenged school officials' AEP transfer decisions as a violation of their
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. As a point of clarification, it is important at this juncture to distin-
79. See Walsh v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1980).
80. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1996).
81. See Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 668-70 (10th Cir. 1981).
82. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
83. See id. at 35.
84. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
85. See id. at 223-24.
86. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
87. Id. at 576.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 582.
90. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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guish between the substantive and procedural components of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause before delving into the case law.
The procedural due process challenges in all of the cases below con-
sider the overall fairness of the exclusionary procedures underlying an AEP
transfer, and whether those procedures were indeed implemented. In
Mathews v. Eldridge,91 the Supreme Court articulated factors to take into
consideration when determining how much process is due when the govern-
ment deprives someone of disability insurance.92 The procedures sought in
school-related due process claims are not significantly different.93 Courts
will consider: 1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official
action;" 2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the] interest ... and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;" and
3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement[s] would entail. 94
As demonstrated by the case law below, under Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process analysis, courts generally find no violation if the
school officials gave the subject student notice and a right to be heard before
AEP transfer. The analytical framework applied to substantive due process
challenges is more involved and complex. Perhaps the best and most concise
explanation of this framework was offered by Justice Stevens in Daniels v.
Williams,95 a case resolved by the Court in 1986. In Daniels, Justice Stevens
explained that the Fourteenth Amendment "contains a substantive compo-
nent, sometimes referred to as 'substantive due process,' which bars certain
arbitrary government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them.'
96
Because there is no explicit or fundamental constitutional right to an
education under the United States Constitution, claims for deprivation of
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are subject
only to "rational basis" scrutiny.97 Under the rational basis standard of re-
view, a court need only determine if the school official's action was ration-
ally related to the promotion of a legitimate state interest.98 If so, there is no
91. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
92. Id. at 323, 334-35.
93. See Falk, supra note 42, at 461-62.
94. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
95. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
96. Id. at 337.
97. Craig v. Selma City Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 585, 594 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
98. Id. at 595.
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violation of a student's substantive due process rights.99 Generally speaking,
a violation only arises where the school's academic decision is "such a sub-
stantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judg-
ment." 100
The cases below-all of which involve the transfer of traditional stu-
dents into AEPs-have tested the contours of the Supreme Court's Four-
teenth Amendment analytical framework as applied to a student's rights to a
public education. In all of the cases, it is abundantly clear that rather than
appreciating the "opportunity" to attend an alternative program, the subject
plaintiffs viewed the transfer into an AEP as a harsh, exclusionary, and dis-
ciplinary measure analogous to an expulsion.'0 '
In Zamora v. Pomeroy, the mother of a high school student brought ac-
tion against a school board superintendent under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
that her son's civil rights were violated when he was transferred to an alter-
native school after contraband was found in his locker.0 2 Notably, the super-
intendent in that case characterized the alternative school as one which en-
rolled potential drop-outs and offered easier courses than were offered to the
average student in the traditional school. 10 3 Plaintiff claimed that he was not
given fair notice and an opportunity to be heard before being transferred to a
school that lacked the academic standing of his original school."
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant
school superintendent and plaintiff appealed. 0 5 The Tenth Circuit affirmed,
explaining that absent a showing that the alternative school assignment was
not "substantially prejudicial," plaintiff lacked standing. 0 6 The court came
to this conclusion only after explicitly acknowledging that the student was
readmitted to and graduated from his old high school.'07 As to the procedural
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)).
101. Wren, supra note 3, at 354.
102. 639 F.2d 662, 663 (10th Cir. 1981).
103. Id. at 665.
104. See id. at 664.
105. Id. at 667.
106. Id. at 670. Specifically, the court stated:
[i]nasmuch as the sanctions imposed were far less severe than expulsion, and in view of the
fact that his offense was serious, it cannot be said that they evidence an injury within the
framework of the constitution, one which is capable of supporting jurisdiction of this court.
The Zamoras' allegations that the ESC was so inferior to amount to an expulsion from the edu-
cational system are not bome out by the record, and in the absence of a clear showing that the
ESC assignment was substantially prejudicial, the Zamoras lack the requisite standing to attack
the appellees' actions on that ground.
Zamora, 639 F.2d at 670.
107. Id. at 669.
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due process issue, it also acknowledged that he was given five occasions to
explain and defend himself prior to the transfer.'08
Interestingly, without inquiring into the nature of the alternative school
or the services rendered there, the court expressly concluded that the "sanc-
tion" of transfer was less severe than an expulsion, which, by implication,
would be more deserving of heightened procedural safeguards.0 9
Similarly, in Buchanan v. City of Bolivar,"0 a junior high school stu-
dent's mother brought suit against her son's school principal under § 1983,
claiming that the principal's decision to transfer her son to an alternative
school as a form of discipline deprived him of his rights to procedural due
process and equal protection."' She further alleged that the principal and
two police officers discriminated against her son on the basis of his race." 2
In that case, a junior high school student threw a rock that caused dam-
age to an assistant principal's car." 3 The assistant principal witnessed the
destructive behavior first-hand and contacted police, who took the student
into their custody." 4 The police released custody of the student to his mother
four hours later, and the student was not prosecuted."5 However, the assis-
tant principal determined that discipline was appropriate and allowed the
mother and her son "to choose between serving a ten day at-home suspension
or attending an alternative school for ten days. Plaintiff opted [for the] alter-
native school and signed an agreement indicating her consent to her son's
attendance at alternative school.""' 6
Although the district court granted summary judgment in favor of de-
fendant, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case. 117 The court ac-
knowledged that students facing suspension from school possess property
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 8 Ap-
plying the Goss rule to the facts, the Sixth Circuit found no evidence in the
record as to what type of conversations took place between plaintiff, her son,
and the school officials." 9 Furthermore, the court found neither evidence
that the school officials informed plaintiff of the reasons behind their deci-
108. Id. at 668.
109. Id. at 670.
110. 99 F.3d 1352 (6th Cir. 1996).
111. Id. at 1355, 1358-60.
112. Id. at 1355, 1360.
113. Id. at 1354.
114. Id. at 1354-55.
115. Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1355.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1360.
118. Id. at 1359.
119. Id.
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sion to transfer the student nor evidence showing that they gave him an op-
portunity to present his side of the story. 2  The Sixth Circuit remanded for
the district court to develop the record. 1
21
As to plaintiffs equal protection and race discrimination claims, the
circuit court affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of defendants. 22 The
court explained that while the assistant principal filed an affidavit stating that
he treated plaintiffs son no differently than any other student, plaintiff did
not carry her burden of providing evidence to the contrary to survive sum-
mary judgment. 123 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiffs race
discrimination claims for the same reasons. 1
24
In Nevares v. San Marcos Consolidated Independent School District,
125
the father of a fifteen-year-old high school student brought an action against
the school district challenging his son's transfer to an alternative education
program based on the fact that the student was detained by police for conduct
punishable as a felony (again, throwing rocks at a car). 126 Weeks after the
incident, the school received a police report of the detention and the assistant
principal pulled the subject student from class. 127 The student was reassigned
to an alternative school for "students whose violations . . . fall short of trig-
gering suspension or expulsion, but for reasons of safety and order must be
removed from the regular classroom."'2 8
The district court held that the statute that permitted such a transfer
without prior hearing was unconstitutional, and the school district ap-
pealed. 29 The Fifth Circuit held that the student lacked standing to challenge
the statute or seek injunctive relief absent deprivation of a federally protected
property or liberty interest. 30 Specifically, like the Tenth Circuit in Zamora,
the Fifth Circuit found no due process violation because "no protected prop-
erty interest [was] implicated in a school's denial to offer a student a particu-
lar curriculum."131
120. Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1359.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1360.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 111 F.3d 25 (5th Cir. 1997).
126. See id. at 26.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Nevares, 111 F.3dat 26.
131. Id. at 27.
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In C.B. v. Driscoll,32 two students brought § 1983 actions against the
school board after it took exclusionary disciplinary measures against them.
3
One student, C.B., was suspended for "nine days for the possession of a
'look-alike' illegal substance." '134 After the suspension, the principal trans-
ferred C.B. to an "'alternative school' where C.B. would do work assigned
by [his] regular teachers .... C.B. then withdrew from school and filed [the]
lawsuit. Later, tests revealed the substance not to be marijuana."' 35
C.B. claimed "that his procedural due process rights were violated be-
cause he was suspended without adequate notice or hearing." '136 Affirming
the district court's ruling in favor of defendants on their motion for summary
judgment,137 the Eleventh Circuit stated "once school administrators tell a
student what they heard or saw, ask why they heard or saw it, and allow a
brief response, a student has received all the process that the Fourteenth
Amendment demands."' 38 Finding that C.B. had two opportunities to discuss
his acts, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. 39 The district court
also granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on C.B.'s claim that
his substantive due process rights were violated by the decision to send him
to an alternative school. 140 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding once again. 4' The circuit court stated that executive acts such as the
decision to send C.B. to an alternative school "warrant no substantive due
process protection unless the right infringed is recognized by the Constitu-
tion as 'fundamental,' which is to say that 'our democratic society and its
inherent freedoms would be lost if that right were to be violated.' '1 42 The
court explained that "[b]ecause the right to an education is state-created, that
right can be restricted as long as adequate procedures are followed."'' 4 3 Ac-
cordingly, the court rejected the substantive due process claim.'"
Interestingly, in a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit also expressed doubt
that C.B. had a property interest under Georgia law in attending his tradi-
tional high school instead of attending the alternative school to which he was
132. 82 F.3d 383 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
133. See id. at 385.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 385.
136. Id. at 388.
137. C.B., 82 F.3d at 385.
138. Id. at 386.
139. Id. at 388-89.
140. Id. at 389.
141. Id.
142. C.B., 82 F.3d at 389.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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assigned.'45 In support of this notion, the court cited Doe v. Bagan,4 6 where
the Tenth Circuit suggested that the right to a public education does not en-
compass "a right to choose one's particular school."' 47
In Bagan, a mother brought suit under § 1983 on behalf of her nine-
year-old son against two caseworkers for the Colorado Department of Social
Services and other individuals for actions arising out of an investigation of
John Doe, the son, on suspicion of possible child abuse. 48 After learning of
a possible incident of sexual assault on a five-year-old girl, Bagan, one of the
caseworkers, contacted Doe's school to arrange an interview. 49 He spoke to
Doe alone in the principal's office for approximately ten minutes, and Doe
denied the abuse.' 50 Bagan later discussed the matter with Doe's mother. 5'
Ultimately, for reasons unstated in the opinion, Doe's name was placed on a
state registry as a child abuser. 52 Plaintiffs alleged that Doe subsequently
endured humiliation at the hands of his classmates when they learned of the
suspicion against him.'53 Although Doe's mother attempted to transfer him
to another school, her request was refused because Doe's special education
needs purportedly could not be fully met by the transferee school.
5 4
Plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated Doe's due process rights by
destroying his reputation that ultimately led to his denial of his state-
guaranteed right to an education.'55 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.' 56
Although the court acknowledged that school age children in Colorado
must be given the opportunity to receive a free public education, the court
found it obvious that Doe was not deprived of this right.'57 Rather, the court
determined that Doe "was only denied his request to attend the public school
of his choice. Plaintiffs cite no Colorado authority, and we have found none,
indicating that the right to a public education encompasses a right to choose
one's particular school."' 58
145. Id. at 389 n.5.
146. 41 F.3d 571 (10th Cir. 1994).
147. C.B., 82 F.3d at 389 (quoting Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 576 (10th Cir. 1994)).
148. Bagan, 41 F.3d at 573.
149. Id. at 574.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Bagan, 41 F.3d at 575-76.
154. Id. at 576 n.5.
155. Id. at 575-76.
156. Id. at 577.
157. Id. at 576.
158. Bagan, 41 F.3d at 576.
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Taken together, Driscoll and Bagan suggest that substantive due proc-
ess claims can only succeed where the transferee alternative school is found
to be so bereft of educational opportunity that enrollment in such a program
is paramount to no education at all. One should note, however, that the stu-
dent in Bagan did not claim that his state constitutional rights were violated.
As explained in some detail below, education opportunity is a fundamental
right under certain state constitutions. Therefore, it may be possible to suc-
cessfully state a substantive due process claim for deprivation of a state-
guaranteed right to a public education by transfer into an AEP where the
plaintiff proves that the AEP is paramount to no education at all.
B. Student Rights to an Education Under Various State Constitutions
"Every state constitution has an education clause. The highest courts of
many states have held that their state constitutions' education clauses afford
individuals an enforceable right to education."'' 59 In California and Pennsyl-
vania, education is considered a fundamental right under the state constitu-
tion.16° Florida's constitution provides that "education of children is a fun-
damental value" of the state.16
1
The Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that "[a] child's right to an ade-
quate education is a fundamental one under our Constitution."'' 62 Pennsyl-
vania's highest court declared the same in School District of Wilkinsburg v.
Wilkinsburg Education Ass 'n.163 In Horton v. Meskill,"6 the Supreme Court
of Connecticut stated that "the right to education is so basic and fundamental
that any infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized.' ' 65 The Su-
preme Courts of North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Virginia have also found that
education is a fundamental right under their states' constitutions.
66
It follows that a student's state equal protection 67 and due process
claims arising out of their transfer into an AEP would more likely succeed
where their state recognizes a fundamental or enforceable right to educa-
tion. 68
159. Reed, supra note 15, at 582.
160. Id. at 583.
161. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
162. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
163. 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995).
164. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
165. Id. at 373.
166. Reed, supra note 15, at 598-600.
167. Id. at 596-97. Several state courts have determined that education is a fundamental
right for the purposes of an equal protection analysis under their states' constitutions. Id.
168. Id.at591.
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Where a student challenges a state action that discriminates against him
on the basis of his race, courts will review the state action on a strict scrutiny
basis. 169 Under strict scrutiny review, a court will determine whether the
state action is narrowly tailored to the promotion of a compelling govern-
ment interest. 70 Courts will also apply this standard of review where the
basis of a student's challenge is the complete deprivation of a fundamental
right. 171
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin's decision in Kukor v. Grover, is il-
lustrative as to a state court's treatment of the issue of educational depriva-
tion where education is a fundamental right under the state's constitution. I7
In Kukor, a group of taxpayers and residents sued Wisconsin's Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction and Wisconsin's Department of Revenue, attack-
ing the constitutionality of a state formula of school funding. 73 The plain-
tiffs argued that because the funding formula did not address the greater fi-
nancial needs of poor school districts (such as offering more dropout preven-
tion units), the formula violated the educational uniformity requirement un-
der the state constitution and the equal protection rights of underprivileged
students under Wisconsin's state constitution. 174
Although the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found that the districts with
a high concentration of poverty faced an "overburden" in the area of dropout
prevention programs for high-risk youth, 75 it held that the funding formula
did not unconstitutionally impinge on the state constitution's uniformity re-
quirement. 176
The court also ruled unfavorably to plaintiffs' equal protection
claims. 177 Importantly, the court interpreted plaintiffs' claims as challenging
the funding formula and not as challenging state action depriving students of
educational opportunity. 78 Acknowledging that an "equal opportunity for
education" is a fundamental right under Wisconsin's constitution, the court
found that such a right was not implicated by the challenged spending dispar-
169. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
170. Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 582 n. 13 (Wis. 1989).
171. Id. at 579.
172. See id. at 568-94.
173. Id. at 570.
174. Id. at 573.
175. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 573.
176. Id. at 578.
177. Id. at 579.
178. Id.
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ity. 179 With this characterization of plaintiffs' claim, the court applied a ra-
tional basis review and found the funding formula constitutional.' 80
Kukor suggests that a student challenging a transfer into an AEP may
only successfully state an equal protection claim where the right to education
is a fundamental right under the state constitution and where the student al-
leges a complete deprivation of that right by way of a transfer to the alterna-
tive program.'8 ' Obviously, this is an onerous burden.
C. The Particularized Rights of Exceptional Students Under Federal Law
Students sent to AEPs are often learning disabled. 82 In Texas, for ex-
ample, twenty percent of all students served statewide in 1996-1997 were
characterized as special education or special needs students under federal
law.'83 Accordingly, school administrators should take note of the legal is-
sues particularly pertaining to the transfer of an exceptional student into an
AEP. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides, inter alia, that:
[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination un-
der any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance. 1
8 4
Further, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")185
provides, inter alia, that a state qualifying for federal assistance under the
Act must establish:
[p]rocedures to ensure that testing and evaluation materials and
procedures utilized for the purposes of evaluation and placement
of children with disabilities will be selected and administered so as
not to be racially or culturally discriminatory .... [N]o single pro-
cedure shall be the sole criterion for determining an appropriate
educational program for a child.186
179. Id.
180. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 579.
181. Seeid. at 579-80.
182. Wren, supra note 3, at 352.
183. Bickerstaff, supra note 39, at 38.
184. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
185. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (2000).
186. § 1412(a)(6)(B).
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As a condition for federal financial assistance, IDEA requires states to
ensure a "free appropriate public education" for all disabled students.'87 The
Act establishes a comprehensive system of procedural safeguards for ensur-
ing this right, including the so-called "stay-put" provision, which directs that
a disabled child "shall remain in [his or her] then-current educational place-
ment" pending completion of any review proceedings unless the parents and
state or local educational agencies agree otherwise. 188 This is one of the most
frequently contested safety measures under IDEA.
89
Originally, IDEA was a response by Congress to the growing need to
educate disabled students who were essentially abandoned by public
schools. 9 ' In the congressional studies behind the formulation of the Act,
Congress found that one out of every eight disabled students was excluded
from the public school system altogether.' 9' Congress also found that "many
others were simply 'warehoused' in special classes or were neglectfully
shepherded through the system until they were old enough to drop out."' 192
What is more disturbing is congressional statistics revealed that in 1974, the
states failed to meet the educational needs of eighty-two percent of all chil-
dren with emotional disabilities.' 93
IDEA "confers upon disabled students an enforceable substantive right
to public education in participating [s]tates."' 94 It also assures that, to the
maximum extent possible, states will "mainstream" disabled students, "i.e.
... educate them with children who are not disabled."' 95 Further, the Act
assures that disabled students will be segregated or otherwise removed from
the regular classroom setting "only when the nature or severity of the handi-
cap is such that education in regular classes ... cannot be achieved satisfac-
torily."' 96 Of course, IDEA also requires that an individualized education
program ("IEP") be constructed, reviewed, and, if necessary, revised at least
once a year to ensure that the needs of the disabled student are being met. 197
187. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
188. § 14150).
189. Elizabeth A. Bunch, School Discipline Under the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act: How the Stay-Put Provision Limits Schools in Providing a Safe Learning Envi-
ronment, 27 J. L. & EDUC. 315, 316 (1998).
190. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988).
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 2 (1975)).
193. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975)).
194. Id. at 310.
195. Honig, 484 U.S. at 311.
196. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5), current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2000)).
197. Id.
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IDEA provides procedural safeguards related to placement.198 First, it
grants parents the right to review "all relevant records pertaining to the iden-
tification, evaluation, and educational placement of their child."1 99 Second, it
provides them with prior written notice with respect to changes in place-
ment. oo Third, it gives them an opportunity to present complaints.20' Fi-
nally, it provides them "an opportunity for 'an impartial due process hearing'
with respect to any such complaints. 20 2 At the conclusion of any such hear-
ing, parents and the educational agency may seek administrative review and
then file a civil action.20 3
The landmark case dealing with exclusion of an exceptional student in
light of IDEA was Honig v. Doe.2° In that case, the parents of two emotion-
ally handicapped students challenged the school board's unilateral exclusion
of their children from the traditional classroom for purportedly dangerous
and disruptive conduct stemming from their disabilities. 205 In both instances,
the school, pursuant to the California Education Code, placed the students at
issue on indefinite suspension pending the completion of expulsion proceed-
ings.20 6 The Honig Court found that the code violated the stay-put provision
of the EHA.2°7
Recognizing the school officials' limited rights to suspend students for a
period of ten days or less, the Court intimated that schools are not without
recourse in keeping students out of the school at the conclusion of that pe-
riod.208 Rather, it found nothing in the Act, preventing schools from seeking
to enjoin a dangerous child from attending the school.20 9 In such a case, a
school would have the burden of showing that administrative review would
be futile.20 They would also have to overcome the presumption in favor of
the child's current placement by showing that maintaining the child in such a
placement "is substantially likely to result in injury either to himself or her-
self, or to others. 21'
198. Id.
199. Id. at 312.
200. Honig, 484 U.S. at 312.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
205. Id. at 312-14.
206. Id. at 313 & n.2, 315.
207. See id. at 328 & n.10.
208. Id. at 327-28.
209. Honig, 484 U.S. at 327.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 328.
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Some argue that, as a result of Honig, schools lack the flexibility needed
to adequately deal with disruptive students who happen to be learning dis-
abled.21 2 Indeed, some contend that they lack flexibility with traditional stu-
dents who might allege a disability after being subjected to an exclusionary
213disciplinary measure.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in Hacienda La Puente Unified School Dis-
trict of Los Angeles v. Honig,214 held that the protection afforded by IDEA is
not limited to those children who had been diagnosed with a disability prior
to their misconduct.215 Thus, the holding explicitly allows students to claim
to have a disability under IDEA at any time before or after disciplinary ac-
tion is taken, and thus misuses the stay-put provision to avoid punishment.216
At least one scholar suggests that expelling a child immediately pending the
due process hearing is one way to avoid this "loophole., 217
Randy M v. Texas City lSD218 is also illustrative. There, the mother of a
special education student filed an application for an injunction to prevent the
school district from placing the student into an AEP.2 19 In that case, "Randy,
acting in concert with another male student, ripped the break-away wind
pants off a female student., 22' Because he was disabled, the placement was
abated until an admission review and dismissal committee determined
whether Randy's actions manifested from his disability.22' The committee
concluded that they did not, and decided to transfer Randy to the AEP for the
remainder of the school year.222 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas held in favor of the school district and declined to
223enter an injunction.
Interestingly, as to plaintiffs contention that Randy's misbehavior
might have been due to an unidentified disability, the court determined that
the committee "bent over backwards" to give her an opportunity to gather
and present evidence of an unrecognized disability which may have caused
him to rip off the student's pants. 24 Thus, the case provides a good example
212. Bunch, supra note 189, at 318.
213. Id.
214. 976 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992).
215. Id. at 494.
216. Bunch, supra note 189, at 318.
217. Id. at 320.
218. 93 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
219. Id. at 1310.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Randy M, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1311.
224. Id.
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of how districts may protect themselves from the "loophole" in IDEA by
providing a potential litigant every reasonable opportunity to prove that the
student's misconduct was attributable to an unidentified disability before
sending the child into an AEP.z25
In light of the relevant case law, critics of IDEA argue that it must be
changed to allow schools to remove dangerous and consistently disruptive
students from the regular classroom in order to ensure a safe and productive
learning environment for all students.226
V. REDUCING LEGAL EXPOSURE AND ADHERING TO THE BROWN MORAL
IMPERATIVE
School officials and legal practitioners should seriously evaluate the le-
gal exposure that can arise from a student's transfer into an AEP. Based on
the case law discussed in this article, it appears that students subject to trans-
fer into an AEP may have the ability to set forth claims that are cognizable
under both federal and state law if the conditions are right.
Although the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
education is not a fundamental right, in light of such cases as Goss, Plyler,
and Ewing, there may be reason to apply a heightened standard of scrutiny in
the face of a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process challenge for transfer into
an AEP where a student can show on the record that his transfer into such a
program resulted in the outright deprivation of his educational opportunity.
The Eleventh Circuit hinted at this sentiment in C.B. when it noted in the
face of a substantive due process claim that the state may only restrict educa-
tional opportunity.227
If, indeed, the AEP is shown to be absolutely bereft of any educational
opportunity, it is likely that a federal court would at least find standing for a
substantive due process claim, since an outright deprivation of education
would undoubtedly constitute "a substantial departure from accepted aca-
demic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did
not actually exercise professional judgment., 228
Conversely, it is highly doubtful that a student can successfully chal-
lenge an AEP transfer as a violation of his or her procedural due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment even where there are only slight
procedural protections. As the Eleventh Circuit succinctly stated in C.B.,
"once school administrators tell a student what they heard or saw, ask why
225. See Bunch, supra note 189, at 318.
226. See id. at 320.
227. See C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 389 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
228. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
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they heard or saw it, and allow a brief response, a student has received all the
process that the Fourteenth Amendment demands., 229 Even the most rudi-
mentary procedures underlying a school official's decision to transfer the
student into an AEP would likely pass constitutional muster under a Four-
teenth Amendment procedural due process attack.
Finally, as to cases arising under state law, school officials and legal
practitioners should be particularly aware of their exposure where the state
constitution recognizes education as a fundamental right. In such states, liti-
gants opposing transfer into an AEP will likely achieve strict scrutiny review
if they show that the AEP is completely devoid of academic opportunities. If
the litigant in such a case is able to show on the record that the AEP at hand
is indeed the "dumping ground" described by so many of the critics of AEPs,
a school official's decision to transfer a student into such a program may be
deemed unconstitutional as the transfer would effect the complete depriva-
tion of the student's fundamental right to an education.
Beyond these most basic requirements of the law, however, school offi-
cials should also evaluate their compliance with the moral imperative articu-
lated by the Brown Court more than fifty years ago when considering
whether to implement a program like an AEP.2 30 In Brown, Chief Justice
Warren stated:
[education] is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education.23'
In light of this statement, and in view of the opinion as a whole, it is
abundantly clear the Brown Court understood that schools do more than just
teach academic skills; they also develop the social skills necessary to achieve
in an adult society. As one scholar recently noted:
[s]ociety itself has deep and legitimate interests in social re-
production-the intellectual, moral, and social development of the
present youth who must become society's leaders in all fields of
endeavor .... The collective future of our schools (a majority of
whose students are expected to be nonwhite by 2020) and our so-
ciety (a majority of whose members are expected to be nonwhite
229. C.B., 82 F.3d at 386.
230. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
231. Id.
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by the middle of the 21st century), depends upon educating citi-
zens who will be able to live and work comfortably across racial
lines.
232
In the face of these realities, there is ample evidence which suggests
that our schools systematically deprive the nation's unruly minority students
the very kind of opportunities discussed by the Brown Court by cordoning
them off from the rest of their traditional school counterparts with their
placement into AEPs. Even if the AEPs offer the same academic opportuni-
ties offered by the transferor schools, the only environment to which such
students may "adjust normally" is one of isolation rather than integration.
Since the United States Department of Education first released the in-
famous "Coleman Report" in 1966, scholars have long recognized that a
student's "achievement is strongly related to the educational backgrounds
and aspirations of the other students in the school" and classroom.
2 33
The report concluded, in fact, that the social characteristics of a
school's student body were the single most important school-
related factor in predicting minority student achievement: "Attrib-
utes of other students account for far more variation in the
achievement of minority group children than do any attributes of
school facilities and slightly more than do attributes of staff.
2 34
It follows that the systematic exclusion and isolation of unruly minority
students through placement into AEPs ultimately frustrates Brown's most
basic promise.2 35 Although school officials may contend that the AEPs offer
staff, curricula, and facilities exactly like that of the transferor school (an
argument that still arises long after the "separate but equal doctrine" was
purportedly obliterated by Brown), while easing the work of traditional
school teachers and enhancing the education of those who "want to learn,"
these officials cannot credibly assert that such programs meet the moral im-
perative articulated by the Brown Court.
School officials and legal practitioners should recognize that AEPs will
not, and indeed cannot, meet the dictates of Brown so long as they function
on a philosophical framework contrary to the original mission of traditional
schools. An AEP should not be created to function as a "soft jail" that keeps
232. John Charles Boger, Education's "Perfect Storm"? Racial Resegregation, High
Stakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1375, 1410-11 (2003).
233. Id. at 1415.
234. Id.
235. See Reyes, supra note 3, at 556.
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disruptive or "bad" students away from the mainstream crowd. Rather, if
AEPs are to function at all, they must do so with an eye toward academic and
social equity, not only within the sphere of alternative schools, but also in the
greater sphere of public schools in general.236
To relieve the very need for AEPs school administrators should docu-
ment and track disciplinary referral trends among teachers working at their
schools in order to identify causes precipitating exclusion. Once such causes
are identified, administrators can attack the heart of the problem through any
number of interventions.
As discussed earlier, there is evidence that the disparate representation
of African Americans and Latinos in AEPs is, in part, attributable to poor
class management skills and cultural ignorance exhibited by novice teachers.
Indeed, it appears that culturally ignorant assumptions may work the greatest
harm upon poor and minority student populations. In one study, for exam-
ple, "teachers in middle-class, predominantly white schools viewed student
inattention as an indication that the teacher needed to do more to gain the
student's interest." '237 Conversely, teachers in lower class, predominantly
black schools attributed student inattention to the students' inability to con-
centrate. 238 These findings exemplify the harm arising from false assump-
tions and illustrate the notion that fiction that is perceived as real is real in its
consequences.
In any event, in light of the current state of affairs, the need for mean-
ingful and effective teacher training to improve classroom management and
to enhance cultural awareness is obvious. Such training will undoubtedly go
a long way toward reversing the trend of excluding poor minority students
from the rest of the student population based on their misconduct and will
help to facilitate the type integration envisioned by the Brown Court.
It is this vision that should drive the efforts of school officials to create
and sustain genuine academic and social equity in the nation's schools. It is
this vision that should guide the legal analysis of controversies stemming
from the development and implementation of AEPs across the country. It is
this vision that cannot be forgotten.
236. See Wren, supra note 3, at 353.
237. Reed, supra note 15, at 608.
238. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright owners are given exclusive rights to their original work.'
These rights mean nothing, however, if the copyright owner cannot enforce
them by suing an infringer. Accordingly, Congress has determined that the
owner of exclusive rights has three years in which to bring an action for in-
fringement.2 But what if the copyright owner, aware of the infringement,
remains silent and waits to see how successful the infringer's work is before
bringing his claim? Should the equitable doctrine of laches preclude such a
claim in order to protect a prejudiced defendant, even if ultimately the claim
is brought within the statutory period?
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corpora-
tion,3 has answered in the affirmative, holding that some copyright owners
have less than three years to bring their infringement claim. In Danjaq, the
court, concerned more with the prejudice caused to the defendant than the
rights of the plaintiff, disregarded the applicable three-year statute of limita-
tions established by Congress and instead held that laches is available as a
defense even to a statutorily timely claim.4
The Fourth Circuit, the only other circuit to confront the issue, reached
the opposite result and rejected the idea that laches can be used as a defense
to an infringement claim brought within the statutory period.5 In Lyons
Partnership, the court held that laches was not available because it is an eq-
uitable doctrine that is inapplicable to an action at law, and its use would
violate the doctrine of separation of powers since Congress already has es-
tablished the limitations period.6
The circuit courts' wholesale acceptance or rejection of laches as a de-
fense to timely infringement actions fails to distinguish between the legal and
equitable claims available within the copyright context.7 This paper will
analyze the nature of each of the Copyright Act's remedies under the United
States Supreme Court's analysis established in Chauffeurs, Teamsters &
Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry,8 and will conclude that laches only should
preclude equitable remedies. This approach results in the fairest adjudication
of copyright infringement claims because a prejudiced defendant escapes
1. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2000).
3. 263 F.3d 942, 954 (9th Cir. 2001).
4. Id. at 954-55.
5. Lyons P'ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2001).
6. Id.
7. See generally id.
8. 494 U.S. 558 (1989).
[Vol. 29:3:663
235
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
THE ROLE OF LACHES
some liability, but the plaintiff retains the right to recourse through available
legal claims. This is a rational result because, while the plaintiff has delayed
in bringing his claim, it nevertheless was filed within the limitations period.
Part I of this paper examines the defense of laches and its elements.
Part II explores the current circuit split created by the Fourth and Ninth Cir-
cuits and demonstrates how both courts took an all-or-nothing approach to
laches within the copyright context, either accepting or rejecting it whole-
sale. Part III takes a brief look at the history of law and equity in the United
States and explains that the United States Supreme Court traditionally has
permitted equitable defenses to defeat equitable, but not legal, claims. Fi-
nally, Part IV analyzes each of the remedies under the Copyright Act, char-
acterizes them either as legal or equitable, and concludes that laches should
preclude only the latter claims.
II. THE EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF LACHES
A. Lack of Diligence by Plaintiff
To successftlly assert a laches defense, a defendant must first demon-
strate that the plaintiff remained silent after learning that his legal rights had
been violated.9 Courts often divide this prong into two separate inquiries: 1)
whether there was a delay; and 2) whether the delay was unreasonable. 0
Whether the plaintiff has delayed in filing his claim depends on when
the "clock" began to run."' Unlike the statute of limitations, which precludes
claims filed three years after the infringement occurs, 2 the clock begins to
run for purposes of laches when the plaintiff knew or should have known
about the claim. 3 Accordingly, if a plaintiff could not have known about a
claim until after the statutory period, the claim may be barred by the statute
of limitations but permitted by laches."' Conversely, a plaintiff may be
barred by laches but not by the statute of limitations if he was aware of, or
should have been aware of, an impending infringement. 5 The United States
Supreme Court has explained that this discrepancy between laches and the
statute of limitations is because:
9. See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 952-55.
10. Id.; 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NDMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.06
(2004) [hereinafter NIMMER I].
11. See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 952.
12. NIMMERI, supra note 10, §12.05[A].
13. Kling v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000).
14. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
15. Kling, 225 F.3d at 1038.
20051
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[e]quity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility. Eq-
uity has acted on the principal that "laches is not like limitation, a
mere matter of time; but principally a question of the inequity of
permitting the claim to be enforced-an inequity founded upon
some change in the condition or relations of the property or the
,,16parties.
Whether a particular delay is reasonable depends on its cause. 17 Courts
have determined, for example, that a delay was reasonable where it was nec-
essary to: exhaust administrative remedies; evaluate and prepare a compli-
cated claim; and determine whether the cost of litigation was justified by the
infringement. 8 On the other hand, delay is unreasonable if its "purpose is to
capitalize on the value of the alleged infringer's labor, by determining
whether the infringing conduct will be profitable."' 9  Indeed, as Judge
Learned Hand explained in one of the most oft-cited copyright passages:
[i]t must be obvious to every one familiar with equitable principles
that it is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice
of an intended infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed
infringer spends large sums of money in its exploitation, and to in-
tervene only when his speculation has proved a success. Delay
under such circumstances allows the owner to speculate without
risk with the other's money; he cannot possibly lose, and he may
win.2°
Hayward v. National Bank2' provides a pertinent example of unreason-
able delay.22 In that case, the United States Supreme Court relied on laches
to reject the appellant's argument that his bank should not have foreclosed on
stock that appellant had used as collateral to secure a loan.23 Before foreclos-
ing, the appellant waited until the stock's value had risen substantially.
24
Justice Harlan, after considering the appellant's lack of diligence, concluded
that laches applied, and that the claim could not stand because the appellant
16. Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 396 (quoting Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 373 (1891));
see S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1919).
17. Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 954 (9th Cir. 2001).
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)).
20. Haas, 234 F. at 108.
21. 96U.S. 611 (1877).
22. Id. at 617-18.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 615-17.
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"remained silent when he should have spoken. He will not be heard now,
when he should be silent."2
B. Prejudice to Defendant
Unreasonable delay is not enough to preclude a claim on the basis of la-
ches; the defendant also must have been prejudiced by the delay.26 There are
two main forms of prejudice: evidentiary and expectations-based.27 The
former is concerned with "such things as lost, stale, or degraded evidence, or
witnesses whose memories have faded or who have died., 21 On the other
hand, a defendant may demonstrate the latter by showing that he acted in
certain ways based on the assumption that he would not be sued, and that he
would have acted differently if the plaintiff had filed the claim promptly.29
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Ninth Circuit
In Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., Danjaq argued that it had been trans-
ferred the rights to the James Bond films by Ian Fleming, who created the
James Bond character.30 The appellant, McClory, however, contended that
he owned rights to the films because he adapted Fleming's unmemorable
Bond for the screen, and through his own creativity, had established the rec-
ognizable movie character that ultimately became successful.3
Fleming had discussions with McClory about creating a James Bond
movie in the late 1950s and worked with him to create a screenplay based on
his unwritten but upcoming novel titled Thunderball.32 McClory argued that
the Bond character developed for the Thunderball screenplay differed from
Fleming's earlier descriptions. 33 Fleming subsequently wrote the Thunder-
ball novel and took credit as the sole author, without mentioning McClory.34
Danjaq, also looking to make James Bond films, in 1961 commissioned a
25. Id. at 617.
26. Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 955.
27. Id.; NIMMER I, supra note 10, §12.06[B][3].
28. Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 955.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 947.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 948.
33. Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 948.
34. Id.
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writer to write the Thunderball screenplay. 5 Danjaq eventually released
numerous Bond films, all of which, McClory argued, infringed his original
description of Bond in the Thunderball screenplay he had created. 6
Danjaq filed suit in 1998, and McClory responded with counterclaims.37
The parties settled all issues before trial except for the issue of Danjaq's al-
leged infringement of McClory's cinematic Bond, for which McClory sought
damages and Danjaq's profits.38  Danjaq responded that McClory's in-
fringement claim was barred by laches.39
1. Delay
The court held that McClory unreasonably delayed in filing his claim.4"
The time between when McClory should have known of his claims (i.e.,
when the films were released) and when he brought suit ranged from nine-
teen to thirty-six years, a length of time that the court determined "[b]y any
metric . . .is more than enough."4' This delay was unreasonable because
McClory had no justification for his tardiness. 42 "This is not a case," the
court noted, "of secret computer code, but of eighteen publicly-released,
"43widely-distributed movies ....
McClory also argued that the recent re-release of James Bond films on
DVD infringed his copyright and should not be barred by laches." The court
rejected this claim, however, and noted that "[w]here, as here, the allegedly
infringing aspect of the DVD is identical to the alleged infringements con-
tained in the underlying movie, then the two should be treated identically for
purposes of laches."45 Thus, by precluding McClory's claim based on the
infringing DVDs, the court made clear that laches sometimes may bar a
claim filed within the statutory period.46
35. Id.
36. Id. at 948-50.
37. Id. at 949.
38. Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 949.
39. Id. at 950.
40. Id. at 952-53.
41. Id. at 952.
42. Id. at 954.
43. Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954.
44. Id. at 953.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 954. The Ninth Circuit recently held that a plaintiff, who brings his claim
within three years of the time that he knew or should have known of the infringement, is not
precluded from recovering damages outside of the three-year statutory window. Polar Bear
Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 705-06 (9th Cir. 2004). This situation is similar to,
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2. Prejudice
The Ninth Circuit determined that Danjaq established both evidentiary
and expectations-based prejudice.47 The former was satisfied because many
of the people involved in the creation of the Bond films had died and many
of the relevant records were missing. 8 Danjaq demonstrated the latter by
showing that it had invested roughly one billion dollars in the Bond films,
which presumably it would not have done if McClory had brought his claim
sooner.
4 9
B. Fourth Circuit
As opposed to the Ninth Circuit's holding, the Fourth Circuit, in Lyons
Partnership v. Morris Costumes, Inc.,5° held that laches never can bar a
statutorily timely claim.5' The plaintiff in Lyons owned the copyright to
Barney (the purple dinosaur) and sought, through its claim for injunctive
relief and damages, to prevent the defendant from marketing look-alike cos-
tumes of the "well-stuffed Tyrannosaurus. ' 52
The district court found that the defendant had infringed the plaintiffs
copyright in Barney; however, it held that-even though some infringement
occurred within the limitations period-all of the claims were barred by the
statute of limitations and laches because the plaintiff knew of the infringe-
ments more than four years before bringing suit.5 3 The Fourth Circuit dis-
agreed and held that, where there is an express statute of limitations, the
separation of powers would be offended if laches, a judicially-created timeli-
ness rule, barred claims brought within the statutory period.54
The Lyons court rejected wholesale the idea that laches can bar a timely
copyright infringement claim.55 Indeed, the court stated that "when Congress
creates a cause of action and provides both legal and equitable remedies, its
but different from, the facts of Danjaq, where the plaintiff brought his claim more than three
years after he should have known of the alleged infringement. Danjaq, 384 F.3d at 953.
47. Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 955.
48. Id. at 955-56.
49. Id. at 956.
50. 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001).
51. Id. at 798. "[W]hen considering the timeliness of a cause of action brought pursuant
to a statute for which Congress has provided a limitations period, a court should not apply
laches to overrule the legislature's judgment as to the appropriate time limit to apply for ac-
tions brought under the statute." Id.
52. Id. at 794-95.
53. Id. at 796-97.
54. Lyons P'ship, 243 F.3d at 797.
55. Id. at 798.
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statute of limitations for that cause of action should govern, regardless of the
remedy sought. ' 56 Therefore, under Lyons, laches never is available as a
defense to preclude timely infringement claims--equitable or legal-because
Congress has created an express statute of limitations."
IV. HISTORY OF LAW AND EQUITY
Although the United States Supreme Court has never specifically ad-
dressed whether laches is available as a defense to copyright infringement
actions, it has confronted the issue of whether laches can defeat certain other
legal and equitable claims where a federal statute of limitations exists. 58 To
understand the implications of the Court's holdings more completely, how-
ever, it is necessary to digress briefly into the history of law and equity in the
United States.
Simply stated, the distinction between legal and equitable claims is
based on the remedies available to the plaintiff.59 A plaintiff seeking equita-
ble relief usually is asking the court to order the defendant to do or not do
something.6" On the other hand, legal relief usually is an order by the court
stating that the plaintiff is entitled to something, such as monetary damages.61
The distinction between legal and equitable claims is critical because only
plaintiffs who assert the former are guaranteed a jury trial by the Seventh
Amendment.62
The division of law and equity courts began in England during the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries.63 As the law courts increasingly became less
willing to grant equitable relief, plaintiffs began to seek redress by taking
their cases directly to the King.6' The King in turn directed plaintiffs to the
chancellor,65 who was next in line after the King as the most powerful gov-
ernmental officer and to whom many looked as the "government's leading
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935) (finding "[1]aches within
the term of the statute of limitations is no defense at law"); Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S.
29, 31 (1951). Laches "should not be determined merely by a reference to and a mechanical
application of the statute of limitations. The equities of the parties must be considered as
well." Gardner, 342 U.S. at 31.
59. ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 1
(6th ed. 2000).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id. at 3.
64. LEAVELLETAL., supra note 59, at 3-4.
65. Id. at 3-4.
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moral authority."66  Accordingly, equitable claims began to be heard in
Chancery (the chancellor's court) and were resolved with flexibility, based
on notions of fairness rather than the rigidity that characterized law courts.67
The American colonies adopted the English bifurcated court system;
however, by the eighteenth century there was a movement to merge law and
equity for procedural purposes, 6 because Americans were skeptical of eq-
uity's shortcomings. 69  For example, Americans complained that equity
courts did not have jury trials, colonial governors abused their powers as
chancellors, and the equity court system was too similar to the royalist Eng-
lish Court of Chancery.7°
The merger of law and equity was accomplished primarily as a result of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7 which, as adopted in 1938, state that
"[t]here shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."' 72 Since
then, the United States Supreme Court has grappled with the role of legal
defenses to equitable claims and visa-versa. While some confusion still re-
mains, the Court has settled many of these issues definitively. For example,
the Court consistently has permitted equitable defenses to defeat equitable
claims brought within the applicable statute of limitations.73 Illustratively, in
Holmberg v. Armbrecht,74 the Court stated that "[a] suit in equity may fail
though 'not barred by the act of limitations"' because "[e]quity eschews me-
chanical rules; it depends on flexibility.,
75
What about equitable defenses to legal claims? In 1985, many years af-
ter the merger of law and equity, the United States Supreme Court affirma-
tively rejected the idea, declaring "that application of the equitable defense
of laches in an action at law would be novel indeed.
76
Thus, it is clear that laches, an equitable defense, can defeat equitable-
but not legal-claims. 77 In the copyright context, where both legal and equi-
table remedies are available, it is not enough to wholly accept or reject la-
66. Id. at 4.
67. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
68. LEAVELL ET AL., supra note 59, at 7.
69. See id. at 7-9.
70. Id. at 9.
71. City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 257 (1949).
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
73. See, e.g., Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940).
74. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
75. Id. at 396 (quoting McKnight v. Taylor, 42 U.S. 161, 162 (1843)).
76. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985). See also
id. at 261-62 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (claiming "the application of a traditional equitable
defense in an action at law is something of a novelty").
77. Id. at 244-45; Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 396.
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ches. Instead, it is necessary to parse out the remedies and permit laches to
prevent equitable, but not legal, claims. The next section of this article at-
tempts to do just that by analyzing each copyright remedy under the Supreme
Court's two-prong test, established in Terry, to determine its legal or equita-
ble nature.
V. SEPARATING LEGAL VS. EQUITABLE COPYRIGHT CLAIMS
It is easy enough to conclude that laches can bar copyright infringement
actions where equitable, but not legal, relief is sought. What is more diffi-
cult, however, is determining which of the Copyright Act's remedies are
legal and which are equitable. As Justice Brennan observed, "' [t]he fact is..
• that there are, for the most part, no such things as inherently 'legal issues'
or inherently 'equitable issues.' There are only factual issues, and, 'like
chameleons [they] take their color from surrounding circumstances. '78
Chapter 5 of the Copyright Act contains the remedies available in a
copyright infringement action. The available remedies include injunctions,79
impounding and disposal of infringing articles,8 actual damages and profits
81or statutory damages, costs and attorney's fees,82 and seizure and forfeiture
of infringing articles to the United States.83
Although tempting, it is not enough simply to apply "the 'general rule'
that monetary relief is legal. 84 Instead, each remedy must be considered in
light of the United State Supreme Court's two-prong test established in Terry
for determining whether it is legal or equitable, which includes an examina-
tion of (1) "the nature of the issues involved," and (2) "the remedy sought., 85
The prongs are not weighted equally-the second is more important.86
A. Section 502: Injunctions
Under section 502(a) of the Copyright Act, a court "may... grant tem-
porary and final injunctions ... to prevent or restrain infringement of a copy-
78. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 577 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 550 (1970)).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
80. § 503.
81. § 504.
82. § 505.
83. § 509.
84. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352 (1998).
85. Terry, 494 U.S. at 565.
86. Id.
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right."87 As Justice Story explained, injunctions are necessary in the copy-
right context because
[i]t is quite plain that if no other remedy could be given in cases of
patents and copyrights than an action at law for damages, the in-
ventor or author might be ruined by the necessity of perpetual liti-
gation, without ever being able to have a final establishment of his
rights.88
Injunctions are the quintessential form of equitable relief,89 and have been
recognized as such in the copyright context.9" Accordingly, no Terry analy-
sis is necessary since it is clear that injunctions constitute equitable relief.91
B. Section 503: Impoundment/ Destruction of Infringing Articles
Section 503 gives the court discretion92 to impound or destroy infring-
ing articles.93 Courts, recognizing the similarity to injunctive relief, have
concluded that the impoundment and/or destruction of infringing articles is
an equitable remedy. 94 Indeed, some courts have required the plaintiff to
87. § 502(a).
88. 2 JOSEPH STORY, LL.D., COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 236 (Melville M. Bigelow, Ph. D. ed., 13th ed.
1988).
89. "Of the various coercive equitable remedies, none is as useful and effective as the
injunction... [which] is perhaps the most widely requested equitable relief." EDWARD D. RE
& JOSEPH R. RE, REMEDIES CASES AND MATERIALS 253 (5th ed. 2000) (emphasis omitted).
90. See, e.g., Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 303, 307 (S.D. Cal. 1959); 4
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[A], at 14-117
(2004) [hereinafter NIMMER II] (Given their antecedents in equity, preliminary injunctions are
sometimes reflexively labeled an 'extraordinary remedy."').
91. Similarly, § 509 of the Copyright Act, which permits a court to order seizure and
forfeiture of infringing articles to the United States, clearly is equitable and thus does not
require analysis under Terry. See 17 U.S.C. § 509(a) (2000).
92. The wording of the statute is permissive, stating that the court "may order" the im-
poundment or destruction. 17 U.S.C. § 503(a)-(b) (emphasis added); see also NIMMER II,
supra note 90, § 14.07[A].
93. § 503.
94. See, e.g., CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Greenleaf Elecs., Inc., No. 99-C7249, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7675, at *29-30 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2000) (seeking equitable relief which included
"impoundment and destruction of existing illegal decoders"); Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar
Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (referring to the court's "equitable powers"
in deciding whether to seize defendant's allegedly infringing articles); WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ
Enters., 584 F. Supp. 132, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (characterizing impoundments as "injunctive
in character").
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satisfy the requirements for injunctive relief before issuing an order for im-
poundment. 95
For example, in WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enterprises, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant infringed its copyright when the defendant submitted an
application to the Federal Communications Commission to erect new radio
broadcasting facilities. 96 The plaintiff asked the court to impound all of de-
fendant's infringing material, including the application. 97 The court charac-
terized an order for impoundment as "injunctive in character"98 and required
the plaintiff to demonstrate that he was entitled to injunctive relief before it
ordered the impoundment of the defendant's infringing articles.99
The discretion given to the courts by the statute and the similarity to in-
junctive relief compels the conclusion that an order for impoundment and/or
destruction of infringing material is equitable in nature.
C. Section 504: Actual Damages and Profits or Statutory Damages
The remedy available under section 504 is disjunctive. The plaintiff can
elect to take either actual damages and profits or statutory damages, but not
both. ' This choice makes it difficult to classify the remedy as either legal
or equitable. Although it may be true that copyright claims for actual and
statutory damages generally were tried in courts of law in front of juries (and
thus are legal in nature),"0 1 a Terry analysis of an action for the infringer's
profits leads to the conclusion that that remedy is equitable in nature.'0°
95. See WPOW, Inc., 584 F. Supp. at 135; Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change,
Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 861 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
96. WPOW, Inc., 584 F. Supp. at 133.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 135.
99. Id. at 139 (holding that "[s]ince the plaintiff has met the standard for the grant of a
preliminary injunction, the Court will issue an order for the impoundment of all of defendants'
materials which infringe plaintiffs engineering report and antenna design").
100. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2000).
101. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348 (1998).
102. In Terry, the Court characterized the damages as legal because the respondent did not
contain attributes which would create an exception to the general rule. Chauffeurs, Teamsters
& Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570-71 (1990). However, the Court "char-
acterized damages as equitable where they are restitutionary, such as in 'action[s] for dis-
gorgement of improper profits."' Id.
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1. Section 504(b): Actual Damages and Profits
If a plaintiff were entitled merely to actual damages, it would be clear
that he would be seeking legal relief.10 3 Under section 504, however, a plain-
tiff is entitled to actual damages and the defendant's profits." It is unclear
whether recovery of the defendant's profits is a legal or equitable remedy;
the United States Supreme Court has never confronted the issue directly, but
in dicta outside the copyright context has stated that it is equitable and-
inconsistently-later stated that it is legal.'0 5 The determination of whether
an action for the defendant's profits is legal or equitable thus requires an
application of the Court's two-prong test set forth in Terry. °6
a. Chauffeurs v. Terry
In Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, decided in
1990, the plaintiffs sought a jury trial on the issue of whether they were owed
backpay for "a union's alleged breach of its duty of fair representation."'0 7
The Court recognized that a jury trial is required under the Seventh Amend-
ment where legal rights are at stake,' and ultimately held that the plaintiffs'
action for backpay was legal in nature.0 9
In reaching its conclusion, however, the Court noted that it never has
held that "any award of monetary relief must necessarily be 'legal' relief.""
Instead, the Court explained that it will characterize remedies "as equitable
where they are restitutionary, such as in 'action[s] for disgorgement of im-
proper profits.' Thus, it follows that, under Terry, a copyright infringe-
ment action that seeks disgorgement of the defendant's profits under Section
504(b) is an equitable remedy."'
103. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974); NIMMER 1, supra note 10, § 12.10[A], at
12-178 (stating that "it is beyond dispute that a plaintiff who seeks to recover actual damages
is entitled to a jury trial").
104. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2000). Although the plaintiff is entitled to recover the defen-
dant's profits, they are recoverable "only if, and to the extent that, such profits have not al-
ready been 'taken into account in computing the actual damages."' NIMMER II, supra note 91,
§ 14.01[A], at 14-5 (quoting § 504(b)).
105. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 570-71.
106. See id. at 565.
107. Id. at 561.
108. Id. at 564-65.
109. Id. at 573.
110. Terry, 494 U.S. at 570 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 570-71.
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b. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Eight years after Terry, the Court decided Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc.' 3 In Feltner, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had in-
fringed its copyright by televising certain shows without authorization." 4
The plaintiff chose to receive statutory damages under section 504(c), and
the question for the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiff should be enti-
tled to a jury trial." 5 The Court was unable to "discern 'any congressional
intent to grant ... the right to a jury trial,"' 6 so it engaged in constitutional
analysis and ultimately concluded that the Seventh Amendment requires "a
jury trial on all issues pertinent to an award of statutory damages." ' 7
Prior to engaging in its constitutional analysis, however, the Feltner
court examined the language of section 504(c) that permits an award of statu-
tory damages to be made "in an amount that 'the court considers just.' ' 118 It
determined that the word "court" meant judge, not jury, and thus implied that
no trial was necessary to determine statutory damages.119 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court compared the language of section 504(c) to section
504(b)-awards of actual damages and profits-which it stated "generally
are thought to constitute legal relief."' 2°
The Court's dicta in Feltner that actual damages and profits constitute
legal relief contradicts its statement in Terry and thus deserves further con-
sideration. 2' The statement was supported by three cases and the Nimmer
treatise, none of which stands directly for the proposition asserted.'22 Indeed,
none of the authorities relied on by the Court distinguishes between actions
for actual damages and actions for the infringer's profits, and only one of the
three cases involved a copyright dispute. 23 Accordingly, there is no reason
to believe that this issue was considered by any of the sources on which the
Court relied.
113. 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
114. Id. at 342-43.
115. Id. at 342.
116. Id. at 345 (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 417 n.3 (1987)).
117. Id. at 355.
118. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 345 (quoting 17 U.S.C.§ 504(c)(1)).
119. Id. at 346 (contrasting the Copyright Act which "does not use the term 'court' in the
subsection addressing awards of actual damages and profits... which generally are thought to
constitute legal relief').
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21,
Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1991); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); NIMMER
I, supra note 10, § 12.10[B].
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The first case cited by the Court, Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, concerned
a trademark infringement. 24 The Court in Dairy Queen held that "an action
for damages based upon a charge of trademark infringement ... [is] subject
to cognizance by a court of law."
' 125
Dairy Queen does not necessarily support the conclusion in Feltner that
an action for the defendant's profits under the Copyright Act is legal in na-
ture. Besides the obvious observation that Dairy Queen interpreted the
Lanham Act and not the Copyright Act, the statement in Dairy Queen is not
limited solely to the defendant's profits-it speaks to "an action for dam-
ages" '126 based on trademark infringement, which can include lost profits,
actual damages, an accounting of the infringer's profits, attorneys' fees,
and/or the costs of the action. 27 Thus, it is impossible to conclude whether
the Dairy Queen Court even considered the narrower issue of whether an
action for the infringer's profits was legal in nature, or whether the court
merely made a general statement without considering the different damages
available for a trademark infringement.
For similar reasons, the second case cited in Feltner, Arnstein v. Por-
ter, 28 also is inapposite. In that case, the plaintiff brought a copyright in-
fringement action seeking "damages" and a jury trial. 129 The defendant ar-
gued that a jury trial was inappropriate; the court disagreed and, analogizing
the claim to one brought under the 1890 Sherman Act, held that "an action
for treble damages ... is triable at 'law' and by a jury as of right."' 3 ° As is
the case in Dairy Queen, it is unclear what type of damages were at issue in
Arnstein, and thus it is impossible to determine whether the plaintiff was
seeking the defendant's profits.' Moreover, Arnstein's analogy to the
Sherman Act may be instructive as to whether claims for actual damages are
triable by jury, but sheds no light on whether a claim for the defendant's
profits is equitable or legal in nature. 3 2
124. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 469.
125. Id. at 477.
126. Id.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2000).
128. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 464.
129. Id. at 467. It is unclear what type of damages the plaintiff sought to recover. Id.
130. Id. at 468. Arnstein interpreted the Sherman Act of 1890 which provides that "[a]ny
person who shall be injured... by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by
this act, may sue therefor ... and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained, and
the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 7,
26 Stat. 210 (1890).
131. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 464.
132. Id.
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The final case cited in Feltner to support the conclusion that an action
for the defendant's profits is legal in nature is Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21,
Ltd. 113 Like the other two cases, the Court's reliance on Video Views is mis-
placed. Video Views states "that the right to a jury trial exists in a copyright
infringement action when the copyright owner endeavors to prove and re-
cover its actual damages ...." Video Views says nothing about an action
for the defendant's profits; indeed, it emphasized that the court was con-
cerned only with actual damages.
35
In addition to the three cases discussed above, the Feltner court relied
on a statement in the Nimmer treatise that "it is beyond dispute that a plain-
tiff who seeks to recover actual damages is entitled to a jury trial.', 136 This
statement, like all of the other authorities cited, applies only to actual dam-
ages and does not address the nature of an action for the defendant's prof-
its.
137
Thus, it is clear that the Court's dicta in Feltner contradicted its state-
ment in Terry, but was unsupported by the authority it relied upon. An un-
supported assertion, however, is not necessarily inaccurate. In light of the
Court's inconsistency regarding the nature of claims for an infringer's prof-
its, it is necessary to apply Terry's two-prong test to characterize the remedy
as either legal or equitable in nature.
c. Terry Prong 1: The Nature of the Issues Involved
The first prong in the Court's analysis to determine the nature of an ac-
tion is to "compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the
courts of England prior to the merger ... of law and equity.' 38 In Feltner,
the Court reviewed the history of copyright infringement actions in this
country. 139 It noted that prior to the ratification of the Seventh Amendment,
in both America and England, copyright infringement suits that sought
"monetary damages were tried in courts of law, and thus before juries."'4 °
While this may be accurate, the Copyright Acts of 1790 4 ' and 1831142 do not
133. Video Views, 925 F.2d at 1010.
134. Id. at 1014 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946)).
135. See id.
136. NIMMER I, supra note 10, § 12.10[A].
137. See id.
138. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990).
139. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
140. Id. at 348-49.
141. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. XV, 71 Stat. 124 (1790).
142. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. XVI, 4 Stat. 436 (1831).
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specifically provide for recovery of the defendant's profits. 43 It was not
until the Copyright Act of 1909 that a plaintiff was entitled to recover "all
the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement."'"
Thus, the observation that copyright claims for monetary damages tradition-
ally were tried before juries does not resolve whether a claim for an in-
fringer's profits was considered legal or equitable in England during the
eighteenth century.
d. Terry Prong 2: The Remedy Sought
The second prong of the Court's analysis looks at the nature of the rem-
edy sought. 45 This prong is more important than the first 46 and "should not
replicate the 'abstruse historical' inquiry of the first part."' 47
In Terry, the Court explained that while an action for monetary damages
was "'the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law,"",148 damages
will be characterized as equitable if they are restitutionary. 49 The goal of
restitution is to prevent "the unjust enrichment of one person at the expense
of another."' 0 Put differently, restitution is limited to "restoring the status
quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the [plain-
tiff].'' 1. 1 An action to recover an infringer's profits thus clearly is restitution-
ary because the defendant merely returns profits that rightfully belong to the
plaintiff, and it follows that such an action should be characterized as equita-
ble in nature.'52
143. Both Acts allowed the plaintiff to recover "all damages occasioned by such injury,"
but neither Act specifically made available the infringer's profits. See § 6, 1 Stat. at 124; § 9,
4 Stat. at 436.
144. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 25, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909).
145. Terry, 494 U.S. at 565.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 571 n.8.
148. Id. at 570 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)).
149. Id.
150. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1107 (3d ed. 1969).
151. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding
Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946)).
152. The equitable character of restitution also is evidenced by the fact that constructive
trusts-which clearly are equitable-sometimes are placed on a defendant's profits when
restitution is ordered. See LEAVELL ET AL, supra note 59, at 393 (explaining that "[a] con-
structive trust is an equitable remedy because it is an in personam order from the court to the
defendant to convey the defendant's gain to the plaintiff'). Cf., Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v.
Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916) (noting that, in a trademark infringement action,
"[t]he infringer is required in equity to account for and yield up his gains to the true owner,
upon a principle analogous to that which charges a trustee with the profits acquired by wrong-
ful use of the property of the cestui que trust"); George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968
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e. Conclusion
While it is understandable that courts 53 and commentators'54 have in-
terpreted the Court's dicta in Feltner to require a jury trial for a copyright
action seeking an infringer's profits, the Court's statement was wholly un-
supported by any relevant authority and was inconsistent with its earlier con-
clusion in Terry. Further scrutiny of the remedy under the Terry analysis
leads to the conclusion that a copyright infringement action seeking an in-
fringer's profits is equitable. 5'
Recall that a plaintiff has the right under section 504(b) to recover ac-
tual damages and profits.'56 As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, claims
of actual damages are legal in nature; however, recovery of the infringer's
profits is equitable.'57 Thus, a plaintiff who has unreasonably delayed in
bringing his claim and thereby has prejudiced the defendant should be pre-
cluded from recovering the defendant's profits, and be limited under section
504(b) to recovering his actual damages. 58 This is a just result since pre-
sumably the defendant would not have continued his infringing activity had
the plaintiff brought the claim earlier. 159
2. Section 504(c): Statutory Damages
Although lower courts have differed about whether an award of statu-
tory damages is a legal or equitable remedy, 6 ' the United States Supreme
F.2d 1532, 1538 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that "a defendant who is liable in a trademark or
trade dress infringement action may be deemed to hold its profits in constructive trust for the
injured plaintiff'); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937).
153. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. E1-Khoury, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20400, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2002).
154. See, e.g., NIMMER 11, supra note 90, § 14.03[D] ("Particularly after Feltner v. Colum-
bia Pictures Television, Inc., it would seem constitutionally suspect to deny trial by jury on
this issue to a party who so requests.").
155. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
156. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2000).
157. Terry, 494 U.S. at 570-73.
158. See Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); see NIMMER I, supra
note 10, § 12.06 [A-B].
159. Haas, 234 F. at 108.
160. Compare Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier Cafe, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 321, 323 (D. Mass. 1952)
(holding that statutory damages are legal) and Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88
F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (same), with Raydiola Music v. Revelation Rob, Inc., 729 F.
Supp. 369, 376 (D. Del. 1990) (opining that "statutory damages in the copyright infringement
context should be characterized as equitable").
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Court affirmatively has characterized it as legal."' Accordingly, no Terry
analysis is necessary.
In Feltner, the Court applied a modified Terry analysis and stated that
statutory damages are a legal remedy and thus require a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment. 162 Under the first prong of the Terry analysis, which
considers the historical context of the remedy, the Court observed that "[t]he
practice of trying copyright damages actions at law before juries was fol-
lowed in this country, where statutory copyright protections were enacted
even before adoption of the Constitution."
'1 63
With respect to the second prong of the Terry analysis, the Court noted
that "an award of statutory damages may serve purposes traditionally associ-
ated with legal relief, such as compensation and punishment."" 6  Accord-
ingly, based on the history of similar claims and on the nature of the remedy
sought, the Court characterized statutory damages as legal in nature.
65
D. Section 505: Costs andAttorney's Fees
Section 505 permits a court, in its discretion, to award costs and attor-
neys' fees to the prevailing party in a copyright dispute. 166 Although some
courts recently have implied that both awards of costs and attorneys' fees are
equitable in nature, 16 the issue has not been addressed by the United States
Supreme Court. It follows that an analysis under Terry is required.
The first prong of Terry--the nature of the issues involved-favors a
conclusion that costs and attorneys' fees are legal remedies. 168  Although
courts in England generally had authority to award costs to prevailing plain-
161. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352 (1998).
162. Id. at 355.
163. Id. at 350.
164. Id. at 352.
165. See id. at 355.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 505; Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994).
167. See CBS Broad. Inc. v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
27,883 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (stating that "[a]n award of attorney's fees is an equitable remedy").
C.f Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey, Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
955 F. Supp. 598, 605 (E.D. Va. 1997) (implying that an award of costs is equitable). The
court stated that, under the Lanham Act, a trademark owner:
may be entitled, subject to "equitable principles," to ... costs ... the availability of
a costs remedy, by itself, provides no basis for a constitutionally mandated jury
right. Costs are merely incidental to and intertwined with other available remedies.
Thus, where the other available remedies are wholly equitable, costs are also an eq-
uitable remedy.
Id.
168. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
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tiffs as early as 1278,169 such was not the case in this country within the
copyright context until the twentieth century. Indeed, the Copyright Act of
1790 was devoid of any provision granting costs or fees to the prevailing
party. 170 The Copyright Act of 1831 was the first version that permitted a
plaintiff to recover his costs; however, it was stated in mandatory terms,
without leaving discretion to the courts. 171 It was not until the adoption of
the Copyright Act of 1909 that Congress included a provision for both costs
and attorneys' fees. 172  The 1909 Act maintained the mandatory award of
costs, 173 but made attorneys' fees permissive. 174 The current iteration of the
Copyright Act, adopted in 1976,17 copied verbatim the permissive language
relating to attorneys' fees, but changed the language pertaining to costs from
mandatory to permissive. 76 In short, an award of costs was not included in
the 1790 Act and, once provided for in 1831, was mandatory until the 1976
Act; attorneys' fees, on the other hand, were not available until 1909 and
always have been permissive. 177 It follows that the nature of these reme-
dies-as viewed from the first prong of the Terry analysis, which considers
historical context-are legal because they were unknown within the copy-
right context until 1831 and were mandatory until 1909.178
The second and more important prong of the Terry analysis, which ex-
amines the remedy sought, leads to the opposite conclusion-that an award
169. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 n.18 (1975).
170. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. XV, § 6, 71 Stat. 124 (1790).
171. See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. XVI, § 12, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (stating that "in all
recoveries under this act, either for damages, forfeitures, or penalties, full costs shall be al-
lowed thereon, any thing in any former act to the contrary notwithstanding") (emphasis
added).
172. Copyright Act of 1907, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (1909).
173. NIMMER I, supra note 10, § 14.09.
174. "[I]n all actions, suits, or proceedings under this Act, except when brought by or
against the United States or any officer thereof, full costs shall be allowed, and the court may
award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." (emphasis
added). § 12, 35 Stat. at 1084.
175. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
176. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000) (setting forth "the court in its discretion may allow the recov-
ery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof...
[and] may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs");
see also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523 n.10 (1994).
177. NIMMER II, supra note 90, § 14.09.
178. The mandatory nature of costs and attorneys' fees leads to the conclusion that, his-
torically, these were legal remedies because the court had no discretion in awarding them. See
Raydiola Music v. Revelation Rob, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 369, 376 (D. Del. 1990) (noting that
discretion given to courts is a "hallmark of equity").
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of costs and attorneys' fees is equitable. 79 Recall that not all monetary
awards are legal in nature.180 To the contrary, the wide discretion given to
courts to award costs and attorneys' fees 181 compels the conclusion that they
are equitable remedies. Granted, these remedies are not easily labeled "resti-
tutionary' ' 18 because they do not prevent unjust enrichment; 183 however, they
are awards of reimbursement and thus are more restitutionary than compen-
satory. 184 The equitable nature of the relief does not change merely because
it is authorized by statute.'85
Although the first and second prongs of the Terry analysis lead to oppo-
site results, the conclusion that costs and attorneys' fees are equitable must
follow. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that the weight
given to the second factor is much greater than that given to the first; indeed,
the Court itself has rested its conclusion solely on the basis of the second
factor when the first factor has left it "in equipoise."'86
E. Summary
Based on the foregoing analysis, the remedies available under the Copy-
right Act should be characterized as follows:'87
Section Remedy Nature
17 U.S.C. § 502 Injunction Equitable
17 U.S.C. § 503 Impoundment and disposal of in- Equitable
fringing articles
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) Actual damages Legal
Infringer's profits Equitable
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) Statutory damages Legal
179. See, e.g., Scott J. Jordan, Comment, Awarding Attorney's Fees to Environmental
Plaintiffs Under a Private Attorney General Theory, 14 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 287, 298
(1987).
180. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990);
Cont'l Bank, N.A. v. Everett, 861 F. Supp. 642, 645 (N.D. Ill. 1994); A.G. Becker-Kipnis &
Co. v. Letterman Commodities, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 118, 123-24 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
181. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534
(1994); NIMMER I, supra note 10, §§ 14.09, 14.10.
182. Terry, 494 U.S. at 570 (characterizing "damages as equitable where they are restitu-
tionary").
183. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 350 (1998).
184. A.G. Becker-Kipnis, 553 F. Supp. at 124.
185. CBS Broad. Inc. v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, Copyright. L. Dec. (CCH) 27,883
(S.D. Fla. 1999).
186. Terry, 494 U.S. at 570, 573-74.
187. 15 U.S.C. §§ 502-505, 509 (2000).
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17 U.S.C. § 505 Costs and attorneys' fees Equitable
17 U.S.C. § 509 Seizure and forfeiture of infring- Equitable
ing articles to the United States
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have created a circuit split regarding the
applicability of laches to a timely copyright infringement action. 8' Surely,
since one permitted laches and the other did not, one of the circuits must
have gotten it correct.
Not necessarily. This article presents a third alternative: courts should
consider the legal or equitable nature of remedies and permit laches to defeat
only the latter. This is consistent with precedent'89 and promotes the fairest
adjudication of copyright claims by permitting a prejudiced defendant to
escape some, but not all, liability.
Although courts of law and equity were separate in the United States for
some time, they merged in 1938 as a result of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.'9" Since that time, the United States Supreme Court has declared that
while equitable defenses may preclude equitable claims, their application to
legal actions would be "novel indeed."' 9' Accordingly, laches should apply
only to the equitable remedies available under Chapter 5 of the Copyright
Act.
In Terry, the Supreme Court established the two-prong test for deter-
mining the nature of remedies.' 92 The first prong considers the historical
context of the remedy; the second looks at the nature of the remedy sought to
determine its character. 93 Application of this test to the remedies available
for copyright infringement leads to the conclusion that only actual and statu-
tory damages are legal; the remaining remedies are equitable. Accordingly,
188. NIMMER I, supra note 10, § 12.06[B][1].
189. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985) (stat-
ing "that application of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law would be novel
indeed"); White v. Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1990) (identifying that "[liaches ... is
properly relevant only where the claims presented may be characterized as equitable, rather
than legal"); Golotrade Shipping and Chartering, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 706 F. Supp.
214, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that "this is an action at law for damages, therefore, the
equitable defense of laches does not apply").
190. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
191. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. at 245 n.16.
192. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990).
193. Id.
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laches should be cognizable as a bar against all of the plaintiffs remedies
except for actual and statutory damages.
As between a plaintiff who unreasonably delayed in filing his claim,
and a prejudiced defendant, the latter should receive more protection. The
plaintiff is not left without recourse, however, for he can opt under section
504 to recover actual or statutory damages.'94 This result appears not only to
be correct, but, well, equitable.
194. An action for the defendant's profits, normally available under section 504 in addi-
tion to the plaintiffs actual damages, is an equitable remedy and thus precluded by laches.
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REHABILITATING THOMAS
JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CLARENCE THOMAS. By Ken
Foskett. William Morrow. 2004. Pp. xi, 339. $24.95.
REVIEWED BY JOHN SANCHEZ*
It is remarkable that a sitting fifty-five year old Supreme Court Justice
would warrant a full-fledge biography. But when the reader discovers the
drama that suffuses Justice Thomas's life, from the hard-scrabble poverty of
his early years, the grueling timetable that his grandfather set up for him (ac-
counting for virtually every minute of the day), the lonely years as the only
African-American in the seminary, the reader discovers that the mere facts of
Thomas's life make for the stuff of fiction.
Ken Foskett, an investigative reporter for the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, seems an unlikely author of Justice Thomas. First of all, Tho-
mas holds a deep-seated distrust of the press. But Mr. Foskett forged a per-
sonal relationship with the Justice in the course of writing a three-part series,
the first part is entitled The Clarence Thomas You Don't Know, published in
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution in July 2001.' Mr. Foskett has done his
homework; he has interviewed over three hundred people and has read sev-
eral thousand pages of Thomas's speeches and legal writings. About the
only source unavailable to the author were Thomas's private papers.
In earnest praise of Mr. Foskett's biography, the book's publisher cites
a few talking points. Here we have a book that:
chronicles Thomas's contempt for upper-crust blacks who snubbed
his uneducated, working-class roots; his flirtation with the priest-
hood and later Black Power; the resentment that fueled his opposi-
tion to affirmative action; the conservative beliefs that ultimately
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University; B.A., Pomona College, 1974; J.D.,
Boalt Hall (University of California, Berkeley), 1977; L.L.M., Georgetown University, 1984.
1. Ken Foskett, The Clarence Thomas You Don't Know He 's a Generous Mentor, a
Talkative Friend, Amiable with Strangers, Proud, Complex-and an Enthusiastic Bus Driver,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 1, 2001, at Al; Ken Foskett, Trials of Life: Racism was One Chal-
lenge. Another was Meeting His Grandfather's Expectations, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 2,
2001, at Al; Ken Foskett, Refusing to Court Favor Youngest Justice Accepts Being 'A Thorn
in the Side'of Those Who Vilify Him, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 3, 2001, at Al.
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led him to the Supreme Court steps; and the inner resilience that
propelled him through the doors.
2
I am a fan of judicial biographies but I must say I was wary of reading
one of a living justice. How can one assess the career of someone who is
perhaps only a third of the way through his judicial career? Thomas has
been on the Court fourteen years. If he stays until he is eighty-five, he could
be on the Court another thirty years. In the end, however, there is enough
evidence in this volume about just why Clarence Thomas is an important
enough judge to deserve such a microscopic biography. Thomas is con-
stantly in the news. Some in the Bush administration have floated Thomas's
name as a likely successor to Chief Justice Rehnquist. Although a former
clerk and current law professor, John C. Yoo, believes Thomas "can do more
good for the country as an outspoken associate justice than he could as chief
justice."3 Thomas also made headlines recently when it was reported that he
had accepted much more valuable gifts than his Supreme Court colleagues
over the last six years.4
This book is not your traditional judicial biography. For starters, the
book devotes several chapters to a fascinating look at Thomas's ancestors, all
the way back to 1832. Thomas's fierce strain of independence is clearly
foreshadowed by his great-great-grandfather, Sandy Wilson who, in 1867,
paid $100 cash for forty acres of Liberty County farmland and "never
worked for a white man again." 5 The book also takes a deep look at the seg-
regated south; from Sherman's march through Georgia, to Reconstruction
and the hard road freed blacks traveled. This immersion is relevant because
it unearths a strain that marks Thomas to this day-the yearning for inde-
pendence, for the black man's need to survive in a white world without a
handout from white society. Mr. Foskett argues that Thomas's life and work
can be properly understood only in reference to race in America, particularly
as it played out in his childhood.
Looking at the facts of Thomas's life one is struck by the contradic-
tions. He was a beneficiary of affirmative action yet he is devoted to the
notion of a colorblind Constitution. He is the "uncompromising tough guy"
who could dissolve "into an emotional, sensitive man.",6
2. KEN FosKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMEs OF CLARENCE THOMAS, at
front flap (2004).
3. John C. Yoo, Clarence Thomas is in the Right Seat, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 5,2005, at BI 1.
4. Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Justice Thomas Reports Wealth of Gifts,
L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 2004, at Al.
5. FOsKETT, supra note 2, at 31.
6. Id. at 313.
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I was familiar with the broad outlines of Thomas's life, from his jour-
ney from Pin Point, Georgia, to Yale Law School, to his tenure as head of the
EEOC under Reagan, and his wrenching appearance before the Senate when
he faced off with Anita Hill. But I was wholly unaware of certain parts of
Thomas's life: his deep love of children, his love of NASCAR racing, and
how he loves to roam the country with his wife in his forty foot mobile
home.
What I especially like about the book is how the author does not try to
whitewash Thomas's life. He boldly restates every criticism that has ever
been lodged against Thomas: charges of opportunism, of turning his back on
blacks, and of currying favor with important white people. Every charge is
painstakingly dealt with. While it is clear that the author likes Clarence Tho-
mas, he does not shrink from inspecting his every motive and action. For
example, Mr. Foskett writes that Thomas's absolutist philosophy often blinds
him to nuance.7 In another instance, Mr. Foskett labels Thomas's denuncia-
tion of welfare as "shrill."8 Moreover, when Thomas defended Republicans
in Congress who were attacking President Clinton's judicial nominees, Mr.
Foskett characterizes the tenor of Thomas's remarks as "petty, self-pitying."9
Judging Thomas spends considerable time identifying people and insti-
tutions that have influenced the thinking of Clarence Thomas. Myers Ander-
son, Thomas's grandfather who relentlessly dominated his early years,
clearly shaped Thomas's libertarian political philosophy. The Catholic
Church "gave him the courage to hold contrary beliefs-the character trait
that defines him today."'" After a twenty-eight year estrangement, from the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, Thomas rejoined the Catho-
lic Church in 1996. While the book claims that the "tumult of the Savannah
civil rights struggle played a key role in shaping [Thomas's] beliefs about
equality and discrimination,"" there is little direct evidence of this. As for
writers, Thomas liked Richard Wright because "[h]e's an angry black novel-
ist.., and I was an angry black man."' 2 He is also such a fan of Ayn Rand's
The Fountainhead that he requires his law clerks to sit through a screening of
the film adapted from the book. 3 Mr. Foskett cites the first Justice Harlan's
7. Id. at 18.
8. Id. at 191.
9. Id. at 295.
10. FosKErTr, supra note 2, at 66.
11. Id. at 67.
12. Id. at 82.
13. Id. at 280.
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dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson4 as support for Thomas's color-blind view of
the Constitution.
1 5
The book properly investigates the roots of Thomas's invocation of
natural law, a controversial "method of constitutional interpretation, even
among conservative judges"1 6 that posits "that a higher law, God's law, was
the ultimate standard against which man's laws were to be judged."' 7 Ac-
cording to Mr. Foskett, the only way Thomas could reconcile original intent
with the existence of slavery in America was to focus on the natural law lan-
guage in the Declaration of Independence. 8 "God's law taught Thomas to
believe in his innate equality."' 9 In support of this philosophy, Thomas also
relied on Harry Jaffa, a German-born philosopher and Leo Strauss disciple,
and on "Lewis Lehrman, a noted New York conservative, for an essay that
used natural law to provide a moral basis for laws outlawing abortion."2
Thomas's support for natural law almost cost him his seat on the Supreme
Court and could still come back to haunt him should he be nominated to be-
come the next Chief Justice.
Fittingly, the most dramatic chapters in the book are those chronicling
Thomas's nomination to the Supreme Court. Even though most are familiar
with the broad outlines of Thomas's traumatic experience appearing before
the Senate, Mr. Foskett's account captures the mini-dramas of belt-way poli-
tics with photographic intensity. Mr. Foskett's account is never less than
compelling as he describes the pounding Senator Biden gave Thomas about
natural law during his twenty-five hours of testimony, "the second longest
grilling of a Supreme Court nominee in history.'"1 While Thomas delivered
almost a "carbon copy of Souter's responses"2 2 when he sailed through the
Senate, Mr. Foskett describes Thomas's performance as "too cautious, too
programmed. '23 "The strategy of vague answers, so effective for Souter,
made Thomas appear dumb, shifty and evasive."2 4
While Thomas insisted he had no position on Roe v. Wade,25 senatorial
questioning returned more than seventy times to abortion over the course of
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
15. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting); FOSKETT, supra note 2, at 190-91.
16. FOSKETT, supra note 2, at 219.
17. Id. at 190.
18. Id. at 189-90.
19. Id. at 190.
20. Id. at 188, 190, 214.
21. FosKETr, supra note 2, at 229.
22. Id. at 228.
23. ld. at 229.
24. Id. at 261.
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the hearings.26 When Thomas learned of Anita Hill's testimony before the
Senate, accusing him of sexual harassment, "I felt like throwing up, ' 27 he
told his most ardent supporter, Senator Danforth. If there is any weakness in
this account of the "he said/she said" dispute, it is that Mr. Foskett never
discloses his own opinion on who he thinks was lying.28 In effect, he throws
up his hands and concludes, "[t]he contradictions between" Hill and Thomas
"were never resolved., 29 Not once did the author ask Thomas whether he
enjoyed pornography, as Hill alleged. (Not that there is any necessary corre-
lation between liking porn and committing sexual harassment or being
deeply religious, as Thomas is portrayed throughout the book). In the end,
Thomas squeaked through the Senate, fifty-two to forty-eight, with "the
highest number of negative votes for any Supreme Court justice in American
history."'3°
While Mr. Foskett devotes a chapter to analyzing key judicial opinions
by Thomas on matters of race, religion, affirmative action, and criminal law,
serious students of Justice Thomas's legal writings should consult Scott
Douglas Gerber's First Principles: The Jurisprudence of Clarence Tho-
mas.31 Mr. Foskett clearly endorses Mr. Gerber's conclusion "that Thomas's
most significant impact on the Court was in the area of race and his insis-
tence on a color-blind reading of the Constitution."32 While Thomas likes
bright line rules and is clearly drawn to constitutional textualism, Mr. Foskett
makes clear that the "integrity of [Thomas's] methodology becomes murkier
when the cases involve issues close to [his] heart, such as race and the law,
or religion in school. 33
The figure who finally emerges in Mr. Foskett's rich, enveloping story
is a proud, sensitive, brooding man who is still deeply scarred by his humili-
ating Supreme Court confirmation. Mr. Foskett finds just the right words to
sign off with, quoting Thomas in summing up his life thus far: "[a]t bottom,
I merely tried to do as my grandfather advised: make the best of the hand
that had been dealt me., 34 The eventfulness of Thomas's extraordinary life
and the refreshing intelligence and craft of the author make this book a
pleasure to read.
26. FOSKETT, supra note 2, at 224, 228.
27. Id. at 234.
28. Id. at 235.
29. Id. at 250.
30. Id. at 253.
31. SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THO-
MAS (1999).
32. FOSKETT, supra note 2, at 298.
33. Id. at 279.
34. Id. at 319.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Software patent drafting and prosecution is still an emerging field be-
cause of the constant changes and developments in the evolution of software
patents. Patent practitioners that draft software patents have to be concerned
with meeting the patentability requirements of the United States Code along
with the restrictions in the case law. In addition, there are other challenges
associated with the proper drafting of a software patent application including
the natural ambiguity of language, the ever-occurring developments in the
software field, and the maximization of the protective lifespan of the inven-
* J.D. Candidate 2006, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center; B.S.
in Computer Science and M.S. in Computer Science, Mississippi State University. The author
is a Registered Patent Agent specializing in software patents. The author wishes to thank: his
wife, Dr. Christine R. Rutter, for all of her love and support throughout this process; his fam-
ily, especially his little sister Kaylei Koon, for encouraging him to never stop learning; his
colleagues at Nova Law Review, especially Sabrina Tirabassi and Carlos Carmona, for their
hard work and dedication during the editing of this article; and the faculty of the Law Center,
especially Professor Linda F. Harrison, for their support and guidance.
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tion. Accordingly, it is imperative that patent practitioners who draft soft-
ware patents understand the limitations of the terminology that can be used
to describe software.
The importance of drafting patent applications that properly protect the
invention along with any variations is the amount of money that can be in-
volved in patent litigation lawsuits. One such lawsuit involved Pitney Bowes
suing Hewlett-Packard for allegedly infringing on its patented technology
that "uses beams of light to make variable-sized dots which help to smooth
the edges of characters, making the letters and numbers less blurry."' "Pit-
ney Bowes was seeking damages of more than $Mbillion," but settled for
$400 million in cash.2 Another such lawsuit involves Stac Electronics, who
won a lawsuit against Microsoft for patent violations involving data com-
pression patents.3 This lawsuit was settled by Microsoft paying Stac ap-
proximately $83 million.4 Both of these settlements are examples of why
using the correct terminology in a software patent is paramount because it
may mean the difference between winning or losing a patent lawsuit which
could involve millions of dollars.
A. Overview
Part I of this article will discuss the different areas of concern for patent
practitioners including the different sections of the United States Code that
have to be satisfied for the successful prosecution, offensive use, and defense
of a software patent. Part II will review the different terminology that can be
used to describe software technology. This terminology includes method,
apparatus, computer, system, means-plus-function, computer-readable me-
dium, computer program product, and article of manufacture. In addition,
Part II provides claim examples of the different terminology along with any
court decisions that affect the interruption of the terminology. Part III gives
a conclusion of the terminology that can be used to describe a software in-
vention. In addition, Part III will review the terminology along with sugges-
tions on how to draft sample claims.
1. Hewlett-Packard Settles up to the Tune of $400 Million, NAT'L L.J., June 18, 2001, at
A12.
2. Id.
3. T.C. Doyle, Microsoft to Pay $83M to Settle Stac Compression Suit, COMPUTER
RESELLER NEWS, June 27, 1994, at 7.
4. Id.
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B. Challenges of Software Patents
One challenge in drafting software patents is that the "ambiguity of
claim language necessarily results in uncertainty in the scope of protection. 5
Part of this ambiguity stems from the disagreement among experts about the
definitions of software-related terms.6 An example of a word that has caused
ambiguity is algorithm.7 In Diamond v. Diehr,8 the practitioner defined algo-
rithm to have a general meaning, while the court held algorithm to have a
narrower definition. 9 Accordingly, all words have some form of ambiguity,
especially when the allowance of the patent is concerned or a lawsuit involv-
ing millions of dollars.1" Thus, it is imperative that patent practitioners have
a solid foundation of the software terminology that is used in patent applica-
tions and how the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and
the courts have construed the terminology.
Another challenge in drafting software patents is that "words do not ex-
ist to describe" the invention.11 This is because "[tjhings are not made for
the sake of words, but words for things."' 2 Thus, there may not be ambiguity
in the terminology used in the patent application, but the terminology may be
undefined in the field of art and thus needs to be properly defined by the pat-
ent practitioner drafting the patent application. This challenge is especially
important in software patents because software in itself is an emerging field
and first received patent protection less than twenty-five years ago. 3 Ac-
cordingly, the terminology is still developing and patent practitioners should
pay special heed to the challenge of defining new words.
Another challenge is that patent practitioners must be meticulous when
drafting the patent specification and claims to ensure that the claims can be
useful during the entire "enforcement duration" of twenty years. 14 Since the
software field is in constant flux, software patents that are drafted with only
5. Stephen J. Stark, Key Words and Tricky Phrases: An Analysis of Patent Drafters'
Attempts to Circumvent the Language of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 365, 371
(1997).
6. Judith A. Szepesi, Maximizing Protection for Computer Software, 12 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 173, 175 (1996).
7. Id.
8. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
9. Id. at 186 n.9.
10. See Szepesi, supra note 6, at 177.
11. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)
(quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. CI. 1967)).
12. Id. (quoting Autogiro Co. ofAm., 384 F.2d at 397).
13. See Diamond, 450 U.S. at 175.
14. Keith E. Witek, Comment, Developing a Comprehensive Software Claim Drafting
Strategy for U.S. Software Patents, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363, 366 (1996).
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today's implementation of the invention in mind may not protect the owner
from future changes in technology. One example is in the field of high per-
formance computing. Twenty years ago, high performance computers were
single system machines such as Cray supercomputers.15 Today, high per-
formance computing is being moved to clusters of machines such as a Beo-
wulf cluster.' 6 This type of innovative change would dramatically degrade
the protection of software that stated its use was only on Cray supercomput-
ers without giving the option of different types of high performance comput-
ing systems. Accordingly, the terminology used in a software patent is im-
portant to ensure the maximum effective life of the patent is not diminished
because of poor word choices.
Accordingly, understanding the perils and requirements of the United
States Code and case law will enable patent practitioners who draft software
patents to develop fully the invention into a form that will provide the maxi-
mum protection under the law. This understanding will benefit both patent
practitioners and software inventors by ensuring that the patent practitioners
can draft the patent application in a form that will benefit the inventor and
the inventor will have the invention protected to the fullest extent allowed by
the law.
C. Meeting the 35 U.S.C. § 101 Requirements
Patent practitioners drafting software patents must first be concerned
with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 10117 because the line between pat-
entable software and non-patentable software is sometimes still in flux. Sec-
tion 101 provides that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the con-
ditions and requirements of this title."' 8 The concern for software is not
"which of the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to-
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter-but rather on the
essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical util-
15. See WILLIAM GROPP ET AL., USING MPI: PORTABLE PARALLEL PROGRAMMING WITH
THE MESSAGE-PASSING INTERFACE 1 (Janusz Kowalik ed., The MIT Press 2d ed. 1999).
16. Id.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
18. Id.
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ity." '19 Thus, the invention must have "some type of practical application,
i.e., 'a useful, concrete and tangible result."'
2
For example, a claim directed to a word processing file stored on a
disk may satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. [§] 101 since
the information stored may have some "real world" value. How-
ever, the mere fact that the claim may satisfy the utility require-
ment of 35 U.S.C. [§] 101 does not mean that a useful result is
achieved under the practical application requirement. The claimed
invention as a whole must produce a "useful, concrete and tangi-
ble" result to have a practical application.
2 1
Accordingly, patent practitioners drafting software patents must draft
the application in such a way to ensure that the described invention produces
"a useful, concrete, and tangible result., 22 This requirement will be further
analyzed through the review of the terminology.
D. Pitfalls of 35 U.SC. § 112
Section 112 of the Patent Act has six paragraphs of which three present
pitfalls to the successful allowance and court challenge of a software patent.23
19. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (noting that the subject matter must still fall into at least one of the categories).
20. Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
21. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 2100-6 (8th ed. 2d rev. 2004) [hereinafter MPEP].
22. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Section 112 states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his inven-
tion.
A claim may be written in independent or, if the nature of the case admits, in de-
pendent or multiple dependent form.
Subject to the following paragraph, a claim in dependent form shall contain a ref-
erence to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the
subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorpo-
rate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
A claim in multiple dependent form shall contain a reference, in the alternative
only, to more than one claim previously set forth and then specify a further limita-
tion of the subject matter claimed. A multiple dependent claim shall not serve as a
basis for any other multiple dependent claim. A multiple dependent claim shall be
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The first paragraph has three separate and distinct requirements. 24 The first
requirement is that the specification must contain a written description of the
invention that is "a full and clear disclosure of the invention. 25 The second
requirement is that there must be a description on how "to make and use the
invention., 26 This "enablement requirement" is required so "that one skilled
in the art can make and use the claimed invention ... to ensure that the inven-
tion is communicated to the interested public in a meaningful way., 27 The
third requirement of the first paragraph is the disclosure of the best mode of
the invention.28 "The best mode requirement is a safeguard against the desire
on the part of some people to obtain patent protection without making a full
disclosure as required by the statute."29 The three requirements of the first
paragraph of § 112 can all create pitfalls for the patent practitioner unaccus-
tomed to drafting software patent applications especially viewed in light of
who is skilled in the software arts.
The second paragraph of § 112 contains two separate requirements to
satisfy the statute.3" The first requirement is that "the claims must set forth
the subject matter that applicants regard as their invention. '31 This require-
ment places the burden on the patent practitioner to ensure that the claimed
invention is the invention that the inventor or assignee desires and needs to
be protected. The second requirement is that "the claims must particularly
point out and distinctly define the metes and bounds of the subject matter
that will be protected by the patent grant. '32 Patent practitioners should work
to avoid the pitfall of this requirement because failure to fulfill the require-
ment could lead to claims that are ambiguous and thus do not adequately
protect the invention. This requirement is examined by "whether the scope
construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the particular claim in
relation to which it is being considered.
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding struc-
ture, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
Id.
24. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-163.
25. Id.
26. MPEP, supranote21, at2100-163;accord§ 112.
27. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-184.
28. § 112.
29. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-200.
30. Id. at 2100-203 (citing § 112).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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of the claim is clear to a hypothetical person possessing the ordinary level of
skill in the pertinent art."33
The sixth paragraph of § 112 allows for means-plus-function claims to
be used.34 The use of the sixth paragraph allows for means-plus-function
claims, but the claims must meet a three-part test:
A claim limitation will be interpreted to invoke 35 U.S.C. [§]
112, sixth paragraph, if it meets the following 3-prong analysis:
(A) the claim limitations must use the phrase "means for" or
"step for";
(B) the "means for" or "step for" must be modified by func-
tional language; and
(C) the phrase "means for" or "step for" must not be modified
by sufficient structure, material or acts for achieving the specified
function.
Beyond meeting the three-part test, the claims must also meet the defi-
niteness requirement in "that the corresponding structure ... of a means (or
step)-plus-function limitation must be disclosed in the specification itself in a
way that one skilled in the art will understand what structure ... will perform
the recited function., 36 Thus, for a patent practitioner to properly utilize the
sixth paragraph of § 112, the three-part test must be satisfied along with the
other requirements to avoid rejections.
Another challenge when viewed in light of the requirements of § 112 is
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kin-
zoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.3 7 In Festo Corp., the Court held that "if a § 112
amendment is necessary and narrows the patent's scope-even if only for the
purpose of better description--estoppel may apply."38 Thus, patent practi-
tioners should be concerned that any modifications to the claims to satisfy
§ 112 may limit the scope of the invention. Although the presumption is
against the narrowing amendment, the presumption can be rebutted but "[t]he
patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art
33. Id.
34. § 112.
35. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-221.
36. Id. at 2100-224 (citing Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374,
1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
37. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
38. Id. at 737.
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could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have
literally encompassed the alleged equivalent., 39 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court's holding may create problems for patent applications that are not
properly described in the specification and claimed in the patent application.
Patent practitioners that draft software patents should take extra precautions
to ensure that the requirements of § 112 are met and that no amendments that
may narrow the patent's scope are needed.
E. Avoiding 35 U.S.C. § 102 and 35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejections
Patent practitioners also have to draft to avoid 35 U.S.C. § 10240 and 35
U.S.C. § 10341 rejections. Software patent applications have been found to
39. Id. at 741.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). Section 102 provides in part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or de-
scribed in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a for-
eign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of
an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a
foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an
application for patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before
the filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) The invention was described in-
(1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b).... ; or
(2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United
States before the invention by the applicant for patent.... ; or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g)(1) during the course of an interference conducted under section 135 or section
291, another inventor involved therein establishes, to the extent permitted in section
104, that before such person's invention thereof the invention was made by such
other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, or (2) before such per-
son's invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another inventor
who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of in-
vention under this subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective
dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reason-
able diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from
a time prior to conception by the other.
Id.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). Section 103 provides in part:
(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject mat-
ter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Pat-
entability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
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be more susceptible to certain rejections.4 2 These rejections are also com-
monplace in non-software patent applications, but because of the relatively
new entry of software patents into the patent realm and the ever-changing
terminology used in the patent application, software patents seem to be espe-
cially susceptible to these rejections.43
One common rejection is "that differences between a claimed invention
and a prior art reference represent 'mere design alternatives.' 4 4 The second
common rejection is that "it would have been obvious to one skilled in the
art at the time of the invention to combine the teaching of' prior art with
another idea to give the claimed invention.45 Besides these two rejections,
patent practitioners have to be concerned with all of the other rejections that
may stem from §§ 102 and 103. These rejections include publications, prior
sales, public use, and other similar rejections stemming from the statutes.
Accordingly, patent practitioners should be aware of the common software
rejections and draft the software patent application in view of these rejec-
tions.
II. TERMINOLOGY
A. Method
The use of methods or processes in software patents is widely used, be-
cause most software inventions are implemented in the computer by a
method or algorithm. Section 100(b) of the Patent Act states that "'process'
means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material., 46  "Software
process claims can be found in roughly 85% of all issued U.S. software pat-
ents. 47 One reason that methods are widely used is that algorithms are eas-
ily transferred into a description and claim utilizing a method approach.
Thus, the widespread use of the method and process claims make it impera-
tive that patent practitioners understand the limitations and properly utilize
the claims to fully describe the invention.
Id.
42. Stuart P. Meyer, Obtaining and Enforcing Patents for Software-Related Inventions:
Avoiding the Pitfalls, 5 SoFTWARE L.J. 715, 722 (1992).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
47. Witek, supra note 14, at 385.
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A method claim must involve "the transformation or conversion of sub-
ject matter representative of or constituting physical activity or objects., 48 It
is important that the method not just do acts within the computer without
some sort of significant output to show for the method. In addition, the
claims cannot "consist solely of mathematical operations without some
claimed practical application" or "simply manipulate abstract ideas ... with-
out some claimed practical application."' 9 Patent practitioners need to pay
special heed to ensure that the method specifically accomplishes some sort of
"practical application. 5 °
A process is statutory if it requires physical acts to be performed
outside the computer independent of and following the steps to be
performed by a programmed computer, where those acts involve
the manipulation of tangible physical objects and result in the ob-
ject having a different physical attribute or structure. 51
This "manipulation of tangible physical objects" can include several
categories of different acts 2.5  One type of act is "physical acts to be per-
formed outside the computer.'"" Examples of this type of act are:
- A method of curing rubber in a mold which relies upon updating
process parameters, using a computer processor to determine a
time period for curing the rubber, using the computer processor to
determine when the time period has been reached in the curing
process and then opening the mold at that stage.
- A method of controlling a mechanical robot which relies upon
storing data in a computer that represents various types of me-
chanical movements of the robot, using a computer processor to
calculate positioning of the robot in relation to given tasks to be
performed by the robot, and controlling the robot's movement and
position based on the calculated position.54
Both of these acts are physical acts that are accomplished outside of the
computer, but the computer is used to control the parameters of the physical
acts. These types of physical acts are allowable patent claims because the
48. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
49. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-12.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2100-15 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-15 to -16.
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objects have "a different physical attribute or structure" upon completion of
the act.55 Thus, one way to ensure compliance is to ensure that acts outside
of the computer are being accomplished by the method. Physical acts out-
side of the computer are sometimes difficult-if not impossible-to integrate
into software patent claims, but where the computer is interacting without
outside objects, this type of claim reduces the risk that the claim will be re-
jected by the USPTO.
Another type of act that satisfies the statutory requirements is an act that
produces "a useful, concrete, and tangible result."56 This type of act allows
methods that consist solely in the computer without touching physical items
outside of the computer. However, the act must have a result that accom-
plishes a real goal instead of just pushing around ones and zeros and giving
no real result. This distinction may sometimes be difficult to achieve be-
cause simply applying an algorithm in a software claim will not suffice to
protect the invention while applying an algorithm to achieve "a useful, con-
crete, and tangible result" has been held to meet the statutory requirements.57
The issue then becomes what exactly is "a useful, concrete, and tangible re-
sult."58 The following examples are acts that produce "a useful, concrete,
and tangible result":59
- A computerized method of optimally controlling transfer, storage
and retrieval of data between cache and hard disk storage devices
such that the most frequently used data is readily available.
- A method of controlling parallel processors to accomplish multi-
tasking of several computing tasks to maximize computing effi-
ciency ....
- A method of making a word processor by storing an executable
word processing application program in a general purpose digital
computer's memory, and executing the stored program to impart
word processing functionality to the general purpose digital com-
puter by changing the state of the computer's arithmetic logic unit
when program instructions of the word processing program are
executed.
55. Id. at 2100-15 (citing Diamond, 450 U.S. at 187).
56. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id
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- A digital filtering process for removing noise from a digital sig-
nal comprising the steps of calculating a mathematical algorithm to
produce a correction signal and subtracting the correction signal
from the digital signal to remove the noise.
Although some of these acts may not seem to produce "a useful, con-
crete, and tangible result, '61 the optimization of data for increased speed or
efficiency is a result that has been held to be useful, concrete, and tangible.62
Although a process "simply calculat[ing] a mathematical algorithm that
models noise is nonstatutory. ' '63 In addition, the imparting of increased func-
tionality to the computer by introducing program instructions to the com-
puter has also been held statutory.64 Thus, it is imperative that method
claims give a result that is not just a mathematical algorithm, but also give a
result that is actually accomplishing a result that can be quantified as accom-
plishing a goal that can be utilized by humans instead of just a machine cal-
culation.
The following example is claim one of U.S. Patent No. 5,333,184:
1. A method for use in a telecommunications system in which in-
terexchange calls initiated by each subscriber are automatically
routed over the facilities of a particular one of a plurality of inter-
exchange carriers associated with that subscriber, said method
comprising the steps of:
generating a message record for an interexchange call between
an originating subscriber and a terminating subscriber, and
including, in said message record, a primary interexchange car-
rier (PIC) indicator having a value which is a function of
whether or not the interexchange carrier associated with said
terminating subscriber is a predetermined one of said interex-
change carriers.65
Claim one of U.S. Patent No. 5,333,184 was challenged in AT&T Corp.
v. Excel Communications, Inc. 66 as being outside the scope of § 10 1.67 The
important aspect of claim one is that the method generates a primary interex-
60. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-18 (citing In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400
(C.C.P.A. 1969)).
61. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
62. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-18.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. U.S. Patent No. 5,333,184 (issued July 26, 1994).
66. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
67. Id. at 1358.
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change carrier indicator which is "a useful, non-abstract result that facilitates
differential billing of long-distance calls made by an IXC's subscriber.
6 8
The court held that "[b]ecause the claimed process applies the Boolean prin-
ciple to produce a useful, concrete, tangible result without pre-empting other
uses of the mathematical principle, on its face the claimed process comforta-
bly falls within the scope of § 101 .,,69
In AT&T Corp., the important distinction that allowed this claim to be
statutory was that the result had "a useful, concrete, and tangible result."7
The result was useful because it facilitated the collection of long distance
billing data.7' The result was concrete because it generated and included the
primary interexchange carrier indicator that was used for a certain purpose.72
The result was tangible because it was used to bill customers and therefore
could be used to produce tangible bills for the customers.73 Accordingly, this
claim was held to be statutory and is an example of how the specification
interlinks with the claim language to ensure compliance with the require-
ments of software patents.74
The following example is claim one of U.S. Patent No. 6,763,397:
1. A method for verifying instructions in a module of a computer
program, the method comprising:
ascertaining whether checking an instruction in a first module
that is loaded requires information in a referenced module dif-
ferent than the first module;
if the information is required, determining whether the refer-
enced module is already loaded;
if the referenced module is determined to be not already loaded,
writing a constraint for the referenced module without loading
the referenced module; and
verifying the instruction in the first module, the verifying com-
prising placing a list including a referenced type defined in a
not-yet-loaded module and a different type at a fixed position
in a merged snapshot.75
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1060
(Fed. Cir. 1992)).
70. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
71. AT&T Corp., 172 F.3dat 1358.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74.
75. United States Patent No. 6,763,397 (issued July 13, 2004) [hereinafter Patent 6,763,
Id 397].
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The question then becomes whether claim one has "a useful, concrete,
and tangible result."76 The method claim is checking about whether instruc-
tions have loaded into a module and verifying those results.77 This verifica-
tion is important to ensure that information is correctly loaded. The method
claim is also reducing the loading of modules by writing a constraint in lieu
of loading the full instruction set. This type of optimization is similar to the
"computerized method of optimally controlling transfer, storage and retrieval
of data between cache and hard disk storage devices such that the most fre-
quently used data is readily available."78 Since this method is optimizing the
access of data for increased access speed, this claim satisfies the statutory
requirements of § 101.79
After meeting the requirements of § 101, patent practitioners also have
to ensure that the method claim meets the requirements of § 112.80 This in-
cludes satisfying the first paragraph of § 112, which requires that the inven-
tion is fully and clearly disclosed, that the description is enabling, and that
the best mode is disclosed.81 In addition, the second paragraph of § 112 must
also be satisfied. This includes claiming the applicant's invention and speci-
fying the proper bounds of the invention. 2 In addition, patent practitioners
should be aware of the common rejections under § 1023 and § 103.84 Ac-
cordingly, patent practitioners drafting software patents have many concerns
to ensure that the patent application will not be rejected and that the inventor
will receive the broadest application of the claims.
B. Apparatus
After State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group,
Inc.,8' apparatus claims in software patents are not as limited by the type of
software that is being implemented on the apparatus, but whether the appara-
tus accomplishes "a useful, concrete, and tangible result., 86  Apparatus
claims also have to be "directed to a specific apparatus of practical utility and
76. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
77. Patent 6,763,397, supra note 75.
78. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-18.
79. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
80. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
81. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-163.
82. Id. at 2100-203.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
84. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
85. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
86. Id, at 1373 (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544).
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specified application. 87 Thus, apparatus claims have the same type of limi-
tation as method claims. One benefit to an apparatus claim is that the burden
of proving utility may be a little lower because the hardware aspect of the
apparatus would in itself lend a type of machine that may qualify under
§ 101.88 Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that "[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. '89 Thus,
patent practitioners need to ensure that the apparatus claims meet the re-
quirement of "a useful, concrete, and tangible result."9
One way the requirement for "a useful, concrete, and tangible result" is
met is to ensure a relationship between the hardware devices and software
implementation.9' "If it appears that the mathematical algorithm is imple-
mented in a specific manner to define structural relationships between the
physical elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine . . . , the
claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster under § 101 .,92 The
following example is claim fifteen of U.S. Patent No. 6,763,397:
15. A verification apparatus comprising:
a computer readable storage medium for storing a module of a computer
program;
a memory into which a module is loaded;
a processor configured to ascertain whether checking an instruction in a
first module that is loaded requires information in a referenced module dif-
ferent than the first module, to determine whether the referenced module is
already loaded if the information is required, to write a constraint for the
referenced module without loading the referenced module if the referenced
module is determined to be not already loaded, and to verify the instruction
in the first module, wherein verifying comprises placing a list including a
referenced type defined in a not-yet-loaded module and a different type at a
fixed position in a merged snapshot.93
87. Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1061 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
88. § 101.
89. Id.
90. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
91. Id.
92. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 906 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758,
767 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
93. Patent 6,763,397, supra note 75.
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One issue for claim fifteen of U.S. Patent No. 6,763,397 is whether the
result is "useful, concrete, and tangible. 94 This analysis is similar to the
analysis for method claims. In this regard, the claim is accomplishing some-
thing besides pushing ones and zeros around. 95 The claim is loading and
verifying modules in the apparatus for verification purposes and thus seems
to accomplish a result that is not just an algorithm.
In addition, the verification apparatus of claim fifteen of U.S. Patent
No. 6,763,397 comprises the hardware devices which then have instructions
that are loaded into the hardware. 96 Then verification is done on the mod-
ule.97 The hardware devices are the computer-readable storage medium, the
memory, and the processor.98 All of these hardware devices are linked to the
software because the software is just contained on the hardware devices.99
The software is simply telling the hardware what to do and is thus acting as a
machine.
The following example is claim one of U.S. Patent No. 5,249,290:
1. A server apparatus for accessing one or more common re-
sources using a plurality of server processes to which client service
requests are assigned, said server apparatus comprising
means for receiving an unassigned client service request.., and
means ... for assigning said unassigned received client service
request to a server process having a workload indication which
is less than the workload indication of all other server proc-
esses.
100
The first issue for claim one of U.S. Patent No. 5,249,290 is whether the
result is "useful, concrete, and tangible."10 ' In this regard, claim one falls
within the method claim examples in that the server apparatus is rearranging
the workload between the servers to optimize the efficiency between serv-
ers.'0 2 Accordingly, apparatus claims that are similar in result to method
claims fall within the same categories and thus meet the statutory require-
ments in the same way as method claims. In addition, other types of appara-
94. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
95. See Patent 6,763,397, supra note 75
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. United States Patent No. 5,249,290 (issued Sept. 28, 1993) [hereinafter Patent
5,249,290].
101. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
102. See Patent 5,249,290, supra note 100; see MPEP, supra note 21, at 2 100-18.
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tus claims are computer, system, and means-plus-function claims. °3 These
claim types are apparatus claims because they are all part of the machine
category in that they are hardware that utilizes software to accomplish a
goal."°
1. Computer
Computer claims are a subtype of apparatus claims because the com-
puter is simply a type of specialized apparatus. The following example is
claim nineteen of U.S. Patent No. 5,249,290:
19. A computer network comprising
a server apparatus,
a plurality of client apparatuses connected to said server apparatus
... said server apparatus comprising
table means...
means for receiving an unassigned client service request...
means ... for accessing said table means to select in which range
said total number of client service requests lies and thus the
number of client service requests or workload that can be as-
signed to each server process, and
means, . . . , for assigning said unassigned received client service
request to a server process having a workload indicator which is
less than the workload indicator of all other server processes.
5
The first issue for claim nineteen of United States Patent No. 5,249,290
is whether the result is "useful, concrete, and tangible."'0 6 The first consid-
eration is what is being accomplished by the claim. Claim nineteen is as-
signing the workload to different servers according to a workload indica-
tor.10 7 This is similar to allowed method claims because the result is directly
affecting the efficiency between servers."' Thus, this computer claim is ac-
complishing "a useful, concrete, and tangible result."'09
103. See MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-14.
104. See id.
105. Patent 5,249,290, supra note 100.
106. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
107. Patent 5,249,290, supra note 100.
108. See MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-18.
109. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
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2. System
A second subtype of apparatus claims is system claims. System claims
are a subtype of apparatus claims because the system is simply a type of spe-
cialized apparatus. The following example is claim forty-two of United
States Patent No. 5,878,434:
42. A system for clash handling comprising:
a first computer;
a second computer connected to the first computer by a network
link, the first computer and the second computer each containing
a replica of a distributed database;
means for merging out a representation of operations performed on
the first computer and applying at least a portion of the opera-
tions to the second replica;
means for merging in a representation of operations performed on
the second computer and applying at least a portion of the opera-
tions to the first computer replica;
means for detecting persistent clashes during at least one of the
merging steps; and
means for recovering from at least a portion of the detected persis-
tent clashes." 0
The first issue for claim forty-two of U.S. Patent No. 5,878,434 is
whether the result is "useful, concrete, and tangible." ''1 Claim forty-two is
similar to method claims that increase the efficiency between computers ex-
cept that this claim increases the efficiency by fixing the conflicts between
the databases."' Accordingly, this claim was allowed by the USPTO and
seems to meet the statutory requirements for software patents." 
3
3. Means-Plus-Function
A third subtype of apparatus claims is a means-plus-function claim. A
means-plus-function claim is a subtype of apparatus claims because it is a
type of machine, but the difference is that the machine is described by its
function instead of a given name. Since the means-plus-function claim gets
meaning from how it is described, the description of means-plus-function
110. United States Patent No. 5,878,434 (issued Mar. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Patent
5,878,434].
111. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
112. Patent 5,878,434, supra note 110; see MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-18.
113. See Patent 5,878,434, supra note 110; see MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-18.
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claims in the specification is important because without an adequate descrip-
tion, the means-plus-function claims may be rejected.114 In this regard, para-
graph six of§ 112 states:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the re-
cital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, ma-
terial, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof. 5
In B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories,'16 the court held that a
"structure disclosed in the specification is 'corresponding' structure only if
the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that struc-
ture to the function recited in the claim."' 1 7 In addition, the court stated:
[I]f one employs means-plus-function language in a claim, one
must set forth in the specification an adequate disclosure showing
what is meant by that language. If an applicant fails to set forth an
adequate disclosure, the applicant has in effect failed to particu-
larly point out and distinctly claim the invention as required by the
second paragraph of section 112.' 18
Patent practitioners need to be concerned that the claim and specifica-
tion are linked in such a manner that "particularly point[s] out and distinctly
claim[s] that particular means.""' 9 Thus, it is vital to the software patent ap-
plication that the patent practitioner ensures all means-plus-function claims
are properly supported in the specification of the application. Another aspect
of this requirement is that the "interpretation of what is disclosed must be
made in light of the knowledge of one skilled in the art.' 120 This interpreta-
tion is limited to "whether one of skill in the art would understand the speci-
fication itself to disclose the structure, not simply whether that person would
be capable of implementing that structure.''
114. MPEP, supra note 2 1, at 2100-221.
115. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
116. 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
117. Id. at 1424.
118. Id. at 1425 (quoting In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
119. Id.
120. Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
121. Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1212 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (citing Atmel Corp., 198 F.3d at 1382).
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To reiterate, the following example is claim forty-two of United States
Patent No. 5,878,434:
42. A system for clash handling comprising:
a first computer;
a second computer connected to the first computer by a network
link, the first computer and the second computer each containing
a replica of a distributed database;
means for merging out a representation of operations performed on
the first computer and applying at least a portion of the opera-
tions to the second replica;
means for merging in a representation of operations performed on
the second computer and applying at least a portion of the opera-
tions to the first computer replica;
means for detecting persistent clashes during at least one of the
merging steps; and
means for recovering from at least a portion of the detected persis-
tent clashes.
122
The means-plus-function terminology is further defined in the specifica-
tion of U.S. Patent No. 5,878,434:
Synchronization of the database replicas is performed after the
computers are reconnected. Synchronization includes a "merging
out" step, a "merging in" step, and one or more clash handling
steps. During the merging out step, operations performed on the
first computer are transmitted to the second computer and applied
to the second replica. During the merging in step, operations per-
formed on the second computer are transmitted to the first com-
puter and applied to the first replica.' 
23
The first issue is to ensure that the means-plus-function claim is prop-
erly supported in the specification. 24 Claim forty-two of United States Pat-
ent No. 5,878,434 discusses a means for merging operations on computers. 25
The specification of United States Patent No. 5,878,434 then discusses how
this merging cooperation is accomplished between the computers.2 6 Thus,
the specification is supporting the means-plus-function part of claim forty-
two and satisfies the requirements of statutory and case law.
122. Patent 5,878,434, supra note 110.
123. Id.
124. See B. Braun Med., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1425 (quoting Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d at 1195).
125. Patent 5,878,434, supra note 110.
126. Id.
[Vol. 29:3:693
281
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
SOFTWARE TERMINOLOGY
The second issue is "whether one of skill in the art would understand
the specification itself to disclose the structure, not simply whether that per-
son would be capable of implementing that structure.' 27 This issue is impor-
tant practically because one skilled in the art depends on the exact field of art
that is being described. Claim forty-two of United States Patent No.
5,878,434 is about database operations.1 28  Thus, the knowledge of one
skilled in the art of databases would need to be examined to ensure the speci-
fication fully describes the invention. In this case, the specification describes
in detail the process of the merging operation while not describing the com-
munication between the two computers. 129 Failing to state how the two com-
puters communicate is not critical because one skilled in the art of com-
puters-and especially databases-would understand the specification with-
out describing in exact detail the communication used between the two com-
puters.
The following example is claim one of United States Patent No.
5,249,290:
1. A server apparatus for accessing one or more common re-
sources using a plurality of server processes to which client service
requests are assigned, said server apparatus comprising
means for receiving an unassigned client service request request-
ing access to one of said common resources and
means, responsive to a workload indication from each server proc-
ess, each workload indication being less than a maximum work-
load for that server process, for assigning said unassigned re-
ceived client service request to a server process having a work-
load indication which is less than the workload indication of all
other server processes.130
Claim one of United States Patent No. 5,249,290 is another example of
a means-plus-function claim.13' The means-plus-function aspect of this
claim is part of the server apparatus. This claim is simply an example of a
means-plus-function claim and no relation to the requirements of means-
plus-function claims is reviewed.
127. Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp., 344 F.3d at 1212 (citing Atmel, 198 F.3d
at 1382).
128. Patent 5,878,434, supra note 110.
129. Id.
130. Patent 5,249,290, supra note 100.
131. Id.
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C. Computer-Readable Medium
Computer-readable medium claims are important because they are part
of the holistic protection of software. Without computer-readable medium
claims, a competitor could copy software and avoid infringement until the
program was executed. With computer-readable medium claims, the patent
is infringed when the program is copied onto the medium. Accordingly,
computer-readable medium claims are very important to ensure the holistic
protection of software. In addition, there are two subtypes of computer-
readable medium claims. These two subtypes are computer program product
and articles of manufacture.
"[C]omputer programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy
diskettes, are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and must be
examined under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.,,132 Computer-readable medium
claims must relate to a functional matter that has "a useful, concrete, and
tangible result." '33 One claim that produced "a useful, concrete, and tangible
result"'134 was a "claim to data structure stored on a computer-readable me-
dium that increases computer efficiency held statutory."' 35 "When nonfunc-
tional descriptive material is recorded on some computer-readable medium,
it is not statutory since no requisite functionality is present to satisfy the
practical application requirement. Merely claiming nonfunctional descrip-
tive material stored in a computer-readable medium does not make it statu-
tory. 13
6
In addition, patent practitioners should carefully draft software patent
claims that utilize data structures and computer programs. "Data structures
not claimed as embodied in computer-readable media are descriptive mate-
rial per se and are not statutory because they are not capable of causing func-
tional change in the computer." 137 "Similarly, computer programs claimed as
computer listings per se ... are not physical 'things."" 38
The following example is claim thirty-one of U.S. Patent No.
5,878,434:
31. A computer-readable storage medium having a configuration
that represents data and instructions which cause a first computer
132. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
133. See Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
134. Id.
135. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-12 (citing In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84 (Fed.
Cir. 1994)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2100-13 (citing In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
138. Id.
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and a second computer connected by a network link to perform
method steps for handling clashes, the first computer and the sec-
ond computer each containing a replica of a distributed database,
the method comprising the steps of:
merging out a representation of operations performed on the first
computer by applying at least a portion of the operations to the
second replica;
merging in a representation of operations performed on the sec-
ond computer by applying at least a portion of the operations to
the first computer replica;
detecting persistent clashes during at least one of the merging
steps; and
recovering from at least a portion of the detected persistent
clashes.
39
The first issue is whether the claim produces "a useful, concrete, and
tangible result."' 4°  The computer-readable storage medium embodies a
method of preventing database clashes. 4 ' Thus, the method of preventing
database clashes is increasing the efficiency of database operations by detect-
ing and attempting to recover from clashes.'42
The second issue is whether the claim contains data structures or com-
puter programs not embodied into a computer-readable storage medium.
Claim thirty-one contains a computer program that is embodied in the com-
puter-readable storage medium. 43 Thus, the computer program is not stand-
ing on its own without a hardware implementation and satisfies the require-
ments of patent law.
1. Computer Program Product
One subtype of a computer-readable storage medium is a computer pro-
gram product. A computer program product is a medium similar to a storage
medium. The following example is claim nine of United States Patent No.
6,763,397:
9. A computer program product for verifying a module of a com-
puter program, the product comprising:
a computer readable storage medium;
139. Patent 5,878,434, supra note 10.
140. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
141. Patent 5,878,434, supra note 10.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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computer controlling commands, stored on the computer read-
able storage medium, for ascertaining whether checking an in-
struction in a first module that is loaded requires information in
a referenced module different than the first module, for deter-
mining whether the referenced module is already loaded if the
information is required, for writing a constraint for the refer-
enced module without loading the referenced module if the ref-
erenced module is not already loaded, and for verifying the in-
struction in the first module, the verifying comprising placing a
list including a referenced type defined in a not-yet-loaded
module and a different type at a fixed position in a merged
snapshot.144
The same issues that were addressed in a computer-readable storage
medium have to be addressed in a computer program product. The first issue
is whether the claim produces "a useful, concrete, and tangible result."
1 45
The claim checks, verifies, and obtains information for a module. 146 This
produces a result that meets the requirements because the result increases the
efficiency of the machine. The second issue is whether the claim contains
data structures or computer programs not embodied into a computer program
product. This claim embodies the computer program into the hardware ele-
ment and thus meets the requirements under the controlling case law. 14' Ac-
cordingly, computer program products are simply another way to write com-
puter-readable medium claims.
2. Article of Manufacture
Another subtype of computer-readable medium claims is article of
manufacture claims. This type of claim has to meet the same requirements
as a computer-readable medium claim although the burden may be a little
less when the article of manufacture falls under the definition of machine in
§ 101.'4 "If a claim defines a useful machine or manufacture by identifying
the physical structure of the machine or manufacture in terms of its hardware
or hardware and software combination, it defines a statutory product."'
149
144. Patent 6,763,397, supra note 75.
145. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
146. Patent 6,763,397, supra note 75.
147. See MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-12.
148. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
149. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-14.
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This seemingly lower burden may help in claim allowance, but the claim still
has to produce "a useful, concrete, and tangible result.""15
The following example is claim three of United States Patent No.
6,760,799:
3. An article of manufacture comprising a computing-device
readable medium having encoded thereon instructions to direct a
processor to perform the operations of:
queuing a first network traffic unit having an associated origin;
receiving a second network traffic unit having an associated ori-
gin, and receiving subsequent network traffic units each having
an associated origins;
comparing said origins of said first and second network traffic
units; and
if said origins differ, then queuing said second unit, else inter-
rupting a host processor for the first unit and the second unit,
and interrupting the host processor for each one of the subse-
quent network traffic units consecutively received after the
second network traffic unit if said subsequent network traffic
units are determined to be substantially received from said ori-
gin of said second network traffic unit.1
51
Claim three is similar to computer-readable medium claims because it is
comprised of "a computing-device readable medium."'52 In addition, it is
similar to a method claim because it is accomplishing a method on the article
of manufacture.'53 This claim compares received information and retrans-
mits if the buffers do not match. 54 In this regard, claim three is increasing
efficiency of the transfer operation and thus produces "a useful, concrete, and
tangible result."'15 5 Accordingly, article of manufacture claims are another
type of claim that can be utilized for software patents.
III. CONCLUSION
This article sets forth the reasons why patent practitioners who draft
software patents should be knowledgeable about the different terminology
that can be utilized in describing software technology. The three main types
150. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
151. Patent No. 6,760,799 (issued July 6, 2004).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
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of software claims are method claims, apparatus claims, and computer-
readable medium claims. Each of these claim types has subtypes that can be
utilized in properly claiming the software invention. Accordingly, there are
many choices for describing the software invention, but each type of claim
has its own advantages and disadvantages.
The optimum protection of software inventions comes from the use of
the three main types of software claims. The use of method, apparatus, and
computer-readable medium claims each have their own advantages in light
of meeting the statutory and case law requirements and when used in the
offensive or defensive infringement stance. Method claims are useful since
most software inventions are implemented in the computer via an algorithm.
Method claims describe these algorithms in an efficient way. In addition,
since software inventors are familiar with algorithms, they are more likely to
understand the specification describing the claims, the method claims, and
the respective diagrams. Accordingly, method claims are an excellent tool in
describing software inventions.
Apparatus claims are also well suited to describe software inventions
since software is implemented on computer hardware devices. Since the
computer hardware is an apparatus, there is a direct correlation between the
apparatus that is stated and the hardware that is utilized in a software inven-
tion. Two of the subtypes of apparatus claims are types of computer hard-
ware described in computer terminology. Means-plus-function claims are
useful in software inventions because some types of means do not have a
definition that is well known in the field of art, and thus the function of the
means can give a better description of the component than an artificially de-
fined word. Accordingly, apparatus claims have the benefit of being closely
related to the hardware that most software inventions are implemented.
Computer-readable medium claims provide protection to software in-
ventors to decrease the copying of patented software.1 16 Without computer-
readable medium claims, it is possible for the patented software to be copied
and sold without infringement.'57 The only infringement with only method
claims and possibly apparatus claims would occur when the software is exe-
cuted, and thus the method or apparatus is infringed. With computer-
readable medium claims, the copying of the claimed software will infringe
the patent when the software is copied onto the computer-readable medium.
Thus, computer-readable medium claims have an important protection aspect
to software patents.
156. MPEP, supra note 21, at 2100-12.
157. See id.
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Patent practitioners who draft software patents should utilize each of the
main types of claims when drafting a software patent application. In addi-
tion, patent practitioners should pay special attention to the claim types to
ensure that each of the special requirements for each type are satisfied in the
specification of the patent application. For example, means-plus-function
claims have to contain a disclosure of the structure in the specification.'58
Thus, a "structure disclosed in the specification is 'corresponding' structure
only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that
structure to the function recited in the claim." '59 Accordingly, the use of the
claim types necessitates an understanding of the requirements.
One commonality between all three of the main types of claims used in
software patents is that the claim must have "some type of practical applica-
tion, i.e., 'a useful, concrete and tangible result. '-160 In making this determi-
nation, the concern for software is not "which of the four categories of sub-
ject matter a claim is directed to-process, machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter-but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject
matter, in particular, its practical utility.' ' 6 Thus, patent practitioners do not
have to be concerned about fitting into the box of the four categories but
must be concerned with the overall result of the claim.
In conclusion, all three types of claims are important for the protection
of software patents. The use of all three together helps obtain a holistic pro-
tection mechanism for the software. This article gives an overview of the
pitfalls that patent practitioners should be aware of when drafting the differ-
ent types of claims. Patent practitioners who draft software patents have
many issues that are of concern when drafting the patent application, but the
use of all three types of claims will maximize the protection of the software.
158. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
159. Id. at 1424.
160. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
161. Id. at 1375.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Horizontal "privity"1 in a breach of warranty lawsuit refers to non-
purchasing plaintiffs who are outside the chain of distribution between the
original seller and ultimate purchaser. 2 Section 2-318 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("U.C.C.") extends warranty coverage on the sale of goods to
such non-purchasing plaintiffs and permits them to sue as third-party benefi-
* Author received her B.S. in Public Relations from the University of Florida and is a
2006 J.D. Candidate from Nova Southeastern University. She would like to thank her family,
Bryan Weinsztok, and friends for their love and support during the writing of this article. She
also would like to thank Professor Michael Richmond for sparking her interest on this topic.
1. See generally BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT
WARRANTIES 10.01 (1984) (defining privity as "a direct contractual relationship between
plaintiff and defendant, and reflects the fact that warranty is at least partly based upon notions
of contract").
2. Id.at 10.01[l].
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ciaries to a purchaser's warranties.3 Titled "Third Party Beneficiaries of
Warranties Express or Implied," section 2-318 provides three alternatives for
states to adopt and gives plaintiffs standing in a breach of warranty action.4
Most jurisdictions have adopted Alternative A,5 which limits the extension of
a "seller's warranty whether express or implied . ..to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods."6 Since most Alternative A jurisdictions only extend warranty
protection to the class of persons specifically mentioned in section 2-318,
employees are generally denied beneficiary standing, because they are not
among the protected class of a seller's warranties.7 However, the ambiguous
language of Official Comment 3 to section 2-318 allows the state's judiciary
to expand warranty protection beyond the enumerated list.8 Since Official
Comment 3 to section 2-318 literally states that the section is "neutral" be-
yond providing warranty protection to the enumerated class, and since it
permits the courts to decide emerging issues of privity, courts interpreting
the section as "neutral" to extending warranty coverage beyond the pur-
3. U.C.C. § 2-318 (2001).
4. Id. Section 2-318 of the U.C.C. provides:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may rea-
sonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the war-
ranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to
the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
Id.
5. 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-318:2 (2001).
Alternative A has been adopted in ... Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Co-
lumbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Id.
6. § 2-318.
7. Diane L. Schmauder, Annotation, Third-Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Under
UCC § 2-318, 50 A.L.R.5th 327, 349 (1997).
8. John F. Kamin, Note, The Extension of Implied Warranty Protection to Employees of
a Purchaser; Whitaker v. Lian Feng Machine Co., 156 1ll. App. 3d 316 509 N.E.2d 591 (1st
Dist. 1987), 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 123, 125 (1989).
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chaser's family, household, and houseguests afford third-party beneficiary
standing to employees.9
Out of all jurisdictions that have adopted Alternative A, only Florida
has expanded the list of third-party beneficiaries by amending section
672.318 of the Florida Statutes to expressly extend warranty coverage to an
"employee, servant or agent of his or her buyer."'" Since jurisdictions are
split regarding whether employees should receive warranty protection under
Alternative A, this article will survey and analyze various jurisdictions that
afford or deny employees standing as third-party beneficiaries to their em-
ployer's warranties. Part II of this article will provide an overview of section
2-318. Part III will analyze section 2-318, Alternative A and evaluate the
class of potential plaintiffs who can recover against a seller for breach of
warranty. Further, Part IV will analyze section 672.318 of the Florida Stat-
utes. Part V will explore the case law of jurisdictions that deny warranty
coverage to employees under section 2-318, Alternative A. Part VI will pre-
sent case law of jurisdictions allowing employees to recover against a seller
for breach of warranties. Finally, Part VII will evaluate whether employees
should be considered third-party beneficiaries under Alternative A and offer
solutions to bring uniformity among the jurisdictions.
II. OVERVIEW OF U.C.C. SECTION 2-318
The original version of section 2-318 was enacted in 1952 and provided
warranty protection for the buyer's family, household, and house guests."
The purpose of the U.C.C. was "to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions.' 2 However, the states viewed this version as a limitation on
the realm of potential plaintiffs who could sue a seller for breach of warran-
ties. 13 As a result, many states adopted their own versions and variations of
section 2-318.'4 In response to the states' rampant opposition and changes to
section 2-318, the drafters of the section amended section 2-318 in 1966 to
offer the states three alternatives. 5 The 1952 version became Alternative A,
Alternative B was added to extend the class of potential plaintiffs beyond the
enumerated class in Alternative A, and Alternative C was added for an even
more liberal approach to allow non-privity plaintiffs to sue as third-party
9. § 2-318 cmt. 3.
10. FLA. STAT. § 672.318 (2004).
11. CLARK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 10.01[2][b].
12. 1 I-AWKLAND, supra note 5, at § 2-318:1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. § 2-318.
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beneficiaries of warranties.16 Official Comment 2 to section 2-318 was
added to illustrate the drafter's intent and stated:
The purpose of this section is to give certain beneficiaries the
benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received in the con-
tract of sale, thereby freeing any such beneficiaries from any tech-
nical rules as to "privity." It seeks to accomplish this purpose
without any derogation of any right or remedy resting on negli-
gence. It rests primarily upon the merchant-seller's warranty 17 un-
der this Article that the goods sold are merchantable and fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used rather than the
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 18 Implicit in the sec-
tion is that any beneficiary of a warranty may bring a direct action
for breach of warranty against the seller whose warranty extends to
him. 19
Although code commentaries are not authoritative law for courts to ap-
ply, they are both helpful and compelling when construing the provisions.2"
Official Comment 3 to section 2-318 addresses the privity issue by stating:
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its
provisions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Be-
yond this, the section in this form is neutral and is not intended to
16. Id.
17. U.C.C. section 2-314 provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchant-
able is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind ....
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quan-
tity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise from
course of dealing or usage of trade.
§ 2-314.
18. U.C.C. section 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which
the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under [section 2-316] an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
§ 2-315.
19. § 2-318 cmt. 2.
20. Kamin, supra note 8.
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enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons
in the distributive chain.2' The second alternative is designed for
states where the case law has already developed further and for
those that desire to expand the class of beneficiaries. The third al-
ternative goes further, following the trend of modem decisions as
indicated by Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A ... in extending the
rule beyond injuries to the person.22
Alternative A limits the class of persons who can be in "horizontal priv-
ity"23 but leaves issues of "vertical privity" 24 for the courts to determine on a
case-by-case basis.25 Alternative B eliminates both horizontal and vertical
privity in regard to "natural person[s] who may reasonably be expected to
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who [are] injured in person by
breach of the warranty. 26 Alternative C takes an even more liberal approach
by affording warranty protection to "any person who may reasonably be ex-
pected to use, consume or be affected by the goods" and allowing recovery
for pure economic loss.27  In adopting one of the alternatives provided by
section 2-318, a state's legislature has established its sphere of horizontal
privity. 8
III. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE A
Recall that Alternative A states:
21. See § 2-103. The term "distributive chain" is not defined in § 2-103. Id. Therefore,
it is unclear whether "distributive chain" refers to those who are in vertical or horizontal priv-
ity with the buyer. William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-
Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-
318 (Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L. REv. 1215, 1258 (1993).
22. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (1999).
23. 3A LARy LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 324 (3d ed.
2002). "'Horizontal privity' addresses the issue as to whether a seller is liable to persons,
other than the buyer, who use the goods." Id.
24. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 742 (1996). Vertical privity "includes all parties
in the distributive chain from the initial supplier of the product to the ultimate purchaser." Id.
25. 3A LAWRENCE, supra note 23. See generally Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509
N.E.2d 591 (I11. App. Ct. 1987).
26. § 2-318, Alternative B.
27. § 2-318, Alternative C. "[I]n a products-liability suit, economic loss includes the cost
of repair or replacement of defective property, as well as commercial loss for the property's
inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (2d
Pocket ed. 2001).
28. See Teel v. Am. Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 345 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
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A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not ex-
29
clude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative A limits the class of potential plaintiffs in five ways.3" First,
the section only extends warranty protection to "natural persons."'" This
means that corporations, partnerships, and businesses cannot recover under
Alternative A.32 Second, the section only allows recovery if the plaintiff
sustains a personal injury.33 Therefore, non-purchasing plaintiffs cannot re-
cover under Alternative A if they only sustained an economic loss. Third,
the language of Alternative A limits the class of non-privity plaintiffs to
those who are in the buyer's family, household, or guests in his home.34 In
adopting Alternative A, a state's legislature indicates an intention to only
extend warranty coverage to the limited classes included in the statute.3 5
Therefore, a buyer's employees are not likely to recover in an Alternative A
jurisdiction since they are not among the third-party beneficiaries contem-
plated by the drafters of the Code. Fourth, Alternative A limits the class of
defendants to direct sellers by expressly stating that the seller's warranty
extends to any natural person "of his buyer. 3 6 However, Official Comment
3 has been interpreted to give courts the discretion to resolve issues of verti-
cal privity and expand the potential class of defendants. 37 Further, the last
sentence of Alternative A, stating that "[a] seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section, '31 forbids the "exclusion of liability by the seller to
the persons to whom the warranties which he has made to his buyer would
extend under this section. ' 39 Finally, Alternative A narrows the class of po-
tential plaintiffs by only allowing the enumerated class to recover if it is
29. § 2-318, Alternative A.
30. 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 5, at 2-318:1, 2-318:2.
31. Id. at § 2-318:1.
32. Id. at § 2-318:2.
33. Id.
34. id.
35. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d § 21:12 (1987).
36. § 2-318, Alternative A.
37. See Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 57-58 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
38. § 2-318, Alternative A.
39. § 2-318 cmt. 1.
[Vol. 29:3:721
294
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/1
ARE EMPLOYEES "A " O.K?
"reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods."4
A prevalent discrepancy among Alternative A jurisdictions is whether
warranty coverage should expand beyond the list of persons expressly in-
cluded in the text of Alternative A.4" A compelling justification for this dis-
crepancy is found in the ambiguous language of Official Comment 3.42 The
problematic language of Official Comment 3 that leads courts to different
interpretations is as follows:
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its
provisions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Be-
yond this, the section in this form is neutral and is not intended to
enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons
in the distributive chain.43
Jurisdictions that take a strict construction approach to interpreting sec-
tion 2-318 only extend warranty protection to the purchaser's family, house-
hold, and guests since "adoption of Alternative A by the legislature indicates
a conscious decision to limit the seller's liability for breach of warranty to
the specific classes enumerated therein. 4 4 These jurisdictions interpret Offi-
cial Comment 3 "as an exhaustive list of the non[-]purchasers whom the
drafters have freed from the privity requirement."45  Therefore, in giving
such a narrow reading of the section, these jurisdictions have held that nei-
ther employees 46 nor innocent bystanders 47 can recover as third-party benefi-
ciaries to a seller's warranty.
40. § 2-318, Alternative A. See McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So. 2d 563,
566-67 (Fla. 1962) (holding that a minor who was injured on playground equipment pur-
chased by his father was "a naturally intended and reasonably contemplated beneficiary of the
warranty of fitness for use or merchantability implied by law" since the father purchased the
equipment for the son's use).
41. Stallworth, supra note 21, at 1257.
42. Id.
43. § 2-318 cmt. 3.
44. 63 AM. JuR. 2DProducts Liability § 751 (1996).
45. Stallworth, supra note 21, at 1257.
46. 3A LAWRENCE, supra note 23, at 344. Employees are protected under both Altema-
tive B and Alternative C if it is reasonable to expect the employee to "use, consume or be
affected by the goods" since Alternative B extends this coverage to any natural person and
Alternative C extends such coverage to anyone. Id. at 324. Therefore, privity of contract
between the employer and those in vertical distribution is irrelevant in jurisdictions adopting
Alternatives B or C, and employees are generally deemed third-party beneficiaries. Id. at 326.
47. See Crews v. W.A. Brown & Son, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 924, 930-31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding a church member, who was injured while trapped inside a freezer in the church, was
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In contrast to the strict construction approach, jurisdictions relying on
the phrase "[b]eyond this, the section in this form is neutral" of Official
Comment 348 have held "the coverage of UCC [section] 2-3 18 may be ex-
panded beyond that adopted by the legislature."49 Since the phrase "[b]eyond
this" could be interpreted to refer to the purchaser's family, household, and
guests, the "neutral" clause could mean the Code is impartial to expanding
the class of plaintiffs who can qualify for warranty protection further than the
enumerated list.50  Therefore, Official Comment 3 could be interpreted to
mean the buyer's family members, household, and houseguests are the
minimum class of non-privity plaintiffs who are afforded warranty protec-
tion, but developments in case law will not limit the expansion of horizontal
privity." Additionally, the Code's failure to define the term "distributive
chain" in section 2-10352 creates an ambiguity as to whether the section is
"neutral" in expanding vertical or horizontal privity.53 Employees have also
been denied standing in a warranty action if their injuries were covered by
worker's compensation54 or if the court dismissed their action because they
could recover under the theories of negligence or strict tort liability.55
not entitled to maintain a breach of implied warranty cause of action because plaintiff was
neither a member of the church's "family," "household," or a guest in the church's home since
a church is not considered a home and does not have a "family" or "household").
48. § 2-318 cmt. 3.
49. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 752 (1996). See Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft
Div., 505 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (D. Conn. 1981). The Quadrini panel stated: "This court is not
persuaded that the adoption of Alternative A ... evinces a clear legislative intent to preclude
all other persons but those in the family, household, or a guest from seeking warranty cover-
age." Id. This holding was especially accurate in light of an amendment to U.C.C. section 2-
318 when the court stated "[t]his section is neutral with respect to case law or statutory law
extending warranties for personal injuries to other persons." Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §
42a-2-318 (1996)).
50. Walter K. Swartzkopf, Note, Products Liability: Employees and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Section 2-318, 68 DICK. L. REv. 444,451 (1964).
51. Id.
52. § 2-103 (1999).
53. Stallworth, supra note 21, at 1258.
54. See Sutton v. Major Prods. Co., 372 S.E.2d 897, 899 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
55. See Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1975). Strict tort liability in a
products liability action is governed by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, which
provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 672.318 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES
Out of the twenty-nine jurisdictions that have adopted Alternative A,
only Florida has expressly expanded the enumerated class of Alternative A to
include employees in section 672.318 of the Florida Statutes. 6 Section
672.318 provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his or her
buyer, who is a guest in his or her home or who is an employee,
servant or agent of his or her buyer if it is reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude nor limit the operation of this section.
57
Although section 672.318 extends warranty coverage beyond the
buyer's family, household, or houseguests, issues of privity regarding plain-
tiffs who are not expressly included in the statute are still decided on "a case
by case basis after a thorough analysis of the facts and considering what
would be a natural expansion of the law in this area. 58 Like other jurisdic-
tions that have adopted Alternative A, Florida courts rely on the Official
Code Comments of section 2-318 in considering whether privity should be
extended beyond the enumerated class. 9 Just as Alternative A only provides
warranty coverage to natural persons who have sustained a personal injury,
section 672.318 also denies corporations, businesses, or partnerships who
have suffered an economic loss the ability to sue as third-party beneficiaries
of contracts.6" Finally, the non-purchasing plaintiff must be a foreseeable
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
56. FLA. STAT. § 672.318 (2004); See generally STATE U.C.C. VARIATIONS, U.C.C. REP.
SERV. (West 1998).
57. § 672.318.
58. Barry v. Ivarson Inc., 249 So. 2d 44, 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (holding lessees
of a residence who were injured by a table in that residence purchased by the lessors from the
defendant were not third-party beneficiaries since lessees were "not within the category of
third-party beneficiaries as contemplated in [Florida Statutes] § 672.318" and "there [was] a
question of foresecability").
59. Id.
60. See Downriver Internists v. Harris Corp., 929 F.2d 1147, 1150 (6th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing a partnership was not a third-party beneficiary of contracts under Florida law and could
not recover economic damages for breach of warranty).
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user of the product to recover as a third-party beneficiary to a seller's war-
ranties.61
V. CASE LAW: JURISDICTIONS DENYING EMPLOYEES WARRANTY
COVERAGE
Not only are jurisdictions split regarding the issue of whether a pur-
chaser's employees should qualify as third-party beneficiaries to their seller's
warranties, but the courts differ regarding why this issue should be answered
in the negative. In Teel v. American Steel Foundries,6 2 the court, in applying
Missouri law, used a strict construction approach to Missouri's Alternative A
statute and held that an employee was neither in privity with the employer's
seller, nor within the class of enumerated persons the statute intended as a
third-party beneficiary.63 The court in Hester v. Purex Corp.64 used legisla-
tive intent for adopting Alternative A instead of Alternatives B or C, which
bars issues of horizontal privity altogether, and denied employees standing as
third-party beneficiaries to their employers' warranties. 65 The Hester court
further held that employees are not without a remedy and could recover un-
der the theories of negligence or strict tort liability. 66 Further, the court in
Sutton v. Major Products Co.67 held that a grocery store employee was barred
from bringing a breach of warranty suit against a manufacturer because she
was covered under worker's compensation insurance.6 8
A. Teel v. American Steel Foundries
The court in Teel faced an issue of first impression-specifically, whether
horizontal privity can be expanded beyond the buyer's family members,
household, or houseguests, in Missouri.69 The plaintiff in Teel was injured
when a defective wheel on the tractor he was operating disengaged the trailer
from the tractor, causing him to lose control and crash.7" Consequently, he
sued to recover as a third-party beneficiary to the contracts between his em-
ployer and the seller of the tractor containing the defective wheel, and be-
61. McCarthy v. Fla. Ladder Co., 295 So. 2d 707, 709 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
62. 529 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
63. Id. at 345-46.
64. 534 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1975).
65. Id. at 1308.
66. Id.
67. 372 S.E.2d 897 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
68. Id. at 899.
69. Teel, 529 F. Supp at 345.
70. Id. at 340.
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tween his employer and the manufacturer of the wheel.7 The defendants
moved to dismiss due to lack of privity.
7 2
Missouri's Legislature has adopted Alternative A verbatim in creating
section 400.2-318 of the Missouri Statutes, which "allows recovery to a very
limited class of non-privity parties. 7 3 The plaintiff insisted that the court
ignore the privity issue and follow the decision in Groppel Co. v. United
States Gypsum Co., where a remote purchaser was able to recover against a
manufacturer based on implied warranties.75 The plaintiff in Groppel Co.
sued the manufacturer of a fireproofing material and a company that in-
spected and approved the product in their published bulletin for economic
losses resulting from extra time and costs spent on re-applying the material
to a building.76 After reasoning that Official Comment 3 of section 2-318
allows the courts to make an exception to the privity requirement, the court
in Groppel Co. noted that other jurisdictions interpreting Alternative A have
held:
[T]he statute speaks only about "horizontal privity" (who, besides
the purchaser, has a right of action against the manufacturer or
seller of a defective product), and is silent on the question of "ver-
tical privity" (who, besides the immediate seller, is liable to the
consumer for damages caused by the defective product) ... [t]here
thus is nothing to prevent this court from joining in the growing
number of jurisdictions which, although bound by the code, have
nevertheless abolished vertical privity in breach of warranty
cases.
77
Based upon such reasoning, the court in Groppel Co. held that implied war-
ranties could extend to remote purchasers.78
Since Groppel Co. decided an issue of vertical privity in extending war-
ranty protection to remote purchasers, and not an issue of horizontal privity,
the court in Teel ignored the plaintiffs contention and held that Groppel Co.
was not authoritative in deciding whether a seller's warranties should extend
71. Id. at344.
72. Id. at 343.
73. Teel v. Am. Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 344 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (referring to
family members, household members and houseguests of the buyer).
74. 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
75. Id. at 58.
76. Id. at 53-54.
77. Id. at 57-58 (quoting Kassab v. Cent. Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 855 (Pa. 1968)).
78. Id. at 58.
2005]
299
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LA WREVIEW
to non-purchasers who are not enumerated in Alternative A.79 Since "Mis-
souri courts have never specifically interpreted section 2-318 with regard to
the class of persons who may be considered in horizontal privity with the
seller," there was no established case law addressing whether a purchaser's
employee can recover as a third-party beneficiary under section 2-318, Al-
ternative A.8" Without governing case law, the court looked to other factors
indicating legislative intent to resolve the issue.8"
Based upon the express language of section 400.2-318 extending war-
ranty protection to the buyer's family, household members, or guests in his
home, the court found "nothing in the express wording of this section to in-
dicate that an employee of a buyer may benefit from the seller's warranty. 8 2
The court then looked to the Official Comment of section 400.2-318"3 and
found it "clearly expresses a legislative intent to limit the class of third party
beneficiaries of the seller's warranty to the class of persons specifically enu-
merated in the statute. 84 Further, the court held "the very fact that the Mis-
souri legislature enacted Alternative A, rather than the more expansive Al-
ternatives B or C provides further indicia of this intent." 5 Finally, the court
looked to other jurisdictions that adopted Alternative A to prevent employees
from recovering for injuries caused by a product purchased by their em-
ployer.86 Ultimately, the court held "the express wording of § 400.2-318 and
the legislative intent implied by the comments to the statute must control.
Had the Missouri legislature intended broader coverage by the UCC they
79. Groppel Co., 616 S.W.2d at 58; Teel v. Am. Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 345
(E.D. Mo. 1981).
80. Teel, 529 F. Supp. at 345.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. The Comment states: "Missouri courts have required privity in warranty cases
which involve goods other than food and drink. The food and drink decisions are distin-
guished on the basis of the nature of the product and do not depend upon a family or house-
hold relationship between the injured person and the purchaser." Id. (quoting Mo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 400.2-318 (1965)).
84. Teel v. Am. Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 345 (E.D. Mo. 1981)
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Weaver v. Ralston Motor Hotel, Inc., 218 S.E.2d 260, 262-263 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1975); Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1975); Colvin v. FMC Corp.,
604 P.2d 157, 160 (Or. Ct. App. 1979)). The court also quoted the Supreme Court of New
Jersey's interpretation of § 2-318, Alternative A, which stated:
[Ilt is not the duty of the courts to amend the statute where the Legislature has spoken. There-
fore, under New Jersey law the statutory breach of warranty claims would not be available to
[defendant] or to any party other than the contract purchaser, or the limited class set forth in §
2-318.
Teel, 529 F. Supp. at 345 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 326 A.2d 90, 95 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974)).
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could have enacted either Alternative B or C to § 2-31 8." The plaintiff was
held to not be in privity with the defendants and was deprived of the ability
to bring a breach of warranty action. 8
B. Hester v. Purex Corp.
In Hester v. Purex Corp., the appellant sustained permanent injuries to
his central nervous system after inhaling fumes of a cleaning solvent during
the course of his employment. 89 Due to his injuries, the appellant sued the
manufacturer of the solvent that sold the product to his employer.9" The ap-
pellant maintained that the manufacturer breached the implied warranty of
merchantability because the cleaning solvent was not fit and safe for its in-
tended purpose of cleaning.9 The trial court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss and plaintiff appealed. 9 The issue on appeal was whether warranty
protection extends to the purchaser's employees.93 The appellant sought to
magnify the language of Official Comment 3 to section 2-318, which states:
"'the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the develop-
ing case law.', 94 Based on the Official Comment, the appellant's position
was that "section 2-3 18 should be construed liberally so as to include any
foreseeable or intended users such as employees of the buyer."95 To support
his contention, he argued "that an employee is a member of the 'business
family or household"' 96 as established in Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom.97
In Newsom, the jury awarded the appellee-plaintiff damages for injuries
sustained from an industrial incident when the shank of a stud being attached
to wood by a fellow workman ricocheted through the wood and hit the plain-
tiff in the head while he was working as a carpenter foreman.98 The plaintiff
brought suit against the manufacturer of the stud on the theories of breach of
express and implied warranties.99 There was no privity issue regarding the
87. Teel, 529 F. Supp. at 345.
88. Id. at 345-46.
89. Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1307 (Okla. 1973).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Hester, 534 P.2d at 1308 (quoting 12A O.S. 1971 § 2-318 cmt. 3) (current version at
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (2004)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967).
98. Id. at 396.
99. Id.
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breach of express warranty since the plaintiff had read pamphlets describing
the studs, and therefore representations regarding the studs were made di-
rectly to him.'00 However, the express warranty claim was dismissed be-
cause the plaintiff did not buy the studs, and there is nothing in the record
proving the employer "relied on any statement in the pamphlet" when pur-
chasing the studs.'' As to the breach of implied warranty claim, the court in
Newsom held an "employee stands in the shoes of his employer and that his
cause of action based on implied warranty is not barred by the shield of priv-
ity."' 2 The court reasoned that manufacturers are aware of the fact that pur-
chaser's employees will use the product since most business activities are
performed by employees. 10 3 Without an Oklahoma case proving otherwise,
the court was "satisfied that the employee may sue on the theory of implied
warranty."' 4 The court relied on expert testimony proving the separation of
the head from the shank of the stud was due to a manufacturing defect'0 5
causing that stud to become weaker. 106 The court found enough evidence to
find the manufacturer liable based on the theory of manufacturer's liabil-
ity.107
Since Newsom was decided on a theory of products liability, the court in
Hester dismissed the appellant's contention because "'[t]he UCC has to do
with commercial transactions and presupposes a buyer in privity with a
seller, the concept being extended only as provided by the Legislature."" 10
8
Since Oklahoma has adopted Alternative A, and has not adopted Alternatives
B or C to expand the realm of warranty coverage, the court held a pur-
chaser's employees were not protected under section 2-318 until the legisla-
ture changes the statute. 09 However, the court reasoned that injured employ-
ees could still maintain a cause of action and recover under the theories of
negligence and strict products liability."0
100. Id. at 397.
101. Id.
102. Newsom, 382 F.2d at 398.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 399. A manufacturing defect is "[a]n imperfection in a product that departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in its assembly and mar-
keting." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 450 (8th ed. 2004).
106. Newsom, 382 F.2d at 399.
107. Id.
108. Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1975) (quoting Moss v. Polyco,
Inc., 522 P.2d 622, 625 (Okla. 1974)).
109. Id.
110. Id. See generally Kirkland v. G.M. Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
[Vol. 29:3:721
302
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss3/1
ARE EMPLOYEES "A " O.K.?
C. Sutton v. Major Products Co.
In Sutton v. Major Products Co.,' a grocery store employee appealed a
summary judgment entered in favor of a manufacturer and distributors of a
potato whitener containing sodium bisulfate."' Plaintiff brought a cause of
action alleging breach of implied warranty of merchantability against both
the manufacturer and distributors of the potato whitener for injuries sustained
from inhaling the noxious fumes of the whitener.1 3 However, section 99B-
2(b) of the General Statutes of North Carolina lists as a claimant for a breach
of implied warranty of merchantability "a buyer, a member or guest of a
member of the family of the buyer, a guest of the buyer, or an employee of
the buyer not covered by worker's compensation insurance.""' 4 Therefore,
the potential class of plaintiffs who can sue a manufacturer for breach of
implied warranty of merchantability is limited."5 The court interpreted the
statute to restrict the class of potential plaintiffs in a products liability action
against those in the vertical chain of distribution for breach of implied war-
ranties.'16 Here, the plaintiff's employer purchased the product for use in the
store; the plaintiff used the whitener during the course of her employment;
and the plaintiffs injury was covered under the Worker's Compensation
Act." 7 Therefore, she was barred from bringing a breach of implied war-
ranty action against the defendants, and the court upheld the summary judg-
ment in favor of the manufacturer." 8
VI. CASE LAW: JURISDICTIONS EXTENDING WARRANTY PROTECTION TO
EMPLOYEES
Just as jurisdictions deny employees warranty coverage under section 2-
318, Alternative A for various reasons, jurisdictions are also split concerning
why employees should have standing to sue as third-party beneficiaries to a
seller's warranties. 9 In Whitaker v. Lian Feng Machine Co., 20 the court
111. 372 S.E.2d 897 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
112. Id. at 898.
113. Id.
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B- 2(b) (2003); Sutton, 372 S.E.2d at 899.
115. See Sutton, 372 S.E.2d at 899.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See e.g., Carlson v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D. Fla.
1987); Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (I11. App. Ct. 1987); McNally v.
Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973).
120. 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
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interpreted Official Comment 3 to allow the judiciary to decide issues of
horizontal privity and extend warranty coverage beyond the enumerated class
of Alternative A.12 ' However, the court conditioned its extension of privity
by only extending third-party beneficiary standing to a purchaser's employ-
ees if the employee's safety in using the goods formed part of the basis of the
bargain between the employer and seller.122 In McNally v. Nicholson Manu-
facturing Co.,123 the Supreme Court of Maine interpreted the Official Com-
ment to section 2-313 and analyzed section 2-318 to establish that courts
have the power to resolve issues of horizontal privity and extend warranty
protection beyond the enumerated class of Alternative A.' 24 Further, the
court reasoned that employees of a corporate purchaser qualify as members
of the corporate "family," thus allowing them to fall within the protected
class of warranty beneficiaries. 25 In Carlson v. Armstrong World Industries,
Inc., 12 an employee was able to bring a breach of warranty action against a
manufacturer because the language of section 672.318 of the Florida Statutes
expressly includes employees within the enumerated class of intended third-
party beneficiaries. 1
27
A. Whitaker v. Lian Feng Machine Co.
In Whitaker, an employee brought suit to recover for injuries sustained
during the course of his employment while working with a bandsaw that was
purchased by his employer. 128 The plaintiff sought to recover against the
manufacturer, importer, and seller of the bandsaw for breach of implied war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. 29 The plain-
tiffs complaint alleged that the defendants knew his employer bought the
handsaw to cut bar stock. 3° After the trial court granted both the importer's
and seller's motions to dismiss the breach of warranties claims due to the
plaintiff's lack of privity, the plaintiff appealed.' 3
The issue on appeal, which had not been specifically ruled on below,
was whether an ultimate purchaser's employee could recover from the seller
121. Id. at 594.
122. Id. at 595.
123. 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973).
124. Id. at 919-20.
125. Id. at 921.
126. 693 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
127. Id. at 1077.
128. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 592.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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for breach of warranty. 13 2 The defendants argued that the plaintiff was not
among the class of intended beneficiaries enumerated in Alternative A.'33
The court responded by stating that the enumerated class of Alternative A is
not a limitation on potential plaintiffs since the language and commentary of
section 2-318 proves "'that the requirement of privity between the purchaser
and remote manufacturer is not established."" 34 The defendants argued sec-
tion 2-318 restricts those in horizontal privity from recovering for breach of
warranty but does not affect those in vertical privity.135 Further, the defen-
dants stated the Illinois Legislature's decision to adopt Alternative A estab-
lishes their intention to deny employees the right to recover as third-party
beneficiaries to a seller's warranties made to their employer, since employees
"would clearly be allowed to recover for breach of warranty under alterna-
tives B and C.",
13 6
Relying on Official Comment 3 to section 2-318, the court held the
statute was not restricted by developing case law concerning issues of hori-
zontal privity. 13 7 Additionally, the court relied on the Official Comment to
section 2-313138 and found "the 'purpose of the law of warranty is to deter-
mine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell ... and to hold the
seller liable if he has failed to supply goods of the agreed upon quality.'
139
132. Id. at 592.
133. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 593. The defendants relied on In re Johns-Manville Asbes-
tosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235, 1239-40 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that Illinois courts have not
allowed a plaintiff who is outside the class of persons enumerated within section 2-318 the
right to recover for breach of warranty) and Hemphill v. Sayers, 552 F. Supp. 685, 693 (S.D.
Ill. 1982) (holding that a plaintiff cannot recover as a functional equivalent to family members
or guests, and the legislature's adoption of the most narrowly worded alternative proves their
intent to bar such plaintiffs from recovery). Id.
134. Id. (quoting Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 309 N.E.2d 550, 556 (Ill. 1974)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 593-94.
137. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 594.
138. U.C.C. section 2-313 provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words
such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an
affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-313 (2001).
139. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 594 (quoting § 2-313 cmt. 4).
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The court then explained that a seller expressly warrants if he makes "'any
affirmation of fact or promise.. . to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain."",140 The court reasoned that section
2-318 creates a conclusive presumption that a purchaser who bargained for a
warranty of safety sought the warranty on behalf of himself and the enumer-
ated class of third-party beneficiaries "'if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods."" 4' Therefore, both
express and implied warranties were found to form "part of the basis of any
bargain in the trade.' 42 Thus, the court held:
[T]he warranty extends to any employee of a purchaser who is in-
jured in the use of the goods, as long as the safety of that employee
in the use of the goods was either explicitly or implicitly part of
the basis of the bargain when the employer purchased the goods. 143
In applying the facts of the case, the court held that the bandsaw the
plaintiffs employer bought from defendants did not conform to its implied
warranty of merchantability or its implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.' 44 In bargaining for a safe, merchantable bandsaw, the plaintiffs
employer "sought the safety on behalf of its employees who were to use the
saw [since a] corporation cannot use the bandsaw at all unless its employees
operate it.' ' 145 Therefore, the court held the defendants either expressly or
impliedly warranted that the bandsaw was safe for the plaintiffs use, thus
enabling the plaintiff to bring an action for breach of warranty.146
B. McNally v. Nicholson Manufacturing Co.
In McNally v. Nicholson Manufacturing Co., 47 the Supreme Court of
Maine relied on policy arguments and its interpretation of official code
comments in holding that an employee who was required to be in close prox-
imity of a machine during the course of his employment was a beneficiary of
140. Id. The court quoted ILL. REv. STAT. § 2-313 (1985), which was replaced by 810 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-313(a) (1993).
141. Id. at 595 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. 1985 Ch. 26, 2-318 (current version at 810 ILL.
COM. STAT. 5/2-318 (2004)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 595.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973).
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the warranties given to his employer by a manufacturer.'48 The plaintiff was
injured during the course of his employment while operating a skidder,
which transfers logs into a chipping machine that grinds them into chips used
for making pulp and paper.1 49 Plaintiff brought a breach of warranty action
against the manufacturer of the skidder due to injuries sustained from a piece
of wood forcefully flying out of a side opening and striking him in the
head. 5 ° The plaintiff alleged the defendant's publication, advertising, and
interviews created an express warranty to the plaintiff's employer since the
skidder was represented to be safely made for its intended purpose. 5' Plain-
tiff further alleged the defendant created the implied warranty of merchant-
ability by selling the chipper to his employer.'52 However, the superior court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which
relief can be granted because the plaintiff, as the purchaser's employee, was
not in privity of contract with the defendant.'53
In reversing the ruling of the lower court, the Supreme Court of Maine
first noted the trend of other jurisdictions that relaxed or deserted privity
requirements in a breach of warranty action. 54 This was the first case to
come before the court on the issue of horizontal privity, which had "no inter-
vening attention to the problem by the Maine Legislature."'55 The court ana-
lyzed the differences between vertical and horizontal privity, and found:
These "horizontal" relationships to the last purchaser were de-
scribed in Section 2-318 in terms of: (1) a "natural person" "in-
jured in [his] person by breach of the warranty", (2) who is "in the
family or household" or "a guest in... [the] home" of the last pur-
chaser and (3) who "it is reasonable to expect" is a "person [who]
may use, consume or be affected by the goods .... 156
Except for being a member of the ultimate purchaser's family, house-
hold, or a houseguest of the ultimate purchaser, the court found the plaintiff
met the criteria required to bring a breach of warranty action under section 2-
318, since he was a natural person who was personally injured and it was
148. Id. at 921.
149. Id. at 914.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. McNally, 313 A.2d at 914.
153. Id. at 916.
154. Id. at 916-17.
155. Id. at 917.
156. Id. at 918 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-318 (1999)) (alteration in original).
2005]
307
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LA W REVIEW
reasonable to expect for him to use or be affected by the machine. 5 7 There-
fore, the issue on appeal was whether the section's express inclusion of the
enumerated class of beneficiaries in horizontal privity with the ultimate pur-
chaser should "be given a strictly literal interpretation which excludes any
other relationship no matter how closely akin, policy-wise. ' ' 5
Interpreting the language of Official Comment 3 to section 2-318, the
court found the section was impartial "beyond" the enumerated class, and
such neutrality was attributed to developing issues of vertical privity. 59
However, since the court found section 2-318 only addressed issues of hori-
zontal privity, the court relied on Official Comment 2 to section 2-313 to
find the correct judicial interpretation of section 2-318.160 The text of Offi-
cial Comment 2 to section 2-313 that addresses section 2-318 states:
The provisions of Section 2-318 on third party beneficiaries ex-
pressly recognizes this case law development within one particular
area. Beyond that, the matter [of lack of privity] is left to the case
law with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer useful
guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise.16 1
The court reasoned the phrase "particular area" addressed by section 2-
318 should be interpreted in regards to non-purchasing parties in horizontal
relationships with the ultimate purchaser and their ability to recover against a
seller's breach of warranty. 62 Therefore, the court interpreted the Official
Comment to section 2-313 to mean that the "policies" of section 2-318
should provide "'useful guidance [for] further cases as they arise"' in resolv-
ing issues of horizontal privity. 163 Based on this interpretation, the court
concluded that the correct judicial approach to resolving issues of horizontal
privity should be determined on a case-by-case basis, and policy supports
that non-purchasing parties could be regarded as functional equivalents to
those specifically enumerated in Alternative A."6
Since it must be reasonable to expect non-purchasing parties to 'use,
consume or be affected by the goods"' in order to gain third-party benefici-
ary standing, the court held the ultimate purchaser would want those who are
expected to come in contact with the goods to have the same warranty pro-
157. McNally, 313 A.2d at 918.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 920.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 919-920 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 2 (2001)) (emphasis in original).
162. McNally, 313 A.2d at 920.
163. Id. (citing § 2-313 cmt. 2).
164. Id. at 920.
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tection a seller has given to him. 6 5 Therefore, the plaintiff, who was em-
ployed by the ultimate purchaser and required to work in close proximately
with the skidder during the course of his employment, was held to be a bene-
ficiary of the warranties given to his employer. 166 Thus, the employer would
want the plaintiff to be a beneficiary of his seller's warranties regarding the
fitness and safety of the chipper. 167 Further, the court gave a figurative inter-
pretation to the word "family" to allow the plaintiff to fall within the enu-
merated class of Alternative A since employees are seen as members of the
corporate "family."' 68 Consequently, an ultimate purchaser's employee was
a third-party beneficiary to a seller's warranty under section 2-31 8.169
C. Carlson v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.
In Carlson v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.,170 the plaintiff con-
tracted pleural disease from exposure to and inhalation of asbestos fibers
during the course of his employment as a painter.17' The plaintiff brought a
breach of warranty action against defendants who mined, manufactured, and
distributed asbestos-containing products. 172 The defendants moved to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
173
Section 672.318 of the Florida Statutes expressly extends warranty
coverage to a purchaser's employee. 174 Since the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants sold the product to either the plaintiff, his employer, or others
who had knowledge that the plaintiff would be exposed to the product, the
court found that the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability between the defendant and the plaintiffs em-
ployer.175 "Therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss . . . [was] denied.' 176
165. Id. at 921 (quoting § 2-318).
166. Id.
167. McNally, 313 A.2d at 921 (citing Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885, 893
(Ark. 1964)).
168. Id. Contra Halderman v. Sanderson Forklifts Co., 818 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that the employer-employee relationship does not fall within the defmi-
tion of "family" under Alternative A).
169. McNally, 313 A.2d at 923.
170. 693 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
171. Id. at 1075.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1077.
175. Carlson, 693 F. Supp. at 1078.
176. Id. However, in Favors v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 309 So. 2d 69, 73 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1975), the Fourth District Court of Appeal held:
2005]
309
: Nova Law Review 29, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LA WREVIEW
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the purpose of section 2-318 was "to make uniform the law
among the various jurisdictions," 17 the states have only achieved uniformity
in deciding issues of vertical privity by allowing purchasers to sue any party
involved in the chain of selling a product. 178 Consequently, there remains a
divergence among Alternative A jurisdictions resolving issues of horizontal
privity.179 Jurisdictions are split in deciding whether third-party beneficiary
standing should extend beyond the buyer's family, household, or house-
guests. This inconsistency is substantially attributed to the ambiguous lan-
guage of Official Code Comment 3 to section 2-318. The commentary states
that Alternative A gives beneficiary status to "the family, household and
guests of the purchaser,"'8 ° but directly follows this phrase by stating the
section is "neutral" beyond the category of third-party beneficiaries contem-
plated by the drafters and does not intend "to enlarge or restrict the develop-
ing case law ' in regards to extending warranty protection to "other persons
in the distributive chain."182 However, the Code's failure to provide a defini-
tion of the term "distributive chain" has left the term open for judicial inter-
pretation. 83 Therefore, if a court interprets the "distributive chain" to refer
only to issues of vertical privity, an employee will be barred from bringing a
breach of warranty action since they were not a purchaser.184 On the other
hand, if a court interprets the "distributive chain" in relation to extending
warranty protection horizontally, an employee is more likely to recover since
the court is not "restricted" to only protect the enumerated class.185 The
Code's use of such vague language presents each state's judiciary with the
opportunity to interpret its meaning differently.
An automobile parts store employee, who was injured when the wheel assembly of a truck
owned by one of the defendants exploded during the mounting of a tire, was not considered a
third-party beneficiary of the truck manufacturer's implied warranty to that defendant, despite
an allegation that the store was the defendant's agent, where the store had simply been engaged
to change the truck's tires, where there was no agency relationship between the defendant and
the store, and where there was no direct employment relationship between the defendant and
the injured employee.
41A FLA. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 51 (2004) (citing Favors, 309 So. 2d at 73).
177. 1 HAWKLAND, supranote 5, at § 2-318:l.
178. See Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
179. 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 5, at § 2-318:1.
180. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (2001).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. § 2-103.
184. See Teel v. Am. Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
185. See McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973).
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Although the issue of extending warranty coverage could be decided ei-
ther way, the fact that the Code failed to provide a definition for "distributive
chain" and used the phrase in a section attempting to resolve privity issues
seems to support the section's neutrality concerning both vertical and hori-
zontal privity. The drafters' express inclusion of the buyer's family, house-
hold, and houseguests as beneficiaries only proves their disposition toward
extending warranty protection to this enumerated class. The phrase "beyond
this, the section in this form is neutral," '186 should be construed to mean the
section is impartial regarding whether other non-purchasers should have
standing to sue on warranty claims.
Jurisdictions that view the category of third-party beneficiaries contem-
plated by the drafters as an exhaustive list of beneficiaries are contradicted
by the language of the commentary. Regardless of whether "distributive
chain" refers to issues of vertical or horizontal privity, the text of Official
Comment 3 says the section is neutral beyond giving the enumerated class
warranty coverage, and the section is not a restraint on developing case law
regarding "whether the seller's warranties ... extend to other persons in the
distributive chain." '187 Therefore, the drafters recognized new privity issues
may arise in a state's judiciary after its legislature enacted Alternative A.
Thus, the drafters left future privity issues for the courts' determination on a
case-by-case basis.188 Therefore, jurisdictions denying employees standing
as third-party beneficiaries because they are not among the enumerated class
seem to be using flawed reasoning. These jurisdictions rely heavily on their
legislative intent for adopting Alternative A. However, in adopting this al-
ternative, the legislature is accepting the exact language of the entire alterna-
tive, including the commentary. By enacting Alternative A verbatim, it ap-
pears a state's legislature is also impartial as to whether warranty coverage
should extend beyond the purchaser's family, household, and houseguests
and intends for the courts to resolve this issue.
Further, denying warranty coverage to a purchaser's employees because
they are protected under the worker's compensation laws is questionable
public policy. If an employee who is injured during the course of his or her
employment by a defective product purchased by their employer can only
recover under a worker's compensation statute, they may be denied recovery
for emotional distress or pain and suffering. 189 Therefore, if the employer
who purchased the product was injured, they could recover far more against
186. § 2-318 cmt. 3.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 610 A.2d 1277, 1279 (Conn. 1992) (cit-
ing Skitromo v. Meriden Yellow Cab Co., 528 A.2d 826, 827 (Conn. 1987)).
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a seller for their injuries than an employee who is injured by the same defec-
tive product and covered under worker's compensation.
In order to resolve the issue of whether employees should be third-party
beneficiaries to a seller's warranties, a state's legislature should follow the
Florida Legislature's lead and amend its version of Alternative A. By doing
so, the legislature will take the issue of extending warranty coverage to a
purchaser's employees out of the judiciary's hands, and the amendment will
create uniformity since the issue will no longer be decided on a case-by-case
basis. The statute could be amended to include employees without any
changes to the commentary, thus leaving remaining issues of privity for the
court's determination. Further, legislatures of jurisdictions that only intend
to give third-party beneficiary standing to the purchaser's family, household,
or houseguests can also resolve this issue by amending the statute to include
language stating the enumerated list is exhaustive. Although jurisdictions
may argue that a legislature's adoption of Alternative A instead of Alterna-
tives B or C proves that the legislature only intended warranty protection for
the enumerated class, giving such a narrow interpretation categorizes all
other non-purchasing parties together and collectively denies them the right
to bring a breach of warranty action.
An employee, like a non-purchasing plaintiff who is in the family or
home of the purchaser, is a "natural person" who reasonably can be expected
to "use, consume or be affected by the goods."'1 90 For that reason, employees
should be viewed as functional equivalents to the enumerated class of Alter-
native A. 9 ' Manufacturers, distributors, and retailers expect a purchaser's
employee to use a product purchased by their employer for use during the
course of their employment. Basically, "[a] corporation cannot use the...
[product] at all unless its employees operate it."' 92 Therefore, jurisdictions
denying standing to all parties not expressly mentioned within the section
group employees with bystanders, who do not use the goods, and lessees,
who may not be contemplated at all by the seller.
In conclusion, the ambiguities of Official Comment 3 have allowed the
courts to reach different conclusions in deciding issues of privity. However,
it seems logical to construe the ambiguous language in relation to both verti-
cal and horizontal privity. In order to resolve the discrepancy among juris-
dictions, a state's legislature should take action by amending its state's statu-
tory version of Alternative A to include employees within the class of pro-
tected beneficiaries. As it stands, leaving issues of privity for the courts to
190. § 2-318, Alternative A.
191. McNally, 313 A.2d at 920.
192. Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Il. App. Ct. 1987).
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decide on a case by case basis will deny employees their right to recover for
injuries sustained from a defective product.
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